日德兰纪念系列 - 战略战术篇 - 第三章 - 战场决策

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前言

1916年5月31日下午，英国海军的大舰队与德国海军的公海舰队，在北海东部、靠近丹麦及挪威的区域相遇，随即爆发了一场规模庞大的海战。双方交战的区域，从陆上来说临近日德兰半岛，而从海上来说临近丹麦与挪威之间的斯卡格拉克海峡，因此分别被参战双方称之为日德兰海战（英方叫法）和斯卡格拉克海峡海战（德方叫法）。这场海战是整个第一次世界大战中规模最大的海战，同时也是有史以来规模最大的以战列舰为主力的海战。

关于这场海战的前因后果，各国学者们早就发表了无数的研究文章和专著，其中既有研究战略战术的，也有研究技术细节的。在本篇中，我将结合各类参考资料，对日德兰海战相关的战略与战术话题，进行简明的介绍。希望能通过这篇内容，帮助各位读者更好地理解日德兰海战的全貌。

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索引

第一章 - 战略规划

此章介绍了一战时期的英德两国海军的战略规划，并重点介绍了英国海军的对德封锁策略，以及德国海军的应对措施。

第二章 - 战术指挥

此章介绍了一战时期的英德两国海军的战术指挥方式，对当时的舰队是如何编组，如何通讯，如何与对方交战等话题进行了具体讲解。

第三章 - 战场决策

此章介绍了日德兰海战的具体过程，并对其中的关键节点上的决策得失，进行了评论。

第四章 - 后续影响

此章介绍了英德两国海军，在日德兰海战后所作出的调整与改变。

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日德兰纪念系列 - 战略战术篇 - 第三章 - 战场决策

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主要参考资料：

Battle of Jutland, 30th May to 1st June, 1916. Official Dispatches with Appendixes

The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916: Its Creation, Development and Work, 作者John Jellicoe

Reproduction of the Record of the Battle of Jutland，作者J. E. T. Harper

The Truth About Jutland，作者J. E. T. Harper

Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland，作者Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar

History of the Great War, Naval Operations, Volume III, May 1915 to June 1916, 作者Julian S. Corbett

From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, 作者Arthur J. Marder

The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command，作者Andrew Gordon

Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting，作者John Campbell

The Battle of Jutland, 作者John Brooks

Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland - The Question of Fire Control，作者John Brooks

Equal Speed Charlie London: Jellicoe’s Deployment at Jutland, 作者Stephen McLaughlin

Divide and Conquer? Divisional Tactics and the Battle of Jutland, 作者Stephen McLaughlin

Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War，作者Reinhard Scheer

Jutland, the German Perspective: A New View of the Great Battle, 31 May 1916，作者V. E. Tarrant

Skagerrak: The Battle of Jutland Through German Eyes，作者Gary Staff

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通过前两章的内容，我们已经对英德双方的海军战略，以及当时的水面舰队战术有了一定的了解。在此基础上，我们就可以对日德兰海战中发生的各种指挥决策，进行细致的解读了。

一、作战计划

至日德兰海战时，大战已经持续了近2年的时间。在此期间，德国海军尝试过针对英国沿海地区的水面舰艇袭击作战，也尝试过针对商船的无限制潜艇战。前者的主要目的是设法削弱英国舰队的实力，但始终未获成功；后者的主要目的是打击英国的海上交通，使英国陷入物资短缺的状态，但由于潜艇数量较少，因此也未取得显著效果。

德国人的作战计划

至1916年4月底时，德国人拿出了一套与以往不太一样的作战计划：他们打算让潜艇参与到水面舰艇的作战行动中，起到侦察并削弱敌舰的作用。具体做法是：希佩尔率领的侦察舰队，对英国东海岸城市桑德兰进行袭击，并引诱英国舰队出击；舍尔率领的公海舰队本队，则在弗兰伯勒角与多格尔沙洲西南部之间的水域待命，换句话说，其位置要比希佩尔更靠南一些；至于潜艇，则会在英国各个军港的出海口进行埋伏。另外，考虑到作战海域非常靠近英国，因此德国人还会派出飞艇，为舰队提供空中侦察和预警。

起初，德国人是打算在5月17日时出击的，但由于第3战列舰中队的部分战列舰的冷凝器存在问题需要修理，再加上塞德里茨号战列巡洋舰在4月份时中了水雷需要修理，因此出击时间被推迟到了5月23日。

在这种情况下，潜艇部队的指挥官提议，可以先把潜艇派出去侦察，公海舰队司令舍尔中将同意了，于是他们派出了10艘潜艇——在5月23日之前，这些潜艇会在北海中部地区巡弋，为其他部队探清敌情；到5月23日时，这些潜艇则会前往英国东北部沿岸进行埋伏。此外，他们还派出了3艘布雷潜艇，前往英国沿海布雷，其中有1艘被击沉，另1艘被迫返航，还有1艘潜入了斯卡帕湾，并布设了水雷，但未能对大舰队造成损伤。另外，在北海南部区域，同样也有德国潜艇进行巡逻。

至5月23日时，塞德里茨号仍然未修好，因此出击时间又不得继续推迟，直到5月29日时，塞德里茨号终于修好了，因此最终的出击时间被定在了5月30日。

另一方面，由于海上持续刮着猛烈的东北风，因此飞艇部队始终无法出击，而如果继续等待下去，潜艇的自持力就会耗尽，因此舍尔决定，如果到5月30日时，飞艇还无法出动，那么他就会放弃袭击桑德兰的作战计划，转而选择一个不需要飞艇侦察的作战计划——他选择前往丹麦和挪威之间的斯卡格拉克海峡——舍尔认为，如果他们出现在该区域，同样也能引诱英国舰队出击。根据他们的计划，希佩尔率领的侦察舰队，会在5月31日下午及夜间，在该海峡内猎杀商船，如果遭遇小股敌舰则歼灭之，如果遭遇大队敌舰则将其引诱至舍尔本队处。德国舰队实际出击时，采用的就是这个作战计划——在5月31日凌晨，他们兵分两路，分别从亚德河口和易北河口出航，驶向了斯卡格拉克海峡。

英国人的作战计划

一个惊人的巧合是，英国人同样也打算前往斯卡格拉克海峡，并认为这么做可以引诱出公海舰队，只不过大舰队总司令杰里科选定的日期，是6月2日，相比舍尔的计划要晚一些。

然而，在5月30日之时，英国海军部得到了新的情报。在此情况下，大舰队的出航时间提前了，他们在5月30日晚间就驶离了港口——这要比德国海军的出航时间，还早了好几个小时。

英国海军为何会比德国舰队提前出港？

英国海军之所以会提前出港，核心原因在于，英国海军情报局下属的40号房间，通过截获并破译的德国无线电通讯，判断出了德国海军的出击行动。因此英国海军得以赶在德国舰队之前率先出航，从而及时出现在了斯卡格拉克海峡，并获得了拦截德国舰队的机会。

在日德兰海战中，40号房间发挥了非常重要的作用。由于这个缘故，我们有必要具体了解一下这个机构的来龙去脉，以及工作表现。

问题：这个部门为什么叫做40号房间？它是如何建立的？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.138）：

Admiralty’s signals intelligence organisation centred on Room 40, Old Building (40 O.B.)...had become proficient at intercepting and decrypting the numerous German wireless messages.
英国海军部的情报机构，是以40号房间为中心的（该机构位于海军部老办公楼的第40号房间，故有此名），他们善于截获并破解德国方面的无线电通讯。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.59）：

The British, by virtue of the Admiralty’s ‘Room 40’, were far ahead of the Germans in signals intelligence. This was substantially, but by no means entirely, a matter of luck. Accounts vary, but there appear to have been two gifts which fell into the Admiralty’s lap early in the war. In August 1914 the Russians salvaged a Signal Book from the wreck of the German cruiser Magdeburg, and passed it on. Then, in November, a sinking German destroyer was alleged to have jettisoned a cipher book which was subsequently dragged up in the nets of a Harwich trawler. At any rate, the Admiralty quickly established a network of coastal listening and direction-finding stations, and Room 40 was gleaning so much from German transmissions that the British were obsessively careful over their own use of wireless.
凭借着海军部的40号房间，英国人在无线电情报方面，是要大幅领先于德国人的。该部门的成就，固然有运气的成分，但也绝不是仅仅依靠运气就能实现的。所谓的运气，主要是指战争初期时，海军部所获得的两桩意外之喜：其一，是1914年8月时，俄国海军从德国海军的马德堡号轻巡洋舰的残骸上，获得了一本通讯手册，并将其转交给了英国海军。其二，是在11月时，据说有一艘德国驱逐舰在沉没时，将船上的密码手册投入了海中，随后又被一艘英国渔船给捞了起来。此后，海军部在沿海地区快速建立了一系列的无线电监听和测向站，而40号房间则获得了海量的德国无线电通讯。受此影响，英国人自己在使用无线电通讯时，就变得非常谨慎了。

问题：40号房间破译的信息，对英国海军高层产生了哪些影响？

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.59-61）：

As May progressed, signal decryptions confirmed the withdrawal of U-boats from the Western Approaches: a movement consonant both with the German claim to have ceased attacks on merchant shipping, and with the possibility of imminent fleet operations in the North Sea. And Scheer was indeed planning an exploit...The High Seas Fleet’s order, on the morning of May the 30th, to prepare for sea, was within two hours deciphered by Room 40 and reported to the Operations Division of the Admiralty. Its essentials were in Admiral Sir John Jellicoe’s hand by 2.20 p.m. (GMT)...At 5.28 p.m., the Admiralty told him to raise steam - an order which he immediately passed on to his two detached subordinates, Sir David Beatty at Rosyth, and Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram at Invergordon in the Cromarty Firth. Another signal from the Admiralty to Jellicoe and Beatty, at 5.55, explained that the German fleet was due to sail tomorrow and proceed to sea via the Horns Reef channel.
1916年5月份时，破译的情报显示，德国海军已经撤回了原先在英国西海岸地区活动的潜艇。这一方面是由于德国方面声称，他们已经停止了攻击商船的行为，另一方面，这也可能意味着德国海军即将在北海地区进行舰队行动。事实上，舍尔的确就是这么打算的。5月30日时，在公海舰队下达出击命令后，不到2个小时内，40号房间就破译了德国人的命令，并将其汇报给了海军参谋总局下辖的作战分局。至14时20分（格林威治时间，下同）时，这份情报中的关键信息，已经传达给了杰里科上将。至17时28分时，海军部命令杰里科准备出航，后者很快就把这条命令转达给了他的两位下属，即驻扎在罗塞斯的大卫·贝蒂代理中将，以及驻扎在克罗默蒂湾内的因弗戈登的马丁·杰拉姆中将。17时55分时，海军部又告知杰里科和贝蒂，德国舰队将在明日启航，取道合恩礁海峡出海。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.141）：

The decrypted German messages received from Room 40 enabled the Admiralty to signal Jellicoe that he should take the Grand Fleet eastwards beyond the Long Forties towards the Skagerrak. The order to rendezvous east of the Long Forties suggests that the COS and his staff had concluded that the Germans intended to continue northwards.
基于40号房间破译的德国无线电通讯，海军部告知杰里科，他应率领大舰队向东出航，驶过朗福蒂斯浅滩，往斯卡格拉克海峡方向进发。从这条命令来看，海军参谋长，以及他下属的参谋们，似乎认为德国人的意图是向北边出击。

Once the High Seas Fleet left harbour, they observed almost total wireless silence. During the morning of 31 May, Room 40 received no signals that indicated that the enemy was at sea, though other messages showed that preparations were being made for airship reconnaissance. Then they received a directional ‘fix’...This was clearly the basis for the signal sent by the Admiralty to Jellicoe and Beatty at 12.30pm: No definite news of enemy. They made all preparations for sailing this morning. It was thought the Fleet had sailed but directional wireless places flagship in Jade at 11.10GMT. Apparently they have been unable to carry out air reconnaissance which has delayed them.
当公海舰队驶离港口后，他们就基本不再使用无线电通讯了。在5月31日上午，40号房间并没有截获任何与敌方舰队行踪有关的通讯，但他们破译的其他通讯则显示，德国人正准备派出飞艇进行侦察。但后来，他们获得了一组无线电定位。基于这个定位，海军部于12时30分时告知杰里科和贝蒂：“暂时还没有敌方的确切信息。他们今天早上在为出航做准备。我们认为敌方舰队已经出航了，但是无线电定位却显示，在11时10分时，他们的旗舰仍然在亚德河口。由于他们没法进行航空侦察，因此他们的行动似乎被耽搁了”。

根据Gary Staff的说法（Skagerrak: The Battle of Jutland Through German Eyes, P.33）：

During the period prior to the German operation a group of young Offizieres devised a brilliant deception to disguise the fact the High Sea Fleet Main Body had put to sea. The FT (Wireless) Offizier of the Fleet and BdA conceived the idea of the Fleet flagship and the wireless station of the III Entrance at Wilhelmshaven exchanging call signs for the duration of the operation. When the British wireless direction finding stations took a bearing on the Fleet flagship call sign, ‘DK’, they would place it on Wilhelmshaven Roads.
在德方的作战计划即将开始之前，有一群年轻军官，发明了一招极为巧妙的欺骗策略，来隐藏公海舰队本队出航的事实。这些公海舰队以及侦察舰队的通讯军官们想出的策略是，在作战行动期间，将总旗舰的无线电呼号，与威廉港的3号入口的无线电站的呼号进行互换。在此情况下，当英国无线电测向定位站探测到德国总旗舰的无线电呼号“DK”时，他们会发现它位于威廉港的锚地内。

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland）：

On May 30, at 5.41 pm, the German Flagship made a signal to the Ostfriesland to say that Wilhelmshaven third entrance would have the wireless call of the Commander-in-Chief, High Sea Fleet. This was in a new key and was not decyphered till the 31st at 6 pm. Meanwhile, in the forenoon of the 31st, directionals placed the Commander-in-Chief’s wireless call in the Jade.
在5月30日17时41分时，腓特烈大帝号向东弗里斯兰号发出了一条电文，表示威廉港的3号入口，会获得公海舰队总司令的呼号。这条电文是使用新的密钥来加密的，因此一直要到5月31日18时，英国方面才破解了这条电文。然而，在5月31日中午时，英国方面通过无线电测向定位发现，公海舰队总司令的呼号在亚德河口。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.42）：

Jellicoe's confidence in all subsequent intelligence of the enemy fleet sent him by the Admiralty was badly shaken. He consequently tended to give more weight to information obtained from units of the fleet than to that obtained from the Admiralty. This was to have disastrous consequences at the time of the night action.
受此影响，对于海军部后续发来的其他有关敌方舰队的情报，杰里科就不太相信了（因为他们后来实际遇到了公海舰队，也就证明海军部在12时30分发来的情报是有误的）。此后，杰里科选择更多地依靠他麾下的舰艇所获得的情报，而不是海军部发来的情报。在后来发生的夜战中，这种做法引发了灾难性的后果。

结论：在此次行动中，40号房间为英国海军提供了非常关键的情报，使得大舰队能够比公海舰队更早出海，对后者进行拦截。但在德国海军的巧妙欺骗下，他们误判了公海舰队总司令的位置，从而误以为他们还没有出海。而海军部则将这个错误的信息告知了杰里科和贝蒂，因而在一定程度上对他们造成了误导。

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二、实力对比

在日德兰海战中，英国海军投入了28艘战列舰（均为无畏舰/超无畏舰）、9艘战列巡洋舰、8艘装甲巡洋舰、26艘轻巡洋舰、79艘驱逐舰（其中有1艘是布雷驱逐舰）、1艘水上飞机母舰，总计151艘军舰（此外还有1艘水上飞机母舰因故返航，未能参与战斗）。

至于德国海军，由于其整体规模明显逊色于英国海军，因此参战军舰数量也要明显更少一些。除了前述的潜艇之外，他们还投入了22艘战列舰（其中16艘为无畏舰，6艘为前无畏舰）、5艘战列巡洋舰、11艘轻巡洋舰、61艘驱逐舰，总计99艘军舰（此外还有1艘驱逐舰因故返航，未能参与战斗）。

大舰队本队的战斗序列

大舰队总司令：杰里科（John Rushworth Jellicoe）上将，总旗舰：铁公爵（HMS Iron Duke）号战列舰，附属舰艇：积极（HMS Active）号侦察巡洋舰，神仆（HMS Abdiel）号布雷驱逐舰，橡树（HMS Oak）号驱逐舰、坎帕尼亚（HMS Campania）号水上飞机母舰（中途返航，未参加战斗）。

第2战列舰中队（2nd Battle Squadron），指挥官：杰拉姆（Thomas Henry Martyn Jerram）中将，下辖编制：第1、第2战列舰分队，附属舰艇：布狄卡（HMS Boadicea）号侦察巡洋舰。

第1战列舰分队（1st Division），指挥官由中队指挥官兼任，下辖舰艇：乔治五世（HMS King George V）号（旗舰）、埃阿斯（HMS Ajax）号、百夫长（HMS Centurion）号、爱尔兰（HMS Erin）号战列舰。

第2战列舰分队（2nd Division），指挥官：莱文森（Arthur Cavenagh Leveson）少将，下辖舰艇：俄里翁（HMS Orion）号（旗舰）、君主（HMS Monarch）号、征服者（HMS Conqueror）号、雷神（HMS Thunderer）号战列舰。

第4战列舰中队（4th Battle Squadron），指挥官：斯特迪（ Frederick Charles Doveton Sturdee）中将，下辖编制：第3、第4战列舰分队，附属舰艇：白种人（HMS Blanche）号侦察巡洋舰。

第3战列舰分队（3rd Division），指挥官：达夫（Alexander Ludovic Duff）少将，下辖舰艇：皇家橡树（HMS Royal Oak）号、壮丽（HMS Superb）号（旗舰）、加拿大（HMS Canada）号战列舰。

第4战列舰分队（4th Division），指挥官由中队指挥官兼任，下辖舰艇：本博（HMS Benbow）号（旗舰）、柏勒洛丰（HMS Bellerophon）号、鲁莽（HMS Temeraire）号、前卫（HMS Vanguard）号战列舰。

第1战列舰中队（1st Battle Squadron），指挥官：伯尼（Cecil Burney）中将，下辖编制：第5、第6战列舰分队，附属舰艇：柏洛娜（HMS Bellona）号侦察巡洋舰。

第5战列舰分队（5th Division），指挥官：冈特（Ernest Frederick Augustus Gaunt）少将，下辖舰艇：巨像（HMS Colossus）号（旗舰）、科林伍德（HMS Collingwood）号、尼普顿（HMS Neptune）号、圣文森特（HMS St. Vincent）号战列舰。

第6战列舰分队（6th Division），指挥官由中队指挥官兼任，下辖舰艇：马尔伯勒（HMS Marlborough）号（旗舰）、复仇（HMS Revenge）号、赫拉克勒斯（HMS Hercules）号、阿金库尔（HMS Agincourt）号战列舰。

第3战列巡洋舰中队（3rd Battlecruiser Squadron），指挥官：胡德（Horace Lambert Alexander Hood）少将，下辖舰艇：无敌（HMS Invincible）号（旗舰）、不屈（HMS Inflexible）号、不挠（HMS Indomitable）号战列巡洋舰，附属舰艇：坎特伯雷（HMS Canterbury）号，切斯特（HMS Chester）号轻巡洋舰。

第1巡洋舰中队（1st Cruiser Squadron），指挥官：阿巴思诺特（Robert Keith Arbuthnot）少将，下辖舰艇：防御（HMS Defence）号（旗舰）、勇士（HMS Warrior）号、爱丁堡公爵（HMS Duke of Edinburgh）号、黑王子（HMS Black Prince）号装甲巡洋舰。

第2巡洋舰中队（2nd Cruiser Squadron），指挥官：希思（Herbert Leopold Heath）少将，下辖舰艇：科克伦（HMS Cochrane）号、香农（HMS Shannon）号、米诺陶（HMS Minotaur）号（旗舰）、汉普郡（HMS Hampshire）号装甲巡洋舰。

第4轻巡洋舰中队（4th Light Cruiser Squadron），指挥官：梅热勒（Charles Edward Le Mesurier）准将，下辖舰艇：卡利俄佩（HMS Calliope）号（旗舰）、康斯坦斯（HMS Constance）号、科摩斯（HMS Comus）号、卡洛琳（HMS Caroline）、保皇党（HMS Royalist）号号轻巡洋舰。

第4驱逐舰中队（4th Destroyer Flotilla），指挥官：温图尔（Charles John Wintour）上校，下辖舰艇：蒂珀雷里（HMS Tipperary）号（中队领舰）、布洛克（HMS Broke）号驱逐领舰，挚友（HMS Achates）号、伏击（HMS Ambuscade）号、热心（HMS Ardent）号、竞赛（HMS Contest）号、命运女神（HMS Fortune）号、花环（HMS Garland）号、鼠海豚（HMS Porpoise）号、雀鹰（HMS Sparrowhawk）号、喷火（HMS Spitfire）号、团结（HMS Unity）号、坚强（HMS Hardy）号、侏儒（HMS Midge）号、猫头鹰（HMS Owl）号、鲨鱼（HMS Shark）号、阿卡斯塔（HMS Acasta）号、克里斯托弗（HMS Christopher）号、奥菲莉娅（HMS Ophelia）号驱逐舰。

第11驱逐舰中队（11th Destroyer Flotilla），指挥官：霍克斯利（James Rose Price Hawksley）准将（他同时也是整个大舰队的驱逐舰部队的指挥官），下辖舰艇：卡斯托耳（HMS Castor）号轻巡洋舰（旗舰），堪培菲特（HMS Kempenfelt）号驱逐领舰，礼仪（HMS Manners）号、马恩（HMS Marne）号、米迦勒（HMS Michael）号、蒙斯（HMS Mons）号、魔术（HMS Magic）号、授权（HMS Mandate）号、尚武（HMS Martial）号、米尔布鲁克（HMS Milbrook）号、宠臣（HMS Minion）号、月亮（HMS Moon）号、晨星（HMS Morning Star）号、芒西（HMS Mounsey）号、神秘（HMS Mystic）号、奥索里（HMS Ossory）号驱逐舰。

第12驱逐舰中队（12th Destroyer Flotilla），指挥官：斯特林（Anselan John Buchanan Stirling）上校，下辖舰艇：福克纳（HMS Faulknor）号（中队领舰）、射手（HMS Marksman）号驱逐领舰，美娜德（HMS Maenad）号、惊奇（HMS Marvel）号、玛丽玫瑰（HMS Mary Rose）号、威胁（HMS Menace）号、细心（HMS Mindful）号、蒙斯特（HMS Munster）号、独角鲸（HMS Narwhal）号、内萨斯（HMS Nessus）号、诺布尔（HMS Noble）号、极品（HMS Nonsuch）号、服从（HMS Obedient）号、突击（HMS Onslaught）号、蛋白石（HMS Opal）号、恶作剧（HMS Mischief）号驱逐舰。

大舰队下属的战列巡洋舰队的战斗序列

战列巡洋舰队司令：贝蒂（David Richard Beatty）代理中将，旗舰：狮（HMS Lion）号战列巡洋舰，附属舰艇：恩加丁（HMS Engadine）号水上飞机母舰。

第1战列巡洋舰中队（1st Battlecruiser Squadron），指挥官：布洛克（Osmond de Beauvior Brock）少将，下辖舰艇：长公主（HMS Princess Royal）号（旗舰）、玛丽王后（HMS Queen Mary）号、虎（HMS Tiger）号战列巡洋舰。

第2战列巡洋舰中队（2nd Battlecruiser Squadron），指挥官：帕肯汉姆（William Christoper Pakenham）少将，下辖舰艇：新西兰（HMS New Zealand）号（旗舰）、不倦（HMS Indefatigable）号战列巡洋舰。

第5战列舰中队（5th Battle Squadron），指挥官：埃文-托马斯（Hugh Evan-Thomas）少将，下辖舰艇：巴勒姆（HMS Barham）号（旗舰）、刚勇（HMS Valiant）号、厌战（HMS Warspite）号、马来亚（HMS Malaya ）号战列舰。

第1轻巡洋舰中队（1st Light Cruiser Squadron），指挥官：亚历山大-辛克莱（Edwyn Sinclair Alexander-Sinclair）准将，下辖舰艇：伽拉忒亚（HMS Galatea）号（旗舰）、法厄同（HMS Phaeton）号、无常（HMS Inconstant）号、考狄利娅（HMS Cordelia）号轻巡洋舰。

第2轻巡洋舰中队（2st Light Cruiser Squadron），指挥官：古迪纳夫（William Edmund Goodenough）准将，下辖舰艇：诺丁汉（HMS Nottingham）号、都柏林（HMS Dublin）号、南安普顿（HMS Southampton）号（旗舰）、伯明翰（HMS Birmingham）号轻巡洋舰。

第3轻巡洋舰中队（3st Light Cruiser Squadron），指挥官：内皮尔（Trevylyan Dacres Willes Napier）少将，下辖舰艇：伯肯黑德（HMS Birkenhead）号、格罗斯特（HMS Gloucester）号、法尔茅斯（HMS Falmouth）号（旗舰）、雅茅斯（HMS Yarmouth）号轻巡洋舰。

第1驱逐舰中队（1st Destroyer Flotilla），指挥官：罗珀（Charles Donnison Roper）上校，下辖舰艇：无恐（HMS Fearless）号侦察巡洋舰（中队领舰），阿刻戎（HMS Acheron）号、精灵（HMS Ariel）号、攻击（HMS Attack）号、獾（HMS Badger）号、防御者（HMS Defender）号、苍鹰（HMS Goshawk）号、许德拉（HMS Hydra）号、田凫（HMS Lapwing）号、蜥蜴（HMS Lizard）号驱逐舰。

第9驱逐舰中队（9th Destroyer Flotilla），指挥官：戈德史密斯（Malcolm Lennon Goldsmith）中校，下辖舰艇：利迪亚德（HMS Lydiard）号（中队领舰）、陆秧鸡（HMS Landrail）号、月桂（HMS Laurel）号、自由（HMS Liberty）号驱逐舰。

第10驱逐舰中队（10th Destroyer Flotilla），指挥官：霍奇森（John Coombe Hodgson）中校，下辖舰艇：泼妇（HMS Termagant）号、喘流（HMS Turbulent）号、穆尔瑟姆（HMS Moorsom）号（中队领舰）、莫里斯（HMS Morris）号驱逐舰。

第13驱逐舰中队（13th Destroyer Flotilla），指挥官：法里（James Uchtred Farie）上校，下辖舰艇：冠军（HMS Champion）号轻巡洋舰（中队领舰），莫尔兹比（HMS Moresby）号、纳伯勒（HMS Narborough）号、尼莉莎（HMS Nerissa）号、涅斯托耳（HMS Nestor）号、斗鹎（HMS Nicator）号、游牧民（HMS Nomad）号、顽固（HMS Obdurate）号、昂斯洛（HMS Onslow）号、攻城雷（HMS Petard）号、鹈鹕（HMS Pelican）号驱逐舰。

公海舰队本队的战斗序列

公海舰队总司令：舍尔（Reinhard Scheer）中将，总旗舰：腓特烈大帝（SMS Friedrich der Große）号战列舰。

第3战列舰中队（III. Geschwader），指挥官：贝恩克（Paul Behncke）少将，下辖编制：第5和第6战列舰分队。

第5战列舰分队（5. Division），指挥官由中队指挥官兼任，下辖舰艇：国王（SMS König）号（旗舰）、大选帝侯（SMS Großer Kurfürst）号、边境伯爵（SMS Markgraf）号、皇太子（SMS Kronprinz）号战列舰。

第6战列舰分队（6. Division），指挥官：诺德曼（Hermann Nordmann）少将，下辖舰艇：皇帝（SMS Kaiser）号（旗舰）、摄政王路易特波特（SMS Prinzregent Luitpold）号、皇后（SMS Kaiserin）号战列舰。

第1战列舰中队（I. Geschwader），指挥官：施密特（Ehrhard Schmidt）中将，下辖编制：第1和第2战列舰分队。

第1战列舰分队（1. Division），指挥官由中队指挥官兼任，下辖舰艇：东弗里斯兰（SMS Ostfriesland）号（旗舰）、图林根（SMS Thüringen）号、赫尔格兰（SMS Helgoland）号、奥尔登堡（SMS Oldenburg）号战列舰。

第2战列舰分队（2. Division），指挥官：恩格尔哈特（Walter Engelhardt）少将，下辖舰艇：波森（SMS Posen）号（旗舰）、莱茵兰（SMS Rheinland）号、拿骚（SMS Nassau）号、威斯特法伦（SMS Westfalen）号战列舰。

第2战列舰中队（II. Geschwader），指挥官：毛弗（Franz Mauve）少将，下辖编制：第3和第4战列舰分队（该中队均为前无畏舰）。

第3战列舰分队（3. Division），指挥官由中队指挥官兼任，下辖舰艇：德意志（SMS Deutschland）号（旗舰）、波美拉尼亚（SMS Pommern）号、西里西亚（SMS Schlesien）号战列舰。

第4战列舰分队（4. Division），指挥官：利希滕费尔斯（Gottfried Freiherr von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels）少将，下辖舰艇：汉诺威（SMS Hannover）号（旗舰）、石勒苏益格-荷尔斯坦因（SMS Schleswig-Holstein）号、黑森（SMS Hessen）号战列舰。

第4侦察群（IV. Aufklärungsgruppe），指挥官：罗伊特（Ludwig von Reuter）准将，下辖舰艇：斯德丁（SMS Stettin）号（旗舰）、慕尼黑（SMS München）号、弗劳恩洛布（SMS Frauenlob）号、斯图加特（SMS Stuttgart）号、汉堡（SMS Hamburg）号轻巡洋舰。

驱逐舰部队指挥官：米切尔森（Andreas Michelsen）准将，旗舰：罗斯托克（SMS Rostock）号轻巡洋舰。

第1驱逐舰中队（I. Torpedoboots Flottille），指挥官：阿尔布雷希特（Conrad Albrecht）上尉，中队领舰：G39号驱逐舰，下辖编制：第1驱逐舰半中队。

第1驱逐舰半中队（1. Halbflottille)，指挥官由中队指挥官兼任，下辖舰艇：G38号、G40号、S32号驱逐舰。

第3驱逐舰中队（V. Torpedoboots Flottille），指挥官：霍尔曼（Wilhelm Hollmann）少校，中队领舰：S53号驱逐舰，下辖编制：第5、第6驱逐舰半中队。

第5驱逐舰半中队（5. Halbflottille），指挥官：戈蒂埃（Theophil Gautier）上尉，下辖舰艇：V71号、V73号、G88号驱逐舰。

第6驱逐舰半中队（6. Halbflottille），指挥官：里德尔（Theodor Riedel）少校，下辖舰艇：S54号、G42号、V48号驱逐舰。

第5驱逐舰中队（V. Torpedoboots Flottille），指挥官：海因克（Oskar Heinecke）少校，中队领舰：G11号驱逐舰，下辖编制：第9、第10驱逐舰半中队。

第9驱逐舰半中队（9. Halbflottille），指挥官：霍费尔（Gerhard Hoefer）上尉，下辖舰艇：V2号、V1号、V3号、V4号、V6号驱逐舰。

第10驱逐舰半中队（10. Halbflottille），指挥官：克莱恩（Friedrich Klein）上尉，下辖舰艇：G8号、V5号、G7号、G9号、G10号驱逐舰。

第7驱逐舰中队（VII. Torpedoboots Flottille），指挥官：科赫（Gottlieb von Koch）少校，中队领舰：S24号驱逐舰，下辖编制：第13、第14驱逐舰半中队。

第13驱逐舰半中队（13. Halbflottille），指挥官：齐策维茨（Georg von Zitzewitz）上尉，下辖舰艇：S15号、S16号、S17号、S18号、S20号驱逐舰。

第14驱逐舰半中队（14. Halbflottille），指挥官：科德斯（Hermann Cordes）少校，下辖舰艇：S19号、S23号、V189号、V186（中途返航，未参加战斗）号驱逐舰。

公海舰队下属的侦察舰队的战斗序列

第1侦察群（I. Aufklärungsgruppe），指挥官：希佩尔（Franz von Hipper）中将（他同时也是整个侦察舰队的司令），下辖舰艇：吕佐夫（SMS Lützow）号（旗舰）、德尔弗林格（SMS Derfflinger）号、塞德里茨（SMS Seydlitz）号、毛齐（SMS Moltke）号、冯·德·坦恩（SMS Von der Tann）号战列巡洋舰。

第2侦察群（II. Aufklärungsgruppe），指挥官：伯迪克（Friedrich Boedicker）少将，下辖舰艇：埃尔宾（SMS Elbing）号、皮劳（SMS Pillau）号、法兰克福（SMS Frankfurt）号（旗舰）、威斯巴登（SMS Wiesbaden）号轻巡洋舰。

驱逐舰部队指挥官：海因里希（Paul Heinrich）准将，旗舰：雷根斯堡（SMS Regensburg）号轻巡洋舰。

第2驱逐舰中队（II. Torpedoboots Flottille），指挥官：索尔（Heinrich Schuur）中校，中队领舰：B98号驱逐舰，下辖编制：第3、第4驱逐舰半中队。

第3驱逐舰半中队（3. Halbflottille），指挥官：伯斯特（Heinrich Boest）少校，下辖舰艇：G101号、G102号、B97号、B112号驱逐舰。

第4驱逐舰半中队（4. Halbflottille），指挥官：迪特玛尔（Adolf Dithmar）少校，下辖舰艇：B109号、B110号、B111号、G103号、G104号驱逐舰。

第6驱逐舰中队（VI. Torpedoboots Flottille），指挥官：舒尔茨（Max Schultz）少校，中队领舰：G41号驱逐舰，下辖编制：第11、第12驱逐舰半中队。

第11驱逐舰半中队（11. Halbflottille），指挥官：吕曼（Wilhelm Rüman）上尉，下辖舰艇：V44号、G86号、G87号驱逐舰。

第12驱逐舰半中队（12. Halbflottille），指挥官：拉斯（Rudolf Lahs）上尉，下辖舰艇：V69号、G37号、V45号、V46号、S50号驱逐舰。

第9驱逐舰中队（IX. Torpedoboots Flottille），指挥官：格勒（Herbert Goehle）少校，中队领舰：V28号驱逐舰，下辖编制：第17、第18驱逐舰半中队。

第17驱逐舰半中队（17. Halbflottille），指挥官：埃尔哈特（Hermann Ehrhardt）上尉，下辖舰艇：V27号、V26号、S36号、S51号、S52号驱逐舰。

第18驱逐舰半中队（18. Halbflottille），指挥官：提勒森（Werner Tillessen）少校，下辖舰艇：V30号、V29号、S33号、S34号、S35号驱逐舰。

如何评价双方舰队的编制？

了解完双方舰队的详细编制后，我们有必要讨论一些相关的话题，例如，双方的力量对比，是否如数量上的差距那么明显？双方对军舰的运用战术是否存在差异？英方没有派出哈里奇分舰队，是不是一个败笔？德方带上了航速缓慢的第2战列舰中队，是不是一个错误？

问题：双方舰队的实力对比，到底有多大差距？

根据John Campbell的说法（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.15-23）：

On paper the Grand Fleet had a very marked superiority over the High Sea Fleet. As the German 2nd Squadron was of little value, the British numerical superiority in battleships was virtually 28 to16, in battlecruisers 9 to 5...The British had many more cruisers and light cruisers present, with eight armoured cruisers and twenty-six light cruisers as against eleven light cruiser only...In destroyers the British superiority was less marked.
从纸面上来看，英国大舰队明显要比德国公海舰队更强大。由于德国第2战列舰中队的作用很小，因此在战列舰方面，英方与德方的数量对比几乎可以说是28比16，而在战列巡洋舰方面则是9比5。英国方面的巡洋舰数量也要多得多，他们拥有8艘装甲巡洋舰和26艘轻巡洋舰，而德方只有11艘轻巡洋舰。在驱逐舰方面，英方的数量优势就不那么明显了。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.145-159）：

Jellicoe’s battleline was superior both in numbers, heavy guns and, by three knots, in speed...Beatty had, in numbers alone, a 2:1 superiority...The British advantage in offensive power was even greater...If Jellicoe alone encounted Scheer’s battle squadrons, the British advantage was almost 2:1; Beatty began the day with more than 3.5 times Hipper’s weight of fire...Of course, weight of primary broadside alone is only a crude measure of offensive potential. It takes no account of differences in gunnery efficiency or in the effectiveness of hits. Nonetheless, the ratios were large enough for there to be no doubt where the offensive advantage lay. On the other hand, German ships were, in general, stronger defensively in their protection against shellfire and underwater attack; the disparity was particularly stark in the comparison between all the German battlecruisers and Beatty’s six older battlecruisers.
杰里科的战列线，具备数量、火力、以及3节航速的优势。贝蒂更是具备2比1的数量优势。英国方面的进攻优势，甚至要比他们的数量优势还要明显。以投射量而论，杰里科对舍尔的优势，几乎达到了2比1，而贝蒂对希佩尔的优势更是达到了3.5倍。当然了，主炮的单舷投射量只是一个非常简单的衡量指标，并没有考虑炮术水准及命中后效方面的差异。尽管如此，双方的差距的确是非常明显的，因此毫无疑问，英方的进攻能力显然是占据优势的。不过在另一方面，德国军舰总体来说具备更好的防护水准，能更好的抵挡炮弹和水下攻击。尤其是与那些老旧的英国战列巡洋舰相比，德国战列巡洋舰的防御优势是相当明显的。

None of the three German armoured cruisers that survived in 1916 were fit to accompany the fleet. In the Grand Fleet, the more modern examples of this obsolescent type were still expected to scout ahead of the battlefleet...With top speeds of 22-23 knots, they had only a small speed margin. Furthermore, in the absence of German ships of their own type, the first heavy ships they were likely to meet would be dreadnought battlecruisers or battleships; against such opponents, their protection was quite insufficient, though, it should be emphasised, little different from the battlecruisers of the 2BCS and 3BCS.
至1916年时，德国海军尚存的3艘装甲巡洋舰，都已经不适合伴随舰队行动了。而在大舰队中，较为新式的装甲巡洋舰仍然还在服役，其任务是在战列舰队前方进行侦察。不过，由于其最大航速仅有22-23节，因此与战列舰队相比，并没有明显的航速差距。更为尴尬的是，由于德国舰队中并无此类军舰，因此这些装甲巡洋舰很可能会与德国战列舰/战列巡洋舰进行交战。在面对这些军舰时，英国装甲巡洋舰的防护是严重不足的，不过有必要说明的是，第2和第3战列巡洋舰中队的那些老式战列巡洋舰，同样也是如此的。

In both fleets, the light cruisers were distributed between the scouting forces and the main battlefleets. Most were organised in squadrons, a few bore commodores or captains of destroyers, four in the Grand Fleet served as repeating ships, while two were temporarily attached to the 3BCS. German admirals, Scheer in particular, were desperately short of light cruisers. At least the vessels of Hipper’s IISG were modern designs. But none of the light cruisers with Scheer had guns bigger than 4.1in and, of the IVSG, only Stettin had turbine propulsion, while Frauenlob had been laid down in 1901.
在双方舰队中，轻巡洋舰都是分散在侦察部队和战列舰队中的。其中大部分是以中队形式组织起来的，但也有少量担任驱逐舰部队的领舰。在大舰队中，还有4艘担任通报舰，另有2艘被临时调配给第3战列巡洋舰中队。德方比较缺轻巡洋舰，不过希佩尔麾下的第2侦察群，至少还都是新锐军舰；而舍尔麾下的第4侦察群，则都是些老舰，主炮口径仅为10.5cm，并且只有斯德丁号是由蒸汽轮机驱动的，其余则是由蒸汽机驱动的，甚至还有一艘是1901年下水的（弗劳恩洛布号）。

In destroyer numbers, Hipper had a modest superiority over Beatty - 30:27 - when they first met. Moreover, as a whole, the German boats were more modern and, at least nominally, faster. Hipper’s destroyers had twice as many torpedo tubes while, even in guns, the two sides were more or less evenly matched. Thus Hipper had a distinct advantage in destroyers which to some extent made up for his inferior strength in light cruisers. But Hipper’s superiority was obtained at Scheer’s expense. As the two battlefleets left harbour, Jellicoe enjoyed a numerical advantage of 50:32. Thus, although he did not know it, Jellicoe would not have to face the larger German destroyer force that had caused him so much apprehension since the beginning of the war. But his advantage was in more than numbers. The British flotillas mounted twice as many guns, all of heavier calibre, than their opponents; they even had a greater number of torpedo tubes.
在驱逐舰方面，希佩尔与贝蒂的数量对比，是30比27，前者略占优势。并且，希佩尔麾下的驱逐舰更为新锐、具备更高的航速（至少名义上如此）、鱼雷发射管的数量比贝蒂多一倍、火炮配置方面则是双方旗鼓相当。因此，希佩尔的驱逐舰，具备明显的战力优势，能在一定程度上弥补其在轻巡洋舰方面的劣势。不过，希佩尔的这种优势，是以舍尔的劣势为代价的。尽管自开战以来，杰里科就一直担心他需要面对数量优于己方的德国驱逐舰，但实际上，杰里科与舍尔的数量对比，是50比32。不过对于这一点，当时杰里科并不知情。并且，这种优势还不仅仅是数量上的，在质量上也是如此。英国驱逐舰部队的火炮数量几乎比德国方面多一倍，火炮口径也更大，甚至连鱼雷发射管的数量也要更多一些。

The German scouting groups had been given priority in the allocation of the larger and more modern boats, that is those of the V25 and later classes. With the battlefleet, only the IHF and IIITF, both under-strength, were so equipped. The VTF and VIITF, though at full strength, were formed mainly from the V1 and S13 classes, which were too small to be properly sea and battle worthy. The only way that Scheer could have been given more destroyers would have been to send out more of the flotillas formed from earlier classes. But their reliance on mixed firing meant that their endurance depended on the stamina of their stokers; and, in any case, none of them were, individually, a match for the numerous British M-class boats now with the Grand Fleet.
德国海军将其大吨位的新锐驱逐舰，即V25级或更新锐的舰型，优先配备给了侦察舰队。在战列舰队中，只有第1驱逐舰半分队和第3驱逐舰中队装备了此类军舰，并且还都不满编，而第5和第7驱逐舰中队则主要装备的是V1和S13级——这些驱逐舰的吨位太小，适航性和战斗力都比较差。如果舍尔想要带上更多的驱逐舰，那么他只能带上那些由老旧驱逐舰组成的中队，但由于这些军舰是油煤混烧的，因此其续航能力取决于铲煤工们的体力，并且也完全无法与大舰队中的M级驱逐舰相抗衡。

问题：在军舰的运用战术方面，英德双方是否存在差异？

根据Julian S. Corbett的说法（History of the Great War, Naval Operations, Volume III, May 1915 to June 1916）：

Admiral Jellicoe had under his own hand, with­out counting the four ships of the 5th Squadron, a fairly homogeneous force of twenty‑four Dreadnoughts, against Admiral Scheer's sixteen and the six ships of the older pre‑Dreadnought squadron. As the Germans had no gun heavier than 12‑inch, while our main armament ranged from 12‑inch to 15‑inch, Admiral Jellicoe had also a considerable superiority in gun power, but, on the other hand, the German ships were better protected and had more torpedo tubes.
在不计入第5战列舰中队的4艘战列舰的情况下，杰里科麾下总共有24艘战列舰，并且全都是无畏舰。相比之下，舍尔麾下则只有16艘无畏舰，外加6艘老旧的前无畏舰。由于德国方面并未装备12英寸以上口径的火炮，而英国方面的大口径火炮的口径则在12至15英寸之间，因此在火炮方面，杰里科也是占据显著优势的。然而在另一方面，德国军舰具备更好的防护水准，且搭载了更多的鱼雷发射管。

From this marked inequality in the main weapon of the two admirals arose a corresponding difference of tactics, and particularly in their views of how to use their minor forces in battle. Since Admiral Jellicoe was so much superior in battleships, his best chance of a decisive success was to get in a smashing blow with his main weapon, while Admiral Scheer would naturally seek to avoid such a blow, or at least to weaken it by energetic use of his minor forces. It was fully expected that for this purpose he would use mines, submarines and destroyers, but in fact he had nothing but destroyers. Accordingly his destroyers were given a highly offensive function.
双方舰队在主要武器配置上的这种显著差异，导致了双方在战术思想方面，尤其是关于如何运用轻型舰艇方面，存在明显的差异。由于杰里科在战列舰方面拥有明显的优势，因此如果他能将大口径火炮充分投入战斗，就有机会取得决定性胜利。而舍尔则会设法避免这种场景，并利用其轻型舰艇部队来削弱英国战列舰部队。英国方面认为，德国人可能会使用水雷、潜艇、驱逐舰等手段。但事实上，舍尔当时只带了驱逐舰，因此他的驱逐舰是非常强调进攻性职能的。

问题：杰里科为何担心德国驱逐舰的数量比他的多？哈里奇舰队又为何没有与大舰队和战列巡洋舰队一起出击？

根据杰里科（John Jellicoe）在其著作中给出的描述（The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916: Its Creation, Development and Work，P.29-30）：

In August, 1914, this country had in home waters 76 destroyers in view of modern requirements. Of the 76 destroyers, 40 were allotted to the Grand Fleet proper, the remaining 36 being based on Harwich. We had in addition 11 large and fast destroyers of the "Tribal" class which, owing to their small fuel capacity, were only of use in southern waters and were appropriated to Dover. And we possessed 25 destroyers of the "River" class, of a nominal speed of only 25 knots, as well as the old 30-knot destroyer; the latter class was only fit for patrol work in the vicinity of the coast.
大战爆发之时，在英国本土海域，我们总共有76艘较为新式的驱逐舰。其中，有40艘是配属给大舰队的，而其余36艘则是驻扎在哈里奇的。除此之外，我们还有11艘吨位较大、航速较快、但燃料搭载量较低的部族级驱逐舰，他们驻扎在多佛，用于英国南部海域的巡逻。再接下来，还有25艘实际只能跑到25节的河流级驱逐舰。最后，就是那些最老式的，只适合在近海区域进行巡逻的所谓的“30节”驱逐舰了。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.29-31）：

Jellicoe had concern about destroyers since the four flotillas of the Grand Fleet were divided, two with the battlefleet itself and two making up Commodore Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force...By July 1915, as the latest M-class boats were allocated to Tyrwhitt’s force, the transfer of 1DF increased the strength of the destroyers in Northern waters. Towards the end of 1915, as the first Repeat-M class were completed, the 11DF and 12DF were formed as parts of the battle fleet. As more Repeat-Ms were commissioned, the 13DF was also formed to work with the BCF. Six boats from the 2DF had been transferred to the Mediterranean and the remainder of the 2DF was sent to Devonport (its H-class boats were the oldest with the fleet). The net result was that the Grand Fleet destroyers, now totals in five flotillas.
杰里科一直担心，他手下的驱逐舰的数量不足。起初，大舰队拥有4个驱逐舰中队，但只有2个是伴随战列舰队的，另外2个则是归哈里奇分舰队的蒂里特准将指挥的。至1915年7月时，随着最新式的M级驱逐舰加入了哈里奇分舰队，较老的第1驱逐舰中队就调往杰里科处了。随着更多的M级驱逐舰入役，至1915年底时，英国海军创建了第11和第12驱逐舰中队，并将其配属给了战列舰队；再后来，还创建了第13驱逐舰中队，并将其配属给了战列巡洋舰队。至于最为老旧的第2驱逐舰中队，其中有6艘驱逐舰被调去了地中海，其余则被调去德文波特了。因此在此消彼长之下，大舰队麾下的驱逐舰中队数量，变成了5个。

He also anticipated ‘a certain inferiority of light cruisers’...After the turn of the year, Jellicoe’s situation would improve steadily...Even after German surface forces had been swept from the trade routes, some ‘Town’-class light cruisers were retained overseas, but the majority, and all the smaller classes of light cruiser, were concentrated in the North Sea...The BCF was given three lightcruiser squadrons: two squadrons of ‘Towns’ and one squadron of ships of the Arethusa and Caroline classes. In June 1915, as more light cruisers of the ‘C’ classes were commissioned, two further squadrons were formed. The 4LCS was created to work closely with the battlefleet. The 5LCS was formed as part of the Harwich Force.
对于轻巡洋舰的数量，起初杰里科也有些担心，不过到1915年后，他的处境就得到了显著的改善。在剿灭了那些袭击通商航线的德国水面舰艇部队后，英国海军的城级轻巡洋舰，只有少量被留在海外区域，大部分都调回了本土，而吨位更小的那些轻巡洋舰，则全都集中在了北海区域。战列巡洋舰队获得了3个轻巡洋舰中队，其中有2个是由城级组成的，另有1个是由林仙级和C级组成的。随着更多的C级轻巡洋舰的入役，在1915年6月时，英国人又创建了2个轻巡洋舰中队，其中第4轻巡洋舰中队是伴随战列舰队的，而第5轻巡洋舰中队则成为了哈里奇分舰队的一部分。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.44-45）：

An Admiralty letter of 14 November 1914 had promised the C.-in-C. that Harwich Force would join him if a fleet action was imminent. That decision was either forgotten or overlooked at the Admiralty on 30 May 1916. Before the Grand Fleet sailed, the Admiralty informed the C.-in-C. (5.55 p.m., 30 May) that the 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron and the Harwich Force would not be sent to sea until more was known about the German objectives. Tyrwhitt, commanding the Harwich Force ('Commodore T'), was ordered (6.20 p.m.) to be ready to sail at daylight if required. At 10.35 p.m. his orders were modified. Instead of being ready to sail at daylight, he was to hold his squadron at one hour's notice. At 4.50 a.m., 31 May, Tyrwhitt, eager to get to sea, sent an urgent telegram to the Admiralty reminding them that he had received no further orders. The curt reply ordered him to remain at one hour's notice, for there was still nothing known about the enemy's objectives. Had Tyrwhitt left for Beatty's rendezvous as late as 8 p.m. on the 30th, at an economical speed of 18 knots, he would have covered the 330 miles in 18 hours. To have joined Jellicoe before dark on the 31st, he should have sailed by 5 a.m. that day. Instead, the Harwich Force remained in harbour 'straining at their leash'.
在一封写于1914年11月14日的信件中，海军部向杰里科保证，在即将发生舰队交战的情况下，哈里奇分舰队会与他汇合的。但是到了1916年5月30日时，海军部不是忘记了，就是忽视了这个决定。在5月30日17时55分，即大舰队出发之前，海军部就告知杰里科，在进一步获悉德国海军的作战目标之前，第3战列舰中队（由前无畏舰构成）、第3巡洋舰中队（由装甲巡洋舰构成）、以及哈里奇分舰队会留在港内待命。18时20分时，海军部要求哈里奇分舰队的蒂里特准将做好准备，如有需要的话，他需要在在日出之后出航。至22时35分时，海军部又修改了命令，要求他做好在1小时内出航的准备。至5月31日4时50分时，迫切想要出航的蒂里特准将，向海军部发出了一份紧急电报，提醒他们，自己还没收到更新的命令。然而海军部的回复，则表示德方的作战目标仍然不明，因此命令不变，依旧是做好1小时内出航的准备。如果蒂里特能在5月30日20时之前出航的话，在18节的经济航速下，他可以在18个小时内航行330海里，从而赶上贝蒂队。如果想要在入夜之前赶上杰里科队的话，那么蒂里特需要在5月31日5时之前出发。但在命令的限制下，哈里奇分舰队被困在港内，无法出航。

What had gone wrong? The First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson, was not aware of the November 1914 decision until several months later! However, the key decision at the time was made by Oliver. Here is how he explained it afterwards: Thomas Jackson, the D.O.D., and Brand, his assistant, and I were always expecting the Huns to make some attempt to block the Channel ports and destroy our line of communications with the Army in France, such as rushing Dover Straits with pre-dreadnought type of ships and using them as blockships, and all we had to counter such an attack was the old battle fleet [3rd B.S.], without destroyers; if they had to sail, the Harwich force had to go with them. I determined to keep the Harwich force until we could be sure the old German battleships were with the High Sea Fleet in case the High Sea Fleet went north to decoy our Grand Fleet while the old German ships attacked on the Thames or tried to disable or block the French Channel ports, and Sir Henry Jackson, the 1st S.L., agreed. We did not get evidence that the old ships were with the High Sea Fleet until very late on the night after the battle...It was not until 2.52 a.m., 1 June, when all fear of a raid on the southern area had passed away, that the Admiralty at last ordered Tyrwhitt to join up with the C.-in-C. By 3.50 a.m. he was away with 5 light cruisers, 2 flotilla leaders, and 16 destroyers. This splendid force arrived too late to be of any use except to lead damaged ships back to their bases.
问题到底出在哪呢？当时的第一海务大臣，亨利·杰克逊上将，根本不清楚1914年11月的那个决定，一直要到几个月后，他才知道这件事！不过，此时做出关键决策的，实际上是海军参谋长，亨利·奥利弗代理中将。对于这个问题，他的解释如下：“在当时的情况下，海军参谋总局的作战分局长，托马斯·杰克逊上校，他的助手布兰德，以及我自己（亨利·奥利弗），始终戒备着一件事，即德国海军有可能对英吉利海峡中的港口发起封锁，从而破坏我们与正在法国作战的陆军之间的交通线。例如，他们有可能会派出前无畏舰，冲进多佛尔海峡内，并用这些船去堵塞航道。为了反制这种战法，我们就需派出老旧的第3战列舰中队，但这些船缺少驱逐舰护卫（并非完全没有，但的确只有少数几艘），所以如果要出航的话，还需要派出哈里奇分舰队与他们同行。当公海舰队向北出航时，敌人是有可能以此作为诱饵，来吸引大舰队出航，从而掩护哪些老式德国军舰南下攻击泰晤士河口，或者海峡对岸的法国港口。为了避免这种情况，我决定暂时不派出哈里奇分舰队。对此，第一海务大臣，亨利·杰克逊上将，也是同意的。在海战爆发后，直到晚上，我们才确定那些老式德国军舰是与公海舰队在一起的”。在此情况下，直到6月1日2时52分，海军部完全排除了德国海军袭击英国南部海域的可能性之后，他们才命令蒂里特准将出航，并与杰里科汇合。3时50分时，蒂里特准将带着5艘轻巡洋舰、2艘驱逐领舰、16艘驱逐舰出发了。但等这支部队赶到现场后，所有战斗都已经结束了，他们唯一能做的，就是引导那些受损的军舰返回港口。

问题：德国海军为什么带上了前无畏舰？这些军舰能发挥实质作用吗？

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.141-142）：

After Dogger Bank, his less popular but clearer-thinking predecessor, Hugo von Pohl, had ruled that “the loss of the Blücher has brought the proof that the older ships cannot be taken into a battle”. What Blücher had been to the 1st Scouting Group, the Deutschlands were to Scheer’s battle-fleet...German fleet’s Achilles’ heel was the squadron of six slow pre-dreadnoughts which were unkindly known as the ‘Funf Minuten Shiffe’, because that is how long they were expected to last when the Grand Fleet found them. Scheer should have left them behind in the Jade (or, more usefully, the Baltic), but had yielded to pressure from their officers to take them along for the jaunt...The German Cin-C made four seriously incompetent, and easily avoidable, decisions at Jutland, this was the first.
在多格尔沙洲海战后，舍尔那位不太受欢迎，但思路清晰的前任，胡戈·冯·波尔指出：“布吕歇尔号的沉没证明，我们不能带着老旧的军舰参加战斗”。布吕歇尔号之于第1侦察群，就相当于德意志级之于德国战列舰队。那6艘航速缓慢的前无畏舰，是德国舰队的弱点所在。这些军舰被调侃为“5分钟军舰”，因为德国人认为，这些军舰在对抗无畏舰时，只能生存这么久。舍尔本应该将这些军舰留在亚德河口，或者留在波罗的海，但在面对这支中队的恳切请战的军官们时，舍尔做出了退让，因而带上了这些老舰。舍尔在日德兰海战中，犯了四个严重的、不称职的、同时也是可以轻易避免的决策，这是其中的第一个。

Early in the war (until April 1915), when the Grand Fleet’s numerical margin over the High Seas Fleet was low, Jellicoe also had taken with him to sea a squadron of slow pre-dreadnoughts, the King Edward VII class. For Scheer, in May 1916, by contrast, the Deutschlands could not imaginably tip the scales in a fleet encounter, and would only be a liability to themselves and to the mobility of the High Seas Fleet. With these antiques in company, the formated top speed of the German battlefleet was no more than 17 knots; and with poor quality coal and reciprocating machinery of doubtful reliability, even that could not be demanded of the predreadnoughts for very long. This afternoon, however, it looked as if the Germans were destined to be the pursuers, and the Deutschlands could be allowed to drop astern.
在大战早期时（1915年4月之前），由于大舰队相比于公海舰队的数量优势没有那么大，因此杰里科也会在出海时，带上一支由航速缓慢的爱德华七世级前无畏舰组成的战列舰中队。作为对比，对于1916年5月时的舍尔来说，这些德意志级并不会改变舰队实力的天平（因为英国方面的战列舰本就更多，并且还都是无畏舰），并且还会影响公海舰队的机动性，因此实际上是个累赘。在带上这些老古董之后，德国战列舰队的编队航速，最高不会超过17节，并且在劣质的煤炭、以及可靠性成疑的往复式蒸汽机的影响下，即便是17节的航速，这些前无畏舰也无法长时间维持。不过在这天下午，德国舰队看起来似乎扮演的是追击者的角色，因此这些德意志级即便落在后面，也没有关系。

On the other hand, since it was fundamental with Admiral Jellicoe that the blow with his dominant weapon should be given with the utmost violence, it was essential that his Dreadnought force should not be interfered with or have its attention distracted by minor attack from the enemy. His destroyers were therefore given a function that was primarily defensive. Their instructions were to confine themselves at first to repelling torpedo attacks which the enemy might threaten, but subject to this restriction commanders of units were given full discretion for delivering their attack as and when they saw occasion.
另一方面，为了能让英国无畏舰充分发挥大口径火炮的威力，杰里科必须要保护这些军舰免受德国轻型舰艇的袭扰。在此情况下，英国驱逐舰是更强调防御性职能的。在英国海军的作战条例中，驱逐舰的首要职能是击退敌方的雷击行动，在确保能够完成这些职能的前提下，驱逐舰部队指挥官可以在合适的情况下对敌人发起雷击。

结论：英国海军的战列舰和巡洋舰阵容，要明显强于德国海军，因此从纸面实力来看，英国海军在炮战领域占据着明显的优势。另一方面，德国海军则拥有比较强的鱼雷战实力，并希望以此来抵消英国海军在大舰巨炮方面的优势。从这个角度来说，英方没有派出哈里奇分舰队，的确可以认为是一个败笔。受其影响，贝蒂队的驱逐舰，在数量和质量上都要逊色于希佩尔队，这也是德方唯一占据明显优势的领域。在其他舰型的对比上，他们至少在数量上是明显逊色于英方的，有些甚至在质量上也不如英方。至于双方的老旧舰艇，则多少都有些累赘的意思：英国方面带上了装甲巡洋舰，但并未带上前无畏舰；而德国方面则相反，虽然未带上装甲巡洋舰，但带上了前无畏舰。从结果来看，这些老旧军舰的战术价值是非常有限，如果不带上她们，可能反而会更好。

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三、交战前夕

在5月31日时，德国人事先派出的10余艘潜艇，已经在英国东部沿岸地区的各个军港出海口外设伏；公海舰队及其下属的侦察舰队，则于5月31日凌晨时驶出了锚地——其中，公海舰队主力的驻地是亚德河口，希佩尔和舍尔一前一后，分别于5月31日1时、以及2时30分时驶离了锚地。至于老旧的第2战列舰中队，其驻地则是易北河口，他们是在1时45分时出发的，在2小时15分钟后（即4时），该部与舍尔队完成了汇合，组成了公海舰队本队。此后，德国舰队避开了英国人设下的雷区，向北驶向了斯卡格拉克海峡。

而英国舰队，则是自5月30日21时起，就兵分三路，陆续从斯卡帕湾、因弗戈登、以及罗塞斯出发了。前两支部队在5月31日中午时分完成了汇合，组成了大舰队本队，而从罗塞斯出发的战列巡洋舰队则是在大舰队本队以南区域单独行动。

尴尬的是，那些埋伏在英国东北部沿岸的德国潜艇，并未对出击的英国舰队造成任何实质性的伤害——有几艘潜艇发现了英舰出击的情况，并通过无线电进行了汇报，但由于他们只看到了出击舰队的一小部分，因此尽管这些信息传递到了舍尔手中，却没有引起后者的重视。被派往英国东南部沿海的潜艇，由于并不在英国舰队的出击路线上，因此在本场海战中也未发挥什么作用。

至于德国飞艇部队，先前一直受到天气情况的影响而无法起飞，直到5月31日上午，天气情况好转后，他们才派出了5艘飞艇执行侦察任务，但实际并未起到什么实质性作用。

双方舰队出航时的宏观态势图，5月30日10时至5月31日2时30分

下图中展示了双方舰队在出航选择的路线、埋伏在英国东海岸的德国潜艇部队的分布情况、以及德国飞艇部队的动向（此类黄底图片出自德国官方战史，标注的是欧洲中部时间，而文中记述的是格林威治时间，前者比后者早1个小时，下同）。



根据杰里科发出的命令，从因弗戈登出发的部队，应前往北纬58°15′东经2°的预定区域，并与从斯卡帕湾出发的部队汇合。同时，杰里科还命令贝蒂队前往北纬56°40′东经5°的预定区域，他预计贝蒂会在5月31日14时左右到达此处，此时杰里科队则应到达北纬57°45′东经4°15′的预定区域，即杰里科应位于贝蒂的西北偏北方向，双方相距69海里。如果没有新的情况，那么杰里科会向合恩礁方向前进，而贝蒂则应与杰里科汇合；但如果贝蒂与敌方发生遭遇的话，那么即便他进行回撤，也需要花费接近两个小时的时间，才能与杰里科汇合，因此这两支部队之间的间距，是略有些远的。另外，由于第3战列巡洋舰中队是临时编入大舰队的，第5战列舰中队是临时编入战列巡洋舰队的，前者原先是隶属战列巡洋舰队的，而后者原先是隶属大舰队本队的，因此按照预定计划，当贝蒂和杰里科汇合后，这两支中队会各归各位，即第3战列巡洋舰中队会加入贝蒂队，而第5战列舰中队则会加入杰里科队。

至约定的14时，贝蒂与杰里科都有些滞后，并未到达预定区域，但双方之间的相对位置和距离是基本正确的。由于一路上并未发现敌舰，因此贝蒂当时已经在调整航向，准备与杰里科汇合了；14时15分时，贝蒂向全体发出了将航向调整为北微东方向（磁方位角，下同）的命令。

另一方面，舍尔与希佩尔，则正在按照作战计划，一前一后向斯卡格拉克海峡方向前进，他们之间的距离，大约为50海里。根据计划，他们将于16时左右，到达斯卡格拉克海峡的入海口（具体位置是北纬57°15′东经7°10′）。然而，在他们到达目的地之前，英德双方的军舰，就发生了遭遇。

英国战列巡洋舰队的队形

下图中展示了贝蒂队当时采用的队形。该编队中总共包含9艘战列巡洋舰、4艘战列舰、14艘轻巡洋舰、27艘驱逐舰、1艘水上飞机母舰。

该编队是作为侦察幕展开的，其最前方是水上飞机母舰恩加丁号，以及由第1、第2、第3轻巡洋舰中队组成的侦察幕。其后方是旗舰狮号，以及第1、第2战列巡洋舰中队。至于第5战列舰中队（快速战列舰），则位于编队的最后方。主力舰都是以中队为单位采用单列纵队的队形，以旗舰狮号及紧随其后的第1战列巡洋舰中队为基准，第5战列舰中队与其保持5海里间距，第2战列巡洋舰中队则与其保持3海里间距。轻巡洋舰则是采用双舰纵队的队形，各纵队之间保持5海里间距，整个轻巡洋舰侦察幕的宽度为25海里，并与旗舰及第1战列巡洋舰中队保持8海里间距。为了保证轻巡洋舰与战列巡洋舰之间的通讯，有一艘轻巡洋舰被布置在了两者之间的位置，作为通报舰使用，她与两者的距离都是4海里。

但是，由于当时他们在向北调整航向，因此队形就发生了变化，前队改后队了。从图片中可以看到，在那个状态下，快速战列舰最靠北（也就是最靠近杰里科），旗舰狮号及第1，第2战列巡洋舰中队稍微靠后，最后方则是轻巡洋舰侦察幕及水上飞机母舰恩加丁号。



德国侦察舰队的队形

下图中展示了希佩尔队当时采用的队形。该编队中总共包含5艘战列巡洋舰、5艘轻巡洋舰、30艘驱逐舰。

该编队是作为侦察幕展开的，其最前方是由轻巡洋舰组成的弧形侦察幕，战列巡洋舰则位于其后方，可对其进行支援，巡洋舰周围还有驱逐舰伴随，起到反潜屏护作用。尽管希佩尔队的编制与贝蒂队不同，队形上也不太一样，但其背后的原则是类似的：都是轻巡洋舰在前，战列巡洋舰/快速战列舰在后。



英国大舰队的队形

下图中展示了杰里科队当时采用的队形。该编队中总共包含24艘战列舰、8艘装甲巡洋舰、12艘轻巡洋舰、52艘驱逐舰。

可以看到，第1、第2、第4战列舰中队，以4舰分队为单位组成了并列纵队，其周围是驱逐舰屏护幕，以及附属的轻巡洋舰，其前方则是横向展开为屏护幕的第4轻巡洋舰中队。再往前，则是横向展开为侦察幕的第1、第2巡洋舰中队，作为前卫的第3战列巡洋舰中队，以及附属的轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰。在整个编队中，第3战列巡洋舰中队最靠前，第1、第2巡洋舰中队所组成的侦察幕，与第3战列巡洋舰中队保持4海里间距；而第4轻巡洋舰中队所组成的屏护幕，则与第1、第2巡洋舰中队保持13海里间距。



德国公海舰队的队形

下图中展示了舍尔队当时采用的队形。该编队中总共包含22艘战列舰、6艘轻巡洋舰、31艘驱逐舰。

可以看到，第1、第2、第3战列舰中队采用了单列纵队的队形，其左右两侧都有驱逐舰组成的屏护幕，再往外还有一层有轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰共同组成的，呈六边形布置的警戒哨。有必要说明的是，舍尔的队形，与杰里科是截然不同的，前者麾下的战列舰采用的是单列纵队，后者则是并列纵队。其背后的原因，则是德国人偏好单列纵队作为行军队形，而英国人则偏好并列纵队。



如何评价杰里科的间距选择及贝蒂的队形选择？

对于杰里科为大舰队以及战列巡洋舰队设定的间距，有部分历史学家提出了批评，认为两支部队之间的距离过于遥远了。对于贝蒂在航行过程中所采用的队形，也有不少历史学家给出了批评，认为其将航速相对较低的第5战列舰中队置于编队后方，是一个错误的选择。

问题：杰里科所设定的间距是否合理？

根据Julian S. Corbett的说法（History of the Great War, Naval Operations, Volume III, May 1915 to June 1916）：

Admiral Beatty was to be at a rendezvous sixty‑nine miles to S.S.E. of the Commander‑in‑Chief. For a true advanced squadron whose function was to bring the enemy within reach of the main fleet the interval was undoubtedly too great, since in the North Sea visual connec­tion could not be counted on over such a distance. But, this was not at the time the primary function of Admiral Beatty's force. As the prospect of a fleet action grew ever more remote, its tactical character as an advanced squadron became secondary to the ever‑present need of intercepting raids on our coast. To this end a disposition was needed which, while the battle fleet could be kept far enough back to prevent the enemy evading it to crush the 10th Cruiser Squadron and raise the blockade, at the same time allowed the advanced force to be far enough to the south­ward to deal with a direct attack across the breadth of the North Sea.
贝蒂应到达的位置，在杰里科的东南偏南方向，双方之间的距离为69海里。前卫舰队的职能，是将敌方引诱至乙方战列舰队处，如果从这个角度看的话，那么这个间距无疑是过大了，其原因在于，在北海区域，舰与舰之间根本不可能在那么远的距离上建立视觉接触。但是，在当时的情况下，由于发生舰队决战的可能性非常小，因此贝蒂队的主要职责，实际上是拦截那些企图袭击我国海岸线的敌方舰队。至于作为前卫舰队进行诱敌，则已经降格为贝蒂队的次要职责了。为了实现这个目标，战列巡洋舰队的位置应尽量靠前、靠南，以便对抗敌方的横跨北海的袭击行动；而战列舰队则需要尽可能地置于后方，以避免敌方绕过这支部队，并对第10巡洋舰中队（负责在苏格兰-挪威沿线执行封锁任务）进行打击，从而打破我们的封锁。

A distance of fifty miles between the two parts of the Grand Fleet was the least that could satisfy these conditions, and the disposition which Admiral Jellicoe now adopted had, after long consideration, become the approved normal whenever there were indications that the Germans were contemplating some large operation with an unknown objective. It was only when we ourselves were operating offensively that the interval was reduced to a mean of about forty miles.
在上述情况下，这两支舰队之间，至少也需要保持50海里的距离。杰里科所采用的，实际上是经过长期考量后，确立下来的常规做法。只要有迹象表明，德国舰队打算大规模出动，且不确定其目的为何，那么我们就会采用这种部署方式。只有在我们自己采取攻势的时候，才会将间距降低至40海里左右。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.46-47）：

During 1915, the Grand Fleet had been ordered to sea five times as the result of special intelligence reports. The distances between the battle fleet and the battle cruisers on these occasions varied between 40 and 110 miles, with a mean range of 70 miles. It was only on the two occasions in 1916 (6 March, 22 April) when the Grand Fleet was carrying out an offensive operation of its own that the distances were reduced to 36 and 44 miles, respectively. The 69 miles on 31 May 1916 was, therefore, not out of the ordinary.
在1915年时，英国海军曾先后五次，基于破译的无线电通讯，命令大舰队出海。在这几次行动中，战列舰队与战列巡洋舰队之间的间距，介于40至110海里之间，平均值为70海里。只有在1916年3月6日及4月22日，英国方面主动出击的情况下，两支舰队之间的距离才分别缩减为36海里和44海里。因此在日德兰海战时采用的69海里间距，是符合常规的。

问题：贝蒂所采用的队形是否合理？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.48-49）：

There is the criticism of Beatty's stationing of the 5th Battle Squadron five miles to the Battle Cruiser Fleet instead of organizing his fleet to fight as one tactical unit. What are the facts? There seem to have been two considerations in Beatty's mind. One is as follows: The 5th B.S. was sent as a supporting Force for the Battle Cruiser Fleet [not to be used as an integral part of the Battle Cruiser Fleet until an action was joined]...In the second place, Beatty made his disposition of the 5th Battle Squadron in part to facilitate their fitting into their place in the van of the Grand Fleet cruising disposition when he turned north to join up with Jellicoe.
有不少人批评，贝蒂不应该把第5战列舰中队布置在战列巡洋舰队后方5海里的位置，而是应该将他们集合到一起。那么事实到底如何呢？在贝蒂的思绪中，似乎有两个考量因素：其一，第5战列舰中队是作为支援力量，派给战列巡洋舰队的，因此在战斗爆发之前，这支部队并没有被当作战列巡洋舰队中的固有的一部分。其二，贝蒂之所以采用这个队形，有部分原因在于，当他与与杰里科汇合后，这个队形能让第5战列舰中队方便地回归到大舰队前卫的位置上。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.68-69）：

Beatty’s positioning of the 5th BS was unsound. The SSE’ly direction of the nearest German bolt-hole should have told him where to place his slower battle-squadron in relation to the BCF: either in the same direction from Lion as Engadine, or at least at right angles to it. In either case, in the real world of the afternoon of May the 31st, he might have put some of Hipper’s battlecruisers under the North Sea instead of losing two of his own. With his battleships placed where they were, the vice-admiral would either go into action without their support, or he would have to hang around for them to catch up while the enemy got away. So why did he not dispose his heavy forces in concentration? The heart of the matter seems to be that Beatty had a mind-set about not meeting the enemy.
由于德国海军的基地在贝蒂队的东南偏南方向，因此他给第5战列舰中队安排的位置，是不合理的。由于该中队的最大航速低于战列巡洋舰们，因此她们应该像水上飞机母舰恩加丁号那样，布置在旗舰的前方，或者至少将其布置在旗舰的侧面。如果贝蒂这么做了，那么在5月31日下午，他很可能会击沉几艘德国战列巡洋舰，而不是像史实那样，自己损失两艘战列巡洋舰。把这些快速战列舰布置在旗舰后方，意味着贝蒂要么只能在得不到这些军舰的支援的情况下投入战斗，要么就只能等待这些军舰追上来，与此同时放任敌人逃之夭夭。所以贝蒂为什么没有将他手下的主力舰集中起来呢？真实原因，可能是贝蒂没想到他们真的会遭遇敌人。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.167-168）：

By presenting fronts inclined NE-SW, both the light cruisers and the battlecruisers were facing the probable direction from which the Germans might advance. In contrast, the 5BS were five miles in the wrong direction, either for supporting Beatty should he encounter a superior force, or for joining him in chasing a retreating enemy. They were, however, conveniently positioned for taking their place between the battlecruisers and the battlefleet in the combined fleets’ cruising order. Thus Beatty seems already to have been thinking mainly about his meeting with Jellicoe.
（在向北汇合之前）贝蒂队的侦察幕，是沿着东北-西南方向展开的，并将轻巡洋舰和战列巡洋舰对准了德舰最有可能出现的方位。然而，第5战列舰中队的位置则有问题，不应该在旗舰后方5海里，而是应该在旗舰前方5海里。无论是在遭遇强敌的情况下，还是在追击撤退敌舰的情况下，这样布置都会更有利。这些快速战列舰之所以被布置在后方，是为了在战列巡洋舰与大舰队本队之间形成衔接。换句话说，贝蒂可能主要考虑的是跟杰里科汇合的事。

结论：杰里科选择的间距是符合常规做法的，他之所以这么做，主要是因为他既需要防范德国人向英国东南沿海发起袭击，同时也需要防范德国人向北突破封锁线。贝蒂采用这个队形，也并非毫无理由，但他的确没有为可能发生的战斗做好充分准备，因此并不是毫无过错的。

seven_nana

四、前卫战，最初的接触

在14时左右，德国侦察舰队最西侧的埃尔宾号轻巡洋舰，发现其西侧有一艘船（后确认为丹麦籍的民船N J Fjord号），随后派出B109号和B110号这两艘驱逐舰前去检查。在14时10分左右，位于英国战列巡洋舰对最东侧的伽拉忒亚号轻巡洋舰，也发现了那艘丹麦民船，于是该舰与法厄同号轻巡洋舰一起前去检查。这样一来，英德双方的军舰就在海上不期而遇了，从而引发了日德兰海战的前卫战。

双方舰队刚发生接触时的宏观态势图

从下图中可以看到，双方轻型舰艇互相遭遇之时，贝蒂队的旗舰狮号，与希佩尔队的旗舰吕佐夫号之间，仍有约40海里的距离。至于双方的战列舰队，则离得更远。如果那艘丹麦民船没有出现的话，那么贝蒂队和希佩尔队可能会继续以大致平行的航向，相安无事地向北航行，并在更晚些时候，在更靠近大舰队的位置发现对方，随后爆发战斗。在这种情况下，海战结果可能会与史实大为不同，但历史没有如果，因此这艘丹麦民船，可以说是在这场海战中，发挥了相当重要的作用。



英德双方的交战态势，14时15分 - 14时45分

14时20分，伽拉忒亚号通过无线电汇报，他们发现了疑似敌舰。在确认了对方是德国军舰后，在14时28分时，伽拉忒亚号与法厄同号一起，在大约11,000码距离上开火了。另一方面，德舰也发现了英舰，并向上级做出了汇报。14时32分，埃尔宾号在大约14,000-15,000码距离上向英舰开火了，而英舰也进行了回击，这便是整场海战中最初的交火。

收到报告后，贝蒂和希佩尔都得知了敌情。德方的战列巡洋舰、以及埃尔宾号之外的其他轻巡洋舰，很快就进行了转向，向正在交战的方向靠拢。另一方面，由于贝蒂队当时正处于向北微东方向进行转向的过程之中，因此他先于14时25分，向驱逐舰发出了即将要进行转向，并要求他们完成转向后重新编队的预告，随后在14时32分，发出了将航向调整为东南偏南的命令。贝蒂的意图是抢在德舰前方，切断他们返回赫尔格兰湾的退路。第1、第2战列巡洋舰中队根据命令进行了转向，但第5战列舰中队却没有照办，直到数分钟后，他们才将航向调整为与其他军舰一致。受此影响，双方之间的距离被进一步拉远了。

另一方面，在与德舰发生接触后，伽拉忒亚号和法厄同号转而向西北方向航行。至14时35分时，伽拉忒亚号通过无线电汇报：“发现大量烟雾，似乎是由一支舰队发出的”。该舰所看到的烟雾，实际上就是德国侦察舰队中的其他军舰所排出的。但是，伽拉忒亚号并未进一步抵近侦察，因而错失了获取详细敌情的机会。

交战态势图，14时15分 - 14时45分

从下图中可以看到，在双方的轻型舰艇开始交火时，贝蒂刚做完14时15分的大转向（为了与杰里科汇合），紧接着又做了一个大转向，奔着德国海军基地的方向去了，而埃文-托马斯则没有立即跟随旗舰转向；至于希佩尔，则是直接冲向了炮火响起的方向。（此类黄底图片出自德国官方战史，其中红色部分为英国军舰及其炮火，蓝色部分为德国军舰及其炮火，下同）。



埃文-托马斯为什么会迟到？

贝蒂麾下总共有六艘战列巡洋舰和四艘快速战列舰，而希佩尔麾下只有五艘战列巡洋舰，前者的优势非常大，但由于第5战列舰中队没能跟随其余军舰一起行动，因此贝蒂的数量优势被削弱为6比5。对于这个情况，有许多学者提出过批评。

问题：埃文-托马斯到底有没有收到命令？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.52）：

Beatty's first signal (2.25), made by flags, was repeated by searchlight to the Barham (2.30) and is logged as received by her at 2.34. Did the message reach Evan-Thomas on the bridge? Corbett says that it cannot be definitely established, although there is evidence (the testimony of Barham's Flag-Commander, Wilfrid Egerton) that the message did reach him. This signal, however, assuming he did see it, gave Evan-Thomas no indication at all as to when the alteration of course was to be made. The Barham's log does not show the receipt of Beatty's second signal (2.32). In a letter in The Times (16 February 1927), Evan-Thomas attributed his delay to the fact that this signal was made by flags only, and these could not be distinguished at the distance between the ships.
贝蒂在14时25分时发出的命令，是用信号旗发布的，并且在14时30分时，用探照灯复述给了巴勒姆号，后者的记录显示，她在14时34分时收到了这条命令。那么这条命令是否有传达给位于舰桥上的埃文-托马斯呢？科贝特（著名的海军史学者）认为无法确定，但的确有证据（巴勒姆号上的威尔弗里德·埃格顿中校的证词）表明，这条命令传达给了埃文-托马斯。然而，即便他收到了这条命令，他也不知道贝蒂何时会发出调整航向的命令。另外，巴勒姆号的日志中，并没有记录贝蒂在14时32分时发出的命令。在一封写给泰晤士报的信中，埃文-托马斯表示，他的迟到，是由于当时这条命令是通过信号旗发布的，但在那个距离上，他们无法看清信号旗。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.70 & P.81-82）：

Flags issued to capital ships were big, but there were still practical limits, imposed by distance, visibility, funnel smoke and wind direction, to what could be expected of them; and from dawn on the 31st Beatty had detailed Tiger, rear ship of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and nearest to Barham, to repeat VABCF’s flag signals by searchlight to Evan-Thomas. This arrangement, together with the 5-mile distance, concealed a flaw which did not become apparent until it really mattered.
主力舰上使用的信号旗是很大的，但其通讯效果仍然会受到距离、能见度、烟雾、风向这些因素的影响，因此自5月31日黎明时分起，贝蒂就要求第1战列巡洋舰中队中位置最靠后的虎号，即最靠近巴勒姆号的那艘军舰，借助探照灯，将贝蒂的信号旗命令复述给埃文-托马斯。这桩安排，以及5海里的间距，为后来的问题埋下了隐患。

Beatty made a general signal by flags at 2.32 ordering his forces to turn for a course of SSE. Without waiting for acknowledgements from senior officers, as BCFOs warned he might not, VABCF hauled the signal down (making it executive).
在14时32分，贝蒂用信号旗发出了命令：“全体舰船将航向调整为东南偏南”，未等待其他将官们回复收到，他就降下了信号旗（表示执行这条命令）。对于这种不等待回复的做法，贝蒂在其【战列巡洋舰队命令】中是提到过的。

Barham’s yeoman saw the flag-hoist but was unable to read it. However, a recommencement of the zigzagging routine (two points either side of the base course), which had lapsed with the turn to the north, was expected, and Barham’s officer-of-the-watch, Lieutenant Alfred Phillips, assumed that this was it. Her hoist for “ALTER COURSE TOGETHER 2 POINTS TO PORT” was probably already bent on the halyard in anticipation, and it now shot up to the yardarm and down again and the four battleships turned simultaneously onto a course of NbyW, almost exactly the opposite course to that adopted by Beatty.
巴勒姆号上的水兵看见了狮号打出的信号旗，但是没能看清。但是，由于他们原本处于向北调整航向的过程中，预期应该是会做2个罗经点的之字规避机动的，所以巴勒姆号上的值班军官估计这是个之字规避机动的信号。甚至有可能，巴勒姆号的旗绳上，当时已经挂好了“向左舷转向，2个罗经点，各舰同时转向”的信号旗了。接下来，这个信号旗就被挂了上去（表示发布这条命令），随后又降了下来（表示执行这条命令），于是该中队的四艘战列舰就同时转向了北微西，与贝蒂采取的航向几乎完全相反。

With the ‘waypoint’ turn to the north at 2.15 Tiger had become the furthest battlecruiser from the 5th BS, and she not unnaturally supposed that her signal-relaying-by-searchlight duty had ended. Lion however, did not grasp this and for several fateful minutes nobody thought to repeat the turn-SSE signal to RA5BS in Barham. So, while Beatty powered off to the SSE behind a great pall of coal smoke, Evan-Thomas’s squadron put itself onto a reciprocal course with every second adding 20 yards to its distance from the battle-cruisers it was supposed to support.
由于在14时15分时，战列巡洋舰队刚刚进行了航向大调整，因此虎号已经不再是第1战列巡洋舰中队中，距离第5战列舰中队最近的军舰了，反而是最远的了。而旗舰狮号却没有意识到这一点，因此在那关键的几分钟内，没有人意识到应该通过探照灯，把转向命令复述给巴勒姆号。于是，当贝蒂冲向东南偏南，并在身后留下浓厚的煤烟时，埃文-托马斯的中队则驶向了相反的航向，导致双方之间的距离，以每秒20码的速度快速拉开。

The 5th BS persisted with its west-of-north course for several fateful minutes, long after it should have been clear that the BCF’s turn was much more drastic than a mere zigzag restart, in fact until Lion, almost out of sight in the afternoon haze, woke up to the fact that the 5th BS was not following and at last repeated by searchlight the order to turn SSE. One belief is that Tiger asked Lion by W/T whether her repeating duty was still in force. Meanwhile on Barham’s bridge, both Captain Arthur Craig and, according to some, Wilfrid Egerton, RA5BS’s flag-commander, “endeavoured to persuade our admiral to turn and follow Beatty”; but Evan-Thomas made a stand on waiting for a clear order.
在接下来的非常关键的几分钟内，第5战列舰中队依旧在往北微西方向航行，但他们实际应该已经能看明白，战列巡洋舰们的转向远远不止是之字规避机动。事实上，一直到双方几乎要在当日下午的阴霾天气下，驶出互相之间的视线范围时，狮号才想起来第5战列舰中队没有跟上，于是才用探照灯复述了命令。另一方面，在巴勒姆号的舰桥上，舰长亚瑟·克雷格上校，可能还有威尔弗里德·埃格顿中校，则试图说服他们的指挥官跟着贝蒂转向，但埃文-托马斯并没有行动，而是继续等待明确的命令。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.171）：

After the War, the events that followed Beatty’s decision to turn SSE became the subject of bitter controversy. Fortunately, at least the main sequence of signals (though not their repeats) was published by the Communications Division of the Naval Staff in September 1919; As with the previous turn to NbyE, the preparations for the new turn began with a signal to all destroyers (as before, this included those screening the 5BS) to be ready to take up the positions appropriate for a course SSE. Also as before, the signal to turn SSE was hauled down seven minutes later at 2.32.
在大战结束后，在贝蒂将航向调整为东南偏南后发生的事，成为了一桩充满唇枪舌剑的争议。幸运的是，在1919年9月时，海军参谋总局下辖的通讯分局，将当时的通讯记录给刊印了出来。与14时15分的转向北微东的命令一样，这条新的转向命令，也是先告知所有的驱逐舰（包括伴随第5战列舰中队的驱逐舰），舰队即将要把航向调整为东南偏南，并提醒他们要在转向完成后恢复编队中的位置。这个预告是在14时25分时打出的，7分钟之后，贝蒂发出了将航向调整为东南偏南的命令。

The extent to which Evan-Thomas was responsible for this increase depends on what signals he received, and when. Determining the whole truth is probably now impossible, because the actual signal logs for the ships concerned were later destroyed. But, in answer to a Parliamentary question on 14 March 1927, the then First Lord, William Bridgeman, stated that the 2.25 destroyer signal was recorded in Barham’s signal log as received by searchlight from Lion at 2.30: and as having been received by Fearless (the leader of the 5BS’s destroyer screen) from Barham at 2.34. However, Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Barnard, a nephew to Evan-Thomas, insisted that his uncle always maintained that no destroyer signal ‘giving any clue to the battle-cruisers’ movements was ever reported to him on the bridge’. These words, which appear to have been chosen with care, allow the signal addressed to all destroyer to have been received by Barham but suggest that her signalling staff failed to bring it to the Rear-Admiral’s attention.
埃文-托马斯到底要为这件事负多少责任，取决于他是否有收到命令，或者何时收到的命令。事情的真相恐怕无法查清了，因为相关军舰的通讯记录后来被销毁了。但是在1927年3月14日时，时任海军大臣的威廉·布里奇曼，在回答议会询问时表示，14时25分的发给驱逐舰的预告，在巴勒姆号的通讯记录中是有记载的，并且写明了是在14时30分时，通过狮号的探照灯复述，收到这条命令的。而巴勒姆号又将这条命令复述给了无恐号轻巡洋舰（伴随第5战列舰中队的驱逐舰中队的领舰），后者是在14时34分收到这条命令的。不过，埃文-托马斯的外甥则强调，他的舅舅一直声称，他本人当时在舰桥上，并且从来没有收到过那条发给驱逐舰的，包含了战列巡洋舰动向信息的命令。这个表述很可能是仔细斟酌过的，暗示了巴勒姆号的确收到了发给驱逐舰的那条命令，但是通讯军官们没有将命令转达给他们的中队指挥官。

Bridgeman also told Parliament that the executive signal to turn was in Barham’s signal log as received by flags from Lion at 2.37. But, given the problems with smoke and the rapidly increasing separation of the flagships at the opposite ends of their lines, this repeat signal cannot have been sent by flags, while even a searchlight signal from Lion would have been difficult to see. In fact, both Evan-Thomas and his flag-captain, Arthur Craig, maintained that the earlier flag signals were not repeated by searchlight until Tiger (in an unrecorded signal) asked Lion by wireless whether they should have been made to Barham. Thus, since after the turn SSE Tiger was better placed, it does seem more likely that she made the searchlight repeat.
另外，布里奇曼还告诉议会，巴勒姆号的通讯记录显示，执行命令的通知，该舰也收到了，是通过信号旗收到的，收到时间是14时37分。但考虑到烟雾及快速拉远的距离的影响，巴勒姆号实际应该是看不清狮号的信号旗的，即便是探照灯也未必看得清。事实上，埃文-托马斯和巴勒姆号的舰长亚瑟·克雷格都表示，狮号一开始并没有用探照灯复述命令，直到虎号用无线电询问狮号，是否需要向巴勒姆号复述命令后，他们才收到了命令。由于在向东南偏南转向后，虎号再度成为了距离巴勒姆号最近的军舰，因此更有可能是该舰用探照灯复述了命令。

问题：埃文-托马斯的转向延迟了多久？造成的后果是什么？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.51）：

Evan-Thomas stood on to the northward for some eight precious minutes, not turning to follow the battle cruisers until 2.40. As a consequence the distance between the Barham and the Lion opened from 4.5 miles to nearly 10 miles, that is, to beyond close supporting distance. This considerable gap delayed the 5th Battle Squadron from getting into action against Hipper until nearly twenty minutes after Beatty was engaged.
埃文-托马斯继续向北航向了约8分钟，直至14时40分才转向并跟随战列巡洋舰。于是，双方之间的距离，从约4.5海里拉长到了近10海里，这已经超出了近距离支援的距离。其后果是，第5战列舰中队未能及时加入对抗希佩尔的战斗，直到贝蒂与希佩尔的交战开始近20分钟后，埃文-托马斯才加入战斗。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.85）：

Evan-Thomas’s delay in turning to the SSE and his consequent distance astern of Beatty have been assessed by various sources averaged 7-ish minutes and 10 miles.
埃文-托马斯的转向延迟，以及转向后他与贝蒂之间的距离，不同的资料有不同的说法，平均值是7分多钟、10海里。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.171）：

The time of his (Evan-Thomas) signal was given at 2.40 but Barham’s Captain Arthur Craig reported that she turned at 2.38. This delay in turning increased the separation between Lion and Barham from five to about ten miles.
在埃文-托马斯的报告中，他是在14时40分做出跟随战列巡洋舰的命令的（即迟了8分钟），但巴勒姆号的舰长亚瑟·克雷格则报告说该舰在14时38分就开始转向了（即迟了6分钟）。这个迟到的转向，将狮号与巴勒姆号之间的距离，从5海里拉长到了约10海里。

埃文-托马斯的转向延迟，对他与贝蒂之间的距离产生的影响

假设在贝蒂转向之前，埃文-托马斯与他的距离是5海里，且双方的航速都是20节，那么：

如果埃文-托马斯的转向延迟时间是5分钟，那么相应的，他与贝蒂之间的距离会被拉开至8.3海里；延迟6分钟，则距离为9海里；延迟7分钟，则距离为9.7海里；延迟8分钟，则距离为10.3海里；延迟9分钟，则距离为11海里。



问题：埃文-托马斯的迟到，责任到底在谁？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.55）：

Neither Admiral is blameless, yet, fundamentally, the confusion stemmed from the fact that the co-operation between the 5th Battle Squadron and the Battle Cruiser Fleet was not of the best. Evan-Thomas and Beatty had never before worked together. Evan-Thomas was not even sent for before leaving Rosyth. Nor was he given the Battle Cruiser Fleet Orders, as one consequence of which he seems not to have been aware of the discretionary power Beatty allowed his subordinates. The 5th Battle Squadron seemed to wait, on this and a later occasion, until they were told to act.
对于这件事，两位将军都是负有责任的。问题的关键在于，第5战列舰中队和战列巡洋舰队之间的协同是存在问题的。埃文-托马斯和贝蒂从未一起共事过，在出航之前，贝蒂也未召见过埃文-托马斯，后者也没有收到过【战列巡洋舰队命令】，因此他并不知道，贝蒂实际上把部分决定权下放给了下属。因此，在收到长官命令之前，第5战列舰中队一直在做等待。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.88-92 & P.100）：

Evan-Thomas had not been favoured with a copy of BCFOs. Had he been, he would have found informative Beatty’s ‘Instructions for Concentrating Battle Cruisers when Spread, and Forming Order of Battle’, for while these injunctions were framed with individual battlecruisers, rather than a squadron of battleships, in mind, the impression they impart of the thrust of BCF lore is unmistakable: A sudden alteration of course by the ship sighting the enemy is seen by those on either side of her far more rapidly than any signal could be sent, and, being an almost certain indication of an enemy having been sighted it should be acted upon immediately. All ships that may be required to support must proceed to do so until they know definitely that they will not be required.
埃文-托马斯并未收到过【战列巡洋舰队命令】，如果他收到过，他应该会读过贝蒂的【有关在战列巡洋舰分散状态下，重新集中并组成战斗队形的指示】。尽管这些指示是写给分散行动的战列巡洋舰的，而不是写给集中在一起的战列舰中队的，但其中反映出的战列巡洋舰队的战术思想，则是非常明确的。这份指示是这么说的：“当一艘军舰发现敌舰，并作出大幅度的转向时，这艘军舰附近的军舰，很快就能发现这个转向动作。这要比发出通讯信号快很多。由于这个突然转向，几乎必然意味着是发现了敌舰，因此其他军舰也应立刻采取行动。除非有收到否定的命令，否则所有担负着支援任务的军舰，都应立刻予以跟进”。

To point out this is to emphasize again the divergence between the tactical regimes of the Battle Fleet and the BCF, and more specifically, between the habits of thought expected of their respective junior flag-officers. But if one ferrets around in the GFBOs, one finds ‘initiative’ injunctions which, while designed to preserve the unity of a deployed battle-line, are at least partly transferable in sense to Barham’s dilemma at 2.32: The Fleet is to be guided generally by the movements of the division led by the Commander-in-Chief, which should be considered as the rallying point. The movements of the Commander-in-Chief must therefore be very carefully watched and his wishes if possible anticipated...In the event of a movement of the Commander-in-Chief’s division carried out without signal or before a signal has got through to all ships in the line, the other divisions should conform.
提及这一点的目的，是为了强调战列巡洋舰队与大舰队本队在战术指挥制度上存在很大的差异，因此这两支部队内的中队指挥官们所习惯的指挥方式也是不一样的。不过如果我们翻阅一下【大舰队战斗命令】，就会发现其中也有关于“主动性”的内容。尽管撰写这些内容的意图，是为了维持战列线秩序，但对于巴勒姆号当时所面临的困境，至少也是有些参考意义的。这份命令是这么说的：“整个舰队的动向，主要是以舰队司令所在的分队的动向为依据的，这支分队应被视为集结点。其余各舰应仔细关注舰队司令的动向，如有可能的话，还应对他的意图进行预判。如果舰队司令所在的分队，在没有发出命令，或者在所有军舰都回复收到前就做出机动，那么其他分队的军舰也应该跟随司令的行动”。

However, the onus would not have devolved onto Evan-Thomas’s initiative if Lion’s signalling had been conducted professionally and in accordance with Grand Fleet Battle Orders.
然而，如果狮号的通讯人员能够表现的更专业一些，并遵照【大舰队战斗命令】开展工作的话，这件事就根本不至于发展到问责埃文-托马斯是否欠缺主动性的地步了。

Beatty, Seymour and Evan-Thomas could each have prevented the thing going awry, and each was remiss in the manner in which he failed to do so.
之所以会出现这桩事情，贝蒂、西摩尔、以及埃文-托马斯，都是负有责任的——但凡这三个人中有一个人做对了，这件事就不会发生了。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.136 & P.172-173）：

Evan-Thomas evidently received at least some of the Battle Cruiser Orders, since at 8am on 31 May, he semaphored to the 5BS: Attention is called to B.C. Orders No. 11...As Evan-Thomas was, after all, acquainted with the Battle Cruiser Orders, and he may have recalled their warning that Beatty might begin a manoeuvre before all ships had received and acknowledged the signal ordering it. But, in this case, he was unsure whether his force was required to follow the vice-admiral...Only a few small enemy vessels had been reported, against which the battlecruisers did not need the support of the 5BS. And there was the possibility that the vice-admiral might be ‘going to signal another course to Fifth Battle Squadron, possibly to get the enemy light cruisers between us’. Thus Evan-Thomas had several reasons for hesitating for a few minutes, even though Captain Craig may have been urging him to turn at once; after five minutes at most, the searchlight repeat resolved Evan-Thomas’s dilemma.
埃文-托马斯显然是收到过【战列巡洋舰队命令】的，至少收到过其中的一部分。因为在5月31日8时，他通过旗语告知第5战列舰中队，要遵守【第11号战列巡洋舰队命令】。由于埃文-托马斯是接触过【战列巡洋舰队命令】的，他可能也记得，贝蒂在里面提及：他可能会不等所有军舰回复收到，就做出转向机动。但是在当时的情况下，他并不确定他是否应该跟随贝蒂行动：当时的敌情，只不过是少数几艘敌舰，而战列巡洋舰们是足以对付这些军舰的，并不需要第5战列舰中队的支援。并且，贝蒂也可能会另行给埃文-托马斯下达转向命令，例如前去包抄敌方轻巡洋舰，将其夹在两队英舰之间。因此尽管他的旗舰舰长敦促他立刻转向，但埃文-托马斯迟疑个几分钟，也不是毫无理由的。5分钟后，虎号用探照灯发来的复述命令，解决了埃文-托马斯所面临的难题。

But no significant delay would have occurred if Lion’s signallers, still commanded by Beatty’s flag-lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Ralph Seymour, had not neglected, in the full seven minutes between the destroyer signal and making executive the signal to turn SSE, to repeat the latter signal by searchlight and obtain an acknowledgement. Yet there was no good reason for these omissions. The Grand Fleet Signal Orders make clear that the responsibility for this signalling failure lay squarely with Beatty himself: It is to be clearly understood that senior officers are responsible for informing ships under their immediate command of all messages that concern them.
如果贝蒂的舰队通讯官，拉尔夫·西摩尔少校，在14时25分（给驱逐舰发预告）至14时32分（下达转向命令）的7分钟之间，要求狮号的通讯兵把命令用探照灯复述给巴勒姆号，并确认对方是否收到命令的话，那么第5战列舰中队并不会出现明显的转向延迟。并且，西摩尔少校省略了这个动作，也是没有什么借口可以找的。【大舰队通讯命令】中写的很清楚，通讯失败的责任在于贝蒂方。这份命令是这么说的：“与下属军舰有关的各类信息，指挥官有责任将其发送给相应的下属军舰”。

结论：埃文-托马斯收到了贝蒂的命令，但收到的时间则大幅晚于其他军舰，这导致了其转向时间要比其他军舰晚7分钟左右，从而使得他与贝蒂之间的距离扩大了5海里左右。至于这件事的责任在谁，不同学者有不同的观点，甚至在关键证据上也有不同的说法，因此很难说清楚责任到底在谁。各打五十大板，可能是最好的论断。

英德双方的交战态势，14时45分 - 15时15分

在双方轻巡洋舰发生接触之后，伽拉忒亚号与法厄同号转向了西北方向，而埃尔宾号也跟着驶向了西北方向。其结果是，英国战列巡洋舰队中的2个轻巡洋舰中队，以及德国侦察舰队中的所有军舰，都跟着这些军舰行动了——英舰跟着伽拉忒亚号走，德舰则跟着埃尔宾号走。其中，德国海军的皮劳号和法兰克福号轻巡洋舰，在15时12分时加入了战斗，在16,000码的距离上向英国轻巡洋舰开火了。

至于贝蒂，则在这段时间内数次调整航向——在14时52分，贝蒂命令将航向调整为东南方向；15时01分时，调整为正东方向；15时13分时，又调整为东北方向——他这么做的目的，是想要截断德舰的退路。而埃文-托马斯则通过抄近路，稍稍拉近了他与贝蒂之间的距离。

除此之外，在14时47分时，贝蒂还命令恩加丁号水上飞机母舰，向东北偏北派出水上飞机进行侦察。15时08分时，两架水上飞机成功起飞，大约10分钟后，他们观察到了德舰，不过这些情报并未能及时报告给狮号。这是历史上最早的，海军航空兵参与舰队作战的案例。

交战态势图，14时45分 - 15时15分

从下图中可以看到，在最早发生接触的几艘军舰的带动下，双方舰队中大部分军舰都被他们调动了起来，只有贝蒂仍在按自己的策略行事（贝蒂周围的几支中队则是在跟随贝蒂的行动）。



如何评价亚历山大-辛克莱与内皮尔的战术决策？

在伽拉忒亚号转向西北方向后，第1轻巡洋舰中队的其他军舰也跟着往北驶去了。此外，第3轻巡洋舰中队也追随了他们的航迹。这是出于这两个中队的指挥官的自行判断，而不是根据贝蒂的命令行事的。对于这个战术决策，也有不少学者提出过批评。

问题：这些英国轻巡洋舰所采取的行动是否合理？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.56）：

During the run to the south he had only four light cruisers with him (Goodenough's 2nd L.C.S.), as the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons had 'marched to the sound of the guns' and closed the Galatea, now well to the northward. This had left the area to the eastward of the battle cruisers open and was in flagrant violation of the G.F.B.O.s, which stated: 'After gaining touch with the enemy, the first essential is to maintain it...[But] forces should be economised so that more ships do not concentrate at anyone point than are necessary to accomplish their object.'
在听见炮声后，第1和第3轻巡洋舰中队就赶去支援了伽拉忒亚号了。受此影响，跟在贝蒂身边的就只剩第2轻巡洋舰中队的四艘轻巡洋舰了。在此情况下，英国战列巡洋舰的东侧区域，就没有了轻巡洋舰侦察幕。这种做法，是严重违反了【大舰队战斗命令】的，后者清楚的写道：“与敌方发生接触后，最重要的是与其保持接触，但为了完成这一目的，并不意味着需要将其他军舰过分地集中到一起”。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.176）：

In their despatches, both Alexander-Sinclair and Napier declared that their object was to draw the enemy towards the battlefleet, Napier stating: Being far outranged, we endeavoured to keep touch without closing much, and to lead the enemy round to the direction of our Battlefleet (N.W.), whilst the Battle Cruisers were steering to the eastward to cut them off.
亚历山大-辛克莱准将和内皮尔少将，都在事后提交的报告中表示，他们的目的是将敌人引诱至战列舰队的方向。内皮尔写道：“由于敌我之间的距离较远，因此我们试图与其保持距离，但不过分接近，并将他们引诱至西北方向，即我们的战列舰队所在的方位。与此同时，战列巡洋舰们则会向东航向，并切断敌人的退路”。

Beatty’s light cruiser commanders were aware that ‘his general principle was to get between the enemy and his base’ but they had not received any direct orders from the vice-admiral. Now they had to decide how to respond to his new courses SE. Both concluded, apparently without consultation, that they should continue to draw the Germans NW’ward, while Beatty attempted to get across the German wake. This unnecessarily committed two-thirds of Beatty’s light cruiser strength against the three German vessels of the same type that were in sight. The British ships did not even take advantage of their considerable superiority to press in both to attack and, more importantly, to obtain further information on the large vessels that they had sighted briefly between 2.35 and 2.45.
贝蒂麾下的轻巡洋舰指挥官们，知道贝蒂的整体原则是“杀到敌方舰队及其基地之间的位置”，但他们并未收到任何直接命令，因此在贝蒂转向东南方向时，他们必须要自己做出决定。这两位指挥官都决定继续引诱德国舰队前往西北方向，以便贝蒂能够杀到德舰的后方。这个诱敌行动，动用了贝蒂麾下2/3的轻巡洋舰，然而在他们视线内，却只能看见三艘德国轻巡洋舰（埃尔宾号、皮劳号、法兰克福号）。这些英国轻巡洋舰甚至没有利用已方的数量优势去攻击德舰，也没有试图去对敌方舰队进行进一步侦察——尽管在14时35分至45分间，伽拉忒亚号一度曾看到过敌方舰队排出的大量烟雾。

By the time the opposing battlecruisers sighted each other, Galatea was about 14 miles NNE of Lion; both the 1LCS and the 3LCS were thus too far away to play any part in the action that was now imminent.
后来，当双方的战列巡洋舰们互相发现对方时，伽拉忒亚号已经位于狮号的东北偏北方向，约14海里处了。英国第1、第3轻巡洋舰中队，都跑得太远了，因此无法在战列巡洋舰之间的交战中发挥作用了。

结论：亚历山大-辛克莱与内皮尔的战术意图是好的，但率领战列巡洋舰队麾下的2/3的轻巡洋舰去与敌方保持接触，则是不必要的。

英德双方的交战态势，15时15分 - 15时48分

希佩尔麾下的第1侦察群和第2侦察群，原本都是追逐着英国轻巡洋舰，向西北方向航行的。15时20分时，第1侦察群发现其西侧有两排浓烟；稍后，塞德里茨号看到了三脚桅，这代表着他们看到了英国主力舰——具体来说，他们看到的是英国第2战列巡洋舰中队，当时双方的距离约为15海里。15时30分时，希佩尔命令第2侦察群向第1侦察群靠拢，因而第2侦察群调转了航向。3分钟后，希佩尔命令第1侦察群调转航向，因此整个德国侦察舰队都在向公海舰队本队的方向回撤了。完成掉头后，希佩尔于15时45分时下令，要求第1侦察群进行同时转向，将航向调整为东南偏南，从而使队形转换为斜队。随后，在15时48分时，吕佐夫号向狮号开火了。

另一方面，在15时25分时，新西兰号发现了德国战列巡洋舰，随后狮号则是于15时30分时看到了敌舰。此后，贝蒂命令将航向调整为正东，航速提升至25节，随后又命令第2战列巡洋舰中队排至第1战列巡洋舰中队后方。15时40分时，贝蒂通过无线电向杰里科汇报，他们发现了五艘德国战列巡洋舰及大量驱逐舰。在英国战列巡洋舰们完成队形转换，组成战列线后，贝蒂并未立即开火，而是在3时45分时下令，先将编队调整为面向东北方向的斜队，随后各舰同时转向，将航向调整为东南偏东。在德舰向他们开火后，英舰很快也予以还击了。双方战列巡洋舰之间的战斗，由此打响了。

交战态势图，15时15分 - 15时48分

从下图中可以看到，英德双方的战列巡洋舰们，在发现了对方之后，都做出了一系列的机动动作，随后才开始交火。但由于德方更早开始，也更早完成机动，因此得以抢先开火。



如何评价贝蒂在前卫战初期所做的战术决策？

自伽拉忒亚号报告发现德国驱逐舰和轻巡洋舰，至新西兰号发现德国战列巡洋舰的1个多小时内，贝蒂做出了多次转向机动，其意图是截断德舰的退路。然而从实际结果来看，他并未能截断德舰的退路，导致双方战巡之间的较量，发展成了希佩尔将贝蒂引诱向舍尔的方向。除此之外，当德舰向他们开火时，贝蒂麾下的战巡们正在进行队形转换及航向调整，因此处于不利的状态下。为什么会出现这些情况呢？

问题：贝蒂为什么没能截断德舰的退路？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.180-183）：

Because Beatty did nothing to prevent two of his three light cruiser squadrons from flocking away northwards, a large hole developed where his advanced cruiser screen should have been. Thus his ill-judged large turn NE at 3.13 was made without any precise enemy reports - though, since he admitted in his despatch that he was already clear that the enemy was ‘Northward and Eastward’, he should not have turned directly towards them anyway. As a result, on sighting Hipper’s force was not, as it should have been, well on Lion’s port bow but three points on her starboard bow. Thus Beatty was already too far north to block Hipper’s retreat should he turn about towards Horns Reef.
由于贝蒂并未阻止这两支轻巡洋舰中队离开编队驶向北方，因此位于他前方的侦察幕，产生了一个大缺口。由于这个缘故，贝蒂在没有任何准确的敌方情报的情况下，在15时13分时做出了将航向调整为东北方向的的错误决策。另外，根据贝蒂事后提交的报告，他当时是知道敌舰位于东北方向某处的，因此他本身就不应该将舰队转向敌舰所在的方位。总之，如果贝蒂不做这个调整的话，当他遇见希佩尔时，后者应在狮号的左舷方向；但因为他做了这个调整，因此实际当他遇到希佩尔时，后者出现在了狮号的右舷方向3个罗经点（33.75°）处。受此影响，当双方相遇时，贝蒂的位置过于靠北了，导致其无法阻止希佩尔往南撤退。

Furthermore, since turning SSE at 2.32, Beatty had done nothing to concentrate his forces and dispose them for action. His series of signals shows that, despite the increased gap between him and the 5BS, he was content to leave them at a distance. As for the 2BCS, he left them bearing ENE, three miles from Lion. This alignment had been ordered initially because it was appropriate for meeting an enemy approaching from ahead when his own course was SSE. Yet he now expected to encounter the enemy somewhere north-easterly, and the actual sighting was to EbyN. Thus the two weakly armoured battlecruisers were thrust forward three miles closer to the enemy and with no prospect of getting into line with Lion and the 1BCS without some violent manoeuvring. With the two sides on converging courses (the British NE, the German NWbyN) and the range falling, Beatty now had little time to overcome the serious tactical problems that were entirely of his own making.
更糟糕的是，自贝蒂在14时32分时，发出将航向调整为东南偏南的命令后，他始终未能聚拢他麾下的部队，并将其调整为适合战斗的队形。从他发出的一系列的命令来看，尽管他与第5战列舰中队相隔较远，但他对此似乎并不在意。至于第2战列巡洋舰中队，则被贝蒂布置在了狮号的东北偏东方向的3海里处。在最初的东南偏南的航向下，这种队形是能够有效应对自正面驶来的敌舰的。但如今敌舰位于东北方向某处，实际遭遇时具体方位是东微北方向，因此这两艘防护薄弱的战列巡洋舰与敌舰之间的距离，反而比狮号近3海里，并且还处在一个必须要做剧烈机动，才能回归至狮号及第1战列巡洋舰中队后方的位置。双方碰面后，英舰航向为东北方向，德舰航向为西北微北，因而距离在不断缩短，此时贝蒂已经没有多少时间，来调整他之前的一系列决策导致的队形不佳的问题了。

With the ISG three points on his starboard bow, Beatty might have turned to port onto a similar NW’ly course. While still leaving the 2BCS closer to the enemy, he would have been able to close the 5BS and his errant light cruisers, and to continue leading Hipper towards the Grand Fleet. But, since Beatty had been preoccupied with getting between the German ships and their bases, he probably hardly considered this possibility...As soon as the British battlecruisers turned E, Hipper responded to prevent Beatty cutting across his line of retreat...The ISG turned away 15 points in succession to SE, a move that would also draw Beatty towards the advancing High Seas Fleet.
双方碰面后，德国第1侦察群位于狮号右舷方向3个罗经点处，此时贝蒂本可向左转向，将航向调整为东北方向，即大致与德舰平行。如此操作的话，尽管第2战列巡洋舰中队依然会更靠近德舰，但贝蒂却能与第5战列舰中队以及第1、第3轻巡洋舰中队靠拢，并且也能继续将希佩尔引诱至杰里科处。但是，由于贝蒂一心想要切断德舰的退路，因此起初他可能并没有考虑这种机动的可能性。后来，当英国战列巡洋舰转向正东方向时，希佩尔将航向调整了15个罗经点，转向了东南方向，从而避免其退路被贝蒂切断，同时也将贝蒂引诱向了舍尔的方向。

问题：贝蒂队为何没能在交火开始前完成队形转换及航向调整？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.190-191; Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland - The Question of Fire Control, P.229）：

At 3.28 Lion hoisted the flag signal to turn E and increase speed to 25 knots. This was followed a minute later by a further hoist addressed to the 2BCS for them to prolong the line ahead. However, at 3.30, with the range from Lion at 23,000 yards, only the general order to all squadrons to turn E, speed 25 knots, was made executive. Instead, at 3.34 the 2BCS was ordered to prolong the line astern; to do so, they had to make two tight turns of almost 16 points first to starboard and then to port, which enabled them to haul into line at 3.45.
在15时28分时，狮号升起了一组信号旗，要求全体舰船转向正东方向，并将航速提升至25节。1分钟后，又升起了另一组信号旗，这是发给第2战列巡洋舰中队的，要求他们加入到编队的前方。然而，至15时30分时，只有转向正东方向，并将航速提升至25节的信号旗被降了下来（代表执行命令）。这个时候，狮号与德舰之间的距离已经只有23,000码了。并且，至15时34分时，贝蒂又改为要求第2战列巡洋舰中队加入编队的后方。为了执行这个命令，第2战列巡洋舰中队不得不接连做出两个大幅度的转向——先是向右舷方向，紧接着又是向左舷方向——其结果是，他们一直要到15时45分，才得以加入编队。

At 3.43, Lion hoisted the flag signal ordering the battlecruisers to form a line of bearing NW, while at 3.45, the line of bearing signal was hauled down (made executive). Lion also made a general flag signal to all ships to alter course together to ESE. In the British ‘Messages’, it was timed at 3.45, but, according to the Vice Admiral’s ‘Narrative’, it was made at 3.47. A line-of-bearing NW was formed from an easterly course by all the ships astern of Lion (the guide) fanning out to port, though the manoeuvre required almost seven minutes to complete.
在15时43分时，狮号升起了一组信号旗，要求战列巡洋舰组成面向东北方向的斜队，至15时45分时，这组信号旗被降下了（代表执行命令）。另外，狮号还发出了全体舰船同时转向，将航向调整为东南偏东的命令。根据官方战报，这条命令是在15时45分时发出的；但根据贝蒂自己的说法，这条命令是在15时47分时发出的。狮号后方的各舰，遂开始散开为扇形，并略微转向了左舷方向，以组成面向东北方向的斜队。但这个队形转换及航向调整的机动，需要花接近7分钟才能完成。

Having turned E, Beatty needed at once to form a line-of-bearing to prevent smoke interference; to alter course to ESE (or further) to reduce the rate, open the turret firing arcs and make it easier for the 2BCS to join the line. Instead, he waited ten minutes or more, with severe consequences. As the Germans opened fire, they had not completed the formation of the line-of-bearing, and the 2BCS were still struggling to maintain station.
当贝蒂把航向调整为正东后，他原本应该立刻将编队调整为斜队，以消除烟雾带来的干扰；他还应该将航向调整为东南偏东，从而降低距离变化率，并让每个炮塔都能投入战斗，另外这么做还可以让第2战列巡洋舰中队能更方便的加入战列线。然而，实际上他等了10多分钟才这么做，这产生了严重的负面影响。当德舰开火时，贝蒂麾下的战巡还没来得及完成队形转换，而第2战列巡洋舰中队则仍在调整自己的位置。

I hope a brief aside to explain this formation will help in understanding the next few hectic minutes on the British side. In simple lineahead, each ship followed in the wake of the leader. In battle, provided the wind and the enemy were both somewhere on the same side, one’s own funnel and gun smoke was carried onto the non-engaged side and did not interfere with gunnery. But smoke interference was potentially a problem if the wind blew from any point in the arc from dead ahead, through all points on the non-engaged side, to dead astern. If ships were then in line, either they could be enveloped in the smoke from those ahead, or the smoke from ahead was carried between each ship and its target. Either problem could be solved by forming a line of bearing, inclined towards the enemy, at an angle to their common course. If formed correctly, each ship had the smoke from all those ahead on her non-engaged side.
在队形问题这个话题上，我希望能通过简短的介绍，来帮助读者理解，接下来的几分钟内，英国舰队所面临的忙乱场景。在纵队的队形下，各舰只需要跟着先导舰航向就行了。在战斗中，如果敌方位于上风方向，即风是从交战侧吹来的，那么我方军舰的烟囱和炮口所排出烟雾，都会被吹向非交战侧，因此不会对我们的炮术发挥造成干扰。但如果风是从前方或后方吹来的，或者是从非交战侧吹来的，那么就会对我们造成干扰。在这种情况下，烟雾可能会飘散到其他军舰附近，或飘到敌我双方之间的区域，从而影响我们的视线。为了解决这种困扰，可以将队形转换成斜队，即斜着指向对方航向的队形。如果斜队的指向合适的话，那么从前方飘来的烟雾，都会被吹到非交战侧，从而降低影响。

结论：贝蒂之所以没能截断德舰的退路，主要责任在于他自身，是他一系列的决策失误导致的结果。而他没能及时完成队形转换及航向调整，同样是由于自己的决策失误导致的。在此情况下，贝蒂队只得以不利的态势，投入接下来的战斗了。

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五、前卫战，向南航行阶段

当希佩尔队完成转向，并向贝蒂队开火后，战斗就进入了前卫战的向南航行阶段。此时，铁公爵号（大舰队旗舰）与狮号之间，仍有约53海里的距离；而国王号（德国战列舰队中的先导舰）与吕佐夫号之间，则仍有约46海里的距离。

由于在接下来的战斗中，贝蒂与希佩尔都是向南航行的，因此舍尔会比杰里科更早加入战斗，但那也要等到近1个小时之后了。在此之前，双方战列巡洋舰才是战场上当之无愧的主角。在这个阶段，希佩尔队给贝蒂队造成了致命打击，取得了非常辉煌的战果。

英德双方的交战态势，15时48分 - 16时10分

双方的战列巡洋舰开始捉对厮杀时，英国第5战列舰中队还位于狮号后方约7.5海里处，因此无法在第一时间加入战斗。直到10分钟后，第5战列舰中队才加入战斗，但起初也只是向德国轻巡洋舰射击，要再过10分钟后，他们才开始向德国战列巡洋舰射击。受此影响，这个阶段，贝蒂的数量优势起初并不大，仅为6比5；后来当不倦号于16时05分殉爆沉没后，贝蒂更是丧失了数量优势。

另外，由于英国第1、第3轻巡洋舰中队原先都在往西北方向航行，并且在希佩尔掉头后，这些军舰也没能立刻转向，因此落在了后方，未能在接下来的战斗中发挥实质作用。而德国第2侦察群，同样也落在了后边，但由于希佩尔在掉头前已经召回了他们，因此落后程度尚可。在此情况下，双方的轻巡洋舰中，只剩下英国第2轻巡洋舰中队，处在了编队前方，即能够发挥实质性作用的位置。至于双方的驱逐舰，倒是大多都位于能够参与战斗的位置。

交战态势图，15时48分 - 16时10分

从下图中可以看到，交战开始时，德国编队已经组成了适合战斗的队形，而英国编队则仍在调整队形。英国第5战列舰中队和德国第2侦察群，则落在了双方战巡的后面；至于英国第1、第3轻巡洋舰中队，则落在了最后面。



双方战列巡洋舰的炮术表现，为何会有很大的差异？

双方战列巡洋舰开始交战后，英方的炮术表现很差，而德方的表现则要好得多。其背后的因素是：第一，能见度与风向，对英方不利，而对德方有利。第二，英方的火力分配出了问题，导致德方的德尔弗林格号处于没有被火力关照的情况下。这是一个非常低级的失误。第三，在交战之初时，英方正在进行队形转换及航向调整，这也大大增加了火控的困难度。

问题：能见度和风向对谁更有利？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.185 & P.192）：

Lion’s officers recalled that, as the flagship turned E, the day had been ‘glorious’, ‘perfect’, with just the masts, funnels and part of the hull of their target being visible above the horizon from aloft. Lion’s director layer confirmed: ‘When action was sounded, the light was good’, though he and others remarked that it deteriorated later. Beatty himself declared that, during the approach: The visibility at this time was good. Tiger’s gunnery officer recollected that, at first the weather was misty in patches, the visibility varying from 12 to 6 mile.
狮号上的军官们回忆道，当他们的军舰转向正东时（15时30分），天气是极好的、完美的，从火控桅楼上望去，可以看见敌舰的桅杆、烟囱、以及部分舰体已经从地平线上冒出来了。狮号的指挥仪俯仰瞄准手也表示，当战斗刚打响时，能见度很好。但他和其他人也都表示，后来能见度就变差了。贝蒂本人则表示，当双方战巡互相接近时，能见度是很好的。虎号的炮术官则回忆道，一开始天气是带些雾气的，能见度在6到12海里之间。

As the visibility became worse, it was more difficult looking eastward to make out the light grey hulls of the German ships in the mist, whereas, from the ISG, the British battlecruisers were silhouetted against a bright and clear western horizon.
当能见度变差后，英国人就难以在东侧的迷雾中分辨德舰的浅灰色舰体了，但对于德国人来说，英舰的舰影则被西侧的明亮清晰的地平线映衬地很清楚。

As Beatty headed E, a westerly wind would pile up smoke in the wake of his ships, causing interference to those further back in the line. Then, as he turned to starboard onto a similar course to the enemy, the wind would carry the smoke onto the engaged side...Hipper’s battlecruisers suffered no interference from their own smoke, which was carried by the wind onto the disengaged side.
当贝蒂转向正东时（15时30分），自西面吹来的风，会导致烟雾的飘散方向与军舰航向相同，进而导致其遮挡住旗舰后方的其他军舰的视线。随后，当贝蒂向右舷方向转向，将航向调整为与敌方大致平行后，风则会把烟雾吹向交战方向。而希佩尔麾下的战巡，则不会受到自身排出的烟雾的影响，因为风会将烟雾吹向非交战方向。

问题：为什么没有英舰向德尔弗林格号射击？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.186-189）：

At 3.46, Beatty ordering Lion and Princess Royal to concentrate on the leading German ship, with the remaining four ships to engage one-to-one with the four rear ships in the German line. This signal was not recorded in the logs of Tiger and New Zealand...Queen Mary engaged Seylitz rather than Derfflinger, contrary to Beatty’s concentration signal...Tiger did not take in the concentration signal. Like Queen Mary, she selected her opposite number in the German line rather than the next to the right. New Zealand missed Beatty’s concentration signal, although both New Zealand and Indefatigable chose the targets he intended for them.
15时46分时，贝蒂命令狮号和长公主号集火射击领头的德国军舰，其余四艘战巡则各自对抗相应位置的德舰。但在虎号和新西兰号的日志中，并没有记录下这条命令（玛丽王后号和不倦号在后续交战中被击沉了，因此无法确认他们是否收到命令）。实际情况是，玛丽王后号没有按照贝蒂的命令，与德尔弗林格号交战，而是选择与塞德里茨号交战。虎号因为没有收到集火射击的命令，因此也与玛丽王后号一样，选择射击其相对应位置的军舰，即毛奇号。新西兰号也没有收到集火射击的命令，但是该舰和不倦号选择的交战目标，倒是都符合贝蒂的命令要求。

The bad ‘funnel smoke of our battle cruisers ahead’ explains why Tiger did not receive Beatty’s concentration signal. Queen Mary seems to have had similar problems with signals and she too selected the wrong target. Both ships apparently ignored the provisions for fire distribution that had been part of fleet orders since 1913: that, when numbers permitted and subject to no enemy ship being unfired at, ships should concentrate on the enemy’s leading ship or ships. This was the distribution scheme assumed, without orders, by Princess Royal at 3.42 and by the 2BCS. However, they had clear views of the whole enemy line, whereas Tiger, and probably Queen Mary, did not. With the enemy fine on the port bow, the German flagship was especially likely to have been hidden by the smoke from ahead, so that either Tiger or Queen Mary could have mistaken the correct target on first sighting some of the enemy.
虎号之所以没收到贝蒂的集火射击命令，可能是由于受到了前方的几艘战巡所排出的烟雾干扰。玛丽女王号可能也遭遇了类似的困难，于是也同样选错了目标。但这两艘军舰都违背了自1913年以来就有的有关火力分配方面的作战命令：根据该命令，在具备数量优势的情况，且每一艘敌舰都能被我方火力关照到的情况下，我方军舰可以集火射击敌方的领头军舰。在15时42分，即贝蒂还没发出集火射击命令时，长公主号就已经预计到会采用集火射击方式了，而第2战列巡洋舰中队也是按照此原则来选择交战目标的。然而，这些军舰是能够看清整个德方编队的，而虎号，可能还有玛丽王后号，则看不清整个德方编队。由于敌舰在左舷的前方区域，因此德方的领头军舰，是很容易被排在玛丽王后号/虎号前面的英方军舰所排出的烟雾给遮住的。所以，虎号和玛丽王后号选错了目标，也可能是由于这个问题导致的。

双方战巡的射击目标选择

下图中展示了交战之初时，双方战巡的射击目标选择情况。可以看到，英国战巡的编队顺序是狮号、长公主号、玛丽王后号、虎号、新西兰号、不倦号；而德国战巡的编队顺序是：吕佐夫号、德尔弗林格号、塞德里茨号、毛齐号、冯·德·坦恩号。英国方面，狮号与长公主号在集火射击吕佐夫号，玛丽王后号在射击塞德里茨号，虎号与新西兰号在集火射击毛奇号，不倦号在射击冯·德·坦恩号，德尔弗林格号则被漏掉了。至于德国方面，则是吕佐夫号射击狮号，德尔弗林格号射击长公主号，塞德里茨号射击玛丽王后号，毛奇号射击虎号，冯·德·坦恩号射击不倦号，新西兰号则没有被火力关照到。由于德方数量比英方少一艘，所以这种情况是无法避免的。



问题：贝蒂的队形转换及航向调整命令，对炮术发挥带来了什么样的影响？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.191 & P.193-194 & P.196-199; Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland - The Question of Fire Control, P.234）：

Beatty himself probably did not fully understand the serious gunnery implications of his delayed orders. Unfortunately, at this critical moment, Beatty could not draw on the gunnery expertise of his flag-captain. Chatfield recalled: I was on the compass platform…with my small staff. Beatty remained for a time on his own bridge below me with his staff. Beatty did not join Chatfield until after Lion had opened fire. But another (though unsubstantiated) possibility is that Beatty had indeed intended to press in to the range of 12,000-14,000 yards, which, after the Dogger Bank, he thought ‘would suit us well’.
贝蒂本人可能并没有充分意识到，他那滞后的命令，会对炮术发挥造成多大的影响。不幸的是，在这个关键时刻，贝蒂和他的旗舰舰长查特菲尔德并不在一起，因此无法接受后者给出的炮术建议（查特菲尔德是炮术专家）。根据查特菲尔德的回忆，当时他自己在罗经舰桥上，而贝蒂则在下面那层舰桥上。直到狮号开火后，两人才碰头。另一种未经证实的可能性，则是贝蒂想要接近至12,000-14,000码的距离后再开火。在多格尔沙洲海战之后，贝蒂认为这才是适合他们的交战距离（因为在多格尔沙洲海战时，交战距离过远，导致命中率很低）。

Beatty, it seems, never explained what had been in his mind, but Hipper was in no doubt about the consequences of his headlong approach. The fact that the English Battlecruisers, [possibly] on account of bad light conditions or perhaps forming line of Battle too late, delayed opening fire, allowed us too to withhold our fire until the enemy was in effective gun range (15,000-16,000 yards). The possibility of obtaining a rapid gunnery superiority…is principally to be attributed to this delay in opening fire which compelled the enemy to remain a longer time within effective gun range.
贝蒂似乎从未解释过，他自己当时到底是怎么想的。但希佩尔则很清楚，贝蒂这么做会带来什么后果，他表示：“或许是因为能见度较差，也可能是因为组成战列线的时间太晚了，总之英国战列巡洋舰没有在第一时间开火，因此让我们得以进入有效射程后才开火。我们之所以能很快就建立起火力优势，主要原因就是因为敌方没有在更早时候开火。其结果是，敌方在我们的火炮有效射程内待的时间比较长”。

Once engaged, Beatty made no further manoeuvring signals. Without signals from the flagship, Beatty’s other battlecruisers were left, as required in Battle Cruiser Orders, to use their ‘initiative and judgement’ in following his movements and avoiding smoke interference...Lion began a series of small turns-away. By 3.55, she had settled on a course SbyE, which she held until 4 o’clock.
交战开始后，贝蒂没有再发出新的机动命令。在没有旗舰命令的情况下，其他战列巡洋舰就只能按照【战列巡洋舰队命令】中要求的那样，根据自己的判断和主动性，跟随旗舰行动，并设法避免烟雾干扰。此后，狮号进行了一系列的小幅度转向，在15时55分至16时00分之间，该舰的航向是南微东。

By 3.52, both Lion and Tiger had been hit twice. Up to four o’clock, Tiger took another six hits. At 3.54, Tiger’s Q and X turrets were hit, with serious consequences for her gunnery. At 4.00, a single shell struck Lion’s Q turret...immediately after the hit on Q turret, she turned away rapidly by almost three points...by 4.04, she had been brought onto a new course S...Meanwhile, at the rear Von der Tann began hitting Indefatigable, the latter disappeared under a towering cloud of smoke as she blew up; 1,071 officers and men were lost, all but two of her crew. From the Lützow it appeared about this time [c.4.05] as if the British flagship hauled out of line, with a list of 10 degrees to starboard; she seemed to disappear at times behind the other vessels wrapped in a thick pall of smoke. Beatty’s line was in disarray, and he had been decisively beaten in the gunnery duel, his ships making only six hits, whilst receiving at least 22. He had quickly lost gunnery superiority and was unable to recover.
至15时52分时，狮号和虎号已经各被击中2次了。至16时，虎号又多挨了6发炮弹。其中在15时54分时，炮弹击中了该舰的Q炮塔和X炮塔，进而对其炮术发挥造成了严重的影响。在16时00分时，狮号的Q炮塔被炮弹击中了（这发炮弹差点使得狮号发生弹药库殉爆）。被击中后，狮号立刻就做了一个3个罗经点的转向。至16时04分时，该舰的航向又调整为正南方向了。与此同时，在队伍末端，冯·德·坦恩号的炮火，开始陆续命中不倦号，后者随即发生弹药库殉爆，并在巨大的烟雾中沉入海中，死亡人数达到1,071名，仅有2人幸存。从吕佐夫号看来，此时（16时05分））英方旗舰似乎已经偏出了航线，并且带有10度左右的右倾，该舰被浓厚的烟雾笼罩着，有时甚至会消失在其他军舰后方。贝蒂的队形是混乱无序的，在炮战对决中也输得非常彻底，起初他没能取得炮术优势，随后也一直没能逆转局势——在这段时间里，英国战巡只打出了6发命中弹，但德国战巡却至少打出了22发命中弹。

结论：在当时的环境下，能见度与风向，的确对英方不利，但交战态势之所以明显不利于英方，主要还是因为人为因素导致的。英方的火力分配错误，与贝蒂未能在战斗开始前及时完成队形调整有一定的关系。不利于炮术发挥的航线选择，主要也是由于贝蒂的指挥导致的。

英德双方的交战态势，16时10分 - 16时30分

自16时08分起，第5战列舰中队的四艘战列舰，陆续开始向德国第1侦察群的战列巡洋舰射击，至16时15分时，排在队列最后的马来亚号也加入了他们的行列。在此情况下，这四艘战列舰的目标选择是：巴勒姆号和刚勇号集火射击毛奇号，厌战号和马来亚号则集火射击冯·德·坦恩号，于是德国编队后方的两艘战列巡洋舰，所承受的压力就骤增了，因而不得不通过频繁的之字规避机动来躲避英舰的炮火。

另一方面，德国编队前方的三艘战列巡洋舰，尚未受到新加入的第5战列舰中队的影响，仍然能够在数量均等的情况下与英舰交战。在此阶段，贝蒂队又有两次大幅度的航向调整。至16时26分时，在德尔弗林格号与塞德里茨号的集火射击下，玛丽王后号也殉爆沉没了，这使得交战双方的主力舰数量变成了8比5。此后不久，希佩尔做了一个大幅度的航向调整，从而暂时远离了战场。

交战态势图，16时10分 - 16时30分

从下图中可以看到，在暂时脱离战斗之前，希佩尔队的航向基本没有做出过调整，埃文-托马斯队也基本没有调整过航向，但贝蒂则有非常明显的航向调整。



第5战列舰中队投入战斗后，对战局产生了什么样的影响？

在前卫战最初的半个多小时内，英国海军明显是处于劣势的，因为他们接连损失了2艘战列巡洋舰。不过在第5战列舰中队加入战斗后，双方之间的交战态势有了不小的改变。除了数量对比上的变化之外，还有一个重要因素，对战局产生了影响，那就是第5战列舰中队优异的炮术表现。

问题：在这个阶段，英国战列巡洋舰、英国快速战列舰、以及德国战列巡洋舰，各自的炮术表现具体如何？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.202-203 & P.205-207）：

By 4.10, Lion, Princess Royal and, probably, Queen Mary were headed S, with Lion still out of line to starboard. Tiger and New Zealand were still hauling into line on more westerly courses. At 4.12, Lion boldly altered course by four points to SE; thus the range to Lützow began to close rapidly. Although without a signal from the flagship, Rear-Admiral Brock in Princess Royal responded appropriately by altering to SSE; by 4.19-20, Lion had evidently regained her position at the head of the line, since she too turned SSE...Lion’s steep approach without signals pushed Princess Royal and the ships astern into closing the range too quickly...Beatty’s impetuous tactics left his ships still forming line under fire. Worst of all, because the fire of the other British battlecruisers was too ineffective, Derfflinger and Seydlitz were allowed to continue almost undisturbed with their fortuitous but fatal concentration on Queen Mary.
在16时10分时，狮号、长公主号、可能还有玛丽王后号的航向，都是正南方向，其中狮号的位置有些偏右。虎号和新西兰号的航向则要更为偏西一些。至16时12分时，狮号非常大胆的进行了4个罗经点的转向，将航向调整为东南方向，因而其与吕佐夫号之间的距离被快速拉近了。尽管没有得到旗舰的命令，但长公主号上的布洛克少将，将航向调整为东南偏南，从而做出了妥当的回应。至16时19-20分时，狮号回到了编队中的正确位置，此时该舰也将航向调整为东南偏南了。狮号在没有发出命令的情况下，所采取的快速拉近距离的机动，迫使长公主号及后方的其他军舰，过于快速地向德舰靠拢了。贝蒂所采用的鲁莽的战术，使得他麾下的军舰不得不冒着敌舰的炮火调整队形。最糟糕的是，由于其他英国战巡的炮术表现非常低下，因此德尔弗林格号和塞德里茨号在几乎不受干扰的情况下，向玛丽王后号射出了致命的炮火。

The first salvo struck abreast of Q turret and may have started the fire that broke out in the working chamber. The big explosion forward broke the ship in half near the foremast, was probably caused by the second salvo. The after part, as far forward as the after funnel, was seen with the stern out of the water, the propellers still turning. It then rolled over to port and blew up; the explosion was perhaps set off by the fire in Q turret’s working chamber. Eighteen officers and men were rescued by the British destroyers (one died after the battle) and two by the German destroyer; 1,270 were killed in the two catastrophic explosions.
德舰的第一轮齐射打中了玛丽王后号的Q炮塔，可能在其换装平台中引起了火灾。随后，舰体前部发生了大爆炸，这可能是由第二轮齐射引发的。至于舰体后部，则是以舰艉向上的姿态沉入了水中，当时螺旋桨仍然还在旋转。不久之后，舰体发生了倾覆，并再次发生了大爆炸。这次爆炸可能是由Q炮塔的换装平台中的火灾引发的。这两次大爆炸导致了1,270人死亡，有18名舰员被英国驱逐舰救起（其中有1人在后续战斗中死亡），德国驱逐舰也救起了2人。

The first hit by the 5BS on Von der Tann had temporarily damaged her steering gear; at 4.20 and 4.23, the German battlecruiser also received two more hits. It is much more likely that these hits were due to the rapid and accurate fire of the 5BS. They holed, respectively, the fore and after barbettes; the fore turret was jammed abaft the beam for the remainder of the battle, while the after turret was out of action until 8pm and then had to be worked almost entirely by hand.
第5战列舰中队，在第1次击中冯·德·坦恩号时，就暂时性的打坏了该舰的舵机。随后在16时20分和16时23分，该舰又先后两次被击中，这也很可能是由第5战列舰中队打出的。这两发炮弹，分别击穿了冯·德·坦恩号的舰艏与舰艉的炮座装甲，其中舰艏炮塔因此被卡住了，在后续战斗中也一直未能修复；而舰艉炮塔也暂时无法使用了，直到20时才被修好，并且在修好后也基本只能通过人力来操作。

In the second phase of the Run to the South, the 5BS scored at least 5, probably 7, hits on Von der Tann and Moltke at long range. The ISG must be allowed at least another 12 hits on the British battlecruisers, as well as the hit on Barham. Whereas, if the two hits on Von der Tann are discounted, the British battlecruiser tally was only three.
在这个阶段（16时05分至16时30分之间），冯·德·坦恩号和毛奇号，至少被英国第5战列舰中队命中5发，可能多达7发，并且这些都是在远距离上打出的。而英国战列巡洋舰可能只打出了3发命中弹，至多也只有5发（那2发命中冯·德·坦恩号的炮弹，也有可能是英国战列巡洋舰发射的）。德国第1侦察群则至少命中英国战巡12发，外加命中巴勒姆号1发。

根据John Campbell的说法（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.49）：

The firing of the 5th Battle Squadron was much more impressive than that of the British battlecruisers in this period. The German Official historian, Captain O Groos, who was the Von der Tann's navigator at Jutland, says that their fire proved to be extremely effective, and that the rear ships of the German line were exposed to a regular hail of 15in projectiles. Salvos of closely spaced shells ,fired at extremely short intervals, fell all about them, and many explosions close to the hulls, caused the latter to shake and reverberate. Both Moltke and Von der Tann made alterations of course and speed to throw out the British fire control, and from Malaya's reports, they were zig-zagging at very short and regular intervals, and were never far off the mean course...The 5th Battle Squadron had the advantage over the battlecruisers of better range-finders - 15ft as against 9ft - and were far less exposed to German fire.
在这个阶段，第5战列舰中队的射击准确度，要比英国战列巡洋舰们高得多。德国官方战史的作者格鲁斯上校，当时在冯·德·坦恩号上担任航海长，根据他的说法，这些英国军舰的炮火非常有效，使得德国编队末尾的军舰，暴露在持续不断的15英寸弹雨之中。英国炮火的齐射散布非常紧密，射速也很快，因此炮弹落在了德舰的前后左右各处，有许多炮弹都在靠近舰体的地方爆炸了，使得德舰的舰体发生振动和回响。为了扰乱英舰的火控，毛奇号和冯·德·坦恩号都对航向和航速进行了调整，根据马来亚号的报告，这些德舰会频繁而持续地进行之字规避机动，且每次机动都不会大幅偏离平均航线。与战列巡洋舰们相比，第5战列舰中队在测距仪方面具备优势，前者装备的是9英尺测距仪，而后者装备的是15英尺测距仪。另外，后者较少遭到德舰炮火的干扰，而前者则一直暴露在德舰炮火之下。

问题：如何评价贝蒂队在前卫战向南航行阶段中的战斗表现？

根据J. E. T. Harper的说法（The Truth About Jutland）：

On the British side Beatty had under his command 4 battleships and 6 battle-cruisers against Hipper’s 5 battle-cruisers. In spite of this overwhelming preponderance of power, we lost two battle-cruisers, sunk by gunfire, while the enemy lost none. Considerably more damage was caused to our ships than they inflicted on the enemy. It is unpalatable - extremely unpalatable - but nevertheless an indisputable fact that, in this first phase of the battle, a British squadron, greatly superior in numbers and gun-power, not only failed to defeat a weaker enemy who made no effort to avoid action, but suffered what can only be described as a partial defeat.
贝蒂麾下拥有4艘战列舰和6艘战列巡洋舰，而希佩尔麾下则只有5艘战列巡洋舰。尽管英方拥有巨大的战力优势，但却有2艘战列巡洋舰被敌方炮火击沉，而敌方却无一损失。德舰对英舰造成的伤害，要远大于英舰对德舰造成的伤害。这种结果，显然是让人难以接受的，但这的的确确就是无可争议的——事实就是，在海战的第一阶段，一支在数量和火炮配置上都占据巨大优势的英国部队，不仅没能击败一支实力更为弱小，并且还没有试图避战的敌方部队，并且还遭受了不轻的损失——对此，除了“部分失败”这个词，实在也找不出更合适的伺候来形容了。

This regrettable result cannot be entirely explained away by the lack of armour protection of our battle-cruisers, the poor quality of the British shells, and the disadvantage under which, it is stated, our ships suffered after the first quarter of an hour in regard to light. The first of these factors certainly had considerable bearing on the total loss of our two ships, but does not account for the comparatively minor damage inflicted on the enemy. For this we must find other reasons, which were, without doubt, firstly, the delay in bringing the Fifth Battle Squadron into action, and, secondly, the inaccurate shooting of our battle-cruisers.
在这种让人失望的结果背后，固然有英国战列巡洋舰的装甲防护不足、英国穿甲弹的质量较差、英国方面在能见度上不占优势等因素带来的影响，但显然又并不能完全归咎于这些因素——装甲防护较弱的问题，可以用来解释英国方面为什么会损失2艘军舰，但无法用来解释德国方面为何受损甚微——对于后一个话题，第5战列舰中队的延迟参战，以及英国战列巡洋舰的拙劣炮术表现，显然也是重要的影响因素。

结论：在这个阶段中，贝蒂队之所以表现得不如希佩尔队，固然是有一些客观因素，但也有不少人为因素导致的差距。除了先前已经大篇幅介绍过的第5战列舰中队未能及时加入战斗的因素之外，炮术表现上的差距，也是很关键的——相比于英国战列巡洋舰，第5战列舰中队具备火控设备上的优势，并且也没有像前者那样长时间暴露在德舰的炮火压力下。另外，英国战列巡洋舰的大幅度调整航向的机动方式，也对其炮术发挥造成了干扰，而第5战列舰中队则并未作出会影响炮术发挥的机动。这些原因，都导致了两者的炮术表现存在较为明显的差异。

英德双方的交战态势，16时30分 - 16时48分

在战巡交战开始后，双方阵营中大部分的轻巡洋舰，都落在了队伍后面，唯有英国第2轻巡洋舰中队，一直都在贝蒂的前方，起到了侦察幕的作用。在16时30分时，南安普顿号轻巡洋舰通过无线电汇报，发现一艘德国轻巡洋舰——英国人发现的是位于公海舰队本队的编队最前方的罗斯托克号轻巡洋舰。在接下来的几分钟内，他们又陆续发现了更多的德舰。16时33分时，南安普顿号通过探照灯向贝蒂汇报，发现了德国战列舰。16时38分时，南安普顿号又通过无线电汇报，发现德国战列舰队。

在收到第一份报告后，贝蒂调整了航向，向着南安普顿号的方向驶去。几分钟后，德国舰队进入了贝蒂的视野之中。单凭贝蒂队的实力，显然是无法与整个公海舰队相抗衡的，因此在16时40分时，贝蒂通过信号旗发出命令，要求全体舰船向右舷方向进行180度掉头，其目的是向大舰队本队靠拢。这个动作，标志着前卫战向南航行阶段的结束。

在这一阶段，除了大舰之间的交锋之外，双方的驱逐舰部队，也都试图对敌方展开雷击，于是互相之间爆发了混战，其结果是，英方损失了涅斯托耳号和游牧民号驱逐舰，而德方则损失了V27号和V29号驱逐舰。在这些驱逐舰的雷击威胁之下，英国第5战列舰中队做出了一次规避机动，德国第1侦察群更是不得不接二连三地做出规避机动。

在躲避完英国鱼雷后，希佩尔于16时38分时，下令将航向调整为东南微南；后来他又在16时41分时下，将航向调整为南微西；舍尔则于16时42分时下令，各战列舰分队顺次转向，将航向调整为西北微北。这两支部队，此时都在试图对贝蒂队施加压力。

交战态势图，16时30分 - 16时48分

从下图中可以看到，当英国战列巡洋舰队遭遇德国公海舰队本队之时，德方并未处在最佳的截击位置上——希佩尔队位于贝蒂队的东北方向，而舍尔队则位于贝蒂队的东南方向，因此未能对贝蒂队形成两面夹击。



如何评价舍尔在遭遇贝蒂前所做的战术决策？

在遭遇贝蒂之时，舍尔实际上并未处在最佳的拦截位置上，因此贝蒂只用了一个敌前掉头机动，就成功逃出了德国战列舰队的火炮射程范围。舍尔当时是否有可能出现在更好的拦截位置上，与希佩尔一起对贝蒂进行左右夹击呢？

问题：舍尔为什么会出现在贝蒂队的左舷方向？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.215-218）：

After midday, the High Seas Fleet had continued N at 14 knots. At 3.10, following Hipper’s first unspecific report of enemy vessels, Scheer ordered ‘General Quarters’ (action stations) and ‘full speed’, an increase to 15 knots. When Hipper signalled at 3.35 that six heavy enemy ships were in sight steering N, he was about 50 miles from the main fleet. Then at 3.54 he announced that he was in action with six enemy battlecruisers that were now headed SE. At 4.05 Scheer turned NW; he also closed up his line between ships and between squadrons but continued in single line rather than reforming into the usual ‘preparatory formation’ of columns disposed abeam. At about this time, he also ordered Hannover to move to the end of the line; thus Rear-Admiral von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels would be able to lead the battlefleet should it be necessary to reverse course. Then at 4.20 Scheer turned W in the hope of catching the BCF between two fires.
当日下午，公海舰队正在以14节航速，向正北方向航行。15时10分时，基于希佩尔发出的敌情报告，舍尔下令进入战斗状态，并要求将航速提高到15节。当希佩尔于15时35分向其告知，发现有6艘敌方主力舰正在向北航行时，希佩尔与舍尔之间的距离大约为50海里。至15时54分时，希佩尔向其告知，他已经在与6艘英国战列巡洋舰交战，航向为东南。16时05分时，舍尔将航向调整为东北方向，缩小了各舰及各中队之间的间距，但仍旧维持着纵队队形，而未将其变更为并列纵队的预备队形。大约在同一时刻，他还命令将汉诺威号的位置移至编队最后方，以便在需要调转航向时，利希滕费尔斯少将可以在最前方引领整个编队。至16时20分时，舍尔将航向调整为正西方向，以试图对英国战列巡洋舰队进行夹击。

However, just as his ships were altering course, he received the report from Bödicker in Frankfurt that he had sighted what he identified as five ships of the 2BS. With the ISG apparently facing eleven heavy ships (and with the possibility of more battleships coming up in support) Scheer at once ordered his forces back to the course N that would gain touch with Hipper as quickly as possible. With action imminent, he ordered his destroyers to assemble on their flotilla leaders and the leader of flotillas, the light cruiser Rostock, and to move to starboard onto what would soon be his disengaged flank.
然而，正当他的舰队调整航向时，伯迪克少将从法兰克福号上发来了报告，后者声称他们发现了英国第2战列舰中队的五艘军舰（实际上是第5战列舰中队）。在此情况下，考虑到第1侦察群要独自面对11艘敌方主力舰，并且可能还会有更多敌方战列舰紧随其后出现，舍尔立刻下令，整个舰队回到之前的正北航向上，以便能尽快与希佩尔队汇合。由于战斗即将打响，舍尔还命令他的驱逐舰向各自的中队领舰靠拢，并要求驱逐舰部队的旗舰，罗斯托克号轻巡洋舰，将位置移至战列舰队的右舷方向，即非交战方向。

结论：舍尔原本是想对贝蒂进行夹击的，但在得知希佩尔遭遇了数量远胜于他的英国舰队后，为了尽快解救希佩尔，舍尔不得不放弃了夹击的策略。

seven_nana

六、前卫战，向北航行阶段

当贝蒂队完成转向后，战斗就进入了前卫战的向北航行阶段。另一方面，尽管铁公爵号还远在约66海里之外，但胡德队已经按照杰里科的命令，全速赶来支援贝蒂了。在大约1个小时后，这三支英国部队，就会完成汇合。在这个阶段，贝蒂队的任务从侦察转变成了诱敌，在他的引诱下，德国舰队在不知情的情况下驶向了大舰队所在的位置。

英德双方的交战态势，16时48分 - 17时10分

贝蒂在16时40分时发出的掉头命令，是发给整个舰队的，其麾下大部分舰船很快就响应了这个命令，随贝蒂一起驶向北方，但第2轻巡洋舰中队和第5战列舰中队，则并没有立刻响应贝蒂的命令——前者大约延迟了5分钟，后者则要到16时53分至16时57分之间的某个时间点上，才开始转向。在此期间，舍尔指挥的公海舰队追了上来，希佩尔指挥的侦察舰队也完成了掉头。此后，战斗由英国人追击德国人，变成了德国人追击英国人。

交战态势图，16时48分 - 17时10分

从下图中可以看到，由于贝蒂队进行了180度转向，因此原先落在最后方的第1和第3轻巡洋舰中队，再度成为了编队最前方的侦察幕，而第2轻巡洋舰中队和第5战列舰中队，由于转向时间较晚，因此成为了向北航行阶段中，落在了整个编队最后方的中队。



古迪纳夫和埃文-托马斯的转向，为什么延迟了？

古迪纳夫和埃文-托马斯，都没有在第一时间随贝蒂转向，但两者各有各的原因。前者的转向延迟时间并不长，也没有造成什么不良后果，后者的转向延迟时间则比较长，并且造成了第5战列舰中队被德国第1侦察群和第3战列舰中队围殴的凶险局面。对于这个情况，有许多学者提出过批评。

问题：古迪纳夫当时在做什么？

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.126-127）：

Goodenough had a reconnaissance task to perform for John Jellicoe. And so he stood on to the south, into the killing ground fully on the beam of the High Seas Fleet, to perform a classic piece of cruiser work. Astonishingly, as the 2nd LCS pressed closer and closer, the German battle-line forbore to fire at it although the little squadron was within easy reach (even of secondary armament) and the leading German battleships were plugging away at Beatty, who was barely a viable target. The reason, Goodenough discovered after the war, when he met a warrant-officer from the spotting-top of one of the German ships, was that while his four cruisers were closing more or less head-on, their nationality was unclear: they could have been Hipper’s 2nd SG fleeing to gain the protection of the battle-fleet.
古迪纳夫的肩上承担着为杰里科提供侦察情报的任务。为了完成这项经典的巡洋舰任务，他继续向南航行，一直冲到了公海舰队的有效射程范围内。当时位于编队前方的德国战列舰，正在顽强地试图追赶渐行渐远的贝蒂队，相比之下，第2轻巡洋舰中队的距离则要近得多，甚至已经进入了德国战列舰上的副炮的射程范围内，但令人惊讶的是，尽管双方距离越来越近，但德国战列舰们却并未向其开火。在大战结束后，古迪纳夫遇到了一位德国准尉，这才弄明白了原因——后者当时身处于一艘德国战列舰的校射桅顶上，根据他的说法，德国人当时无法判断这4艘向他们驶来的轻巡洋舰的国籍，他们认为，这有可能是希佩尔麾下的第2侦察群，正在寻求战列舰队的庇护。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.219）：

Undaunted, Goodenough pressed on to obtain more information and in the hope of making a torpedo attack. Nottingham fired a single torpedo set for extreme range at the seventh German battleship (Kaiserin of the IIIBS), though without success; the other three light cruisers concluded that they could not reach a position for an effective attack, presumably because their torpedoes had been set for long range. The 2LCS continued to advance bows-on to the enemy while the Germans, uncertain of whether they were hostile, still held their fire. At 4.45, Goodenough hauled down the turn signal that had been flying for the last five minutes. As soon as his ships veered away revealing their four-funnelled profiles, some half a dozen German battleships opened fire as the 2LCS retired in line-abreast with Southampton nearest the enemy. The 2LCS remained under a hot fire for most of the next hour. They were obliged to zigzag continually to dodge the enemy salvos, Southampton’s navigator steering the ship away from where he thought the next salvo would fall; they were so successful that the 2LCS survived without a single direct hit, though they were regularly deluged by shell slashes and showered with splinters from near misses.
古迪纳夫非常勇敢的继续向前冲去，以获得更多的情报，并期望能够有机会发起鱼雷攻击。诺丁汉号向德方编队中的第7艘战列舰（第3战列舰中队的皇后号），发射了1枚超远程模式（17,500码射程）设定的鱼雷，但并未取得命中。其余3艘轻巡洋舰则认为他们并未处在能够发起有效攻击的位置，原因可能是他们的鱼雷是采用远程设定（10,750码射程）设定的。当第2轻巡洋舰中队直直地冲向德国战列舰时，后者不确定前者是否是敌舰，因而没有开火。至16时45分时，古迪纳夫终于把5分钟前就升起的转向信号旗给降了下来（代表执行命令）。这些军舰开始转向后，就暴露出了四根烟囱的侧影（德国第2侦察群的4艘轻巡洋舰都是三根烟囱的），于是有五六艘德国战列舰都向这些英舰开火了。当时这些英舰正在以斜队的队形航向，其中南安普顿号距离德舰最近。在接下来的1个小时内，他们几乎始终都处在德舰的炮火笼罩之下。为了规避德舰炮火，这些英国军舰不得不采用之字规避机动，其中南安普顿号的航海长，采用了对敌方的炮弹落点进行了预判，并驶离该区域的做法。英国人的做法非常成功，尽管他们时常被近失弹的水柱和弹片袭扰，但没有1发直击弹击中第2轻巡洋舰中队的军舰。

问题：埃文-托马斯为何又没有及时转向？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.63）：

The 5th Battle Squadron was eight miles astern (that is, to the northward) of the battle cruisers when the general signal to turn was made. The Barham had not received the Southampton's enemy reports (arrangements for reception and decoding of W/T signals in the Barham must have been poor, though it is possible that reception was prevented by atmospherics) and definitely did not see Beatty's signal to turn, which was made by flags and was not repeated by searchlight, except to the Southampton, apparently.
当贝蒂发出全体转向的命令时，第5战列舰中队大约在其后方（即北侧）8海里处。巴勒姆号没有收到南安普顿号发出的敌情报告（该舰的无线电接收和解码工作显然很糟糕，但也有可能是大气噪声影响了无线电接收），显然也没有看到贝蒂的信号旗，另外这条命令也没有通过探照灯进行复述给巴勒姆号，而是只复述给了南安普顿号。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.129 & P.133）：

Beatty completed his turn and steadied on a north-westerly course to find Barham still some 7 miles off but now approaching rapidly from a relative bearing of about green 20° (i.e. 20° on Lion’s starboard bow), just showing her port bow but almost head-on. But what were they going to do now? Had both admirals stood on, their squadrons would have passed very close green-to-green. Then one of Beatty’s staff asked him on which side he wanted the battleships to pass, and he replied, “Our disengaged side” (i.e. his own port side). This decision required the BCF to alter to starboard, and Lion accordingly turned 4 points (45°) in that direction on to 347° (N mag.) at 4.44-ish, when Barham was still some 5½ miles away.
当贝蒂完成转向，正沿着东北方向航行时，他发现巴勒姆号位于狮号的右舷方向越20度处，距离他大约有7海里，且正在向他驶来。这时候他们应该怎么办呢？如果两位将官什么都不做的话，这两支部队可能会在非常近的距离上，以右舷对右舷的方式擦肩而过。这时贝蒂的一名幕僚询问他，希望战列舰们从哪个方向驶过，贝蒂则回答：“我们的非交战侧（即他的左舷方向）”。这个决策意味着战列巡洋舰队需要向右舷方向转向，于是狮号在16时44分时进行了4个罗经点的转向，将航向调整为正北方向，此时巴勒姆号与其还有5.5海里的距离。

Whether Evan-Thomas saw Lion’s aspect change, realized that he was the cause of it and sought to give his senior officer searoom, or whether he was merely avoiding a torpedo threat from German destroyers, he also altered to starboard, at 4.47, onto a course of about 177° (SbyW). The two groups were now set to pass red-to-red, less than 2 miles apart, in a very few minutes.
在16时47分时，埃文-托马斯也向右舷方向进行了转向，将航向调整为东南微南方向。他这么做的原因，有可能是看到了狮号的航向改变，意识到他挡了道，于是想给长官让路；也有可能他只是想避开德国驱逐舰的鱼雷威胁。总之这两支部队现在已经不处于交汇航线上了，他们之间的距离也只剩下了不到2海里，很快就会互相越过对方了。

Some minutes - probably three - before the flagships passed each other, Lion hoisted a flag signal ordering Evan-Thomas to “ALTER COURSE IN SUCCESSION 16 POINTS TO STARBOARD”. This was the order which was necessary to bring the 5th BS into line astern of New Zealand, allowing for the battlecruisers’ alteration to port (back to NW), as soon as the battleships were out of the way. The success of the manoeuvre depended on the order’s being executed by Lion, and implemented by Barham, at about the time the flagships were abeam. Unfortunately there occurred a communication hitch between the two flagships which, like the one at 2.35, was to have serious tactical consequences.
在双方旗舰互相越过对方的几分钟（可能是3分钟）前，狮号上升起了一组信号旗，命令埃文-托马斯“以顺次转向的方式，向右舷方向转向16个罗经点”。根据这条命令，第5战列舰中队会加入编队，并排到新西兰号的后方，并且等这些战列舰驶离后，战列巡洋舰们就可以立刻向左转向，从而恢复至西北方向的航线了。为了顺利地完成这个编队机动，狮号需要在即将与巴勒姆号交汇时，将信号旗降下（代表执行命令），而巴勒姆号则应尽快执行这条命令。不幸的是，双方之间的沟通再度出现了问题，并且与14时35分时那次一样，这次同样引发了严重的后果。

问题：如何评价贝蒂对埃文-托马斯下达的转向命令？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.64）：

This signal drew Jellicoe's fire in his unpublished post-war analyses of the battle. The 5th Battle Squadron should not have been ordered to turn in succession. 'If', comments Jellicoe, 'it was desired for any reason (none is obvious) to turn the 5th Battle Squadron up in rear of the Battle Cruisers, the proper course would have been to turn the ships together.' The turn would have been made more quickly had the ships turned together, and it would not have offered the Germans a 'turning point' at which to direct their fire as each of Evan-Thomas's ships turned in succession. The criticism needs qualification, for a turn of this nature would have resulted in the Admiral trying to conduct his squadron from the rear, and it is doubtful if the subsequent disadvantages of this would not have outweighted the hits on the turn.
大战结束后，杰里科撰写了一份有关此战的分析，他对这条命令提出了批评。杰里科认为，贝蒂不应该命令第5战列舰中队进行顺次转向。杰里科评论道：“如果想要让第5战列舰中队加入战列巡洋舰的后方的话，应该采取的方式是同步转向”。采用同步转向的话，该中队的转向所需耗费的时间会更少，并且也不会产生一个能够让德舰瞄准的“转向点”，即埃文-托马斯麾下的军舰在进行顺次转向时，所经过的那个位置。对于杰里科的这个批评，有必要补充说明的是，采用同步转向之后，中队指挥官所在的军舰，会成为中队中最靠后的军舰，他将不得不在编队后方指挥自己的部队。这种情况所带来的不利因素，或许会比在转向时被敌方炮弹命中，来得更为严重。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.131-132）：

Evan-Thomas could not be expected to know that Beatty intended, as soon as the 5th BS had passed, to alter back to port, across the 5th BS’s wake, to regain his NW’ly course, and for this reason wished the 5th BS to turn round to starboard. A 16-point turn to port would have swung the battleships round towards the advancing High Seas Fleet and would have caused them to describe more than a half-circle in total if they were to follow the BCF across their own wake.
贝蒂的想法，是在越过第5战列舰中队后，就向左舷方向转向，从而回到西北方向的航线上，因此他才会希望第5战列舰中队向右舷方向进行掉头。并且，如果要求这些战列舰向左舷方向进行16个罗经点的转向，就会导致他们与公海舰队战列舰之间的距离拉得过近；此外，在这种情况下，这些战列舰们实际上需要转上大半圈，才能跟上战列巡洋舰的航迹。但是，对于贝蒂的想法，埃文-托马斯显然是无从得知的。

Assuming that RA5BS’s tactical purpose was still to close his elusive senior, the BCF’s passing to starboard (green-to-green) would have made it obvious to him which way to turn. Seymour need only have flashed the instruction “PROLONG THE LINE”, or just “JOIN ME”, and Evan-Thomas could have judged his own turn to starboard and fallen into line astern, as Beatty now intended (see diagram overleaf (a)).
如果埃文-托马斯的战术意图，依然是追上他那位令人难以捉摸的上司（贝蒂）的话，那么只要战列巡洋舰们以右舷对右舷的方式越过埃文-托马斯，后者自然就明白应该如何转向了。在这种情况下，西摩尔（贝蒂的舰队通讯官）只需要在双方互相越过对方时，用探照灯打出“加入编队”或“跟上我”的信号，埃文-托马斯就可以自行判断出应该向右舷方向转向，随后加入编队后方。这实际上就是贝蒂的本意（见插图a）。

To have flashed “PROLONG THE LINE” or “JOIN ME” while passing to port would have invited Evan-Thomas to turn the wrong way (see (b)).
如果在以左舷对左舷的方式互相越过对方时，打出“加入编队”或“跟上我”的信号，则会导致埃文-托马斯向错误的方向进行转向（见插图b）。

To have flashed something like “PROLONG THE LINE, TURN TO STARBOARD” while passing to port would have made no sense to the recipient (see (c)).
如果在以左舷对左舷的方式互相越过对方时，打出“向右舷方向转向，并加入编队”的信号，则会让埃文-托马斯一头雾水、无法理解（见插图c）。

So, short of flashing Barham an elaborate explanation, Lion would now have no option but to take executive control of Evan-Thomas’s squadron and turn it to starboard with a formal tactical order by flag signal (see (d)) - and this at a time when the hapless Seymour’s signalling load was at its heaviest.
因此，在左舷对左舷的情况下，除非用探照灯向巴勒姆号打出一长串复杂的解释，否则狮号只能通过信号旗向埃文-托马斯发出正式的转向命令（见插图d）。不巧的是，倒霉的西摩尔这会正忙于处理大量的通讯任务。

Andrew Gordon所描述的四种场景的示意图

在右舷对右舷的情况下，埃文-托马斯向右转小半圈就能加入编队（插图a）；在左舷对左舷的情况下，如果贝蒂要求埃文-托马斯加入编队，后者正常来说会向左转向，但由于贝蒂会再做一个左转，于是后者实际上需要转大半圈才能加入编队（插图b）；另外，在这种情况下，如果贝蒂要求埃文-托马斯右转并加入编队的话，后者是无法理解的，因为对后者来说，在不知道贝蒂还要做一个左转的前提下，左转加入编队会比右转加入编队更快更便捷（插图c）；于是，就只剩下了历史上的那种选择（插图d）。



问题：埃文-托马斯到底是在什么时候转向的？

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.133-136）：

From the Official Despatches, published during Beatty’s First Sea Lordship, the belief gained acceptance that Beatty executed (i.e. hauled down) the signal at 4.48 and Evan-Thomas obeyed it at 4.57. If 9 minutes did indeed elapse between order and action, then, with the 5th BS advancing by 3½ miles and the van of the High Seas Fleet advancing obliquely by 3 miles, the range between the two would have closed by some 10,000 yards while Evan-Thomas presumably dithered. This is spatially impossible, for it would have placed Barham only about 12,000 yards (Malaya 11,000) from Scheer’s van at the end of the turn.
基于在贝蒂担任第一海务大臣时期发表的官方报告，人们逐渐开始认为，贝蒂是在16时48分时降下信号旗（代表执行命令）的，而埃文-托马斯则迟至16时57分时才执行命令。如果下达命令和实际开始转向这两件事之间，真的有9分钟的时间差的话，那么在这段时间内，第5战列舰中队会向前航行3.5海里，而德国公海舰队则会向前航行3海里（但双方航线并不是完全迎头相对的）。换句话说，如果埃文-托马斯此时真的出现了犹豫不决的情况的话，那么双方之间的距离会缩短10,000码左右。这就意味着，在英舰完成转向时，巴勒姆号与最靠前的德国战列舰之间的距离，会只有12,000码左右（相距马来亚号更是只有11,000码左右）。

There can be little doubt that Evan-Thomas turned Barham later than Beatty can have intended when he originated the signal. According to the Official Despatches, the 5th Battle Squadron turned at: 4.57 Beatty’s report, 4.53 Evan-Thomas’s report, 4.53 Barham’s report, 4.57 Valiant’s report, 4.55 Warspite’s report, 4.57 Malaya’s report. The average of these six offerings is 4.55 (although it is not clear whether the last three refer to the time of Barham’s turn or of their own subsequential turns: if to their own turns, we must subtract 1, 2 and 3 minutes respectively, and the average time for the flagship’s wheel-over becomes 4.54).
埃文-托马斯的转向时间，要比贝蒂在下达命令时所规划的转向时间更晚，这一点是毫无疑问的。对于具体的转向时间，各类官方报告中的记录情况如下：贝蒂的报告，16时57分；埃文-托马斯的报告，16时53分；巴勒姆号的报告，16时53分；刚勇号的报告，16时57分；厌战号的报告，16时55分；马来亚号的报告，16时57分。这两组数据的平均值是16时55分，但我们不清楚后三者记录的到底是巴勒姆号的转向时间，还是他们自己的转向时间，如果是后者的话，那么应该分别减去1、2、3分钟的时间，即巴勒姆号的转向时间的平均值，会变为16时54分。

There is in fact an impressive array of evidence and circumstantial factors which point to Lion’s ‘4.48’ signal’s having been hoisted, rather than hauled down, at 4.48...As 3 minutes is a reasonable time to expect to have a signal flying, we are justified in concluding that the signal was hoisted at 4.48, and that it was still flying when Lion passed Barham at 4.51-ish (by which time Barham had understood and acknowledged it, and it should have been hauled down). However - here we come to the crux of the matter - Barham went on for about another 3 minutes before turning, at an opportunity cost of 4,000 yards’ range on the High Seas Fleet...It seems clear, therefore, that Lion’s ‘4.48’ signal was not hauled down at 4.48, should have been hauled down at 4.51, and was not obeyed by Barham until 4.54.
有大量证据可以证明，在16时48分时，狮号才刚刚升起，而不是降下那组信号旗。从升起信号旗到降下信号旗，中间隔3分钟左右，是很常见的情况。基于这个情况，我们可以推断出，狮号是在16时48分时升起的信号旗，并且在16时51分前后，即狮号与巴勒姆号互相越过对方时，信号旗还挂在狮号的旗杆上。此时巴勒姆号应该已经看清楚信号旗，并读懂命令了，因此信号旗就该降下来了。这个时候，关键问题来了——巴勒姆号实际上继续等待了3分钟左右，才开始转向，这就意味着他与公海舰队之间的距离，拉近了4,000码左右。换句话说，狮号的信号旗并没有在16时48分时降下，且本该在16时51分时降下，但直到16时54分时，巴勒姆号才按照命令进行了转向。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.224-225）：

Around the time of 4.45, Lion’s unsteady signalling organisation was dealing with a rush of signals. At 4.43, the destroyers were recalled. At 4.45, a flag hoist, presumably intended mainly for the information of Evan-Thomas, announced the sighting of the enemy battlefleet bearing SE. At the same time, Lion’s semaphore instructed Princess Royal to report the sighting. Lion’s next signal, at 4.47, ordered Fearless to pick up men in the water (this must have referred to survivors of Queen Mary); but it is not mentioned in any of the despatches from the 1DF and may well not have been seen by them. SO BCF’s next signal ordered the 5BS to turn 16 points in succession to starboard, that is away from the BCF and the enemy further to the East.
在16时45分前后，狮号上那批靠不住的通讯人员，正在忙于处理一大堆命令。16时43分时，贝蒂下令将麾下的驱逐舰召回（先前这些驱逐舰被派出去发动雷击了）；16时45分时，狮号通过信号旗发出了“发现敌方战列舰队，位于东南方向”的信息，这条信息的主要目的应该是将情况告知埃文-托马斯；同一时刻，狮号又用旗语联系了长公主号，要求其向杰里科汇报敌方情报（狮号自己的无线电设备被打坏了）；16时47分时，狮号命令无恐号侦察巡洋舰前去救援落水的人员（显然是指玛丽王后号上的幸存者），但第1驱逐舰中队事后提交的报告中，并未提及该命令，可能是他们并未看见这条命令。再接下来，贝蒂对第5战列舰中队发出命令，要求其以顺次转向的方式，向右舷方向转向16个罗经点——也就是说，贝蒂要求后者朝向远离自己、也远离敌人的方向转向。

In the Official Despatches, it was listed with a time-of-despatch of 4.48. For flag signals, this was normally the time when the signal was hauled down, that is made executive. But, in this instance, as Lion’s assistant navigator at Jutland (later Rear-Admiral W S Chalmers, Beatty’s biographer) recalled, this was the time at which it was hoisted. Evan-Thomas recorded in his despatch: At 4.50 p.m., ‘Lion’ approached the Fifth Battle Squadron steering to the Northward with the signal flying to the Fifth Battle Squadron - ‘Turn 16 points in succession to starboard’; this turn was made after our battle-cruisers had passed at 4.53, and the Fifth Battle Squadron altered course a little further to starboard to follow and support the battle-cruisers. New Zealand’s gunnery officer confirmed that the ‘5th B.S. held on longer than the battle cruisers and finally turned up on our starboard quarter’; hence the turn was of 17 rather than 16 points.
在官方报告中，这条转向命令的时间记录是16时48分。对于用信号旗发出的命令来说，其时间记录通常是指降下信号旗的时间，即要求执行命令的时间。但在这个特定情况下，根据狮号的助理航海官威廉·查默斯上尉（后官至少将，并为贝蒂撰写了传记）的回忆，这个时间实际上是信号旗升起的时间。根据埃文-托马斯在事后提交的报告：“16时50分时，狮号向第5战列舰中队迎面驶来，其航向是正北方向，旗杆上挂着给第5战列舰中队的信号旗，要求我们以顺次转向的方式，向右舷方向转向16个罗经点。在战列巡洋舰们驶过后，我们于16时53分时完成了转向。为了跟上战列巡洋舰，并为其提供支援，我们还向右舷方向略微多转了一些”。新西兰号的炮术长也确认，第5战列舰中队的转向时间有点晚，并且最终出现在了我们的右舷后方的位置。也就是说，他们实际做了17个罗经点的转向，而不是16个罗经点。

By 1923, this signal and its timing had become part of the Jutland controversy and Evan-Thomas insisted: Fifth Battle Squadron was definitely ordered to turn to Starboard. The signal was ‘Compass 16’ which was not hauled down [until] some time after Lion had passed. Thus, in accordance with signalling protocol, Evan-Thomas did not execute the turn until the signal was hauled down, so that the 5BS was left trailing astern of the battlecruisers. In his despatch, Barham’s Captain Craig stated that the gap between them was ‘about two miles’. However, an officer in Malaya reckoned that ‘our battlecruisers...were already quite 7,000 or 8,000 yards [3½-4nm] ahead of us’, though this may have included the nine cables (0.9nm) between Barham and Malaya. Corbett gave the separation as ‘some three miles’.
至1923年时，这条命令及其发出时间，成为了有关日德兰海战的争议的一部分。埃文-托马斯坚持认为，第5战列舰中队收到的命令是以顺次转向的方式，向右舷方向转向16个罗经点，并且在狮号越过我们之后，又过了一段时间，这组信号旗才降了下来。因此，根据通讯规则，在信号旗降下来之前，埃文-托马斯一直没有执行这条命令，于是第5战列舰中队就落在了战列巡洋舰们的后面。巴勒姆号的舰长克雷格上校，在事后提交的报告中表示，完成转向后，双方之间的间距约为2海里。马来亚号的一名军官则表示，战列巡洋舰们在他们前方7,000到8,000码处（即3.5-4海里），但这个说法可能包含了巴勒姆号与马来亚号之间的9链（0.9海里）距离。科贝特（著名的海军史学者）认为间距约为3海里。

Until the signal was hauled down, the BCF and 5BS continued on opposite courses at a combined speed of 48 knots; each minute’s delay after Lion and Barham passed increased the subsequent gap between them by 0.8nm. Barham then advanced by about 500 yards (0.25nm) before completing the turn of 17 points onto course NbyE in two minutes, after which her speed was probably about 10 knots. During this turn, the BCF at 25 knots steamed ahead by 0.85nm. Thus if, as suggested by Andrew Gordon, the delay was as much as three minutes, the resultant gap would already have been 3.5 miles as the turn was completed. However, the gap would then have increased further while the battleships strove to regain their previous speed.
在信号旗被降下来之前，第5战列舰中队与战列巡洋舰们的航向是相反的，他们之间的相对速度是48节。换句话说，当狮号与巴勒姆号互相越过对方之后，每延迟一分钟，他们之间的距离就会拉远0.8海里。完成17个罗经点的转向，将航向调整为北微东，需要花费巴勒姆号大约2分钟的时间；在转向过程中，巴勒姆号会向前驶出500码（0.25海里）左右；在转向完成后，其航速则会下降至10节左右。在他进行转向的同时，战列巡洋舰们则会以25节的航速，向北驶出0.85海里。换句话说，如果像Andrew Gordon所说的那样，延迟时间长达3分钟的话，那么在完成转向后，双方之间的间距会多达3.5海里，并且在战列舰们努力恢复航速的过程中，这个间距还会被进一步的拉开。

To arrive at a better estimate of the actual delay requires a knowledge of both the speed lost in the turn and the rate at which it could be regained afterwards. Estimates indicate that, assuming that the eventual gap between the two flagships was between two and three miles, Lion’s signal was hauled down and Barham put her helm over between one and two minutes after they passed. To have enabled Barham to haul into line three cables astern of New Zealand, the turn sign would have had to be made executive about 55 seconds before the flagships would have passed.
若想要推论出更为准确的延迟时间，就需要弄清楚这些战列舰在转向时到底会损失多少航速，以及完成转向后，提升航速的速度有多快。估测结果表明，如果两位指挥官的座舰之间的间距，在2-3海里之间的话，狮号的信号旗应该是在双方互相越过对方后的1-2分钟内降下来的。如果想要让巴勒姆号能够加入战列巡洋舰们的编队，并保持在新西兰号后方3链（0.3海里）的位置上的话，那么狮号必须在双方互相越过对方之前的55秒时，就把信号旗给降下来。

问题：埃文-托马斯的迟到的转向，造成了什么后果？

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.140-141）：

While Evan-Thomas waited for Lion to haul down the signal to turn, Scheer’s vanguard division was advancing at a combined closing speed of 40 knots, and gained 4,000 yards. As a consequence, the Queen Elizabeths 1. missed the chance to fall into line astern of the BCF and operate thereafter with the battlecruisers as a united force; 2. were within range of the enemy fleet by the time they turned, and became the targets of heavy shellfire while they were turning; 3. continued to be the targets of concentrated and potentially fatal shellfire for a protracted period after their turn.
当埃文-托马斯在等待狮号上的信号旗降下来的同时，他与公海舰队之间的相对速度高达24节，且距离拉近了4,000码。其后果是，4艘伊丽莎白女王级战列舰错过了与战列巡洋舰们汇合成，并作为一个编队共同行动的机会；并且在他们转向的同时，敌人已经迫近到了其有效射程内，因此在转向过程，以及后续的追逐过程中，她们遭到了敌舰的持续的炮火攻击。

If one of the 5th BS had been disabled at the turn or at any stage during the subsequent ‘run to the north’ she would have shared the fate of Blücher at Dogger Bank. If she were abandoned by her sisters, the damage to the morale of the Grand Fleet would have been serious. If Evan-Thomas had turned his other ships back to help, they too would have been lost. Scheer would have achieved his dream of isolating and defeating a proportion of the Grand Fleet - and its most prestigious and powerful squadron to boot. This may be hypothetical, but it was only one unlucky shell, on a day of unlucky shells, from reality.
在进行转向，或向北航行的过程中，如果第5战列舰中队有一艘军舰被击伤掉队，她就会遭遇多格尔沙洲海战中的布吕歇尔号那样的命运（在围殴下被击沉）。如果其他姐妹舰抛弃了这艘军舰，那么大舰队的士气显然就会受到挫折。如果埃文-托马斯命令其他舰船折返救援，那么这些军舰可能也会被击沉，而舍尔则能达成他的梦想——孤立并击败大舰队的其中一部分——更何况，第5战列舰中队可是大舰队中最强大也最显耀的中队。这种场景虽然只是假设，但只需要一枚不凑巧的炮弹，它就有可能变为现实。

As it happens the QEs were very lucky, in the sense that none of them actually fell into the arms of their pursuers; but the damage they sustained, the 250 men killed, maimed and burned, and the risk of very much worse, were pointless and avoidable. The extra 4,000 yards which would have been retained by a timely turn-in-succession or a belated turn-together would have kept the High Seas Fleet just out of range, and enabled the 5th BS and BCF to operate as a single, tight, tactical force.
从实际结果来看，这几艘伊丽莎白女王级无疑是非常幸运的，在接下来的战斗中，没有任何一艘被德舰击沉，但也还是承受了较重的损伤，导致有250人伤亡。然而，这些损伤原本是完全可以避免的，如果他们能够及时进行顺次转向，或者尽管没有及时转向，但采用了同步转向的方式的话，都是可以避免那多余的4,000码距离的，也就可以避免自身进入公海舰队的射程范围内，同时还能让第5战列舰中队和战列巡洋舰们，组成一个紧密协同的战术部队。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.227 & P.233）：

As the 5BS turned in succession, they were vulnerable to a concentration of fire on the turning point: or, to be exact, on the same fixed arc around which each ship normally steamed one after the other. As each ship turned, it became the aiming point but, because the arc remained in the same place, no allowance was needed for the movement of the target along the line of fire. However, determining deflection was more difficult because the target’s speed fell throughout the turn and the target course was changing continuously. Probably, a suitable value, determined mainly by spotting, could only have been arrived at after a few ships had made their turns. Notwithstanding the difficulties, British officers expected a concentration on the turn and those in Malaya were in no doubt that they had been subjected to one. Captain Boyle confirmed that: ‘Enemy’s battle Fleet opened fire on the turn so “Malaya” turned short’.
当第5战列舰中队进行顺次转向时，他们的转向点会成为敌方军舰集火射击的目标——准确的来说，每艘军舰依次驶过的那段弧形的航线，会成为敌方的射击目标。换句话说，尽管军舰是在移动的，但由于那段弧形的航线是固定不变的，因此对于射击舰来说，是不需要就射击距离做出额外调整的。然而，由于在转向的过程中，目标舰的速度是在下降的，并且目标舰的航向也是在持续发生变化的，因此射击提前量的调整，反而会比通常情况下更为困难。可能只有通过校射的办法，才能获得一个合适的射击提前量数据，但在获得这个数据时，可能已经有好几艘船已经完成转向了。尽管这种集火射击并不是轻轻松松就能完成的，但英国军官们的确也预计到了他们转向时会遭到集火射击，尤其是马来亚号上的军官们，就更是对此确信无疑了（因为他们是排在最后的那艘军舰）。马来亚号的舰长博伊尔上校表示：“由于敌舰在向转向点射击，因此马来亚号提前转弯了”。

For all that, none of the British battleships were hit during the turn itself. But Barham, as soon as she steadied on her Northerly course, received a damaging hit at 4.56-58 and a second hit at 5.01. She was hit again at 5.08 and 5.10. Thereafter, she escaped further damage, as did Valiant throughout the Run to the North. Even though Warspite and Malaya had survived with their main armament, buoyancy and machinery largely intact, they had been in great danger; no wonder that, at 5.30, Evan-Thomas gave the order permitting each of his battleships to ‘Proceed at your utmost speed’.
实际上，在转向过程中，这几艘英国战列舰并没有被敌舰炮弹击中。不过当巴勒姆号完成转向后，她在16时56分至58分之间，以及17时01分时，各挨了一发炮弹。随后在17时08分和17时10分时，又被炮弹击中了。此后，该舰没有再遭到损伤。至于刚勇号，在整个向北航行的过程中，都没有受到损伤。至于厌战号和马来亚号，尽管在后续的交战中，她们的主炮、动力设备、以及舰体浮力都没有发生大碍，但的确是陷入了危险的境况。这种情况下，也难怪埃文-托马斯会在17时30分时下令，允许麾下各艘战列舰，各自以最高航速前进。

问题：埃文-托马斯为何不无视狮号的命令，并自行下令转向？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.64）：

It has been argued that Evan-Thomas need not have waited for the executive signal-that he could have carried out the order on his own initiative. But flag officers, like Evan-Thomas, with a long background of manoeuvring fleets by precise signals, did not do such things in those days.
有人说，埃文-托马斯不需要等待信号旗降下，说他可以基于自己的判断，去执行这条命令。但是那个年代的军官，并不会这么行事——像埃文-托马斯这样的将官，长期以来都是根据上级的命令，去执行编队机动的。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.149-150）：

If Beatty had refrained from signalling, RA5BS would probably have turned himself on his own authority at the right time - after all, he had been directing his squadron perfectly well on his own for the last two hours. But Lion’s act of hoisting a manoeuvring signal to RA5BS amounted to a resumption of executive responsibility for the 5th BS. Thus, Evan-Thomas was left hanging about while Seymour forgot to haul the signal down.
如果贝蒂没有发出那条命令，埃文-托马斯或许能基于自己的判断，在正确的时间点上进行转向——毕竟，在过去的2个小时内，他对自己中队的指挥是无可指摘的。但狮号升起信号旗，相当于直接控制了第5战列舰中队的行动。在此情况下，西摩尔（贝蒂的舰队通讯官）忘记了信号旗还没降下来，而埃文-托马斯则不得不等候命令下达。

However, the ultimate responsibility for the 5th BS rested with its appointed senior officer. There would have been no procedural problem in Evan-Thomas’s pre-empting or amending Beatty’s order to turn. His captains may have witnessed the signal to RA5BS, but it was not addressed to them. Beatty was not the squadron’s appointed flag-officer: he could not give orders to Craig, Woollcombe, Phillpotts or Boyle over Evan-Thomas’s head. It would even have been navigationally unsound for Beatty to exercise direct executive responsibility for a squadron which was not actually formated on him. Evan-Thomas was not there merely to be an automatic boost-transmitter for Beatty’s signals.
然而，第5战列舰中队的最终责任人，是该中队的指挥官本人。如果埃文-托马斯在信号旗降下之前，就提前执行了命令，或者干脆修改了贝蒂的命令，实际也不会遭到下属舰长们的反对——这些舰长们或许看到了转向命令，但这条命令并不是发给这些舰长们的——贝蒂不是该中队的指挥官，因此他不能越过埃文-托马斯，而直接给这些舰长们下令。从航海角度说，由于该中队与贝蒂并不在一个编队内，因此由后者直接控制前者的行动，实际上是有些不合理的，而埃文-托马斯也并不是一个负责接收贝蒂命令的机器人。

Inevitably, when discussing RA5BS’s options at 4.50, the term ‘obedience’ is produced by his apologists, partly as a shield against accusation of lack of initiative: they make their stand on his punctilious obedience both at 2.35 and at 4.50 as if he had no responsible alternative.
当埃文-托马斯的支持者们，在谈及这位指挥官在14时35分前后，以及16时50分前后的行为时，他们不可避免地会提及“服从”这个概念。在面临他人提出的“缺乏主动性”的指责时，“服从”实际上是一道护身符。按他们的说法，好像埃文-托马斯除了“服从”之外，就没有其他的职责了。

It need hardly be stated that a military organization depends on the probability that seniors will be obeyed: the idea is virtually tautological. But what if the delay in Lion’s executing the signal had been extended indefinitely, with Scheer bearing down on the 5th BS at a combined closing speed of more than 20 yards a second, for how many more minutes does the ‘obedience’ school consider Evan-Thomas should have continued rushing headlong to oblivion? Common sense says that Britain’s finest battle-squadron should not have found itself, in effect, ‘not under command’ at this critical juncture, and that, when Beatty passed on his opposite course, an admiral worthy of 120,000 tons of capital ships should have manoeuvred them of his own accord.
对于军事组织来说，下级应当遵循上级的命令，这是无需多言的。但当舍尔正以每秒20码以上的速度向第5战列舰中队驶来的情况下，如果狮号的信号旗始终没有降下来，那么对于那些强调“服从”的人来说，埃文-托马斯到底应该向敌人所在的方向继续航行多久呢？根据常识，在这个紧要关头下，英国最新锐的战列舰中队，不应该陷入六神无主的状态；而一位能够指挥总计12万吨排水量的主力舰的将官，在看见他的上级正在以相反的航线向其驶来时，也应该能根据自己的判断，下达转向命令。

结论：古迪纳夫没有立刻转向的原因，是因为他当时另有打算；而埃文-托马斯没有立刻转向的原因，则是因为他没有收到转向命令。后来，贝蒂又再度向埃文-托马斯发出了转向命令，但在贝蒂的错误决策及其下属的通讯失误的双重影响下，这条转向命令并不是最合理的，并且发出命令的时间也延迟了几分钟。再加上埃文-托马斯也的确有些死板，缺乏主动性，因此最终导致第5战列舰中队落入了德国公海舰队的射程范围之内。与之前那次情况类似，对于这一次转向延迟，两位将官也同样都负有一定的责任。

英德双方的交战态势，17时10分 - 17时35分

在完成转向之后，英国军舰尽管时不时也会做出航向调整，但大体来说，他们是往西北方向，即杰里科所在的方向航行的。至于德国，尽管各个中队之间的航向略有差异，但整体来说也是往西北方向进行追击的。在这个阶段，由于双方之间的距离普遍很大，因此德国第1侦察群未能延续先前的辉煌的炮术表现。至于德国战列舰队，尤其是位置靠前的第5、第6、第1战列舰分队，则一直对英国舰队穷追不舍，并与第1侦察群一起，对英国第5战列舰中队造成了较大的压力，并使得马来亚号战列舰受到了较为严重的损伤。尽管如此，这些英国军舰并未掉队，因而最终凭借着更高的航速，逐步拉大了他们与德国战列舰队之间的距离。

至17时33分时，担任贝蒂队先导舰的法尔茅斯号轻巡洋舰（该舰位于狮号前方约5海里处），终于发现了位于杰里科本队前方的屏护幕中最西侧的黑王子号装甲巡洋舰。另一方面，杰里科在得知贝蒂与希佩尔发生交战后，就于16时05分时，命令胡德率领第3战列巡洋舰中队前去支援贝蒂。经过一番赶路后，这支部队此时出现在了战场的东北侧，很快也要加入战斗了。

交战态势图，17时10分 - 17时35分

从下图中可以看到，双方部队都在向着西北方向航行，也就是说，在不知情的情况下，德国人正在逐步接近英国大舰队。另外，我们还能看到，在这个阶段，德国第1侦察群明显落在了英国战列巡洋舰们的后方，而德国公海舰队则在英国第5战列舰中队后面紧追不舍，这也使得战列巡洋舰队一度退出了战斗，而第5战列舰中队则成为了此阶段中，英国方面最主要的参战部队。



如何评价德方舰队的追击行动？

在向北航行的过程中，德国侦察舰队的航速有些偏慢，因而被英国战列巡洋舰队甩开了距离；而德国公海舰队尽管在尽全力追赶，但其队形则有些散乱了。除此之外，对于舍尔的追击决策本身，也有学者提出过质疑。对于这些话题，我们将逐一进行评论。

问题：希佩尔队为什么没有跑出最高航速？

根据John Campbell的说法（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.97 & P.103）：

Hipper's failure to pursue Beatty as soon as the 1st Scouting Group turned north, allowed his opponent to escape from an action at ranges where further disaster to the British Battlecruisers might well have occurred, and although Hipper subsequently steamed at 26kts for a time, he was unable to close the range sufficiently for effective firing in the decreasing visibility. However, if Hipper had chased immediately after Beatty at full speed, he would have been exposed to the fire of the 5th BS to a greater extent than was actually the case, and this could well have led to very serious damage to the German battlecruisers...The 1st Scouting Group were wary of approaching the 5th Battle Squdron too closely, and during the ‘Run to the North’ their range was at least 17,000yds with a maximum of around 20,500yds at about 1720.
当第1侦察群转而向北航行后，希佩尔未能尽快追上贝蒂，这导致了后者逃离了前者的有效射程范围，因此尽管希佩尔后来曾一度用26节航速追击，但由于能见度下降了，因此他无法把距离缩小到有效射程范围内。由于这个缘故，在这个阶段内，德舰并未对英国战列巡洋舰造成严重的损伤。然而，如果希佩尔立刻全速追赶贝蒂的话，那么第5战列舰中队的火力，可能会进一步集中在他身上，进而导致德国战列巡洋舰们受到非常严重的损伤。在向北航行的阶段中，第1侦察群一直小心翼翼地避免快速靠近第5战列舰中队，两者之间的距离始终不低于17,000码，最远距离则出现于17时20分前后，当时双方距离达到了20,500码左右。

问题：舍尔队的队形为什么有些散乱？

根据V. E. Tarrant的说法（Jutland, the German Perspective: A New View of the Great Battle, 31 May 1916, P.99）

When it was reported by look-outs in Konig's foretop that the enemy battlecruisers were turning to the north, Scheer ordered the Fleet to make a two-point turn to port by divisions at 5.45, so that the battleships advanced towards the enemy in six columns.
当国王号上的桅顶中的瞭望哨，发现英国战列巡洋舰向北转向后，这个信息很快就上报给了舍尔，于是后者于16时45分时下达命令，要求整个战列舰队以分队为单位，向左舷方向转向2个罗经点，于是就形成了一个由6个分队组成的并列纵队。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.224-225）：

At 4.58, Scheer ordered a turn by divisions to NW and demanded ‘Utmost speed’. But on this course only the fore turrets could bear and he turned back to NNW at 5.05. Perhaps to keep all their guns bearing, the four Königs of the leading Vth Division continued NNW until they turned briefly away to N at 5.06 (this was about the time that Onslow and Moresby were attempting a torpedo attack) and then back to NNW at 5.11.
在16时58分时，舍尔命令各分队将航向调整为西北方向，并将航速提高至极速。但在这个航向下，德舰只有舰艏炮塔才能指向英舰，于是在17时05分时，航向又重新调整回西北偏北方向了。第5战列舰分队的4艘国王级战列舰，并没有遵循第一条转向命令，其原因可能是为了让其余炮塔也能指向敌舰。在17时06分至17时11分之间，这4艘军舰曾短暂地将航向调整为正北方向，其目的是躲避英国驱逐舰发起的雷击。在17时11分时，他们的航向又调回了西北偏北方向。

根据John Campbell的说法（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.98）：

The 5th Division did not comply with the earlier course signals...the 6th Division conformed approximately to Scheer's orders, and as a result of these divergent courses, and also of the 5th Division's higher speed, the distance between the Konig and Kaiser, which was little over a mile at 1648, had increased by c3000yds at 1710.
第5战列舰分队（4艘国王级）没有遵循舍尔的转向命令，而第6战列舰分队（3艘皇帝级）则遵循了舍尔的命令，这就导致他们之间的航向出现了差异。再加上第5战列舰分队的航速也要更高一些，因此尽管在16时48分时，国王号和皇帝号之间仅有1海里出头的距离差，但至17时10分时，又额外增加了约3,000码距离（即增加到了超过2.5海里）。

问题：舍尔的追击决策本身，是否合理？

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.409）：

If the story of Jutland were a work of fiction, one of several flaws in the plot would be the manner in which Scheer kept following Beatty in a direction which should have told him that VABCF had some agenda other than straightforward escape. This was the German C-in-C’s second ‘death-wish’ mistake at Jutland. It was as if he was carelessly tempting fate to turn Hipper’s Ausfallsflotte victory into his own Risikoflotte defeat, and it was certainly a failure of staff-work in Friedrich der Große. But, for the time being, the pursuit appeared to be cost-free; and Scheer was hoping that a British capital ship would (in von Hase’s words) “be so damaged as to fall a prey to our main fleet”. It was surely this incentive, combined (no doubt) with group pressure on the admiral’s bridge, which occluded his judgement and enabled Beatty to lead him by the nose.
如果日德兰海战是一本虚构的文学作品的话，那么舍尔对贝蒂的追击行动，无疑是故事情节中的一个重大的败笔——从贝蒂的航行方向来看，他显然并不是简单的在逃跑，应该还有其他的目的才对啊！这是公海舰队总司令，在日德兰海战中犯下的第二个“自杀性”的错误。舍尔的做法是如此的冒险，就好像是他想用他自己的公海舰队的失败，来掩盖希佩尔的侦察舰队所取得的胜利一般——对于这个决策，大选帝侯号上的参谋团队，显然是难辞其咎的。不过，在当时的情景下来看，这个追击行动似乎是完全无害的，用德尔弗林格号的炮术长冯·哈泽中校的话来说就是：“舍尔希望能击伤英舰，待其失速掉队后，便会称为公海舰队的猎物”。在胜利欲望的刺激下，在舰桥上的其他军官们的恳切期望下，舍尔做出了错误的决策，从而被贝蒂牵着鼻子走了。

结论：希佩尔队的航速较低，是因为希佩尔不想让自己成为英国战列巡洋舰及快速战列舰的集火射击对象。而舍尔队的队形散乱，则是多重因素共同作用下的结果：首先，在交战开始，舍尔前将编队从纵队调整成了并列纵队。其次，由于各个战列舰分队的航速不太一致，而舍尔又要求提高至极速，因此并列纵队的队形就很难维持了。最后，第5战列舰分队指挥官基于自己的判断，选择了有别于总司令命令的航向。在这些因素的共同影响下，导致德国战列舰队的队形变得有些散乱了。至于舍尔的追击决策，的确是有些莽撞或者说盲目的成分在里面，毕竟如果贝蒂只是想逃跑的话，那他应该往西边航向才对啊！

英德双方的交战态势，17时35分 - 17时55分

在前卫战向北阶段的最初的近1小时内，能见度依然还是对德方更有利的，但随后就开始变得对双方都不利，甚至对英方有利而对德方不利了。受此影响，在后续的战斗中，德方的炮术表现有了较大的下滑。另一方面，战斗发展至这个阶段，贝蒂队、杰里科队、以及胡德队，终于即将汇合成一支完整的大舰队了。

交战态势图，17时35分 - 17时55分

从下图中可以看到，当贝蒂队向杰里科队靠拢之时，他也成功地将德国舰队引诱到了杰里科的面前。如果以杰里科队作为原点的话，那么贝蒂队位于其右前方，而胡德队则位于其正前方略微偏左，他们一起构成了一个口袋，而德国舰队则正在往这个口袋中钻。此时德国舰队实际上已经被英国舰队三面包围，但却还蒙在鼓中毫不知情，可谓是落入了非常凶险的境地。



在向北航行的过程中，贝蒂队的表现是否称职？

贝蒂所指挥的战列巡洋舰队，既能作为一支半独立于大舰队之外的部队，承担打击任务，对抗敌方巡洋舰部队；同时也能够作为大舰队的前卫，承担侦察任务，将敌方情报汇报给杰里科。在前卫战的向南航行阶段中，他承担的任务主要是前一类，且表现得并不太好。在前卫战的向北航行阶段，他承担的任务主要是后一类，那么他表现得又如何呢？

问题：自发现德国战列舰队起，贝蒂队向杰里科汇报了哪些情报？谁做的比较好？谁做的比较差？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.77-78）：

The battle cruisers have often been indicted for (1) their failure to maintain touch with the enemy during the whole of the run to the north and (2) to give the C.-in-C. frequent and reliable information on the enemy battle fleet's position, formation, and strength. Jellicoe himself has remarked: Had Sir David Beatty reported the position of the German Battle Cruisers at 5.40 p.m. when he once more came in sight of them and re-engaged, the difficulties of the Commander in Chief would have been greatly lessened, but he made no report of any kind between 4.45 p.m. and 6.6 p.m., the latter report being in reply to urgent enquiries from the Commander in Chief.
有不少人都指责说，在向北航行的过程中，英国战列巡洋舰队未能始终与敌方舰队保持接触，并且也没有将敌方舰队的准确信息，如位置、队形、规模等，持续地发送给大舰队总司令。杰里科自己就曾表示过：“如果贝蒂能在17时40分，即德方战列巡洋舰再度出现在他视线范围内，并与之发生交战时，将敌方位置汇报过来的话，总司令所面临的决策难度，就不会那么高了；但是在16时45分至18时06分之间，贝蒂没有汇报过任何信息，并且连18时06分的那次报告，也是因为总司令先进行了询问，所以贝蒂才做出回复的”。

Beatty knew that Goodenough's squadron were providing the C.-in-C. with a flow of reports. This did not, of course, relieve him of his responsibility of keeping the C.-in-C. informed of the enemy's position, course, and speed. In fact, neither the light cruisers (other than Goodenough's) nor the battle cruisers appreciated the vital importance of making enemy reports continually by wireless, although the G.F.B.O.s were very specific on this primary duty of all cruisers before battle was joined-that is, before the main fleets engaged.
贝蒂知道，古迪纳夫向总司令汇报了很多信息。但是，这并不意味着贝蒂自己就不用向总司令汇报敌方的位置、航向、速度等信息了。事实上，尽管【大舰队战斗命令】明确强调，在主力决战开始之前，所有巡洋舰的主要任务，都是侦察并汇报敌情，但除了古迪纳夫之外，其余各支战列巡洋舰和轻巡洋舰中队的指挥官，都没有通过无线电，向上级持续汇报敌方情报。

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, P.78-79）：

The best position to keep in touch with the enemy Battle Fleet was astern of the 5th Battle Squadron, and this position was taken up by the Southampton. She hung doggedly on to the enemy under fire, and though her reports were somewhat marred by mistakes and discrepancies in reckonings, they show that she had a clear conception of her task and did her best to fulfil it. The 5th Battle Squadron had been in sight of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, and might well have made a report, when it was lost to sight at about 5.25 pm. The Barham’s wireless was out of action, and the Malaya had received heavy punishment, but the Valiant certainly was in a position to make a report, and the fact that not a single report was sent in by the 5th Battle Squadron, clearly shows that its importance to the Commander-in-Chief had not been sufficiently appreciated.
与敌方战列舰队保持接触的最佳位置，是第5战列舰中队的后方。当时南安普顿号就处在这个位置上，在敌舰的炮火面前，该舰表现的非常顽强。尽管其汇报内容中存在一些错误，且给出的自身位置存在一些误差，但很显然，他们非常清楚自己所承担的指责，并且也尽力去履行了这份职责。另外，第5战列舰中队也与敌方战列舰队保持着接触。在17时25分时，德国战列舰队消失在他们视线中了，此时本可以做出汇报的，但他们并没有这么做。巴勒姆号的无线电设备的确被击毁了，马来亚号则遭到了德国舰队的痛击，但刚勇号是可以完成这项工作的，然而在这段时间内，第5战列舰中队连一份情报都没有发出过。显然，他们并没有意识到，对于杰里科来说，情报有多么的重要。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.421-424）：

Goodenough has been too much praised and Beatty too much blamed. Beatty’s token effort to inform his C-in-C of the enemy’s whereabouts was a feeble gesture for the senior officer of the Grand Fleet’s ‘advanced forces’. Commodore Goodenough did well to have reported the High Seas Fleet three times by five o’clock, but his ensuing silence hardly justifies the plaudits which historians have heaped upon him.
历史学家们给了古迪纳夫过多的赞美，同时又给了贝蒂过多的批评。作为大舰队下属的前卫舰队的司令，贝蒂只是象征性地向上级汇报了有关敌方的情报，这个表现固然是不称职的。至于古迪纳夫准将，的确在17时之前，三次汇报了公海舰队的相关情报，但此后就陷入沉默了，因此很难说他配得上历史学家们给予他的赞美。

The real problem, however, seems to be with RA5BS, senior officer of the loose-ish group of ships remaining in contact with the enemy. Evan-Thomas’s failure to report has been remarked upon by historians, though they were presumably unaware of its full irony. This man was one of the RN’s highest authorities on signalling ‘process’. That he should not now think of signalling to Jellicoe the enemy’s position, course and speed, was an abnegation of his specialized career-credentials and an extraordinary testimony of his lack of ‘product’ awareness. Barham’s main W/T had been severed from its aerials, and her auxiliary W/T smashed up; but she was in close company with three perfectly articulate sister-ships, all of whom would presumably have maintained a pointless wireless-silence. All it needed was a few seconds’ semaphoring from Barham to Valiant to arrange for updates to be sent to the C-in-C every ten minutes. If W/T was not to be made use of at a time like this, what in the world were they carrying it for?
然而，真正的问题，应该是出在第5战列舰中队的指挥官，埃文-托马斯的身上。这支部队一直是与敌方保持接触的，历史学家们也指出了他未能汇报敌情的问题，但他们可能并不知道，在英国海军中，埃文-托马斯实际上是通讯方面的权威人士——这是整件事中，最为讽刺的部分。埃文-托马斯没有通过无线电，向杰里科汇报敌方的位置、航向、速度等信息的事实，这无疑证实了他是一位缺乏主动性的军官，并且还是一位在自己专精领域内都不称职的军官。巴勒姆号的无线电设备，的确是受损了，但她附近还有三艘姐妹舰，能够完成这项任务。然而，这几艘军舰一直保持着无意义的无线电静默状态，事实上，巴勒姆号只需要通过旗语告知刚勇号，每隔10分钟向总司令汇报一次敌情，就可以了。如果在这样的情形下，还不使用无线电的话，那这些设备还能用来干嘛呢？

结论：在这个阶段，除了古迪纳夫之外，贝蒂及其麾下的其他指挥官们，都没能尽到作为巡洋舰部队指挥官应尽的侦察职能，且即便是古迪纳夫的表现，也只能说是矮子里拔将军。另外，在这些人中，表现最差的并不是饱受指责的贝蒂，而是埃文-托马斯。

英德双方的交战态势，17时55分 - 18时10分

贝蒂与杰里科的汇合，标志着前卫战向北航行阶段的结束。在主力决战即将打响之前，贝蒂队和胡德队，对希佩尔队进行了左右夹击，而大舰队前方的巡洋舰侦察幕，此时也投入了战斗；在此情况下，德国侦察舰队遭到了压制，不得不向公海舰队本队的方向进行回撤。

在交战过程中，伴随第3战列巡洋舰中队的切斯特号与坎特伯雷号轻巡洋舰，与战列巡洋舰们走散了；在随后的战斗中，切斯特号与德国第2侦察群发生了遭遇战，并在对方的优势炮火下遭到重创。而同样伴随第3战列巡洋舰中队行动的4艘驱逐舰，也与德方的轻巡洋舰及驱逐舰们进行了混战，其结果是英方的鲨鱼号和阿卡斯塔号驱逐舰被重创。除此之外，贝蒂队麾下的昂斯洛号驱逐舰，此时单枪匹马对德国舰队发起了冲击，该舰发射的鱼雷击中了威斯巴登号，但自身也受到了重创。这艘驱逐舰的舰长，就是后来官至海军元帅的约翰·托维（John Tovey）。

交战态势图，17时55分 - 18时10分

从下图中可以看到，挡在英国战列舰队与德国侦察舰队之间的，是包括英国第1、第2、第3战列巡洋舰中队，第1巡洋舰中队，第1、第3、第4轻巡洋舰中队等在内的大量巡洋舰部队。他们在各自部队的指挥官的主动意识下，组成了一道屏护幕，遮挡住了位于其身后的英国战列舰队。



如何评价双方巡洋舰部队在这个关键时刻中的表现？

在这个阶段，贝蒂队与杰里科队完成了汇合。他们之间的汇合，在难度上显然要高于希佩尔队与舍尔队的汇合。原因在于，后两者分开的时间更短、过程中发生的状况较少，而前两者分开的时间更长，过程中发生的状况也更多。此外，对于伴随战列舰部队行动的巡洋舰部队来说，侦察/反侦察是一项非常重要的战术职能。在这个阶段，英国巡洋舰部队成功地对德国巡洋舰部队施加了压迫，导致其未能发现英国战列舰队。基于以上两点，是否可以认为，在这个阶段中，英方巡洋舰部队发挥出了优异的战术表现，而德方的战术表现则相形见拙了呢？

贝蒂队与杰里科队是如何汇合的？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.247）：

At 5.30 or 5.33, Falmouth sighted ‘two or three cruisers approaching from the NW’. They must have been Black Prince and Duke of Edinburgh. At 5.36, Falmouth informed Black Prince by searchlight of ‘Battle Cruisers engaged to the SSW of me’. While Napier ought to have reported his sighting to Beatty as well, there is no record of such a signal. Beatty’s despatch states only that: At 5.50 p.m. British Cruisers were sighted on the Port Bow, and at 5.56 p.m. the leading Battleships of the Grand Fleet bearing North 5 miles.
在17时30分或17时33分时，法尔茅斯号发现，西北方向有两至三艘巡洋舰正在驶来。这显然是指黑王子号和爱丁堡公爵号。17时36分时，法尔茅斯号通过探照灯告知黑王子号：“在我的西南偏南方向，战列巡洋舰正在交战”。内皮尔少将本该把他看到的情况汇报给贝蒂的，但从通讯记录来看，他并没有这么做。而贝蒂的报告中则只写到：“17时50分时，在舰艏左舷方向发现了英国巡洋舰；17时56分时，发现了大舰队的战列舰，其位置在北侧5海里处”。

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, P.69-70）：

At 5.13 the Commander-in-Chief made his position to the Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Force. This was evidently his 5 pm position, but as no time was mentioned in the body of the signal, the Lion probably gave it the time of origin, in which case the Iron Duke would appear to be 13 minutes (or 4 miles) behind the Commander-in-Chief’s reckoning. This in itself would not be serious, but in conjunction with other cumulative errors of reckoning, would throw out the Lion’s bearing of the Iron Duke.
在17时13分时，杰里科向贝蒂告知了自己的位置。准确地说，他告知的是自己在17时的位置，但并未在无线电文中提及此事，因此狮号可能将其误认为是发报时的位置了。于是这两个位置之间，存在13分钟（4海里）的误差。这件事本身并没有那么重要，但是，在结合了贝蒂与杰里科各自的航位推算误差后，问题就变得严重了。

The Commander-in-Chief in his dispatch says that ‘it was apparent on meeting that the reckoning of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was about 12 miles to the eastward of the Iron Duke’s reckoning’. This was the cumulative effect of a series of three errors: (a) Firstly, the Iron Duke’s position by reckoning at 5.13 pm was 4.3 miles (13 minutes at 20 knots) ahead of the position given to the Lion. This was due to the omission of a specific time in the Iron Duke’s signal of 1713. (b) Secondly, the Iron Duke’s real position was 4½ miles ahead (that is, to south-eastward) of her reckoning. (c) Thirdly, the Lion was actually some 6¾ miles to westward of her reckoning.
杰里科在其报告中写道：“当双方汇合时，战列巡洋舰队的航位推算位置，在铁公爵号的航位推算位置的东侧，距离约12海里”。这背后的原因有三方面：第一，在17时13分时，铁公爵号向狮号告知了自己的航位推算位置，但并未标明对应的时间，这导致了狮号对铁公爵号位置的认知，存出现了4.3海里的偏差（以20节航速航行13分钟的结果）。第二，相比于航位推算位置，铁公爵号的实际位置，要向东南方向偏出4.5海里。第三，相比于航位推算位置，狮号的实际位置，要向西侧偏出6.75海里。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.250）：

This was much closer than he had previously expected. It was now certain that something more decisive was required. He no longer had the searoom to continue NE’wards in order to shepherd the enemy across the heads of Jellicoe’s columns in preparation for a port deployment in that direction. In any case, this had ceased to be a possibility because, although the German battle line was still steering NNE, Hipper was now leading the head of their line Eastwards. Furthermore, as stipulated by the GFBOs, Beatty’s primary functionwas the destruction of the enemy battlecruisers; thus, with the ISG rapidly disappearing into the smoke and mist on their new course, he too had to respond by turning E, which he did at 6.00. This course had other attractions. Without changing course too sharply, it turned Lion away from the rapidly approaching Marlborough. And it could still take the BCF across the heads of the battleship columns to a position ahead of the port division.
贝蒂与杰里科之间的实际距离，要比贝蒂此前预想的近得多。他原本的打算，是将敌方舰队引至杰里科的前方，以便让后者向左舷转向，向东北方向展开为战列线。但如今，由于两支舰队之间已经没有太多空间了，因此贝蒂已经无法再继续向东北方向航行了。在这种情况下，贝蒂必须做出决断。另外，尽管德国战列舰队仍然在向东北偏北方向航行，但希佩尔已经转而向东航行了，因此贝蒂也没法再引导他们向东北方向前进了。再者，根据【大舰队战斗命令】中的规定，贝蒂队的首要职能，是摧毁敌方战列巡洋舰，因此当德国第1侦察群调整航向，并消失在浓烟与迷雾中后，贝蒂也必须要转向东方。在18时00分时，贝蒂这么做了。选择这个航向，还有另外的好处——在不作出大范围的航向调整的情况下，狮号驶离了正在快速向其靠近的马尔伯勒号，同时还让战列巡洋舰队能够从大舰队前方穿过，到达其位于最左侧的分队的排头位置。

18时00分时，贝蒂队与杰里科队的相对位置

下图中，X点是狮号在18时00分的实际位置，Z点是狮号在18时00分的航位推算位置；A点是狮号根据17时13分时的那份情报推算出的铁公爵号在18时00分的位置，B点是铁公爵号号在18时00分的实际位置，B'点是狮号实际看到铁公爵号后，误以为其所在的位置（误会的原因是狮号自己的实际位置与航位推算位置之间存在误差），C点是铁公爵号在18时00分的航位推算位置；XZ之间存在6.75海里的误差，AB之间存在9海里的误差，AB'之间存在14海里的误差，BC之间存在4.5海里的误差。

A点位于Z点的北偏西35度方位，两者距离15.5海里；B点位于X点的北偏东32度方位，两者距离5.5海里；换句话说，对于狮号而言，在18时00分时，双方的实际位置，相比于狮号根据航位推算掌握的位置，无论是在方位上，还是距离上，都存在较大出入。



问题：双方的巡洋舰部队，当时具体是如何对抗的？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.74）：

With Beatty's alteration from N.N.W. to N.N.E. at 5.35 (a four-point turn to starboard to adjust course for meeting the battle fleet) and Hipper's alteration to N.W. (four points to port at 5.26 to conform with Scheer's general signal to steer N.W.), the two battle-cruiser forces found themselves converging...For the first time during the action, visibility conditions favoured the British. The sun, low in the sky, appeared through the mist behind Beatty's ships and dazzled the eyes of the German gunners, making it increasingly difficult for them to range and spot. British gunners, with the enemy's ships now clearly visible and at relatively short range, took full advantage of their opportunity. They were aided by the fact that Hipper was practically unsupported by Scheer, as the distance between them had increased from three to six miles. The concentrated fire of Beatty and Evan-Thomas was so hot and telling that Hipper, unable to reply owing to the bad visibility to the westward, was forced to turn back to N.N.W. (5.47), then to N. (5.51), and to order his flotillas to attack.
在17时26分时，希佩尔根据舍尔的命令，向左舷方向进行了4个罗经点的转向，将航向调整为西北方向。在17时35分时，贝蒂向右舷方向进行了4个罗经点的转向，将航向从西北偏北方向调整为东北偏北方向，以便与战列舰队汇合。这就使得两支战列巡洋舰部队处于交汇航线上了。此外，自战斗开始以来，能见度一直是对德方有利的，但此时却开始偏向对英方有利了。低垂的夕阳正位于贝蒂队的后方，那透过迷雾射来的阳光，将德国炮手的眼睛照得目眩，使得测距和校射工作变得愈发困难；同时，这缕阳光还将德国军舰照得清晰可见，因此英国炮手得以在如今相对较近的距离上，充分发挥他们的炮术能力。另外，由于希佩尔与舍尔的距离越拉越远，已经从起初的3海里增加到了6海里，因此后者已经难以对前者进行支援了；在此情况下，贝蒂和埃文-托马斯的炮火都集中在了希佩尔身上，并且希佩尔还受到了糟糕的能见度的影响，难以对西侧的敌舰进行还击，于是不得不在17时47分时，将航向调整为西北偏北方向，并在17时51分时进一步调整为正北方向，同时命令麾下的驱逐舰发起雷击。

A new opponent had suddenly appeared, the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron (Hood), with four destroyers and the light cruisers Canterbury and Chester in company. At 5.56 Hipper altered course to the east under pressure from Beatty. When heavy shells began to pitch near his ships from the north-eastward - from Hood's squadron - he believed he had run into the British battle fleet. He promptly turned his ships together to S.W., that is, in the opposite direction (6.05), and fell back on Scheer...Beatty's outflanking action (whether or not he had this effect in mind) and Hood's unexpected intervention, by forcing Hipper to the eastward and southward, had concealed from him all sight of Jellicoe's approach. This was to put the German battle fleet in a perilous position when Jellicoe deployed.
此时，又有一支新的敌方部队突然出现了，那就是胡德少将所指挥的第3战列巡洋舰中队，以及伴随其行动的2艘轻巡洋舰和4艘驱逐舰。在17时56分时，希佩尔队再度转向，将航向调整为正东方向，以缓解来自贝蒂队的压力。当胡德队发射的大口径炮弹自东北方向射来，并落在他们军舰附近时，希佩尔还以为他遇到了英国战列舰队，于是在18时05分时，他迅速将航向调整为西南方向，即与来袭炮弹完全相反的方向，并向舍尔队靠拢。贝蒂的包抄行动（无论他是不是有意这么做的），以及胡德的意外干预，迫使希佩尔首先向东，随后向南转进，因而使其错过了发现杰里科队的机会，这就导致后来杰里科将舰队展开为战列线时，德国舰队处在了一个危险的位置上。

Before the Germans could extricate themselves, the 2nd Scouting Group, Hipper's light-cruiser screen, had been severely punished by Hood's battle cruisers, which had opened fire on it at 5.50. The Wiesbaden was partly crippled and the Pillau and Frankfurt were badly hit, at the cost to Hood of one destroyer. Apart from being an important factor in Hipper's decision to turn round and close Scheer, the most important results of Hood's surprise appearance were that it drew off the previously launched destroyer attack on Beatty and committed the flotillas to an attack on the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, from which they did not recover in time to interfere with the deployment of the British battle fleet.
自17时50分起，胡德队的战巡们，就已经在向第2侦察群，即希佩尔麾下的轻巡洋舰们射击了。在这些德舰脱离险境之前，他们已经受到了严重的损伤——威斯巴登号几乎已经被打瘫了，皮劳号和法兰克福号也受损颇重。胡德队的突然现身，不仅对希佩尔的战场决策产生了重要影响，使得其选择调转航向与舍尔汇合，更重要的是，胡德还吸引走了德国驱逐舰的注意力——后者原本是要向贝蒂发起鱼雷攻击的，但随后改为向第3战列巡洋舰中队发起雷击，于是当英国战列舰队现身时，这些驱逐舰们已经远离了适合发起雷击的位置，因而无法阻挠英国战列线的展开了。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.431-432）：

Beatty came round to starboard to close the range and thence to barge Hipper over towards the north-east. It is usually assumed that VABCF was trying to prevent his German opposite from sighting, and giving Scheer early warning of, the Grand Fleet. But it cannot have been clear to him that such a movement would serve that purpose, and it is more likely that he was merely pushing Hipper in the rough direction of Jellicoe’s centre, in the knowledge that Scheer must follow in support of his junior.
贝蒂向右舷方向进行的转向，拉近了他与希佩尔之间的距离，因而把后者赶往了东北方向。一般认为，贝蒂的举动，意在避免希佩尔发现大舰队，从而让舍尔得到提前预警。但在当时的情况下，贝蒂是无法得知他的行为能起到这样的作用的。实际上，他的这种做法，更有可能是想把希佩尔赶往杰里科队的正中央的位置，并认为舍尔也会跟上去为希佩尔提供支援（进而就会撞上英国大舰队）。

Beatty, hitherto the senior British officer engaged, had shrugged off losses. He was, once again, setting the agenda, and was now within an ace of completing his allotted military task. Although his tactics were less than the master-plan which immediate hindsight could construe them to be, in von Hase’s view, by completely outflanking us in spite of our highest speed, [he] accomplished an excellent tactical manoeuvre, and his ships carried out an admirable feat of technique. He accomplished the famous ‘crossing the T’, compelled us to alter course, and finally brought us into such a position that we were completely enveloped by the English Battle Fleet and the English battlecruisers.
作为前卫战阶段的英方最高阶指挥官，贝蒂摆脱了惨重损失带来的影响。在这个阶段，他再度成为了主导局面的那个人，并且眼见着即将要完成他的战术职能。尽管从事后诸葛亮的角度看，贝蒂所采用的战术还不够完美，但根据冯·哈泽（德尔弗林格号的炮术长）的观点，贝蒂的战术机动非常优秀，他手下的军舰也表现出了高超的技术，从而成功完成了对德国侦察舰队的翼侧包抄。贝蒂摆出了著名的T头之势，从而迫使德国舰队改变了航向，进而落入了英国战列巡洋舰和战列舰们的包围圈中。

Hipper, in von Hase’s words, “did not grasp the object of the enemy’s manoeuvre” and, fearing that the BCF was trying to cross his T, yielded as required. But he shortly found himself confronted by a fresh squadron of British dreadnoughts which suddenly materialized out of the murk to the east. It was this fortuitous appearance of Horace Hood’s 3rd BCS which turned Hipper back onto Scheer and debarred him from performing a vital reconnaissance function.
冯·哈泽还认为，希佩尔没能看清敌方机动的目的——他害怕自己撞上英国战列巡洋舰队的T头，于是退却了；但不久之后，他又与一支从东方的迷雾中突然现身的英国部队发生了遭遇。正是由于第3战列巡洋舰中队的意外出现，导致了希佩尔决定掉头后撤与舍尔汇合，从而使得他没能完成最主要的侦察任务（即发现英国大舰队）。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.249 & P.258）：

Between 5.53 and 5.55, the ISG made their large turn to course E. Hipper had several pressing reasons for altering course decisively. First, his battlecruisers were under a hot fire from the BCF and the 5BS, to which they could not reply effectively because of the deteriorating visibility. Second, they were experiencing difficulties in maintaining the high speed that they needed to keep their opponents, especially the 5BS, at long range; clinker from stony coal was clogging their furnaces, the stokers and coal trimmers were becoming exhausted and, in some ships, the supplementary oil firing had been choked by sediment from the fuel tanks. And, third, from 5.36 Hipper’s light cruisers of the IISG on his starboard side had been in action with Chester, one of the two light cruisers in company with the 3BCS. Admiral Hood’s battlecruisers themselves engaged the IISG from 5.50 to 6.00. Rear-Admiral Bödicker in Frankfurt did not report his predicament until 6.00 (he then described his new opponents as enemy battleships) but, since Hipper turned E soon after the 3BCS opened fire, his turn was probably hastened by the sound and flashes of heavy guns in that direction and his realisation that his light cruisers needed immediate support.
在17时53分至55分之间，第1侦察群做了一个大幅度的转向，将航向调整至正东方向了。希佩尔之所以这么做，有几个重要的原因：其一，他麾下的战巡遭到了英国战列巡洋舰队及第5战列舰中队的集火射击，且他们自己还受制于糟糕的能见度，无法对其进行有效的还击。其二，希佩尔队无法再继续维持高航速了——其原因是多方面的，首先铲煤工们已经相当疲劳了；其次是煤炭燃烧产生的煤渣，堵塞了锅炉的炉膛；另外，在部分舰只上，由于燃油舱内存在沉淀物，因此燃油管道也被堵塞了——在这些因素影响下，希佩尔就很难再与敌舰，尤其是第5战列舰中队保持距离了。其三，自17时36分起，伴随英国第3战列巡洋舰中队行动的切斯特号轻巡洋舰，就与德国第2侦察群的轻巡洋舰交上火了。而胡德少将麾下的战列巡洋舰们，则是在17时50分至18时00分之间，与第2侦察群进行了交战。但是，身在法兰克福号轻巡洋舰上的伯迪克少将，直到18时00分时才报告了他的遭遇，并且还将他新遇到的敌人描述成了敌方的战列舰。相比之下，希佩尔的转向时机则要更早一些——在胡德开火后，希佩尔可能是通过重炮的炮口火光和隆隆响声，判断出了其方位，并意识到了他麾下的轻巡洋舰急需得到支援，于是他很快就转向了正东方向。

Hipper turned E between 5.53 and 5.55, but enemy cruisers and destroyers then appeared to the North and seemed to be assembling for a torpedo attack. They were probably the advanced forces of the Grand Fleet and the BCF meeting up amidst enough confusion to preclude any concerted action. But to Hipper they appeared a real danger when his own flotillas had been drawn Eastwards to attack the 3BCS. According to the German signal list, at 5.59, a minute before Frankfurt reported that she was under fire from enemy battleships, Hipper ordered the ISG to turn away to starboard together onto an opposite course, though other sources give later times. Even if Bödicker’s report did not prompt Hipper’s decision to turn away, it surely convinced him that his position was untenable and that he must at once fall back on the High Seas Fleet, some seven miles astern.
当希佩尔在17时53分至55分之间转向正东方向后，敌方的巡洋舰和驱逐舰开始从北面出现，并且看起来正在组织鱼雷攻击。这些部队可能是大舰队的前卫部队，以及与其相遇的贝蒂队。当时的情况相当混乱，显然英方是无法做出什么协同行动的，但对于希佩尔来说，在他麾下的驱逐舰们已经前去攻击东侧的第3战列巡洋舰中队的情况下，这些新出现的英舰，看起来像是个实打实的威胁。根据德国海军的通讯记录，在17时59分时，希佩尔命令第1侦察群向右舷方向进行同时转向——这要比法兰克福号报告其遭到了敌方战列舰的攻击，还要早1分钟——不过也有其他资料称，希佩尔的转向晚于法兰克福号发出报告。无论在希佩尔决定向南转向时，他有没有收到伯迪克的报告，这份报告显然会让他进一步确信，不能继续呆在目前的位置上了，而是应该向南回撤，与7海里之外的公海舰队进行汇合。

结论：在情报问题和航位推算误差的双重影响下，杰里科队并未出现在贝蒂队预期的位置上，并且预期与实际之间的误差是颇大的。另外，由于贝蒂队的先导巡洋舰，并未将自己发现大舰队前卫的情况告知贝蒂，因此当后者实际看到大舰队时，双方已经相当接近了。不过结合德国舰队的实际位置与航向来看，这两支英国舰队的汇合方式，也不算太差，而贝蒂后续做出的机动，也较好地弥补了误差导致的问题。

另一方面，在贝蒂及其他英国巡洋舰部队的压迫下，德国巡洋舰部队在短时间遭到了多重威胁，这就使得战场决策变得非常困难了。或许在希佩尔看来，他们已经无法独自应对这些威胁了，因而不得不选择暂时撤退并与后面的大部队汇合。如果他不进行回撤，或许会遭受较为沉重的打击，但也可能会及时发现英国战列舰部队的真正位置。历史固然无法假设，但如果当时他做出了不同的决策的话，日德兰海战的主力决战，很可能会以不同的方式展开。

seven_nana

七、主力决战，第一阶段

当贝蒂与杰里科完成汇合后，战斗就进入了主力决战的第一阶段。在这个阶段，英国战列舰队完成了从行军队形向战斗队形的转变，成功地组成了战列线。与此同时，德国舰队仍然被蒙在鼓里，径直冲向了大舰队，两者的航线近乎于垂直——这种态势，叫做T头。在当时的海军战术下，没有比这更糟糕的情况了，这是整场海战中，德国舰队第一次陷入重大危机。

由于在日德兰海战中，英国大舰队曾先后两次占据T头优势，因此这个阶段，又名第一次T头。

英德双方的交战态势，18时10分 - 18时20分

当铁公爵号收到伽拉忒亚号发出的第一份敌情报告时，英国战列舰队仍在以15节的航速前进。自14时35分起，这些军舰开始逐步提速，此外他们也不再定期进行之字规避机动，而是采用笔直前进的方式，向交战方向赶去。此后，杰里科又陆续收到了若干敌情报告，但由于其中的信息大多存在一定误差，因此杰里科很难掌握准确的敌方情报。直到他与贝蒂队汇合后，通过数次主动询问后得到的答复，杰里科才大致掌握了德国舰队的方位信息。

18时15分时，杰里科下达了“向东南微东方向进行等速机动展开”的命令。在作为先导舰的第1战列舰分队旗舰，英王乔治五世号的引领下，英国战列舰队逐步展开成了一条由24艘战列舰构成，总长度接近12,000码的战列线——有史以来最为强大的战列线，即将要成型了！

另一方面，在18时10分时，希佩尔率领的德国第1侦察群调转了航向，舍尔率领的公海舰队则紧随其后，双双冲向了英国战列线。

交战态势图，18时10分 - 18时20分

从下图中可以看到，在双方主力即将发生交锋之时，英国第1、第2战列巡洋舰中队、以及第3轻巡洋舰中队，从大舰队的前方横跨了过去；而第5战列舰中队、以及第1、第2轻巡洋舰中队，则落在了后面，于是这些原本在一起行动的部队，就分为两股了。



杰里科是在什么样的情况下，做出展开战列线的关键决策的？

杰里科在做出展开战列线的决策时，所面临的挑战是非常大的——相比于具备上帝视角和后见之明的我们，他当时所掌握的情报，无论是在数量上、还是准确度上，都相去甚远。

问题：杰里科为何需要掌握敌方战列舰队的方位与航向等情报？

根据J. E. T. Harper的说法（The Truth About Jutland）：

It was of the utmost importance for Jellicoe to know, as accurately as possible, the position of the enemy battle fleet relative to his own position. It was also important for him to know from time to time the direction in which the enemy was steering. With this knowledge he would have been able, with some certainty, to forecast the bearing on which he would sight the enemy. To form the battle fleet into line of battle - or in other words, to deploy - before reliable information of the enemy’s position was obtained would have been the negation of sound tactics. If possible, the deployment should be made in time for the
whole battle fleet to be in line of battle shortly before the enemy is actually within gun range; which, in these days of long range, means shortly before the enemy is sighted.
对于杰里科来说，敌方战列舰队的相对位置与航向，是他必须掌握的重要情报。有了这些信息之后，他才能较为准确地预测出他会在什么方位上发现敌方的踪迹。如果在没有掌握可靠的敌方位置信息的情况下，将战列舰队展开为战列线，就意味着我们将会把战术优势拱手让人。如果可能的话，应该尽量在我方进入敌方火炮射程之前，就完成战列线的展开。考虑到现在的火炮所具备的长射程，这就意味着需要在敌人即将进入目视距离之时，就开始战列线的展开机动。

问题：在贝蒂队与杰里科队互相接触之前，杰里科收到了哪些情报？其准确度如何？

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, P.65-67）：

The first sign of the enemy came from the Galatea at 2.20 pm...Up to 3.30, then, the encounter appeared as an affair of light cruisers...In the course of the next half hour, however, the situation began to harden. At 1540 an important signal came in from Beatty reporting five battle cruisers North-East of him, and between that time and four o’clock six signals were received. By the Iron Duke’s reckoning, the Lion at 3.35 pm, when she sighted the enemy, bore S 16° E, 60 miles from the Commander-in-Chief. At 3.55 pm an important signal arrived: Beatty was engaged. After 4 o’clock the reports shut down, and for three-quarters of an hour the Commander-in-Chief received no news of the situation. He was evidently somewhat anxious about it, for at 4.15 he asked Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas if the 5th Battle Squadron was in company with Beatty’s force, and received a reply in the affirmative...It was now 4.30, and there was no indication of the enemy Battle Fleet appearing on the scene, but in the next quarter of an hour the whole situation underwent a dramatic change. The first token of it was a signal from the Southampton reporting a cruiser to the South-East
第一份敌情报告，是由伽拉忒亚号，在14时20分发出的。此后，截止至15时30分为止，双方之间的交战，仅限于轻巡洋舰。但在接下来的半个小时内，情况发生了变化。在15时40分时，贝蒂发来了一份重要的报告，表示在他东北方位有五艘敌方战列巡洋舰；此后，截止至16时为止，杰里科总共收到了6份有关敌方战巡的报告。根据铁公爵号的航位推算，在15时35分时，即狮号发现敌舰的时候，该舰应在铁公爵号的南偏东16度的位置，两者之间的距离应是60海里。15时55分时，又收到了一条重要情报：贝蒂与敌舰开始交战了。自16时后，杰里科在大半个小时内，没有再收到报告。对此，他显然表现地有些焦虑，于是在16时15分时，他向埃文-托马斯询问，第5战列舰中队是否与贝蒂在一起，并得到了肯定的答复。此后，至16时30分为止，并无迹象表明英国舰队会与德国战列舰队发生遭遇，不过在接下来的10余分钟内，战局发生了戏剧性的变化。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.122-123 & P.421-422）：

Goodenough’s first W/T signal was sent at 4.30: “URGENT ONE ENEMY CRUISER BEARING SE STEERING NE” (plus own lat. & long.). it was addressed to both Jellicoe and Beatty, and referred to Rostock, stationed about 2 miles ahead of Scheer’s battle-fleet. A few minutes later the serried masts and funnels of the High Seas Fleet became apparent beneath the smoke and against a backdrop of lowering grey overcast, and enough was clear for Goodenough to flash to Beatty “BATTLESHIPS IN SIGHT”.
古迪纳夫的第一份无线电报告，是在16时30分时发出的：紧急！发现一艘敌方巡洋舰，方位东南，航向东北（外加本舰的经纬度）。这份报告是发给杰里科和贝蒂的，他发现的那艘军舰，是位于舍尔的战列舰队前方约2海里处的罗斯托克号。几分钟后，在灰暗阴沉的地平线上，出现了一连串的烟柱、桅杆、以及烟囱。古迪纳夫明白，这无疑就是公海舰队了，于是他用探照灯向贝蒂报告：发现敌方战列舰。

Within 22 minutes of the sighting of the High Seas Fleet, Jellicoe was sent six separate reports. Three from Goodenough, at 4.38, 4.48 and 5.00, gave Com2LCS’s own positions (at odds with each other by several miles) at those times, plus the enemy’s bearing and course (the latter, always “North”). One from the light-cruiser Champion (leader of the 13th DF) at 4.38 gave another erroneous position and strangely specified the enemy’s course as ENE. One from Beatty (through Princess Royal) at 4.45 was received in garbled form. One from the Admiralty, at 5.0 p.m., was the yield from a 4.09 direction-find, and was quite accurate, but it was an hour stale, and as more immediate stuff appeared to be flowing in, Iron Duke may not have bothered to plot it. The information available to the C-in-C therefore rested, in practice, on the signals coming in from his old friend Goodenough.
在发现公海舰队之后的22分钟内，杰里科收到了6份情报。其中有3份是古迪纳夫发出的，时间分别是16时38分、16时48分、以及17时00分，这些报告中都给出了古迪纳夫当时所处的位置（但误差都比较大），以及敌方的方位与航向（都是正北）。有1份是冠军号轻巡洋舰，在16时38分发出的，这份报告中的自身位置也是错误的，并且还将敌方航向错误地记录为东北偏东。有1份是在贝蒂要求下，由长公主号在16时45分发出的，但由于接收过程出了问题，因此铁公爵号收到的报告是错误的。最后还有1份是海军部在17时00分发出的，这份报告中给出了德国舰队在16时09分时的无线电定位。尽管该报告的准确度相当不错，但由于是1个小时之前的，再加上后来又有许多新的情报陆续汇报上来，因此铁公爵号可能没有去理会这条报告。因此，对于杰里科来说，有用的情报，主要就是由他的老朋友古迪纳夫发出的。

The accuracy of Goodenough’s four signals: 1. His position at 4.30 was given as 7 miles too far EbyS; 2. His position at 4.38 was given as 12 miles too far ESE; 3. His position at 4.48 was given as 8½ miles too far SEbyS; 4. His position at 5.00 was given as 4½ miles too far SE.
古迪纳夫的四个无线电报告的准确度是：16时30分的报告，向东微南方向偏了7海里；16时38分的报告，向东南偏东方向偏了12海里；16时48分的报告，向东南微南方向偏了8.5海里；17时00分的报告，向东南方向偏了4.5海里。

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, P.68）：

The Champion’s position made her a long way off the Southampton, and the Southampton’s 1638 position was 8 miles from her 1630 position, giving her a speed of 60 miles an hour. Her next signal was very little better, and made her go 6 miles in eight minutes, a speed of 45 knots. Signal from Lion, made at 4.45 pm, had became mutilated, and as received by the Commander-in-Chief, reported the enemy to be steering South-East. Lion’s signal could be rejected, for all the other signals agreed on a Northerly or North-Westerly course. Then again the Southampton’s last signal at 5 pm was probably the most correct of her series.
冠军号报告的位置，与南安普顿号相差甚远。南安普顿号在16时38分报告的位置，与16时30分时报告的位置相差8海里，意味着这段时间内他的航速需达到60节。该舰的下一份报告也没好到哪去，其位置变化意味着他的航速需达到45节。狮号在16时45分时给出的报告，则在接收时出现了问题，因此在杰里科收到的报告中，敌方舰队的航向变成了东南方向。狮号给出的报告，显然是需要被排除的，因为其他报告中都将敌方航向记录为正北或西北方向。南安普顿号在17时00分的报告，可能是这些报告中作为准确的。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.242）：

Goodenough, busy dodging enemy salvos, did not report again until 5.40, while Beatty, even though under no pressure after 5.12, did not see fit to keep Jellicoe informed. Thus the C-in-C did not know that, after 5 o’clock, both the British and German forces were steering NNW or even NW, nor that both the BCF and 5BS were making 24 knots with at least the van of the German battlefleet keeping pace. These factors meant that contact would actually be made earlier than could have been predicted in Iron Duke.
此后，直至17时40分为止，古迪纳夫都在忙于躲避敌方的炮火，因而没有再发出报告。至于贝蒂，尽管自17时12分起，就已经不再受到敌方炮火威胁了，但也没有继续向杰里科汇报敌情。因此大舰队总司令并不知道，在17时之后，英德双方舰队的航向，实际上都是西北偏北、甚至西北方向（而不是古迪纳夫之前汇报的正北方向）；并且他也不知道，英国战列巡洋舰队和第5战列舰中队的航速都在24节以上，而德国战列舰队的前卫部队也在努力追赶——这些信息意味着，大舰队与德国舰队发生接触的时间，会比杰里科所预计的更早。

问题：自贝蒂队与杰里科队互相接触，至杰里科做出展开战列线的决策之间，他收到了哪些情报？其准确度如何？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.247 & P.271-274）：

Jellicoe first learned that gunfire was already audible to the Southward in reports received at 5.40 from Minotaur and also from Hampshire and Comus (4LCS)...The visibility was already deteriorating and would soon become ‘extremely baffling. Though variable, the limits of visibility were generally estimated at between 4½ and 6 miles. At 5.42, Black Prince reported battlecruisers five miles S but she probably did not give their nationality; for unexplained reasons, this report did not reach Jellicoe until ‘considerably later’. At 5.46, Arbuthnot signalled that unspecified ships were in action SSW, steering NE.
17时40分时，米诺陶号向杰里科报告，南侧有炮声传来。除此之外，汉普郡号和科摩斯号也报告了这个情况。此时，能见度已经开始下降了，并且很快就会变得非常糟糕。具体数据存在一些出入，大致在4.5至6海里之间。在17时42分时，黑王子号汇报，其南侧5海里处有5艘战列巡洋舰，但该舰可能并未说明这些军舰的国籍。由于某些未知的原因，这条情报延迟了很久才送达杰里科手中。在17时46分时，阿巴思诺特少将（第1巡洋舰中队的指挥官）汇报，其西南偏南方向有不明军舰正在交战，其航向为东北方向。

At 5.45, the Admiralty despatched a new report based on an intercepted signal giving the German position, course and speed at 4.30; it was received in Iron Duke at 5.53 but it probably did not reach the bridge until about 6 o’clock. As Jellicoe wrote in 1922, ‘as it gave the enemy’s position at 4.30 p.m., it was obviously of little use for fixing it 1½ hours later’.
17时45分时，海军部发来了一条新的情报——基于他们截获的德方无线电通讯，他们判断出了德方在16时30分的位置、航向、以及航速。17时53分时，铁公爵号收到了这条情报，但可能要到18时左右，才送达舰桥。在1922年时，杰里科写道：“这条情报给出的是敌人在16时30分时的位置，基于这条情报来推测其在1.5个小时之后的位置，显然是没有太大意义的”。

At 5.50, Calliope (on the port wing of the 4LCS) informed the C-in-C by searchlight that she could see flashes of guns SSW while, even less precisely, Burney reported flashes and heavy firing ‘on the starboard bow’. At 5.55, Jellicoe asked him: ‘What can you see’ and Marlborough replied at 6.00 that Beatty’s battlecruisers were in sight 3-4 miles to the SSW, steering E.
17时50分时，卡利俄佩号（第4轻巡洋舰中队的旗舰，位于编队最左侧）通过探照灯告知杰里科，他看到西南偏南有炮火。而伯尼中将（第1战列舰中队的指挥官）则汇报，在舰艏右舷方向有大口径火炮的火光。17时55分时，杰里科向马尔伯勒号询问：“你能看到什么”，后者于18时00分回答，贝蒂的战列巡洋舰们在其西南偏南方位，距离大约3-4海里，并正在向东航行。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.83-86）：

Between 5.40 and 6.03 there were three reports from the Southampton. No report was made in this period either by the Chester, which had bumped into Hipper's screen and been roughly handled, or by Hood, of their actions with the 2nd Scouting Group.
在17时40分至18时03分之间，南安普顿号又先后发来了三份报告。然而，尽管在这段时间内，切斯特号轻巡洋舰与德方轻巡洋舰发生了激烈交战，胡德少将后来也与德国第2侦察群进行了战斗，但他们都没有向杰里科做出报告。

When the Iron Duke sighted Beatty's battle cruisers, the C.-in-C. signalled the Vice-Admiral (6.01) : 'Where is Enemy's Battlefleet?' Beatty had not seen the German battle fleet since he had begun his run to the north and was therefore only able to reply: 'Enemy battle cruisers bearing S.E.' This was received by the C.-in-C. at 6.06. It said nothing about the battle fleet, and the information conflicted with a Goodenough report ten minutes earlier that the enemy battle fleet had altered to N. and that Hipper was bearing S.W. from it. The C.-in-C. repeated his query (6.10). Beatty had altered course to east. In hauling round to starboard to take station ahead, the mist suddenly lifted and he sighted Hipper and the head of the German line. His signal-searchlight at once flashed to the C.-in-C. (received at 6.14) : 'Have sighted Enemy's Battlefleet bearing S.S.W.' The report did not give the vitally important information of the enemy's course. By giving the Lion a visibility of only five miles, it looked to the C.-in-C. as if the Germans were only about five miles off (actually, it was about seven).
当铁公爵号自己也看到狮号后，杰里科于18时01分时，向贝蒂发问：“敌方战列舰队在哪里”。然而自从向北掉头之后，贝蒂就没再见过德国战列舰队了，因此他只能回复：“敌方战列巡洋舰在东南方位”。杰里科在18时06分时收到了这个回复。这条回复中并未包含德国战列舰队的信息，并且与古迪纳夫在10分钟前发来的情报是相悖的——后者表示，德国战列舰队已经将航向转为正北，而希佩尔则在其西南方位。在18时10分时，杰里科再度向贝蒂发去了同样的问题。此时贝蒂已经将航向调整为正东方向了，并且在他转向的过程中，迷雾突然散开了，于是他看到了希佩尔、以及德国战列舰队的前卫。他立刻通过探照灯回复：“敌方战列舰队在西南偏南方位”。16时14分时，杰里科收到了这个回复。不过，狮号的回复中没有给出敌方的航向信息。另外，如果假设狮号的能见度是5海里的话，那么在杰里科看来，德国舰队应该就在约5海里外，但实际上，他们在约7海里外。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.277）：

At 6.07, he received a report from Marlborough that the 5BS had been sighted bearing SW, though as usual without any indication of distance. But the fast battleships, like the battlecruisers, had lost sight of the enemy in the mist and neither reported further for the moment. At 6.10, Barham also reported by wireless that she had sighted the enemy battlefleet bearing SSE at about the same time; while the signal records indicate that her message was received in Iron Duke’s wireless office at 6.12, Jellicoe insisted that he did not get it until 6.15. In any case, he could only guess the distances from Barham to Marlborough and to the German ships; whereas Lion was in sight from Iron Duke on a SE’ly bearing and Jellicoe now ‘assumed that the course of the enemy was approximately the same as that of our battle cruisers’.
在18时07分时，马尔伯勒号向其汇报，第5战列舰中队出现在其西南方位，但并未告知距离。受到迷雾的影响，这些快速战列舰与战列巡洋舰一样，都失去了与敌方军舰之间的视觉接触，因此他们都没能给出具体的情报。18时10分时，巴勒姆号也通过无线电汇报（通过刚勇号转达），在东南偏南方向发现德国战列舰队。通讯记录显示，铁公爵号的无线电通讯室，在18时12分时收到了这条情报，但杰里科坚称，他要到18时15分时才收到这条信息。不管怎么样，在当时的情况下，杰里科并不知道马尔伯勒号与巴勒姆号之间的距离，也不知道巴勒姆号与德国战列舰之间的距离。但狮号，则已经在他视线范围内了，当时位于他的东南方向，于是杰里科猜测，敌方舰队的航向，应该与英国战列巡洋舰队大致相同。

18时14分时，德国战列舰队的情报位置与真实位置

下图中，分别展示了巴勒姆号在18时10分时的位置、该舰汇报的敌方战列舰队的位置（假设能见度是5海里）、狮号在18时14分时的位置、该舰汇报的敌方战列舰队的位置（假设能见度是5海里）、大舰队在18时14分时的位置、杰里科所判断的敌方战列舰队的位置（J点）、以及德国战列舰队的真实航迹（图中右下方的虚线）。



结论：从杰里科的角度看，他所掌握的情报，的确是严重不足的；且即便是他收到的情报，有许多也是不够完整、或存在误差的。另一方面，那些承担着侦察和反馈职责的巡洋舰们，也有着自己的困难——在那个没有雷达、没有卫星定位的时代，误差是在所难免的。并且在能见度有限的环境下，有时候他们自己也看不见敌舰，因此也就无法将敌情汇报给杰里科了。在这种情况下，最值得注意的，应该是各中队的指挥官们是否具备及时汇报敌情的意识，而非情报的准确性——由此来看，贝蒂所承担的骂名固然有其道理，埃文-托马斯做得也不够好，胡德更是完全没有尽到汇报敌情的职责。至于古迪纳夫，则依旧展现出了积极汇报敌情的优秀意识，所以尽管他在这个阶段汇报的情报是明显有误的，但我们也不应过于苛责他。

英德双方的交战态势，18时20分 - 18时30分

在杰里科展开战列线的同时，贝蒂正在与胡德汇合，而埃文-托马斯则正在试图加入战列线的末端。此外，英方的两个巡洋舰中队、四个轻巡洋舰中队、以及大量的驱逐舰，也在努力融入队伍之中，因此当时的情况，实际上是相当混乱的。

交战态势图，18时20分 - 18时25分

从下图中可以看到，当近150艘军舰汇集到一小片海域中时，交通环境就变得拥挤不堪了。在此情况下，第3轻巡洋舰中队与第4轻巡洋舰中队，以及第1、第2、第3战列巡洋舰中队汇合到了一起，跑到了战列线的前端；而第1轻巡洋舰中队则与第2轻巡洋舰中队汇合到了一起，跑到了战列线的尾端。



交战态势图，18时25分 - 18时30分

从下图中可以看到，当英国舰队形成T头优势后，德国战列巡洋舰，以及位置靠前的德国战列舰，遭到了英方的迎头痛击。在此情况下，尽管德国战列巡洋舰调整航向进行了躲避，但吕佐夫号还是受到了严重的损伤。不过，德舰的反击，也导致了无敌号战列巡洋舰的沉没。



在双方战列舰队互相碰撞的大背景下，发生了哪些插曲？

在杰里科展开战列线的同时，还发生不少了插曲。其中造成影响最大的，是防御号、勇士号、厌战号、以及无敌号的经历。除此之外，英方的巡洋舰和驱逐舰部队的行动，也受到了战列线展开的影响。对于这些事件，我们有必要具体介绍一下。

问题：防御号是如何被击沉的？勇士号和厌战号又是如何与各自的姐妹舰走散的？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.97-98）：

At 5.47 the Defence and Warrior, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron (the former was Arbuthnot's flagship), had caught a glimpse of the 2nd Scouting Group. They opened fire, the shots falling short. As the enemy disappeared in the mist, Arbuthnot turned to starboard in pursuit (6.01). So hell-bent was he on getting at the enemy that he pressed across the bows of the Lion, forcing her to alter to port to avoid a collision. Arbuthnot had closed to 5,500 yards when the huge outlines of German capital ships loomed up to the southward, less than 8,000 yards away. The odds were impossible.
在17时47分时，第1巡洋舰中队的防御号和勇士号（前者是阿巴思诺特少将的旗舰），发现了德国第2侦察群。英舰开火了，但射击距离过近了。当德舰隐入迷雾中后，阿巴思诺特在18时01分时，向右舷方向进行了转向。他追击敌舰的举动，有些过于拼命了，直接从狮号的前方穿了过去，后者为了避免发生碰撞事故，不得不向左舷方向调整了航向。当阿巴思诺特追到只有5,500码的时候，德国主力舰自南方冲了过来，距离其只有不到8,000码。在这种情况下，他几乎没有打赢的可能性。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.444-445）：

The two armoured-cruisers “were practically continuously hidden by splashes”. Then, Defence “was blown into the air, deckplates, bodies, and debris being plainly visible against the smoke”. Warrior now took the brunt of the Germans’ attention and reeled under the blows of fifteen heavy shells which killed a hundred men, set her on fire and wrecked her engineroom. Duke of Edinburgh was fortunate in having been ill-placed to follow her sisters across the BCF’s bows: she had swung into loose station on the battlecruisers’ port side and thereafter strained to follow them to the van of the battle-line. The fourth ship of the squadron, Black Prince, out on a limb to starboard, had been too far away to get involved in the fiasco, and went to the rear of the battle-fleet.
在那两艘装甲巡洋舰周围，水柱持续不断地升起，几乎挡住了军舰的身影。接着，防御号就被炸上了天，甲板、尸体、残骸飞的到处都是。随后，德方的火力转移到了勇士号身上，后者被15发大口径炮弹击中，舰员死亡人数过百，船上燃起了大火，连轮机舱都被击毁了。同中队的爱丁堡公爵号，没能跟随她的姐妹舰，从狮号前方穿过，因此跑到了战列巡洋舰的左舷方向，随后勉强跟上了后者，并跑到了战列线的头部之前。该中队的最后一艘军舰，黑王子号，则孤零零地转向了右舷方向，跑到了战列线的尾部，因此没参与这场一边倒的战斗。

Cruisers had no business to be messing around in the killing ground between the fleets. Sir Robert was out of his league. He should have taken note of Beatty’s gunfire (as did everybody else) and cleared off out of his senior’s way, instead of loitering to dismember carrion in the middle of the most dangerous highway man could devise.
当双方舰队陷入厮杀时，这些装甲巡洋舰本不应该掺和其中的。阿巴思诺特少将，本该注意到贝蒂正在与敌方交战的（其他人都注意到了这一点），他也应该给上级军官让出航道的，然而他却冲进了最危险的战场，试图为自己分一杯羹。然而这种级别的战斗，不是他可以参与的。

Warrior was to be saved from the fate of her sister-ship by the unscripted intervention of a more attractive target. No sooner had Arbuthnot’s tragedy been played out, than another drama began in the 5th Battle Squadron. At first RA5BS assumed Vice-Admiral Burney’s ships to be the van of a Battle Fleet already deployed to starboard, and pressed on after Beatty. But as they drew closer, it became clear to him that they were still in cruising formation and that the front of the battle-fleet was, in effect, trying to slot into the gap between the battlecruisers and the Queen Elizabeths.
勇士号之所以没有被当场击沉，主要还是因为战场上出现了更具吸引力的目标。阿巴思诺特的悲剧刚结束没多久，第5战列舰中队又发生了一桩戏剧性的事件。埃文-托马斯起初认为，大舰队会以右翼分队为先导来展开为战列线，而伯尼中将的座舰（马尔伯勒号）会成为领头舰，于是他继续跟在贝蒂后面跑。但当他越来越靠近大舰队后，他发现后者仍然处在行军队形下，且位于排头的那些军舰，正试图挤进贝蒂与埃文-托马斯之间的空档。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.282-284）：

Recognising his mistake and that, if he attempted to follow Beatty’s battlecruisers towards the van, he would mask the fire of the battlefleet, he decided to make a large turn to port (a second turn to starboard would then have been necessary) to haul into line astern of the 6th Division. As he described it: This was done without signal, and all ships were exceedingly well handled by their Captains.
埃文-托马斯意识到，自己判断错了。此时如果他继续跟着贝蒂，往战列线的头部跑，那么他就有可能会挡住战列舰队的射界。于是他决定，向左舷方向进行大转弯（随后还需要向右舷方向再做一个转弯），以便加入第6战列舰分队的后方。根据他的描述：“这个机动是在没有打出信号旗的情况下完成的，且各舰的舰长们，操舰动作都极为优异”。

The reality was much less satisfactory, though many details remain obscure. Warspite, after altering course to port, found herself apparently approaching Malaya. Warspite’s Captain Phillpotts gave the helm order ‘Port 20°’, thus initiating a quite rapid turn to starboard. The helm was put over too quickly and, perhaps in part due to damage to the steering engine caused by a hit or near miss, jammed at ‘Port 15°’ when ‘Amidships’ was ordered. Warspite then shaved close under Valiant’s stern onto the latter’s starboard quarter before continuing round towards the enemy line. Attempts to use the engines to stop her turning only reduced the speed at which she was closing the enemy, so her captain decided to go full speed ahead and the ship turned almost two complete circles before, by going astern with the port engines, she managed to check her swing and stagger away to the Northward. As she circled, she was the first reasonably visible target for the German battleships. Warspite probably received 11 hits during this intense concentration.
实际情况，远不像他描述的那么好，但具体细节，很多依然是不清楚的。在向左舷方向转向之后，厌战号发现，自己正在靠近马来亚号。于是厌战号的舰长，菲尔波茨上校下令，向右舷方向进行急转向。由于打方向时速度太快了，且该舰的舵机可能在之前的交战中受到了损伤，因此在舰长要求将舵机回正时，它卡住了。于是厌战号穿过了刚勇号的后方穿了过去，跑到了后者的右后侧，这使得他与德国舰队之间的距离，变得越来越近了。舰员们试图通过调整轮机出力，来抵消转向效果，但其结果只是让该舰的航速降了下来，让她没有那么快靠近德国舰队。在这种情况下，舰长决定全速前进，随后该舰几乎在原地转了两个圈。最后，通过让左舷轮机进行倒车，该舰才控制住了航向，蹒跚着驶向了北侧。在此之前，该舰是德国战列舰队眼中最为合理的射击目标，在后者的集火射击下，厌战号可能挨了11发炮弹。

As Warrior approached the circling Warspite, it appears that Warspite was making her first circle when Warrior attempted to pass astern but, as the battleship continued to turn to starboard, she passed under Warrior’s stern, screening the armoured cruiser from enemy fire. Warrior herself was in a serious condition. The engine rooms continued to fill with water but they could not be reached due to fires raging aft. Warspite had been badly damaged by shellfire but she was not disabled and her casualties were comparatively light.
当厌战号转圈的时候，勇士号驶向了这艘军舰。似乎是在厌战号转第一个圈的时候，勇士号试图从其舰艉方向穿过，但由于这艘战列舰继续向右舷方向，因此厌战号从勇士号的舰艉方向穿了过去，替后者挡住了敌方的炮火。而勇士号本身，则处在了很危险的状态下，该舰的轮机舱持续进水，但在火势阻挡下，舰员们无法到达此处进行损管。至于厌战号，虽然在炮火打击下受损颇重，但并未被打瘫，且人员损伤也相对较为轻微。

贝蒂与阿巴思诺特的相遇

阿巴思诺特的勇猛但鲁莽的行为，使得同样以勇猛而著称的贝蒂，都不得不为其让路。如果前者能明智地选择退避的话，英国海军可能就不会损失那2艘装甲巡洋舰了。



勇士号与厌战号的相遇

防御号沉没后，勇士号继续西行，于是遇到了厌战号。当后者原地打转之时，她与德国战列舰队之间，只有10,000码左右的距离，这可能是整场海战中，英国海军最接近于损失一艘战列舰的时刻。但凭借着良好的防护水准与储备浮力，该舰还是挺了过来，最终凭借自身动力返回了母港。而勇士号就没有那么幸运了，该舰后来接受了水上飞机母舰恩加丁号的拖曳，但在返回母港的途中，由于进水过多，最终还是不得不弃舰。



问题：第2巡洋舰中队，为何会与大舰队走散了？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.266）：

Soon after the sounds of firing were heard to the South, Minotaur sighted two large ships and altered course to NE to bring her starboard guns to bear. Having received no reply to her challenge, she was about to open fire when the ships were recognised as Invincibles of the 3BCS. They were also seen from Shannon (next in line) shortly after 6 o’clock. Hampshire turned NE with Minotaur but then briefly engaged a three-funnelled cruiser, perhaps one of the IISG. Having lost sight of the Grand Fleet, at about 6.10 Heath informed Shannon: ‘I am going round to take up position in the van for Easterly deployment’. As Cochrane joined his line in a position between the flagship and Shannon, the 2CS altered course gradually to port until they had turned through 32 points onto SE’ly courses after 6.25. The reports from Heath’s 2CS are somewhat contradictory. Heath admitted, with considerable understatement, that a ‘somewhat wide sweep was made’.
在听见从南方传来的炮声后，米诺陶号发现了两艘大型军舰，随后转向了东北方向，并将其右舷侧的火炮转了过去。她发出了识别信号，但却没有收到回答。就在即将要开火之时，她识别出对面的军舰是第3战列巡洋舰中队的无敌级。在18时过后，香农号（位于米诺陶号后方）也看到了这些军舰。汉普郡号与米诺陶号一起，转向了东北方向，接下来短暂地与一艘三烟囱的巡洋舰进行了交火，对方可能是德国第2侦察群的轻巡洋舰。当大舰队从他们的视线范围内消失后，中队指挥官希思少将，在18时10分左右告知香农号：“我打算向东走，加入战列线的前方”。接下来，科克伦号也加入了他们，插进了旗舰与香农号之间的位置。这支中队缓缓地转向左舷方向，在原地转了一个圈，最后在18时25分后，将航向调整为东南方向。希思少将事后提交的报告，是有些自相矛盾的，他对此事的描述有些轻描淡写，但也承认，他们转了一个大圈。

问题：胡德队和贝蒂队是如何汇合的？无敌号又是怎么被击沉的？

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.449-450）：

While these things were going on, at the far end of the arena, Rear-Admiral Horace Hood was swinging his detached battlecruiser-squadron (the 3rd BCS), and its attendants, smartly into line ahead of the BCF. Hood waited until Trevylyan Napier’s light-cruisers had careered past, and then turned through 16 points to place himself about two miles ahead of Beatty. As he did so the shapes of Hipper’s battlecruisers became apparent within easy range to the south-westwards. Invincible, Indomitable and Inflexible trained their 12-inch guns round from port to starboard and opened an extremely accurate fire on the 1st SG at just 9,000 yards. For several minutes the Germans could see nothing of their new assailants, and fired ineffectually in the general direction of Hood’s gun-flashes, while Lützow and Derfflinger were hit again and again - the former eight times in eight minutes, and her ultimate loss may be attributed substantially to damage she received now from Invincible.
在这些事件发生之时，在战场的另一侧，在胡德少将的率领下，第3战列巡洋舰中队及其附属军舰们，巧妙地跑到了战列巡洋舰队的前方——他先等待内皮尔少将麾下的轻巡洋舰（第3轻巡洋舰中队）从他前方冲过，随后做了一个16个罗经点的转向，使自己出现在了贝蒂队前方约2海里处。此时，希佩尔的战列巡洋舰们，从西南方向冒了出来，且距离胡德并不远。无敌号、不屈号、不挠号三艘战列巡洋舰，将她们的12英寸火炮，从左舷方向转到了右舷方向，在略大于9,000码的距离上，向德国第1侦察群开火了。在接下来的几分钟内，德国人完全看不见是谁在攻击他们，因此向着胡德队的炮口火光的方向，乱打了一通。而英舰则打出了极为精准的炮火，吕佐夫号和德尔弗林格号都多次中弹，其中前者在8分钟内被8枚炮弹击中，该舰最终之所以会沉没，可能就与无敌号对其造成的损伤有关。

However, at around 6.30 “the veil of mist in front of [the Germans] split across like the curtain at a theatre” and Hood’s ships were briefly lit up in sharp relief. Now, with clear targets, Hipper’s battlecruisers replied to devastating effect. A salvo engulfed Hood’s flagship, with a shell penetrating one of the midship turrets, bursting inside and relay-igniting the magazine. The explosion cut the ship in two, evidently removing a substantial midships section, and causing the bow and stern sections to collapse inwards and downwards. Of Invincible’s company of 1,032, just six men survived.
不过，到18时30分左右，德舰前方的迷雾，就像剧院里的幕布那样分开了，胡德麾下的军舰们，短暂地被阳光照的轮廓鲜明。在看清目标后，希佩尔麾下的战列巡洋舰也打出了致命的反击。胡德的旗舰被其中一轮齐射吞没，炮弹击穿了舰体舯部的炮塔，并在其内部爆炸，随后引燃了弹药库。爆炸摧毁了舰体舯部，将该舰折成两段，使得舰艏和舰艉部分向下沉入了海底。无敌号的1,032名舰员中，只有6人得以幸存。

问题：英方的轻巡洋舰中队和驱逐舰中队，当时是如何行动的？

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, P.89-91）：

The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been two miles ahead of the Lion at 6 pm, got entangled for a time in the lines of the Battle Fleet, then, leaving the Galatea behind, went on at full speed round the disengaged side of the fleet. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron were some distance away all this time. When the deployment commenced they were some 7½ miles behind the Lion, and went on towards the deployment point. The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron were well ahead of the Battle Fleet just before deployment. The movements of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron were simple enough. In a position immediately ahead of the Battle Fleet, it was more easily able to conform to its movements, and forming line ahead just before deployment.
在18时00分时，第1轻巡洋舰中队位于狮号前方2海里处，但该中队接下来迎面遇上了战列舰队，经过一番波折后，伽拉忒亚号被抛下了（动力系统出了问题），其余几艘则开足马力，跑到了战列线的非交战侧。第2轻巡洋舰中队则一直是落在后面的，因此当战列线展开之时，该中队还在狮号后方约7.5海里处，于是该舰跟上了战列线的末端。第3轻巡洋舰，则是在战列线展开之前，就已经跑到战列舰队前方很远的地方了。至于第4轻巡洋舰中队，由于本身就位于战列舰队的前方，因此很容易跟随后者行动，于是在战列线展开之前，就跑到了其前端。

Shortly after 6 pm the Commander-in-Chief had ordered destroyers to take up No. 1 disposition. The 4th, 11th and 12th Flotillas were ahead of the Battle Fleet. On the port beam of the Lion was the 1st Flotilla, unable to get ahead because of the Lion’s speed: the Fearless, their leader, had fallen behind; so, too, had the 13th Flotilla; the 9th and 10th, had dropped to the port beam of the 5th Battle Squadron at 6 pm.
18时过后，杰里科命令麾下的驱逐舰们，按照1号部署方案，进入各自战位。当时，第4、第11、第12驱逐舰中队当时位于战列舰队的前方。第1驱逐舰中队当时位于狮号的左侧，但他们跟不上狮号的速度。该中队的领舰，无恐号侦察巡洋舰，也落到了后面。同样落到后面的，还有第13驱逐舰中队。至于第9和第10驱逐舰中队，则是在18时前后，跑到了第5战列舰中队的左侧。

When the fleet deployed, the 4th and 11th Flotillas turned to port and proceeded to take station ahead of the line: the 12th turned and took up its position in rear on the engaged side. The 13th and 9th did the same on the disengaged side and remained there during the action. As the battle cruisers passed the head of the Battle Fleet, the destroyers of the 1st and 12th Flotillas began to run through one another’s lines, and several had to stop and go astern to avoid collision. The lines were in some confusion at this juncture, and for a short time destroyers were so busy getting out of one another’s way that they had little time to think of the enemy. The disposition of the flotillas was too cramped, but this was a temporary drawback, and the confusion had certainly straightened out by 6.30 pm.
当战列舰队开始展开后，第4和第11驱逐舰中队进行了左转，并跑到了战列线的前端。第12驱逐舰中队则调转了方向，沿着交战侧，跑到了战列线的后端。第9和第13驱逐舰中队，则是跑到了战列线的非交战侧，且后来也没换过位置。当战列巡洋舰们从战列舰队前方穿过时，第1和第12驱逐舰中队正互相朝着对方迎面驶去，为了避免发生碰撞，有好几艘军舰不得不停了下来。当时在这片海域上，交通颇为混乱，因此有一段时间内，这些驱逐舰们都在忙着避免撞到自己人，而没什么时间去考虑怎么对抗敌舰。并且，这些驱逐舰们的部署态势，也过于拥挤了，不过这只是暂时性的缺陷，至18时30分时，这些问题都已经得到解决了。

英国战列舰队展开之时，各个轻巡洋舰中队的动向

下图中标出了各个巡洋舰中队的动向。在这个阶段，第1轻巡洋舰中队的表现是略有些糟糕的，其余3支轻巡洋舰中队中都成功进入了合适的战位。



英国战列舰队展开之时，各个驱逐舰中队的动向

下图中标出了各个驱逐舰中队的动向（第10驱逐舰中队的4艘军舰，有2艘是跟随第9驱逐舰中队行动的，另有2艘是跟随第13驱逐舰中队行动的，因此没有单独标出）。由于驱逐舰的数量，要比轻巡洋舰多出好几倍，因此引发的混乱也要更多。



结论：防御号和勇士号的遭遇，是阿巴思诺特的不明智的行为导致的。厌战号与姐妹舰走散，并遭到德国战列舰队的集火射击，主要原因是机械故障，但也与当时战场环境复杂且拥挤，埃文-托马斯误判了杰里科的意图有关。而第2巡洋舰中队，则当场出丑了，幸好他们当时远离核心交战区域，因此没有引发严重的后果。无敌号的沉没，核心原因是能见度的突然变化，因此似乎有些命中注定的意味了。至于轻巡洋舰中队和驱逐舰中队，则是在经过了一番机动和挣扎后，加入到了战列线的前后两端。

英德双方的交战态势，18时30分 - 18时45分

当英国战列舰队完全展开后，摆在德国舰队面前的，是一条由7艘战列巡洋舰（其中无敌号于18时33分被击沉了）及27艘战列舰（未计入与大部队走散的厌战号）组成，且占据T头优势的战列线。在这种困境下，希佩尔已经在18时22分时转向东南偏南，后来又进一步转向正南，以避开英国战列巡洋舰的锋芒。自18时30分起，位于德国战列舰队最前方的国王号，也因抵挡不住英舰的炮火，进行了大幅度的转向，随后德国第5战列舰分队的其他3艘军舰也跟着开始转向了。在此情况下，舍尔于18时36分时下达了战斗回转（Gefechtskehrtwendung）的命令。所谓的战斗回转，是一种能让整个舰队在短时间内完成掉头，并将前队改作后队的机动方式。通过这个机动，他们成功脱离了战斗，为自己赢得了短暂的喘息之机。

除了大舰巨炮的猛烈炮火之外，在这个阶段，双方的轻型舰艇也发生了小规模的交火，其结果是，英方先前已经遭到重创的鲨鱼号驱逐舰被击沉，但该舰在沉没前打瘫了德方的V48号驱逐舰，后者随后又遭到了多艘英舰的炮击，最终也沉没了。

交战态势图，18时30分 - 18时45分

从下图中可以看到，在这个阶段，德方舰队只能对位于英国编队最前方的战列巡洋舰队和最后方的第5战列舰中队进行还击、或者射击落单的厌战号和勇士号；但对于英国战列线的核心部分，他们却无法组织起有效的还击。



从下图中可以看到，由于迷雾的影响，有部分英国战列舰是看不到德舰的，因此并未向德舰进行射击。由于这个缘故，德舰受到的打击并不算特别严重。



从下图中可以看到，凭借着战斗回转机动，德国舰队成功地从不利局面中脱身了。



如何评价杰里科在第一次T头时的指挥决策表现？

在第一次T头时，德国人虽然陷入了T头困境，但从结果来看，其损伤并不太严重。对于这个结果，英国海军在展开事后复盘时，自然是感到不满的，因此杰里科所作出的决策，就成为了带有争议的话题。

问题：对于如何展开战列线这个问题，杰里科当时是如何决策的？

根据杰里科（John Jellicoe）在其著作中给出的描述（The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916: Its Creation, Development and Work，P.346-348）：

As the evidence accumulated that the enemy's Battle Fleet was on our starboard side, but on a bearing well before the beam of the Iron Duke, the point for decision was whether to form line of battle on the starboard or on the port wing column. My first and natural impulse was to form on the starboard wing column in order to bring the Fleet into action at the earliest possible moment, but it became increasingly apparent, both from the sound of gunfire and the reports from the Lion and the Barham, that the High Sea Fleet was in such close proximity and on such a bearing as to create obvious disadvantages in such a movement. I assumed that the German destroyers would be ahead of their Battle Fleet, and it was clear that, owing to the mist, the operations of destroyers attacking from a commanding position in the van would be much facilitated; it would be suicidal to place the Battle Fleet in a position where it might be open to attack by destroyers during such a deployment, as such an event would throw the Fleet into confusion at a critical moment.
根据已经获得的情报，敌方战列舰队位于我们的右舷方向，并且从铁公爵号来看，敌方更靠近我们的侧方而不是前方。在那个情况下，需要作出决策的，是以左翼分队为先导来展开战列线，还是以右翼分队为先导来展开战列线。当时我的第一反应，也是我的自然反应，是以右翼分队为先导，从而让战列舰队在第一时间投入战斗。但无论是从炮声的方向、还是狮号和巴勒姆号发来的情报来看，都能判断出，公海舰队当时距离我们已经很近了，在这种情况下，如果还以右翼分队为先导，可能会引发明显不利于我方的局面。当时我估计，德国驱逐舰会位于其战列舰队的前方，并且在那种迷雾环境下，敌方显然有很大概率会派出驱逐舰来攻击我方战列线中的先导分队。在这种情况下，如果以右翼分队为先导，那么当我们展开战列线时，敌方很可能会对先导分队发起鱼雷攻击，使得我方舰队在关键时刻陷入混乱——换句话说，这么做无异于自杀。

The further points that occurred to me were, that if the German ships were as close as seemed probable, there was considerable danger of the 1st Battle Squadron, and especially the Marlborough's Division, being severely handled by the concentrated fire of the High Sea Fleet before the remaining divisions could get into line to assist. The 1st Battle Squadron was composed of many of our weakest ships, with only indifferent protection as compared with the German capital ships, and an interval of at least four minutes would elapse between each division coming into line astern of the sixth division and a further interval before the guns could be directed on to the ship selected and their fire become effective after so large a change of course.
除此之外，我当时还顾虑到，第1战列舰中队下辖的军舰，大多是较为老弱的军舰，其防护水准是不如德国战列舰的。由于德国军舰似乎离我们很近，因此在那种情况下，如果以右翼分队为先导，那么第1战列舰中队，尤其是马尔伯勒号所在的第6战列舰分队，可能会遭到公海舰队的集火射击。与此同时，由于将6个战列舰分队，从并列纵队调整为首尾相接的状态，至少需要4分钟的时间，并且在经过这样大幅度的转向后，还需要再花费一些时间，才能让各舰的火炮都能够指向德舰，打出有效的炮火，因此如果我方的其他分队当时尚处在展开过程中的话，那么他们是无法在那种情况下对德舰进行还击的。

The final disadvantage would be that it appeared, from the supposed position of the High Sea Fleet, that the van of the enemy would have a very considerable "overlap" if the deployment took place on the starboard wing division, whereas this would not be the case with deployment on the port wing column. The overlap would necessitate a large turn of the starboard wing division to port to prevent the "T" being crossed, and each successive division coming into line would have to make this turn, in addition to the 8-point turn required to form the line. I therefore decided to deploy on the first, the port wing, division.
最后，在当时的情况下，如果以右翼分队为先导，那么我方先导分队可能会陷入敌方的T头。如果想要避免陷入T头，就需要让先导分队向左舷方向进行转向。而其余分队，除了需要先做一个8个罗经点的转向，以组成战列线之外，还需要跟着先导分队，接二连三地向左舷方向进行转向。相比之下，如果以左翼分队为先导，就不会陷入敌方的T头。因此我决定，以左翼分队为先导来展开战列线。

根据Stephen McLaughlin的说法（Equal Speed Charlie London: Jellicoe’s Deployment at Jutland, P.11-13）：

Jellicoe hesitated over the decision for several seconds, then made up his mind to deploy to port. Jellicoe initially proposed deploying the fleet to the SE - the same course the fleet was already steering - his fleet signal officer, Commander A. R. Woods, suggested: Would you make it a point to port, Sir, so that they will know it is on the port-wing column? Woods' suggestion removed any possible ambiguity. Jellicoe acceded to the request, He ordered the signal 'Equal Speed Charlie London' hoisted, which, in the shorthand of signalling, translated into the following: The column nearest S. E. by E. is to alter course in succession to that point of the compass, the remaining columns altering course leading ships together the rest in succession so as to form astern of that column, maintaining the speed of the Fleet. Note that the signal did not explicitly specify which wing the fleet would deploy upon; rather, it signalled the desired final course and ordered the fleet to deploy on the wing closest to that course. Although it took about twenty minutes to complete, it unmasked the guns of the entire fleet in four minutes.
在做出决策之前，杰里科犹豫了几秒，随后决定要向左舷方向展开。杰里科起初打算向东南方向展开，因为这正是舰队目前所采用的航向。他的舰队通讯官，伍德中校提议，将航向往左舷方向调整1个罗经点，以便让其他人明白这是要求左翼分队作为先导分队。伍德的提议，可以消除命令中的含糊之处，杰里科同意了这个请求。他所打出的命令，是“向东南微东方向进行等速机动展开”，其含义是：最靠近东南微东方位的分队，向该罗盘方位进行顺次转向，其余分队调整航向跟随该中队，其中领头舰同时转向，其余军舰顺次转，舰队航速保持不变。请注意，这条命令中，并没有特别写明到底是由左翼分队还是右翼分队来作为先导分队，它写明的是最终的航向，并要求最靠近该航向的分队作为先导分队。另外，尽管这个展开机动需要花大约20分钟才能完成，但在4分钟后，整个舰队就能够投入所有侧舷火力了。

There were two other options: deployment to starboard or by unequal speed manoeuvre. The last-named option would send one wing column ahead to form the van while the other columns steered so as to converge, in proper sequence, on a point in the wake of the van column. This was a much-practised manoeuvre, and detailed tables had been prepared giving the exact speed and course each column would have to steer to form the line properly. But this form of deployment had a fatal drawback: while the columns were converging on the turning point, they would be 'sliding' past one another, masking one another's guns; it would take fully twenty minutes to deploy the fleet so that it could use all its guns, and it was clear that the German fleet would come into range well before that. The remaining option, an equal-speed deployment on the starboard wing, was equally unappealing.
当时他还有另外两种选项：向右舷方向进行等速机动展开，或者采用非等速机动展开。如果采用后一种方式，那么位于侧翼的两支分队中，有一支会作为先导分队，其余分队也会像调整航向，并按照先后顺序，依次与其汇合。这种展开方式，是他们当时经常训练的，并且已经预先准备好了详细的表格，写明了各分队需要采用什么样的航速和航向，来完成这个机动。但是，这种展开方式有一个致命的缺陷：当各分队进行汇合的过程中，各分队的军舰会互相遮挡对方，从而导致火炮无法对准敌舰。采用这种方式时，需要花20分钟的时间，舰队才能完成展开，各舰的火炮才能充分发挥火力。然而，早在他们完成这个展开机动之前，德国舰队就会进入射程之内。至于另一个选项，即向右舷方向进行等速机动展开，也同样不够理想。

问题：对于杰里科的决策，同时代的其他人是如何评价的？

根据Julian S. Corbett的说法（History of the Great War, Naval Operations, Volume III, May 1915 to June 1916）：

Many had been the critical situations which British admirals in the past had been called upon suddenly to solve, but never had there been one which demanded higher quali­ties of leadership, ripe judgment and quick decision, than that which confronted Admiral Jellicoe in this supreme moment of the naval war. There was not an instant to lose if deployment were to be made in time. The enemy, instead of being met ahead, were on his starboard side. He could only guess their course. Beyond a few miles every­thing was shrouded in mist; the little that could be seen was no more than a blurred picture, and with every tick of the clock the situation was developing with a rapidity of which his predecessors had never dreamt. At a speed higher than anything in their experience the two hostile fleets were rushing upon each other, and the vessels steaming across his front were shutting out all beyond in an impenetrable pall of funnel smoke. Above all was the roar of battle both ahead and to starboard, and in this blind distraction Admiral Jellicoe had to make the decision on which the fortunes of his country hung.
在过去的历史上，有许多英国海军将领，都曾面对过突然出现的、需要迅速解决的难题，但从未有人面对过杰里科当时所面临的难题——这个关键时刻，对杰里科的领导力、判断力及决策速度所提出的要求，可谓是前所未有的高——对于如何展开战列线的问题，杰里科需要立刻做出决策。当时，敌方舰队并不在英国舰队的正前方，而是出现在了右舷方向，且其具体航向并无明确情报，因此加大了展开机动决策的难度。此外，当时的能见度只有几海里，再远一些就是一片迷雾了，因此难以看清宏观的局面。再者，由于双方舰队在快速接近，因此每时每刻，局面都在发生快速变化，这也是杰里科的先辈们从未面临过的挑战。于是，在以往的海军将领们从未体会过的快速节奏下，两支舰队迎头冲向了对方，大量军舰排放出了遮天蔽日的烟雾，前方及右前方则传来了隆隆的炮声，而杰里科正是在这种局势并不明朗的情况下，做出了一个足以影响国运的关键决定。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.90-92）：

Was the battle fleet deployed to the best advantage under existing circumstances? In other words, was the division chosen the best one to 'form' on? A few of Jellicoe's critics, the Dewars and Winston Churchill among them (the latter appears to have got hold of the Staff Appreciation and based his account of Jutland largely on it), reply with a resounding No. The nub of their case is that it diminished the chance of a decisive action by increasing the range and delaying the commencement of the battle at a time when only two or three hours of daylight remained; deployment should have taken place on the starboard-wing column, the one nearest the enemy, which would have brought the line five miles more to starboard than was the case...On the other side, the German Official History declares: 'One must agree with the British leader that had he acted in this way [deployment to starboard] he would in fact have led his ships into a position which would have been only too welcome to the German Fleet.'
在当时的情况下，杰里科所采取的展开方式，是最为有利的吗？换句话说，他选择的先导分队，是最理想的吗？有几位杰里科的批评者，如杜瓦兄弟和温斯顿·丘吉尔，给出了否定的答案（丘吉尔手里似乎有前者写的书，并且他对于日德兰海战的观点，主要就是以这本书作为依据的）。他们的核心论点是，杰里科的决策，使得双方舰队之间的距离被扩大了，并且延迟了双方展开战斗的时间，再加上当时只剩2-3个小时就要入夜了，因此导致英国海军失去了打出决定性战果的机会。他们认为，应该以右翼分队，即距离敌方最近的分队为先导进行展开，如此一来，战列线的位置将会向右侧移动5海里。然而在另一方面，德国海军的官方战史则表示：“我们赞同英国指挥官所采取的决策，如果他采用右翼展开的话，那么他的部队将会陷入对德国舰队最有利的环境”。

Those who endorse Jellicoe's deployment stress, that deployment to port had three mighty advantages. It took the battle fleet across the tip of the approaching enemy, that is, it crossed his 'T'. Second, the deployment took the battle fleet between the High Seas Fleet and its line of retreat, whether through the Bight or the Skagerrak, which would force a decisive action on the enemy. Third, Jellicoe secured the advantage of light. Whereas his ships were almost invisible, except for gun flashes, the German ships were silhouetted against a bright though misty western horizon. Deployment to starboard had none of these advantages, although, to be sure, it would have allowed Jellicoe to bring his battleships into action sooner.
而那些认可杰里科的展开方式的人们则强调，采用左翼展开，具备三项重大优势。其一，这会让英国战列舰队横跨过敌方舰队的前方，即形成T头之势。其二，这样展开后，英国舰队会挡在德国舰队的撤退航线上，无论德国人想返回赫尔格兰湾，还是穿越斯卡格拉克海峡，都必须要与英国人进行决战。其三，这使得英方获得了光照环境上的优势。在迷雾密布的西侧地平线的映衬下，德国军舰的轮廓被显现出来了。但英国军舰则几乎无法分辨，只能看到他们的炮口火光。如果向右舷方向展开的话，尽管能让英方战列舰更早投入战斗，但却不具备上述的三项优势。

A third alternative method of deployment has been advanced, namely, deployment on the Iron Duke's Division, that is, on one of the centre columns, with the others following astern. The Naval Staff Appreciation and Churchill have been its chief proponents. Jellicoe does not seem to have considered this deployment. Deployment on the centre theoretically might have proved the best. But it was much more complicated than the one carried out, and too complicated to be employed when the fleet was already in action with the enemy.
除此之外，还有人提出了第三种替代方案——以铁公爵号所在的分队，即中央分队作为先导分队，其余分队跟进，从而展开为战列线。杜瓦兄弟和温斯顿·丘吉尔，是这个方案的主要支持者。杰里科似乎并未考虑过这种做法。从理论上来说，这可能会是最好的做法，但相比于实际采用的做法，其复杂程度要高得多，并且由于当时双方已经在交战了，因此这种做法实际操作起来存在很大的难度。

问题：应该如何评价右翼展开策略？

根据Stephen McLaughlin的说法（Equal Speed Charlie London: Jellicoe’s Deployment at Jutland, P.13-14）：

As already noted, Jellicoe had considered deploying on the starboard column, and the Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, written after the war by the brothers A. C. and K. G. B. Dewar, described this option in favourable terms. This analysis was highly critical of Jellicoe, dismising his objections to this manoeuvre by claiming that: The risk to the Marlborough and wing column from the enemy's gun fire...in the light of later events cannot be regarded as excessive'. Of course, Jellicoe had no way of knowing what light 'later events' would shed on the situation he faced. Jellicoe's concern over the risk to the Marlborough's division of a torpedo attack by the German destroyers was also given short shrift, since the destroyers were not leading the German formation, as Jellicoe had supposed - again, something Jellicoe did not know at the time.
如前所述，杰里科考虑过右翼展开，而杜瓦兄弟所写的著作，更是对这种策略多加赞赏。后者对杰里科进行了强烈的批判，反驳了杰里科关于右翼展开的观点。杜瓦兄弟表示：从事后结果来看，敌军对马尔伯勒号以及其所在分队进行集火打击的风险并不算很大。当然了，杰里科当时是无法得知“事后结果”的，也无法得知这“事后结果”会造成什么影响。至于杰里科担心马尔伯勒号所在分队遭到德国驱逐舰的鱼雷攻击的问题，杜瓦兄弟也没有理会，他们表示，实际上德国驱逐舰并没有像杰里科所猜测的那样，处在编队前方的位置。同样的，杰里科当时是不知道这个情况的。

The Staff Appreciation's favourable view of the starboard deployment was also based on an extreme improbability it was plotted by 'Assuming Scheer accepted battle’. But Scheer could have escaped unimpeded to the sourtheast - toward Heligoland - at any time afer a British deployment on the starboard wing, most probebly after pummelling Marborough's unsupported column, whose 'T' it would have crossed. As a final point, it would have taken almost half an hour for all the British bettleships to come into action, with the powerful divisions on the port wing being the last to have their guns unmasked. Taken all in all, a starboard deployment was a most unpromising manoeuvre, and on the basis of the uncertain information available to Jellicoe at the time - and all the evidence that has since come to light - he was correct to reject it.
另外，杜瓦兄弟对右翼展开所持有的乐观观点，还是建立在一个可能性非常低的假设场景下的：他们默认舍尔会应战。然而，如果英国舰队真的采用右翼展开的话，舍尔会对马尔伯勒号所在分队形成T头之势，并对其进行重击。并且他完全有可能在英国舰队尚未完成展开机动之时，就不受阻挠地脱离战斗，并向东南方向，即赫尔格兰湾的方向逃窜。最后，由于右翼展开机动需要花费接近半小时的试驾，才能让所有英国战列舰都投入战斗，且那些位于左翼的、战斗力更强的分队，要到展开机动接近完成时，才能陆续发挥火力。结合以上情况来看，右翼展开机动是最为糟糕的策略。无论是基于杰里科当时已经掌握的信息，还是他当时不掌握，但后人掌握的更多信息来看，杰里科没有选择右翼展开的决策，是正确的。

杜瓦兄弟推崇的右翼展开机动的示意图

如果以这种方式展开，且舍尔选择应战的话，双方之间的交战距离，会比历史上更近，但会比杰里科估计的更远（因为杰里科把德国舰队的距离给估计得太近了）。另外，为了避免被德方形成T头之势，英国舰队总共需要完成至少12个罗经点的转向，因此这个机动所需花费的时间是比较长的。



问题：应该如何评价中央展开策略？

根据Stephen McLaughlin的说法（Equal Speed Charlie London: Jellicoe’s Deployment at Jutland, P.14-16）：

Although the Staff Appreciation had discussed a starboard deployment in rather favourable terms, the method its authors really preferred was deployment on a centre column, on the assumption that Jellicoe in Iron Duke would have led the fleet. This was not a standard manoeuvre practised by the Grand Fleet, but it could, in theory, have been ordered by a 'Forming and Disposing' signal. This would have required Jellicoe to signal the order in which the divisions were to form line of battle, leaving them to take up their positions according to their best judgment. As shown in the Staff Appreciation's diagram, the starboard columns would turn to port and then turn to starboard to fom up in the wake of the flagship's division; meanwhile, the divisions to port of the flagship would mark time by turning away from the flagship, then circle round to join up in the rear of the battle line. The advantage claimed for this manoeuvre was that it would placed the Grand Fleet's line of battle 4,000 yards closer to the enemy than the port deployment actually carried out, at a time when the visibility was fast fading.
尽管杜瓦兄弟在其著作中，对右翼展开颇为赞赏，但他们真正青睐的策略，是中央展开，即在杰里科的指挥下，由铁公爵号担任先导舰，带领舰队展开为战列线。这并不是大舰队日常训练的标准的展开机动，但至少从理论上来说，是可以通过信号旗，将该命令发布出去的。如果要这么做的话，杰里科需要命令各分队组成战列线，并由各分队自行判断，该如何完成这个机动。从杜瓦兄弟的著作中给出的示意图来看，右翼分队需要先向左转，再向右转，从而加入中央分队的后方；而左翼分队则需要兜一个大圈，随后才能加入战列线的后方。相比于实际采用的左翼展开，中央展开能将双方战列线之间的距离缩短4,000码；考虑到当时的能见度在快速下降，这的确算是个优点。

K. G. B. Dewar, served as a naval advisor to Winston Churchill while he was writing his history of the war, The World Crisis. Churchill followed Dewar's lead and described the centre-column deployment as a 'sure, prudent and glorious middle course'. The advantages attributed to the centre deployment therefore gained a wide audience. Jellicoe's supporters have usually cited the complexity of the centre column deployment as the chief reason for not using it in battle, but Jellicoe himself held a different view, writing: The strongest reason against the method suggested is that all experience had shown that with a very large fleet the best position for the Commander-in-Chief was in the centre of the line. Jellicoe's objection was rooted in the experience gained in prewar tactical exercises dating back to the 1901 combined manoeuvres of the Mediterranean and Channel fleets, where all the participants had agreed that a commander could control his fleet more easily and certainly from the centre. Nor did Jellicoe think much of the argument that the centre-column deployment would have put the Grand Fleet closer to the enemy: The mere fact of our line being placed 4,000 yards nearer the German fleet would, as events have shown, have made no difference in the end, as Admiral Scheer would have undoubtedly executed his 16 point turn away from our line as soon as our fire began to tell. While the centre-column deployment was not without its advantages, these were relatively minor, while the risks of undertaking an unpractised manoeuvre in the presence of the enemy were certainly great.
当温斯顿·丘吉尔撰写他的一战回忆录【世界危机】时，肯尼思·杜瓦担任了他的海军顾问。因此在丘吉尔的著作中，他采纳了杜瓦的观点，将中央展开描述为“可靠、谨慎、且光荣的中间路线”。受其影响，中央展开的优势，得到了广泛关注。杰里科的支持者们，通常会表示，之所以没有使用这种策略，主要原因在于这种机动方式非常复杂。但杰里科自己则持有不同观点，他写道：之所以不采用中央展开，最主要的原因在于，所有经验都表明，在统辖一支非常庞大的舰队时，总司令的最佳战位，是战列线的中央位置。杰里科的这个反对意见，是植根于战前的各类战术演习的经验的，最早可以追溯到1901年时，地中海舰队与海峡舰队的联合演习——在那场演习中，所有参与者都同意，当处在中央位置时，指挥官能够更为简单有效地控制他的舰队。另外，对于中央展开能够拉近双方距离的观点，杰里科也是嗤之以鼻的，他表示：从事后结果来看，即便双方距离拉近4,000码，也不会对结果起到什么影响的，因为在我方炮火开始轰击敌舰后，舍尔肯定会通过16个罗经点的转向，来脱离战斗的。总的来说，尽管中央展开并非毫无优点，但其优势并不大，然而在敌舰面前执行这样一个未曾练习过的机动方式，风险实在是太大了。

杜瓦兄弟推崇的中央展开机动的示意图

如果以这种方式展开，且舍尔选择应战的话，双方之间的交战距离，也会比历史上更近，但最靠近左侧的两个分队，需要作出复杂的转向才能完成这个机动。另外，这个机动会将铁公爵号置于战列线的最前端（以左翼或右翼分队作为先导展开时，铁公爵号都会位于战列线的中央位置）。



问题：如果采用分队战术，又会如何？

根据Stephen McLaughlin的说法（Equal Speed Charlie London: Jellicoe’s Deployment at Jutland, P.11）：

Before Jutland, Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee, commander of the Fourth Battle Squadron, wrote a series of memoranda to Jellicoe suggesting a number of tactical ideas, one of these was dividing the fleet during the approach into two main groups that would mount a coordinated attack on the enemy from different directions. Jellicoe rejected this idea, but during the battle Sturdee hoped it might happen spontaneously, writing after the war that: When deployment was ordered to Port or away from the enemy V. A. [Vice-Admiral] First Battle Squadron [i.e..on the starboard wing] might have taken the great responsibility of deploying the other way. My hope at the time was that he would and I should have followed him.
在日德兰海战之前，第4战列舰中队的指挥官，斯特迪中将，曾经给杰里科写过一系列的备忘录，并向后者推荐了一些战术设想，其中就包括在接敌之时，将舰队分为两股，并从不同方向对敌人进行协同攻击的设想。杰里科驳回了这个设想，但在日德兰海战时，斯特迪曾希望这种情况能够自然地出现。在海战结束后，他写道：在收到左翼展开，或者向远离敌舰的方向展开的命令后，第1战列舰中队（位于整个舰队的右翼）的指挥官，或许可以自行决定向另一个方向展开。当时我真希望他这么做，随后我会跟随他的行动。

根据Stephen McLaughlin的说法（Divide and Conquer? Divisional Tactics and the Battle of Jutland, P.8-9）：

Of course, the commander of the First Battle Squadron, Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney - who has been described as ‘orthodox, unimaginative, utterly lacking in initiative’ - did no such thing, nor was he ever likely to. But we can take a stab at analysing the possible results of such an action. To begin with, Sturdee’s statement is somewhat ambiguous, since there are two possibilities: First, while the three divisions of the battle fleet on the port wing turned first NE, then turned SEbyE, the three starboard divisions could have deployed to the SW, opening an ever-widening gap between the two wings of the fleet. Probably the western half of the fleet, with the three Queen Elizabeth class ships of the 5th Battle Squadron (Warspite had fallen out of line as a result of her steering difficulties), would have then shaped course more to the south, and then perhaps gradually turned more to the east, attacking the rear of the German line. This would have placed the German fleet between two fires, with Jellicoe’s half of the fleet to the northeast and the other half 10,000 - 13,000 yards to the northwest.
当然了，第1战列舰中队的指挥官，伯尼中将，并没有这么做，并且也不可能会这么做。毕竟，人们对他的描述是“传统、缺乏想象力、完全不具备主动性”。不过我们倒是不妨分析一下，这种情况可能会导致的结果。首先，斯特迪的描述是有些含糊的，因为实际上有可能发生两种情况：一种可能性，是左翼的三支战列舰分队首先向东北方向转向，随后向东南微东方向转向，另外三支战列舰分队则可以像西南方向展开，随后这两支部队会渐行渐远。接下来，那些驶向西侧的部队，以及那3艘伊丽莎白女王级战列舰（厌战号由于转向困难，已经无法加入战列线），可能会转向南方，甚至可能会逐渐转向东方，以便对德国舰队的后卫进行攻击。这样一来的话，德国舰队就会被夹在两支英国部队之间，其中杰里科所在的那半支舰队位于德国舰队的东北方位，而另外半支舰队则位于德国舰队的西北方位，距离约10,000到13,000码。

But this is where the visibility factor comes into play. As a result, the western wing would have had to contend with a misty eastern horizon that might have made effective gunnery very difficult, while at the same time the Germans might have seen them much more clearly to the westward. This is critical, since the western half of the fleet would have consisted for the most part of the older dreadnoughts with 12in guns, and would have been outnumbered by the German battleships, sixteen to fifteen. So if the High Seas Fleet turned westward to avoid Jellicoe’s force, it might well have been able to engage the western half of the Grand Fleet on equal or better-than equal terms. At this point, however, things become unpredictable. Would Admiral Reinhard Scheer, C-in-C of the High Seas Fleet, have made the same battle-turn-away he did? What would Jellicoe have done when he realised that half his fleet was going the other way?
然而，在这种情况下，能见度因素就会发挥影响了。其结果是，位于西侧的半支舰队，可能只能看见布满迷雾的东侧地平线，因此其炮术发挥会受到很大的影响。与此同时，德国舰队在瞄准这些位于西侧的英国军舰时，则会容易得多。这个因素是很关键的，因为位于西侧的那半支舰队，主要是由老旧的、装备12英寸火炮的无畏舰构成的，且其数量也少于德国舰队（德方16艘，英方15艘）。所以如果公海舰队向西侧转向，避开杰里科所在的半支舰队的话，那么他们完全可以在平等条件、甚至是占据优势的条件下，与半支大舰队进行对抗。至于此后会发生什么，就难以预料了。舍尔还会做出那个16个罗经点的转向吗？如果杰里科意识到，西侧那半支舰队独走了，他又会采取什么行动呢？

The second possibility would have been for Burney to steam straight ahead, then turn 90° to port and follow, at some distance, Jellicoe’s half of the fleet. This is a bit more promising in some ways, since it preserves the better visibility while placing the trailing half of the fleet at a reasonable range for good gunnery - about 10,000 yards. The two halves of the fleet would have stayed within visual range and therefore could support one another effectively. By the same token, however, the trailing half would have come into action one ship at a time as they turned eastward, and so it would have been some while before they could develop their full volume of fire. Still, this course of action might have offered several advantages over the deployment as actually carried out.
还有一种可能性，是伯尼中将带领舰队直接向前航行，随后向左舷方向做4个罗经点的转向，并跟在杰里科的那半支舰队的后面。这种做法有几点好处，首先这样会占据能见度上的优势，其次也会让跟在后面的那半支舰队，与敌方舰队保持合理的交战距离，即大约10,000码，以便有效发挥炮术。另外，这样做的话，这两支英国部队还可以互相保持在视觉接触范围内，因此互相之间可以开展有效的支援。然而，采用这种方式后，后面那半支舰队，在转向东侧的过程中，并不是所有军舰都能有效发挥火力的，因此需要等待其完成机动后，才能发挥全部火力。尽管如此，相比于历史上实际采用的展开方式，这种操作可能会更占优势一些。

Before moving on, we should note Sturdee’s somewhat plaintive observation on his situation at Jutland: It was constantly present in my mind how any individual action of mine in the centre of the very long line could help the action, but I was painfully aware that I was powerless to move out of the line. This was exactly why Jellicoe had placed Sturdee’s division in the middle of the battle fleet, rather than on one of the wings: he did not trust the renegade admiral not to try something along the lines of a split deployment. Sandwiched in the middle of the fleet, there was little Sturdee could do in the way of independent action.
在结束这个话题之前，我们有必要提及的是，斯特迪对他在日德兰海战时的处境，作出了以下的略带悲哀的描述：在我的脑海中经常浮现的话题是，当我处在一条非常长的战列线的中央位置时，我的个人举动，到底能对战况产生什么正面影响。但我痛苦的意识到，我是无法脱离这条战列线的。正是基于这个原因，杰里科才选择将斯特迪置于战列舰队的中央位置，而不是将其置于左右两翼。杰里科不信任这位带有异端战术思想的中队指挥官，并且担心他会采取分兵行动。但把他夹在整个舰队的中间时，斯特迪就没办法单独行动了。

斯特迪推崇的分队战术的示意图

如果右翼分队向西南方向展开的话，那么尽管能对德国舰队形成夹击，但受制于能见度，其战果未必会很好，并且还存在被德方单独击破的风险；如果右翼分队向东北方向展开的话，那么与历史上实际采用的展开机动，实际上差别并不是太大。



问题：当时的能见度到底有多差？

根据J. E. T. Harper的说法（Reproduction of the Record of the Battle of Jutland, P.35-36）：

At this time the sky was overcast, sea calm, wind South Westerly, light. Owing to the combination of atmospheric conditions and the smoke from our own ships, the visibility was bad, but variable; and great difficulty was experienced in distinguishing ships. The Rear-Admiral, First Battle Squadron, states: The visibility was extremely baffling, partly due to misty clouds appearing and dissolving, and partly due to the layers of smoke from funnels and ships firing. The Rear-Admiral, Fourth Battle Squadron, states: I estimated the visibility at about 5 to 6 miles. By 6.45 p.m. it had somewhat decreased and the light was becoming bad. From the on the visibility varied, but was not, I think, ever more than 12,000 yards. Vanguard reports: It is not known whether the enemy Battle Fleet was present or not. They were not seen by Vanguard. St. Vincent reports: Weather very misty, visibility extreme about 5.5 miles. Indomitable reports: On some bearing one could see 16,000 yards, whilst on others only 2,000. The above extracts, which are a few only of those which could be quoted, are sufficient to indicate the variability of the visibility at the commencement and throughout the action.
此时，天色阴沉，海况平静，吹着轻微的西南风。在大气条件及军舰排放出的烟雾的影响下，能见度并不好，并且还相当多变，因此在辨别舰只时，存在很大的难度。第1战列舰中队的冈特少将表示，能见度对他们的影响非常大，这一方面是因为时隐时现的迷雾，另一方面是因为从烟囱口排出、从炮口喷出的烟雾。第4战列舰中队的达夫少将表示，他估计能见度在5-6海里之间，并且至18时45分时，能见度又下降了，且光照情况也变差了。此后，能见度较为多变，但从来都没有超过12,000码。前卫号报告称，他们根本不知道敌方战列舰队是不是在那里，至少他们自己没看到。圣文森特号报告称，雾气非常浓重，能见度最好的时候，也不过就是5.5海里左右。不挠号则报告称，在一些方位上，能见度可达16,000码，但在另一些方位上，则只有2,000码。以上引用的内容，只是有关能见度的报告中的很少一部分，但已经足以表明，在交战开始时、以及交战过程中，能见度非常的多变。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.94-95）：

The atmospheric visibility was reasonably good. But patches of mist together with the heavy funnel and gun smoke of both fleets seriously reduced the overall visibility. The Germans were at a greater disadvantage, silhouetted as they were against the setting sun. The British fleet, on the other hand, suffered more from the smoke. 'The direction of the wind was about W.S.W., force 2, causing the enemy's funnel smoke to drift towards our line', according to Jellicoe. The occasionally good visibility, particularly for the rear divisions, should not obscure this basic fact: visibility, though favouring the British battle fleet, was generally none too good after 6 p.m., more especially for the leading and centre divisions.
当时的大气环境还是比较好的，但一片片的迷雾，再加上双方舰艇的烟囱和炮口排出的烟雾，使得能见度受到了极大的影响。德国方面的处境更为不利一些，夕阳照射映衬出了他们舰艇的轮廓。但烟雾则对英国方面产生了更大的影响。根据杰里科的说法，当时的风向是西南偏西，风力2级，因此敌方排放出的烟雾，被风吹着飘向了我方。总体来说，在18时之后，尽管能见度对英方更为有利一些，且有时候的确还不错，但总体来说并不算很好。另外，尽管英国战列线中靠后的舰艇们的能见度还不错，但靠前以及居中的舰艇们的能见度并不好。

问题：能见度因素，对交战双方造成了什么样的影响？

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, P.92）：

The Battle Fleet after deployment was only occasionally in action. For the first twenty minutes the firing was limited to about one-third of the fleet, the ships firing with any effect on the enemy’s Battle Fleet at this time numbering less than a dozen; but in spite of smoke and poor visibility considerable punishment was certainly inflicted between 6.25 and 6.35 on the leading ships of the German line.
在展开为战列线后，英国舰队只是时不时地向德舰进行射击。在前20分钟内，整个舰队中，只有大约1/3的军舰在开火，至于能对敌方战列舰队进行有效射击的，更是两只手就能数的过来。不过，尽管受到了烟雾和能见度问题的困扰，但在18时25分至35分之间，我们仍旧对德国战列线的前卫造成了有效的打击。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.292 & P.294 & P.298-300）：

Of all the Grand Fleet, Jellicoe’s flagship did most to inflict damage on the enemy. Due to the smoke and mist, Jellicoe himself had been able to make out only three or four enemy ships from Iron Duke and he had no idea of the enemy’s formation...Scheer knew that he was facing practically the whole of the Grand Fleet but he could make out little more than the flashes of their guns in an arc of fire extending from NNW round to E.
在整个大舰队中，杰里科的旗舰对敌方造成的伤害是最大的。但由于浓烟和迷雾的影响，在铁公爵号上，杰里科只能看见3-4艘敌舰，且完全搞不清敌方的队形到底是什么样的。至于舍尔，他当时很清楚自己面对的是整个大舰队，但除了从东北偏北方向一直延伸到正东方向的一长串的炮口火光之外，他基本上什么都看不见。

Iron Duke’s fire control staff saw their target turn away into the mist at 6.37, as did Captain Dreyer. From Marlborough, the Kaiser-class battleship briefly engaged at 6.39 was also seen to do the same. These observations of single ships were not reported to Jellicoe and Burney, but even if they had been, it is very unlikely that they would have been taken as definite signs of a concerted turn-about by the whole High Seas Fleet. By 6.45, there was a lull in the firing all along the line though, until about 6.54, there were further brief sightings of the enemy, albeit nothing that revealed their actual movements. Thus neither Jellicoe nor any of his divisional commanders had any notion that Scheer had executed an action-turn-about and that the leading German divisions were then steering W.
在18时37分时，铁公爵号的火控人员看见他们的目标舰（国王号）进行了转向，并遁入了迷雾之中，该舰的舰长德雷尔上校也看到了这一幕。在18时39分时，马尔伯勒号也看到了他们的目标舰（某艘皇帝级）做出了同样的机动。这些情况并没有被汇报给杰里科和伯尼，但即便汇报了，英方指挥官也不太可能将这些对单舰的观察报告，视作整个公海舰队进行了全体掉头的确切证据。至18时45分时，整个战列线的炮火都停止了。后来，一直到18时54分为止，尽管时不时仍有英国军舰短暂地看到了德国军舰，但他们从未看明白德国舰队的真正动向。因此，无论是杰里科，还是他手下的分队指挥官们，都完全不知道舍尔已经下达了战斗回转的命令，并且这些德舰已经掉头向西航行了。

问题：在这个阶段中，英国海军取得了什么样的战果？

根据John Campbell的说法（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.183-196）：

Of the German Battlecruisers, the Lützow was probably hit by 10 heavy shells in this phase of the action, of which 2 were from the Lion, and the remaining 8 from the Invincible and Inflexible. There appear to have been three hits on the Derfflinger in his phase by 12in shells from the Indomitable. The Seydlitz was hit at about 1834 by a shell which was most probably a 12in APC from Indomitable. There were no major caliber hits on the other battlecruisers. Of the battleships König was hit by eight heavy shells. The Markgraf was hit once at 1835. None of the other battleships appears to have been hit in this phase of the action. Of the above 9 were due to battleships, 2 to Beatty’s battlecruiser and 12 to the 3rd BCS.
在德国战列巡洋舰中，吕佐夫号可能被10发大口径炮弹击中，其中有2发是狮号打出的，其余8发是无敌号和不屈号打出的。德尔弗林格号似乎被不挠号打出的3发12英寸炮弹击中了。此外塞德里茨号也在18时34分左右被击中了，这很可能是不挠号发射的12英寸穿甲弹。除此之外，其余战列巡洋舰，在这个阶段中并未被大口径炮弹击中。在德国战列舰中，国王号被8发大口径炮弹击中。边境伯爵号在18时35分时被1发炮弹击中。其余战列舰，在这个阶段中并未被击中。以上命中弹中，有9发是英国战列舰打出的（击中的都是德国战列舰），2发是狮号打出的，其余12发是第3战列巡洋舰中队打出的（后面14发击中的都是德国战列巡洋舰）。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.101）：

The German battle cruisers were in a very bad state, the Lützow, Hipper's flagship, coming under particularly heavy fire. Listing heavily, and her bows deep in the water, she had to leave the line. Leadership devolved on the Derfflinger, but she, too, was in a sorry condition, with water streaming in through a large hole in her bows. Hipper was unable to transfer his flag to the Seydlitz, as she was awash up to the middle deck forward. The Von der Tann had no turrets in action. Only the Moltke remained serviceable, and Hipper decided upon her, though it was not until 9.50 p.m. that he was able to board her and resume command.
德国战列巡洋舰的受损情况，当时已经相当严重了。希佩尔的旗舰吕佐夫号，受到了沉重的打击，其舰体明显倾斜，舰艏已经埋入水中，因此不得不从队伍中退出。随后，指挥权被交到了德尔弗林格号，但该舰的受损情况也不轻，海水正从舰艏的破洞处涌入舰体之内。希佩尔本想将其司令部移至塞德里茨号，但该舰的舰艏区域同样也进水严重。至于冯·德·坦恩号，则是炮塔受损严重。当时只有毛奇号依旧堪用，因此希佩尔最终决定移至该舰，但他一直要到21时50分时，才登上该舰并重新掌控指挥权。

结论：在当时的情况下，杰里科需要在有限的情报支持下，快速做出一个至关重要的决策，而他所选择的左翼展开的决策，绝对不能算是一个糟糕的决策——在所有潜在的选项之中，向西南方向展开的分队战术，可能是最糟糕的，它在能见度和协同方面都处于明显劣势。右翼展开则是风险最大的策略，但由于其距离敌方最近，因此也有可能打出更高的战果。至于中央展开，尽管具备交战距离更近的优势，但其机动方式关于复杂，且平日里疏于练习，因此也带有较大的风险。向东北方向展开的分队战术，可能会比历史上的决策更优秀，但两者的差异是有限的。以此来看，杰里科所下达的左翼展开的命令，是一个非常稳健的决策。至于其结果，虽然并不理想，但这主要是由于能见度因素导致的，而不是由于杰里科的决策导致的。

seven_nana

八、主力决战，第二阶段

当公海舰队通过战斗回转机动，成功脱离战斗之后，主力决战的第一阶段就结束了。然而不久之后，出于某种让后人费解的动机，舍尔再度下达了战斗回转命令，因而他们又再度返回了刚才还在试图逃离的区域，于是双方进入了主力决战的第二阶段。由于在接下来的战斗中，德国舰队再一次陷入了英国战列舰队的T头，因此这个阶段，又名第二次T头。这是整场海战中，德国舰队第二次陷入重大危机。

英德双方的交战态势，18时45分 - 18时55分

脱离险境后不久，舍尔就于18时48分时，命令各分队以顺次转向的方式，向右舷方向转向2个罗经点。随后在18时55分时，他下达了第二个战斗回转命令。另一方面，在18时44分时，杰里科命令各分队顺次转向至东南方向。在18时55分时，他又下达了各分队顺次转向，将航向调整为正南方向的命令。尽管双方指挥官，当时互相不知道对方身在何处，但两支舰队再度形成了航向近乎于垂直的场面。不久之后，他们就将要再次碰面了。

另外，虽然在18时之前，威斯巴登号就已经被打瘫了，且由于其距离英国战列舰队非常之近（远比德国战列舰和战列巡洋舰们更近），因此该舰实际上遭到了不少英国战列舰的轮番轰击（据估计，有10余发大口径炮弹击中了该舰）。尽管如此，该舰依旧十分顽强，甚至还对英舰进行了还击。

交战态势图，18时45分 - 18时50分

从下图中可以看到，在舍尔下达转向命令之前，尽管双方舰队之间的距离尚不足10海里，但由于能见度的影响，他们是互相看不到对方的。在那个局面下，舍尔本来已经脱离战斗了，但他接下来做出的决策，改变了这个局面。



交战态势图，18时50分 - 18时55分

从下图中可以看到，由于英国舰队挡在了德国舰队的东侧，因此如果舍尔想要返回基地，就需要击败这支舰队，或者设法绕过去。



舍尔为什么会下达第二个战斗回转命令？

舍尔下达的第二个战斗回转命令，引发了历史学家们的许多评论和猜测——毕竟，从事后诸葛亮的角度看，这个决策，实在是过于愚蠢了。

问题：舍尔在下达这个命令时，到底是怎么想的？

根据舍尔（Reinhard Scheer）在其著作中给出的描述（Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War, P.155）：

The manoeuvre would be bound to surprise the enemy, to upset his plans for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would facilitate the breaking loose at night. The fight of the Wiesbaden helped also to strengthen my resolve to make an effort to render assistance to her and at least save the crew.
我们的举动，能起到对敌军进行突袭的效果，并且当敌方做出后续的决策时，他们的思绪也会被这个举动所干扰。另外，如果我们能对敌方造成重大打击的话，也会有利于我们在夜间的突围行动。再者，威斯巴登号的顽强奋战，也让我决意要设法救援该舰，至少也要救下其船员。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.110-112）：

Scheer would have us believe that his extraordinary tum to the east was deliberate. He gives a number of reasons for it, the decisive one, allegedly, being this one: It was [he wrote in his 'immediate report' to the Emperor after the battle] as yet too early to assume 'night cruising order'. The enemy could have compelled us to fight before dark, he could have prevented our exercising our initiative, and finally he could have cut off our return to the German Bight. There was only one way of avoiding this: to deal the enemy a second blow by again advancing regardless of consequences, and to bring all destroyers to attack.
舍尔想让我们相信，他所作出的向东转向的离奇决定，是故意而为之的。他给出了不少理由，最重要的似乎是这个：在当时的情况下，将舰队调整为夜战队形，还为时过早。敌人有可能会赶在天黑之前，迫使我们与其交战，他们可能会抢占先机并阻止我们的行动，并且他们还可以切断我们返回赫尔格兰湾的退路。想要避免这个局面，只有一个办法，就是不计后果地再度冲向敌方舰队，并让所有驱逐舰都投入攻击行动（这是他在海战结束后，写给德皇的报告中的表述）。

No, it is extremely improbable that Scheer deliberately headed the High Seas Fleet towards the British battle line. It was imperative that he get beyond reach of the Grand Fleet before daylight on 1 June, or annihilation threatened him. Most probably, therefore, his intention was to slip past astern of the British fleet (that is, to the northward of the fleet) undetected before nightfall and make for his base.
但实际上，舍尔应该并不是故意带领公海舰队冲向英国战列舰队的。对他来说，最重要的任务，是赶在6月1日天亮之前，彻底逃离大舰队的控制范围，否则他的舰队有可能会被歼灭。因此，他的动机，很可能是想在入夜之前，从大舰队的后方（即北侧）悄悄地溜过去，从而返回基地。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.458）：

This was his third ‘death-wish’ decision at Jutland, and it may never be convincingly explained...It is unclear how much of the British battle-line Scheer, near the centre of his own line in Friederich der Große, had seen, and it may be that he still did not appreciate that the whole of the Grand Fleet was present. Whatever his logic, he marched the High Seas Fleet, headed by Hipper’s battered and relatively thinly-armoured battlecruisers, straight back into the worst trouble that it lay in his gift, as C-in-C, to contrive.
这是舍尔在日德兰海战中犯下的第三个“自杀性”的决策，并且其背后的理由，似乎永远也无法得到合理的解释。由于舍尔所在的腓特烈大帝号，处在整个德国战列舰队的中部区域，因此他可能并未观察到英国战列舰队的全貌，甚至连自己已经与整个英国大舰队发生交战的事实，他当时可能都是不知晓的。无论舍尔当时到底是怎么想的，作为公海舰队司令，他所下达的命令，意味着希佩尔麾下那饱受创伤、且装甲相对较为薄弱的战列巡洋舰们，即将要面对的是最为糟糕的局面，没有之一。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.313）：

Scheer himself added to the impression of faulty tactical judgement by admitting to the Kaiser that: ‘In peace time...one would deny that I had any ability to lead a fleet, had I executed such a manoeuvre as I did at the Skagerrak’. After a good dinner, he admitted: ‘My idea? I had no idea...The thing just happened’. In the opinion of his own Chief-of-Staff, ‘if an admiral had brought about such a situation in manoeuvres, or at a war game, he would never be entrusted with another command’.
舍尔事后曾向德皇承认：“如果我在和平时期的演习中，做出了我在日德兰海战时所做的决定的话，那么别人一定会认为，我完全不具备指挥舰队的能力”。从这个表述来看，舍尔自己似乎也认为这个战术决策是有问题的。此外，在一次晚餐后，他还表示过：“我当时是怎么想的？我也不知道，事情就这么发生了”。在舍尔的参谋长看来，如果一位将军在演习或沙盘模拟中陷入这种局面的话，那么他永远都不可能再当上指挥官了。

结论：所谓的主动出击，很可能是舍尔事后给自己找的借口。他真正的意图，或许是想悄悄地溜走，只不过他搞砸了。

英德双方的交战态势，18时55分 - 19时05分

当两支舰队再次遭遇之时，最先与德国军舰交上火的，是古迪纳夫所指挥的第2轻巡洋舰中队——自18时47分起，该中队就调整了航向，驶向了德国舰队所在的方向，一方面是为了攻击瘫痪的威斯巴登号，另一方面则是对敌方动向进行侦察。在遭到德舰的大口径火炮轰击后，这些轻巡洋舰选择了退却，但与此同时，位于其后方的英国战列舰队，此时也发现了德国战列舰队，于是双方主力再度发生了交战。

交战态势图，18时55分 - 19时00分

从下图中可以看到，在18时55分时，双方舰队不约而同地调整了航向。此时距离德方舰队最近的，是英国第2轻巡洋舰中队，于是他们遭到了位于编队前方的德国第5战列舰分队的攻击。



交战态势图，19时00分 - 19时05分

从下图中可以看到，当双方舰队完成转向后，英方再次对德方形成了T头优势，但与第一次T头不同的是，这次英国舰队并未组成连贯的战列线，而是处在并列纵队的状态下，因此有部分军舰的射界，可能会被其他军舰所遮挡。



在两次T头之间的停火时刻，英国舰队在做什么？

如上文所述，由于能见度因素的影响，当德国舰队进行第一次战斗回转之时，杰里科并不清楚敌方的具体动向，因此并未选择追击。这样的决策是否合理呢？有没有更好的做法呢？

另一方面，在两次T头之间，贝蒂队做出了整场日德兰海战中，最为奇怪的举动——他们进行了一次32个罗经点的转向，其航迹划出了一个完整的圆。他们为什么会这么做呢？

问题：在第一次T头之后，如果杰里科采用分队战术，能否取得更好的战果？

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, P.95-97）：

The turn to South at 6.55, which brought the fleet into a quarter line formation of divisions in line ahead, is one of the noteworthy movements of the action, for it brought the fleet back again into divisions. It had taken nearly half an hour to deploy, and had only been deployed about quarter of an hour when a divisional formation was resumed leaving the Marlborough’s division more exposed to attack than it was at 6.15, when its position caused the Commander-in-Chief to deploy away from the enemy. This resumption of a divisional formation indicates that the fleet was too large to manoeuvre as a single whole, and that a more flexible tactical system was required in which the Commander-in-Chief, after indicating the point of attack, would have left the squadron commanders free to support and assist each other in carrying out his wishes.
18时55分的转向，使得舰队队形变成了斜向布置的并列纵队。这是整场海战中，有必要重点关注的环节——此前花费了近半个小时才组成的战列线，仅仅维持了大约一刻钟的时间，就由于这次编队机动，而散开了。另外，在18时15分时，杰里科之所以会选择向远离敌舰的方向展开战列线，很重要的一个原因就是考虑到马尔伯勒号所在的分队的安全，但在此次编队机动后，该分队所处的位置，实际上比之前还要更容易遭到敌方攻击。在短暂的展开为战列线后，很快又恢复并列纵队这个现象，揭示了一个道理——我们的舰队过于庞大了，难以作为一个整体来行动。我们应该采用一种更为灵活的战术方式，其中总司令会指定攻击点，而中队指挥官则享有自由机动的权力，并根据各自的判断，在各中队之间进行协同与支援。

If the 5th Battle Squadron, followed by the 6th, 5th, and 4th Divisions had led round to the south-westward and proceeded at full speed to the northward of the enemy fleet, whilst the battle cruisers, followed by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions, had carried out a similar movement to the southward, the rear of the High Sea Fleet would have been enveloped and exposed to an overwhelming concentration. But an attack of this kind was outside the scope of the Grand Fleet Battle Orders, which were based on the principle of the Battle Fleet working as one large unit in a single line.
如果由第5战列舰中队领头，第6、第5、第4战列舰分队相继跟随，向西南方向航行，并全速驶向敌方舰队的北侧区域，与此同时第1、第2、第3战列舰分队则跟随战列巡洋舰队，继续向正南方向航行，那么我们就能对德国舰队的后卫进行两面夹击，并对其施以压倒性的集火射击。然而，由于【大舰队战斗命令】的基本原则，是将舰队组成单条战列线来运用，因此其中并不包含这种进攻方式。

根据Stephen McLaughlin的说法（Divide and Conquer? Divisional Tactics and the Battle of Jutland, P.12）：

On paper, things look bad for the High Seas Fleet, but in fact there are several problems with this manoeuvre. First and foremost is the fact that the British didn’t know exactly where the Germans had gone. To most observers it seemed likely that the enemy was simply concealed by a local thickening of the mist. Even if the German turn-away had been understood, the poor visibility would have created other problems. The courses described by the Dewar brothers - southwesterly for the western wing and southerly for the eastern - lead to ranges on the order of 10,000-12,000 yards to the trailing German ships of the 5th Division and the 1st Scouting Group, and it is likely that the western wing would have been able to see the enemy only dimly at this range due to the mist. Moreover, the two wings of the British fleet would not have been able to see each other, making any sort of cooperation between them impossible.
从纸面上来看，这样做会让公海舰队陷入困境；但事实上，这种机动方式存在好几个严重的问题。首先，最重要的问题是，英国方面并不知道德国舰队跑哪去了。当时，在绝大部分人来看，敌方舰队似乎只是被局部的浓雾给遮挡住了。即便英国人识破了德国人的转向机动，在当时那种糟糕的能见度环境下，进行追击也是会遇到很多问题的。如果按照杜瓦兄弟所推崇的航线，即西翼分队驶向西南方向，东翼分队驶向正南方向那么前者与德国第5战列舰分队的距离，以及后者与德国第1侦察群的距离，都会在10,000到12,000码之间。受到迷雾的影响，在此距离下，西翼分队只能非常模糊的看见德国舰队。除此之外，由于这两支英国舰队彼此之间也法看见对方，因此无法进行任何形式的协同。

The divided Grand Fleet would also have offered two golden opportunities to the Germans. First, as Captain V S H Haggard, director of the Training and Staff Duties Division (the section of the Admiralty Staff charged with studying the lessons of the war) noted in 1922, this splitting of the British fleet would have ‘resulted in the fleet being cut in half by Scheer’s easterly movement’ when the High Seas Fleet executed a second Gefechtskehrtwendung and turned back to the east at 6.55 pm. In other words, Scheer would have had a wide-open pathway back home between the two wings. And secondly, if Scheer did not turn eastward at 6.55, he would have been in a very good position to cross the ‘T’ of the western wing.
将大舰队一分为二，还会为德国人创造两个绝佳的机会。海军参谋总局下辖的训练与参谋分局（负责研究战训）的分局长哈格德上校，就在1922年时指出，当舍尔在18时55分时下达第二个战斗回转命令后，随着公海舰队向东驶来，英国舰队将会被一切为二。换句话说，舍尔可以从两支相隔甚远的分队之间穿过去，从而得以返回母港。另外，如果舍尔没有下达第二个战斗回转命令，那么当双方遭遇之时，舍尔很有可能会对英方的西翼分队形成T头优势。

杜瓦兄弟推崇的的分队战术的示意图（第一次T头之后）

尽管这种战术乍看起来颇有价值，但潜在风险也不可小觑，因此其可行性和合理性并不高。



问题：贝蒂队为何会做出32个罗经点的转向？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.303-304）：

After the sinking of Invincible, all six surviving British battlecruisers lost touch with the enemy; they sighted no more German capital ships until 7.13...When Invincible blew up, Indomitable was about three cables astern of Inflexible with the other battlecruisers coming up astern...at 6.50 Beatty ordered the 3BCS to prolong his line astern.
在无敌号沉没之后，幸存的6艘英国战列巡洋舰，并未与德舰继续交火，此后直到19时13分时，他们才再度看到德国主力舰。当无敌号爆炸之时，不挠号位于不屈号后方约3链（0.3海里）处，其余战巡则在更后方。至18时50分时，贝蒂命令第3战列巡洋舰中队加入其编队后方。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.457-458）：

About this time, Captain Ernle Chatfield left Lion’s bridge to see for himself the damage to his ship. In his absence from the bridge there occurred a problem with Lion’s steering which was to assume surreal proportions in the post-Jutland bickerings. The BCF flagship turned a full, lazy 360° circle. She probably put helm on, in conformity to the Grand Fleet’s four-point turn to starboard, and left it on. The battlecruisers astern followed her round, while the two ahead (Inflexible and Indomitable) turned in imitation and took the opportunity to tag on to the end of the line. Napier’s 3rd LCS, also ahead, copied the circle. Beatty later insisted that it never happened, claiming it was a double turn to close the enemy, to starboard and then back to port, and tried to ban the circle from the battlecruisers’ track-charts.
大约在这一时刻，狮号舰长查特菲尔德上校，离开了舰桥，前去查看军舰的受损状况。在他离开舰桥的这段时间内，狮号的操舵出现了问题——这艘战列巡洋舰队的旗舰，慢吞吞地进行了一个360度转向。该舰之所以会转向，可能是为了配合大舰队向右舷方向做出的4个罗经点转向，但转完4个罗经点后没有将舵回正，于是就出现了这样的情况。跟在后面的其他战列巡洋舰，也跟着狮号进行了转向；而位于狮号前方的那两艘（不屈号和不挠号）也跟着进行了转向，并借此机会加入了编队后方；至于内皮尔少将所指挥的第3轻巡洋舰中队，同样也跟随旗舰进行了转向。这个操舵失误，在日德兰海战后的争议中，起到了非常离奇的作用。贝蒂后来坚称，这个转向从未发生过，并试图从航迹图中抹去这个记录。贝蒂还声称，他们当时实际上做了两个转向，首先是向右舷方向转向，以便拉近与敌方之间的距离，随后又转回了左舷方向。

How could such a thing happen by mistake? It scarcely matters, but Beatty made such a fuss about it that it invites our attention. In calm, sunless conditions, and with no scenery (in the form of land or shipping), it is just about possible for an inattentive officer-on-the-con to turn a circle; but not all of these conditions applied. Lord Chatfield’s reference to it in his memoirs is deliberate, and carefully worded: before leaving the bridge, he put starboard helm on while handing over the con to Beatty’s chief of staff, Captain Rudolf Bentinck. But it was pretty shoddy to hand over with helm on - and why to Bentinck, who was not in Lion’s lawful chain of command, rather than to Strutt (Lion’s navigator)? In fact Bentinck was due to supersede Henry Pelly in command of Tiger in a few days’ time, and it was no doubt thought a good idea to let him ‘have a go’. Perhaps the chief of staff was thrown by the gyrocompass failure which Lion reported after the battle; but the course change was in magnetic-compass points, and, with more than a dozen nearby ships (including, briefly, the van of the Grand Fleet) tracking across his field of vision, not to mention A and B turrets training back and forth, the manoeuvre suggests a rare absence of mind.
为什么会出现这样失误呢？其原因其实并不重要，但贝蒂如此大惊小怪的举动，反而吸引了我们的关注。在海况平缓、缺乏阳光照射、且没有参照物的环境下，一名疏忽大意的操舵军官，的确是有可能在原地转上一个圈的，但当时的情况却并非如此（周围有其他军舰作为参照物）。在查特菲尔德的回忆录中，他故意撇清了自己，并小心翼翼、斟字酌句地表示，在他离开舰桥之前，他将舵转向了右舷方向，随后将职责交给了贝蒂的参谋长，鲁道夫·本廷克上校。然而，在船舵没有回正的情况下，就将其交给另一个人，本就是一件不合理的事情，更何况，本廷克并不在狮号的指挥链中。为何不是将职责交给斯特拉特（狮号的航海长）呢？事实上，根据计划，本廷克在不久之后就会接替亨利·佩里，担任虎号的舰长，因此查特菲尔德很可能是想让他先试一试，而这位参谋长则可能是受到了狮号的陀螺罗经的影响（狮号在战后报告称，该舰的陀螺罗经出了问题）。然而，当时实际做出的航向调整，是基于磁罗经点的，并且当狮号转向之时，舰桥视野内会出现十数艘军舰，并且A、B两座炮塔也会因为本舰转向，而不得不向反方向进行旋回（以便指向交战侧）。由此来看，这次操舵失误，属于那种难得一见的心不在焉的操作。

结论：基于当时的情况来看，杰里科在两次T头之间的决策，并无大的问题。如果采用分队战术进行追击，反倒是有可能让情况变得更为糟糕。至于贝蒂队的原地360度转向，似乎并不是贝蒂本人的责任，而是临时代替查特菲尔德指挥狮号的本廷克上校犯的低级错误。幸好这次转向发生了两次T头之间，因而没有产生什么实质性的后果。

英德双方的交战态势，19时05分 - 19时20分

自18时55分（即英方将航向调整为正南，而德方进行第二次战斗回转）时起，就陆续有几艘英国战列舰发现了德舰的踪迹，不过他们并未向旗舰汇报这一情况。而古迪纳夫则通过无线电报告，发现了德国战列舰队的踪迹。19时00分时，铁公爵号收到了南安普顿号发来的消息，随后杰里科于19时05分时下令，向右舷方向转向3个罗经点；当敌舰陆续出现在视野内后，他又于19时09分时再度下令，向左舷方向转向3个罗经点。这两次命令的目的，是向敌方靠拢，从而拉近交战距离。

在T头优势下，英国战列舰队的强大火力，再次对德国舰队造成了重击，且由于能见度相对较好，因此在这个阶段中，英方所取得的命中数，要比第一次T头时还要更多。同时，由于交战态势和能见度都对德方极为不利，因此他们完全无法组织起有效的火炮反击。在此情况下，舍尔不得不要求第1侦察群发起突击、驱逐舰队发起雷击，从而掩护德国战列舰队，使后者得以再度完成战斗回转，并撤离战场。

交战态势图，19时05分 - 19时10分

从下图中可以看到，在经过了两次战斗回转之后，德方的队形已经有些杂乱了，此刻第1侦察群挡在了战列舰队的前方，导致第5战列舰分队不得不减速等待，这一情况加剧了战场环境的复杂程度。



交战态势图，19时10分 - 19时15分

从下图中可以看到，尽管英国舰队此刻已经不再是战列线的队形，但毕竟仍然占据着T头优势，因此依旧能对德国舰队进行压倒性的打击。



交战态势图，19时15分 - 19时20分

从下图中可以看到，面对巨大的生存压力，德国舰队进行了第三次战斗回转，但由于战场环境较为混乱，他们在此次战斗回转中所经历的波折，要远多于前两次。



在第二次T头时，德国舰队是如何再度逃离险境的？

问题：当时的战场态势，对德方而言究竟有多不利？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.112）：

It was at about 7.10 p.m. that the two rear (northernmost) divisions of Jellicoe's line sighted the leading German battleships about 10,000 yards to the south-west and opened fire. By 7.15 the fire from most of the battle fleet was sweeping the whole length of the German line, at ranges of 11,000 to 14,000 yards, punishing the 5th division ('Konigs') and the battle cruisers especially severely. Beatty's battle cruisers joined in soon after 7.15 at ranges variously estimated at 15,000 to 19,800 yards. The Germans were unable to reply to the British fire, with the exception of a few ships, on account of adverse conditions of visibility (they could see only the British gun flashes) and their tactical position.
自19时10分前后起，位于编队末尾的两支英国战列舰分队，陆续在西南方向上，发现了德国战列舰队的前卫，距离约为10,000码左右，随后对其开火了。至19时15分时，英国战列舰队中的绝大部分军舰，都已经在轰击德国舰队了，交战距离为11,000码至14,000码不等，并对德方的战列巡洋舰和第5战列舰分队（4艘国王级）造成了沉重的打击。19时15分过后，贝蒂的战列巡洋舰队也加入了战斗，交战距离预计在15,000码至19,800码之间。在能见度及战术位置的双重负面影响下，绝大部分德国军舰都无法对英舰进行反击。

根据John Campbell的说法（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.204）：

During this period visibility was much in favour of the British, and to the eastward the Germans could only make out the gun-flashes of their opponents, though to the northward conditions were better. In contrast to this some of the leading British battleships, as well as the battlecruisers, were able to fire at over 9 miles, though from the Superb visibility was never much more than 6 miles...The British battleships suffered less from interference by their own ships than in the previous phase, but the King George V again complained of the Duke of Edinburgh's smoke, the Ajax was masked by the 4th LCS after only one salvo, the Vanguard was on at least one occasion masked by the Colossus, and the Thunderer by the Iron Duke.
在这一阶段，能见度对英方较为有利。对于德方来说，尽管他们能看清北侧的情况，但对于东侧区域（即英国舰队所在的方位），他们只能看见炮火，却无法看清敌舰。而对于英方来说，战列巡洋舰及编队中位置靠前的战列舰，能在超过9海里的距离上开火，而壮丽号（位于编队中央）至少也能在6海里左右的距离上射击。与上一阶段相比，已方军舰所排放出的烟雾，对英国战列舰所造成的干扰也要相对小一些，但也并非完全不受影响，例如英王乔治五世号再度抱怨了爱丁堡公爵号的排烟，埃阿斯号在仅仅打出一轮齐射后，视线就被第4轻巡洋舰中队排出的烟雾所遮蔽，而前卫号和雷神号，则分别受到了巨像号与铁公爵号的烟雾影响。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.459）：

British fire was initially sporadic, but it quickly grew in volume as the enemy emerged into view. And the German van was much more seriously bunched up and not fully under command. Hipper and his staff had disembarked from the crippled Lützow and were steaming about in a destroyer trying to find a battlecruiser in a fit state to take them. The battlecruisers themselves were physically obstructing the 3rd Squadron astern of them, causing the battleships to reduce speed and, in some cases, even stop. And now, German disorganization turned to chaos as, for a few terrible minutes, British salvoes rocketed in, thick and fast.
英舰的火力发挥，起初还是零零星星的，但随着敌舰陆续进入视野之内，很快就变得猛烈起来了。另一方面，德国舰队的前卫部分，当时正挤作一团，队形糟糕，并且在指挥体系上也存在问题——希佩尔和他的参谋人员，当时已经离开吕佐夫号，正在寻找一艘合适的战列巡洋舰登舰。而其他的战列巡洋舰们则挡住了第3战列舰中队的前进道路，使得这些战列舰们不得不被迫减速，甚至停船。正当德国舰队陷入混乱之际，英国方面的齐射炮火接踵而至。

问题：为了逃离险境，德国舰队采取了哪些手段？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.112-113）：

To extricate himself from an impossible situation, Scheer did three things. First, at 7.13 he made his historic signal to the battle cruisers to charge. Its literal translation is: 'Battle cruisers, at the enemy. Give it everything.' (Schlachtkreuzer ran an den Feind, voll einsetzen). They set off at top speed in single line ahead on a 'death ride' against the British line. They had recklessly closed to within 7,700 yards of the Colossus, when, at 7.17, they made out their fleet flagship's signal, flying since 7.14, which in effect called off the charge by ordering them to engage the van. To do so they altered course to the southward, but then quickly turned away to the westward to conform to the movements of the rest of the fleet. Second, at 7.15 Scheer ordered his flotillas to attack and raise a smoke-screen in order to cover the withdrawal of the battle fleet. Third, at 7.18 he ordered the battle fleet to turn together 16 points to starboard, its third such turn.
为了从险境中脱身，舍尔做了三件事情。其一，在19时13分时，他命令战列巡洋舰们发起冲击，那条被历史所铭记的命令，字面意思是：“战列巡洋舰向敌人发起冲锋，不惜一切代价”。这些军舰随后以纵队队形，以“死亡冲锋”的姿态，全速驶向了英国战列舰队，最终冲到了距离巨像号仅7,700码。不过，在19时14分时，舍尔就调整了命令，要求战列巡洋舰们转而攻击敌方的前卫。至19时17分时，德尔弗林格号收到了旗舰的命令，于是转而向南航行，随后很快又转向了西侧，以便跟随其余部队的行动。其二，在19时15分时，舍尔命令驱逐舰队发动雷击，同时释放烟雾以掩护战列舰队的撤退。其三，在19时18分时，他命令战列舰队向右舷方向进行16个罗经点的转向，即他们的第三个战斗回转。

问题：在这次战斗回转中，德国舰队遭遇了哪些混乱状况？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.318-320）：

Scheer ordered his third Gefechtskehrtwendung, again to starboard. ‘But on this occasion the execution of this manoeuvre, so close to the enemy and under the full weight of his broadsides, was much more difficult than before’...Even before the action-turn-about, the German van had crumpled up and turned away to starboard. In doing so, the Kaiserin had closed up so far on her next ahead that Prinzregent Luitpold had been forced to sheer out of line even further to starboard.
舍尔下达的第三个战斗回转命令，与之前一样，都是向右舷方向进行转向。不过这次的情况与先前有所不同，原因在于，敌我之间的距离非常近，并且敌方的火力也非常猛烈。事实上，在舍尔下达战斗回转命令之前，德国舰队的前卫部分，就已经挤作一团，并开始向右舷方向进行转向了。在此过程中，皇后号的位置有些过于靠前了，导致位于其前方的摄政王路易特波特号，不得不做出更大幅度的右转，因而偏离了其队列位置。

At the German rear, the action-turn-about was probably executed without much difficulty...In the Ist Division, Helgoland was hit at 7.15. Whether for this reason or, as the German historian claimed, ‘to hasten matters’, Vice-Admiral Schmidt in Ostfriesland commenced the turn at once. Before the turn, Friedrich der Große had been next ahead of the Ostfriesland and astern of the Kaiserin, though the latter was already out of line to starboard. After the turn, Kaiserin attempted to increase her distance from Ostfriesland in order to leave room for Friedrich der Große; but then Prinzregent Luitpold came up at high speed. ‘This forced the “Kaiserin” to remain outside the line for a considerable time before she could haul in astern of “Prinzregent Luitpold” ’; thus these two ships eventually exchanged places in the line.
在德国编队的后方，战斗回转命令得到了顺利执行。然而在编队的中央位置，赫尔格兰号在19时15分时被1发炮弹击中，或许是因为这个原因，或许是像德国历史学家所说的那样，为了加速进程，总之东弗里斯兰号上的施密特中将，立刻就进行了转向（也就是说，其转向时间早于舍尔的命令）。在这次战斗回转之前，腓特烈大帝号（舍尔的座舰）位于东弗里斯兰号的前方，皇后号的后方。由于皇后号已经提前右转了，因此在东弗里斯兰号转向后，皇后号试图与其保持距离，以便为腓特烈大帝号留出机动空间。然而由于摄政王路易特波特号（此时位于皇后号的后方）的航速较高，因此皇后号不得不脱离了队列，过了很长一段时间后才重新加入队列，并跟在了摄政王路易特波特号的后方，因此这两艘军舰的队列位置，就这样发生了变化。

All the German battleships executed the action-turn-about by turning to starboard, except for Friedrich der Große, which turned out to port. In his memoirs, Scheer acknowledged that: ‘This might have led the ships following behind to think that there was a mistake in the signalling’, but he explained that his intention had been to ‘save the ships in front of the Friedrich der Große from a difficult situation’ - the ships in question being, presumably, Kaiserin and Prinzregent Luitpold. It is unlikely that he would have risked it unless his flagship’s starboard turn was completely blocked.
除了腓特烈大帝号之外，其余所有德国战列舰，都是向右舷方向进行转向的，不过腓特烈大帝号自己则是向左舷方向进行转向的。舍尔在自己的回忆录中承认：“这种做法，可能会让后续的军舰产生误会，认为转向命令是有误的”，但他也解释道，他的意图是帮助腓特烈大帝号之前的军舰脱离困境。在这个语境下，舍尔所指的应当是皇后号和摄政王路易特波特号。考虑到这种做法的风险，除非右转机动空间已经被完全堵死，否则舍尔应该是不会冒险让他的旗舰进行左转的。

The Vth Division also had problems in turning about. Markgraf, with her port engine stopped, could no longer develop her full speed; in order to get away from the area under fire and to gain ground in the probable new direction of the fleet, her captain also turned early, before his next astern, Kronprinz. Eventually the division hauled into line astern of Kaiser with Markgraf leading Kronprinz (thus they too swapped places) and Großer Kurfürst and König bringing up the rear.
位于编队前方的第5战列舰分队，同样在战斗回转时遇到了问题。由于边境伯爵号的左舷动力机组已经停机了，无法使出全部动力，因此为了脱离敌方火力范围，并跟上编队中其他军舰的机动，该舰的舰长提前开始了转向动作。在战斗回转之前，边境伯爵号位于皇太子号的前方，大选帝侯号的后方。当该舰开始转向后，其他军舰也受到了干扰，因此最终该分队的队列位置也发生了变化，变成了边境伯爵号在前，皇太子号紧随其次，再接下来则是大选帝侯号和国王号。

结论：在第二次T头时，德国舰队的境况比第一次T头时更为恶劣：其一，尽管英方的队形不太好，但能见度较好，且交战距离也比较近，因此更有利于炮术发挥；其二，由于能见度对德方十分不利，因此他们无法打出有效的炮火反击；其三，在经过战火的洗礼及两次战斗回转之后，德方的编队已经有些散乱了，指挥官们也有些焦虑了，因此在战斗回转时出现了多起混乱状况。

英德双方的交战态势，19时20分 - 19时35分

完成第三次战斗回转后，舍尔于19时27分下令，将航向调整为西南方向，航速17节。另一方面，第1侦察群在完成掩护任务，开始转向脱离后，首先选择了西南偏西航向，随后又调整为正西航向，以便追上战列舰队。此后，直至19时30分为止，尽管仍有零星炮弹击中德国战列巡洋舰，但驱逐舰们射出的鱼雷、释放的烟雾，还是起到了遮蔽己方、威胁敌方的作用，于是德国舰队再度得以转危为安，逃脱险境。

为了对抗德国驱逐舰的雷击威胁，杰里科一方面命令麾下的轻型舰艇前去拦截，另一方面又对战列舰队发出了一系列的命令——首先是在19时20分时，命令将航速降低至15节；随后是在19时22分时，命令战列舰队麾下各舰，以半分队（即2艘军舰）为单位，向左舷方向转向2个罗经点；最后，由于担心2个罗经点的转向不足以完全避开敌方雷击威胁，杰里科又再度下令向左舷方向转向2个罗经点——也就是说，他累计要求各舰进行了4个罗经点的转向。不过，由于当时的队形并非简单的单列纵队，而是颇为复杂的斜向布置的并列纵队，因此有不少军舰为了避免与其他军舰相撞，没有严格执行杰里科的命令——例如，乔治五世号只转了1个罗经点，巨像号只转了2个罗经点，而俄里翁号则只转了3个罗经点。

交战态势图，19时20分 - 19时25分

从下图中可以看到，为了躲避德方的雷击，英国战列舰队进行了较大幅度的转向，这使得各舰之间的视线阻挡变得更为严重了；除此之外，随着英德双方舰队分别向着相反的方向进行转向，双方的距离也被快速拉开了；在这两方面因素，以及德舰释放的烟雾的影响下，英国战列舰的炮火变得不再像先前那般猛烈而准确了。



交战态势图，19时25分 - 19时30分

从下图中可以看到，由于德国战列巡洋舰的转向时间更晚、位置也更靠近英国舰队，因此当德国战列舰队逃出英方的火力范围之后，后者就将火力集中在德国战列巡洋舰上了——在第二次T头阶段，这些军舰无疑是交战双方中，受损最为惨重的部队，没有之一。



交战态势图，19时30分 - 19时35分

从下图中可以看到，由于英国战列巡洋舰队并未遭到雷击，也没有跟随战列舰队一起转向，因此至第二次T头阶段的末尾时，他们终于冲到了所有英国主力舰部队中，最靠近西侧的位置，但他们与德国战列舰队之间的距离仍然很远（超过20km）。



如何评价杰里科在第二次T头时的指挥决策表现？

为了避开德方的雷击，杰里科选择让战列舰队进行规避机动，这个决策事后引起了巨大的争议——尽管英国战列舰队毫发无伤地避开了雷击，但同时也使得德国舰队暂时脱离了战斗，这导致有不少人认为，杰里科浪费了一个本可以对德国舰队造成重大杀伤的关键机会。这种观点到底有没有根据呢？

问题：德方的雷击规模有多大？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.113）：

When Scheer ordered his destroyer flotillas to attack, the four boats of the 1st Flotilla and two other boats were protecting the Lützow. This left six flotillas available for the attack, but in the event only two flotillas, the 6th and 9th (13 boats), succeeded in reaching a favourable firing position, moving out about 7.16 from a position near the head of the German battle line. They fired 31 of their torpedoes, none of which found a target. One destroyer was sunk. Of the other flotillas, the 3rd and 5th (17 boats) attacked later and more towards the rear of the Grand Fleet, where they were driven back by the British rear flotilla, the 12th, and only one torpedo was fired; the 2nd (10 boats plus three of the 6th) started to attack but was recalled when the British battleships turned away and disappeared into the mist; and the 7th (9 boats) did not advance, as its commander thought it was too far in the rear.
在舍尔命令驱逐舰发起雷击之时，第1驱逐舰中队的4艘驱逐舰、以及来自其余部队的2艘驱逐舰，由于正在保护吕佐夫号，因此无法抽身。余下的6个驱逐舰中队中，则只有来自第6和第9驱逐舰中队的13艘驱逐舰成功发起了进攻——这两支中队起初位于德国战列舰队的前方，并且自19时16分就开始行动了，因此成功地机动到了有利的雷击阵位。他们总共发射了31枚鱼雷，然而无一命中敌舰，并且还有1艘驱逐舰（S35号）被击沉。至于其他的驱逐舰中队，各自情况如下：首先，第3和第5驱逐舰中队的17艘驱逐舰，由于起初位于德国战列舰队的后方，且开始行动的时间也较晚，因此被位于英国战列舰队后方的第12驱逐舰中队击退了，他们总共只发射了1枚鱼雷；其次，第2驱逐舰中队的10艘驱逐舰、以及来自第6驱逐舰中队的3艘驱逐舰，尽管发起了攻击，但由于英国战列舰进行了转向规避，遁入了迷雾之中，因此在尚未发射鱼雷前就被召回了；最后，第7驱逐舰中队的指挥官认为，他们的位置过于靠后，因此其麾下的9艘驱逐舰并未按照舍尔的命令发起雷击。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.325）：

In the end, only the boats of the VITF and IXTF, and one boat of the IIITF, succeeded in firing torpedoes at the British battle line. This was hardly the ‘massed attack’ proclaimed by the German historian. Nonetheless, a total of thirty-two torpedoes had been fired and they would have a decisive effect on Jellicoe’s tactics.
实际向英国战列舰队射出鱼雷的，只有第6、第9驱逐舰中队，外加第3驱逐舰中队的其中1艘驱逐舰。换句话说，实际情况与德国历史学家们声称的“大规模鱼雷攻击”相去甚远。尽管如此，这些驱逐舰们射出的32枚鱼雷，还是对杰里科的战术决策造成了决定性的影响。

问题：杰里科为什么会选择采取规避机动？这种做法是否合理？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.115-116）：

Jellicoe's turn-away shocked a number of officers in the fleet...It was most criticized afterwards in the Fleet. Thus, Admiral Duff commented: 'A Destroyer attack developed abreast of the centre of our line, which could be no possible menace to our van, very little to our centre, but serious to our rear. To meet the situation, all that was necessary was to turn away our tail. To keep our van in touch was essential. What we did was to turn away the whole Battle Fleet for 12 minutes, and thereby lost all hope of a decisive action which until then was in our power to force by turning our van towards the enemy.'
杰里科的转向规避，让舰队中的部分军官感到很惊讶，并且在事后招致了最多的批评声音。例如，达夫少将（第3战列舰分队的指挥官）就评论道：“敌方的驱逐舰攻击波，是与我方战列舰队的中军齐平的，也就是说，我方战列舰队的前卫是不可能受到威胁的，中军受到的威胁也很小，但后卫会受到严重威胁。因此，只需要让后卫部分进行转向规避，就能应对这种威胁。至于前卫部分，则必须继续与敌方保持接触。当时，我们完全可以让前卫部分转向敌方，逼迫他们继续交战。然而实际上，我们的整个战列舰队都进行了转向规避，并且这个规避动作持续了12分钟，因此完全丧失了与敌方进行决战的希望”。

To sum up the position of the critics, we can say that the turnaway came at a very unfortunate moment. The Germans were tactically beaten and in headlong flight, and, by the time the battleships had completed their turn, their line was in a state of disarray. Had Jellicoe adopted 'tactics of active pursuit', it would have cost the Germans serious loss and perhaps even have led to a rout. At the least, Jellicoe would have made mincemeat of Scheer's battle cruisers...Instead, the time and the range sacrificed by the two turns, several precious minutes and about 3,000 yards, permitted the enemy to make good their escape into the friendly smoke and haze.
从批判方的角度来看，可以说这次转向的时机选择非常糟糕——当时，德国舰队在战术上处于极大的劣势，正在逃离战场，且当他们完成转向之时，队形已变得颇为混乱了。如果杰里科采取了积极的追击战术的话，显然会让德国舰队遭受严重的损伤，甚至有可能使其陷入溃败状态——即便在最差的情况下，至少也能留下几艘德国战列巡洋舰。然而，在这至关重要的时刻，杰里科却接连下达了两次转向命令，于是双方之间的距离被拉开了约3,000码。其结果是，在烟雾和迷雾的掩护下，德国舰队成功地脱离了战斗。

The consequences may have been regrettable, but they could not be helped. Jellicoe has a strong case, which can be boiled down to these points: (1) His ships were in close order (500 yards, ship to ship), and their distance was well within torpedo range. (2) It is reasonable to suppose that the C.-in-C. was anticipating a mass attack by all available torpedo craft. (3) The danger of turning a fleet towards attacking flotillas lay in the fact that they might attack in 'waves', with the torpedoes coming at different angles. (4) In 1916 it was Jellicoe's settled plan of action, approved almost without exception by Service opinion, that the torpedo menace could not be accepted and that the tactical answer to a concentrated torpedo attack was the turn-away. (5) When Jellicoe ordered the two turns, he did not know that the enemy had turned away and had no idea what they were doing. Scheer's movement had not been observed in the Iron Duke, so effective was the destroyers' smoke-screen, combined with the mist and the failing light.
这个规避机动的后果，可能的确是非常遗憾的，然而这也是没有办法的事，因为杰里科这么做的理由也是很充分的：第一，英国战列舰队当时处在鱼雷射程之内，并且还处在小间距的状态下（各舰之间相隔仅500码，这意味着更容易被鱼雷击中）。第二，杰里科有充分的理由认为，德方会投入所有可用的驱逐舰，进行大规模的雷击作战。第三，考虑到敌方的雷击行动可能会是多波次的，既鱼雷可能会来自多个不同角度，因此将舰队转向敌方的做法，是存在危险的。第四，在1916年时，既定的作战方针，就是通过转向规避来应对敌方的大规模雷击威胁，且这种做法并不是杰里科个人的独断专行，而是得到了普遍认可的。第五，在迷雾、德方驱逐舰所施放的烟雾、以及越来越差的能见度的影响下，铁公爵号并没有观察到德国舰队的机动，因此当杰里科下达那两个转向命令时，他并不清楚敌方的动向，不知道他们已经掉头逃走了。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.463-467）：

As a means of defeating the torpedo attack, Jellicoe’s manoeuvre was a complete success, and, had it occurred much earlier in the day, would be acclaimed as a skillful dodge to disarm the High Seas Fleet’s destroyers. But it also granted success to Scheer’s extrication-bid, and, with sunset only forty minutes away, has assumed the proportions of the defining moment of the fleet-to-fleet encounter. By it, Sir John was widely held to have forsaken the Royal Navy’s opportunity for unambiguous victory...All three of Sir John’s squadronal vice-admirals (Burney, Sturdee and Jerram) had misgivings about the turn (Beatty’s people were furious). And as Jellicoe allegedly blamed himself, in his post-battle depression, for missing “one of the greatest opportunities a man ever had”, even by the ‘Jellicoe-school’ yardstick, there is a case to answer.
作为应对敌方雷击的手段，杰里科的机动规避是非常成功的。如果这个机动是在更早些时候出现的话，显然会被认为是有效消耗了德国驱逐舰所携带的鱼雷，而得到广泛赞誉。然而，这也导致了舍尔脱离战斗的企图得以实现。再考虑到，当时距离日落时刻仅剩40分钟，因此可以说是浪费了一个关键的舰队决战的机会。由于这个缘故，有许多人都认为，杰里科的决策，让英国海军错过了一次大获全胜的机会。杰里科麾下的三位战列舰中队指挥官（伯尼、斯特迪、杰拉姆），对这个机动都抱有一些想法，而贝蒂派更是为此感到非常愤怒。在战后的反思中，据说连杰里科自己，也出现了悲观的情绪，并为此感到自责，认为自己错过了有史以来最为重大的机会之一。所以，即便从杰里科派的角度出发，这也是一个无法回避的问题。

The High Seas Fleet, although a thorn in Britannia’s flesh, was relatively benign in grand-strategic terms, and its destruction considerably less important than the preservation of the Grand Fleet ‘in-being’. We also understand something of the cultural provenance of his authoritarian preoccupation with order and control.
尽管对于英国来说，公海舰队的存在如同芒刺在背，但从大战略的视角来看，其威胁并非十分显著——相比于摧毁公海舰队，保存大舰队的实力，无疑要重要的多。另外，从文化渊源的角度看，杰里科那种威权主义的人，是非常在意自己能不能发号施令、并对下属保持控制的，因此他会这么做，也是可以理解的（考虑到当时的战场环境，如果对公海舰队进行追击，杰里科很可能无法继续掌控全局，因此不得不让各位下属指挥官见机行事）。

Jellicoe's letter to the Admiralty of October the 30th, 1914, brings us to the specific, material reasons for his reluctance to pursue a retreating enemy: fear of a submarine trap, fear of mass attacks by destroyers, and fear of floating mines. The ‘submarine trap’ idea (disregarding its detailed difficulties) is hardly applicable to Jutland, since, as Jellicoe knew perfectly well, Beatty had been steering Scheer for an hour and a half before the battle-fleets met. The torpedoes and mines, however, both amounted to idées fixes in the Commander-in-Chief’s mind.
在1914年10月30日时，杰里科给海军部写了一封信，内容中提及了他为什么不太愿意对撤退的敌人展开追击：他担心由潜艇设下的陷阱，担心由驱逐舰发起的大规模雷击，还担心敌方会布设水雷。潜艇陷阱是很难组织的，在日德兰的环境下就更不可能实现了，因为杰里科很清楚，在主力决战之前，贝蒂队已经领着德国舰队航行了一个半小时了（当时的潜艇航速较低，因此即便有潜艇，也早就被甩在后头了）。然而对鱼雷和水雷的担忧，则几乎可以说是杰里科的执念了。

Jellicoe calculated that the Grand Fleet would face eight flotillas (88 boats), and 440 torpedoes, all at once. The new German C-in-C, Reinhard Scheer, was a torpedo specialist by trade, and Jellicoe’s own torpedo people had told him that 35% of torpedoes fired indiscriminately at a fleet in close order would hit (which might be true if no one took avoiding action). To counter this onslaught, the ploy of turning away held big defensive advantages over turning towards: the missiles would be approaching at a slower relative speed, making them much easier to avoid, and some of them might (as they did) run out of puff before they reached the fleet. All this rationalization made detailed, on-paper sense. But while it is the job of staff-officers to foresee hazards, it is the role of the admiral to review their warnings in the wider context.
根据杰里科的估算，大舰队所需面对的鱼雷威胁，是整整8个中队，合计88艘驱逐舰，总共能够搭载440枚鱼雷；而德国公海舰队的新上任的总司令，莱茵哈德·舍尔，又是一位鱼雷战的专家；并且，杰里科麾下的鱼雷军官还告诉他，对于一支以小间距编队的舰队进行雷击时，如果不考虑规避机动的话，那么命中率可以高达35%；最后，从防御性的角度看，让舰队采取规避机动，显然是明显优于让舰队转向敌方的：在前一种情况下，鱼雷与军舰之间的相对速度会变得更慢，因此会变得更容易躲避，并且有些鱼雷可能会在抵达目标之前就耗尽燃料。基于以上情况来看，从纸面上来说，采取规避机动是具备充分依据的。然而，预判风险实际上是参谋军官的指责，而指挥官则需要在评估风险后，结合更高层次的因素，再做出决策。

Then there was the question of floating mines. Jellicoe believed that the Germans, in retreat, would strew in their wake masses of mines, and that the water through which they had passed must therefore be avoided at all costs. The High Seas Fleet carried no mines.
至于水雷的问题，杰里科认为，当德国舰队撤退之时，会在其航迹上布设大量水雷，因此英国舰队在任何情况下，都不得驶入德国舰队驶过的水域。然而，公海舰队的军舰实际上并未携带水雷。

There is also a ‘fantasy’ problem with Grand Fleet Battle Orders. While Jellicoe correctly understood that a fleet action would have to be forced upon Scheer, the conception in GFBOs of the ensuing tournament was that the High Seas Fleet would fight it as a set-piece duel, by steering a parallel course and awaiting the pleasure of British gunnery-officers, like coconuts in a shy. But with this stricture as a cornerstone of doctrine, Jellicoe’s staff must have known among themselves that the chances of a decisive pay-off rested on the High Seas Fleet’s behaving in a manner contrary to its own best interests, and were therefore more remote than the rank and file of the Grand Fleet were encouraged to believe. Part of the shock of Jutland was the discovery of this mismatch of expectations.
最后，【大舰队战斗命令】本身，也存在过于理想主义的问题。杰里科很清楚，他需要迫使舍尔与其进行舰队决战，这一点上他的认知是没错的。然而他却认为，当决战开始之后，公海舰队就会一直陪着大舰队打下去，会乖乖地行驶在平行航线下，任由英国舰队的炮术官们对德舰进行持续轰击。换句话说，他们的战术准则，是建立在一种非常狭窄的战术设想之上的。杰里科的参谋军官们理应清楚，尽管大舰队上下的官兵都满怀信心，认为他们能取得胜利，但实际上，除非公海舰队采取不符合他们自身利益的做法，否则大舰队是难以取得决定性胜利的。日德兰海战之所以会给英国海军带来极大的震撼，其中一个重要的原因就是，他们发现实际情况与他们所预想的并不一样。

What we can say for certain is that this career-technocrat was misled by ‘rationalist’ doctrine (for which he was ultimately responsible) into getting grossly wrong the threat-percentage in regard to both mines and torpedoes. His sleepless nights were visited by a fearful array of underwater weapons, and, as a consequence, for seventeen critical minutes, while the fate and future of the High Seas Fleet - or, at least, of a substantial part of it - hung in the balance, he helped Scheer to disengage.
我们可以确定的是，作为一名技术统治论者，杰里科构建出了一套理想主义的战术准则，同时又受到了这种战术准则的误导，并且还严重误判了鱼雷和水雷的威胁程度。在许多个无眠之夜中，他被水下武器的威胁所困扰，其结果是，在公海舰队（至少也是公海舰队的一部）命悬一线的关键时刻，杰里科亲自帮助舍尔脱离了险境。

问题：在第二次T头中，双方主力舰的受损情况各自如何？

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.459）：

Hipper’s ships took the brunt: they were, in Commander von Hase’s words, “in absoluten Wurstkessel!” The already crippled Lützow and Seydlitz were each hit five times, Von der Tann once. Derfflinger was shattered by fourteen hits, having two of her gun-turrets gutted. Of the battle-fleet, König, Markgraf and Helgoland were each hit once (Helgoland, eleventh in the line, probably by an ‘over’), Kaiser twice, and Großer Kurfürst seven times.
希佩尔麾下的军舰，遭受的打击最为惨重。其中，受损最重的就是德尔弗林格号，总计有14枚炮弹击中该舰，导致其2座炮塔失去战斗力，按照冯·哈泽中校（德尔弗林格号的炮术长）的说法，当时的情况完全就是“人为刀俎，我为鱼肉”。除此之外，塞德里茨号和原本就已经受损严重的吕佐夫号，各自被5枚炮弹击中，冯·德·坦恩号则被1枚炮弹击中。在战列舰队中，国王号、边境伯爵号以及赫尔格兰号，各自被击中1次（由于赫尔格兰号位于编队中央位置，因此击中该舰的可能是1发远弹），皇帝号被击中2次，大选帝侯号则被击中7次。

根据John Campbell的说法（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.218）：

The Colossus was the only British ship hit during this phase of the battle...two shells struck at 1916...Both were from the same salvo, and are credited to the Seydlitz.
在这一阶段，英国方面只有巨像号战列舰被德国炮弹击中。在19时16分时，2枚炮弹击中了该舰，它们出自同一轮齐射，据信是由塞德里茨号打出的。

问题：在第二次T头之后，如果杰里科采用分队战术，能否取得更好的战果？

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, P.106）：

From 7.15 to 8 pm the movements of the British Battle Fleet seem to have been mainly directed to getting back into single line as if nothing could be done until it were again ranged according to the Deployment Diagram...Was it necessary at this stage to preserve the unity of the Battle Fleet? Was it not preferable to break up that long inarticulate line and for each division or sub-division to press forward independently at utmost speed to the westward, supporting each other in the envelopment and destruction of the German Fleet? If the Battle Fleet had proceeded in this direction, one half to the northward and the other half to the southward of the German line, led by the 5th Battle Squadron and Battle Cruiser Fleet respectively, the fate of the High Sea Fleet would probably have been sealed. But the idea of attack was lacking, and the High Sea Fleet withdrew in safety whilst the British Battle Fleet was struggling to free itself from the rigidity of its own formation.
在19时15分至20时之间，英国战列舰队所采取的机动，似乎主要是为了能恢复为单条战列线。似乎他们觉得，如果不按照【大舰队战斗命令】中的阵型图，去组成战列线的话，他们就会一事无成。在战斗的这个阶段，继续保持战列舰队的队形完整性，真的有必要吗？如果将战列线分开，以分队或半分队为单位来行动，全速向西侧展开追击，各部之间互相支援，保持协同，对德国舰队进行包抄和歼灭，会不会是更好的做法呢？如果我们的战列舰队一分为二，一队以第五战列舰中队为先导，从北侧对德国舰队进行包抄，另一队以战列巡洋舰队为先导，从南侧对德国舰队进行包抄，那么公海舰队很可能就在劫难逃了。然而，由于指挥官缺乏锐意进取的精神，因此当英国海军还在试图整理队形之时，公海舰队趁机逃脱了。

根据Stephen McLaughlin的说法（Divide and Conquer? Divisional Tactics and the Battle of Jutland, P.12）：

An interpretation of this notion is given in Figure...The overall result is somewhat messy, and not without dangers, as the German torpedoes were coming from somewhat different directions at high speed, so some dodging would have been necessary, and it is likely that some ships would have been hit. But the real question is: What would the Germans have done? As can be seen from the diagram, the High Seas Fleet could turn either northwards or southwards and cross the ‘T’ of one or the other wing of the advancing British. In any case, there is little in the way of an ‘envelopment’ -  the Germans simply had too much of a head start. Only if the action had developed into a long stern chase would there have been any chance of enveloping the enemy’s trailing ships.
对于杜瓦兄弟所描述的意图，下图中给出了解读。总的来看，这种做法会让舰队陷入有些杂乱的状态，再考虑到德国鱼雷所构成的威胁，有些军舰势必需要作出规避机动，因此会让局面变得更为混乱，甚至有可能会有军舰被鱼雷击中。但最关键的问题是，在这种局面下，德国人会怎么做呢？从下图中可以看到公海舰队既可以向北转向，也可以向南转向，且无论选择哪一种，都可以对其中一支英国部队形成T头之势。另外，由于双方距离较远，因此除非双方陷入长时间的追击战，否则英方不太可能完成对德方的包抄。

杜瓦兄弟推崇的的分队战术的示意图（第二次T头之后）

如果英国舰队分为两股，并试图对德国舰队进行两翼包抄，那么原先位于靠后位置的两支战列舰中队，就需要冒着被鱼雷击中的风险进行机动。即便他们躲过了德国鱼雷，接下来只要德国舰队进行转向，英国舰队就难以完成包抄了，甚至还可能陷入劣势局面。



结论：杰里科所采取的规避机动，称得上是整场日德兰海战中最具争议的关键点之一。由于第二次T头时，英方取得的战果要比第一次T头时更好（第一次时英方打出23枚命中弹，第二次时则打出37枚，且第一次时英方损伤不轻，第二次时则损伤甚微），因此有不少人感叹，如果采用不同的策略，可能会取得更佳的战果。然而，如果不采取规避机动，而是选择以某种形式展开追击的话，具体又该如何进行追击才更合理呢？追击所能获得的潜在战果，又是否能抵消掉其带来的潜在风险呢？由于没有人能够准确预测出并未发生过的事，因此我们只能带着疑问与叹息，来面对这个问题了。

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九、入夜之前的交战

当第二次T头结束之时，距离日落时间，已经不足1个小时了（铁公爵号所在位置的日落时间是20时07分）；距离天色完全变黑，则还有1个多小时的时间（铁公爵号所在位置上，要到21时30分左右，天色才会完全变黑）。此时，英方占据了双重优势。首先，由于德国舰队位于西侧，英国舰队位于东侧，而德国舰队的母港则位于这两支舰队的东南方向，因此英国舰队挡在了德国舰队的返航路线上——换句话说，英方舰队正位于有利的拦截位置上。其次，由于双方所处位置的关系，尽管英方能够分辨出夕阳映衬下的德舰轮廓，但德方却无法看清楚与漆黑的地平线融为一体的英舰轮廓——换句话说，英方占据了能见度上的优势。

尽管如此，在这入夜之前的最后时刻，除了贝蒂队与德方进行了短暂的交战之外，其余英国部队并未与德方发生有效的接触，于是就连这最后的一丝战机，也被英国人浪费掉了。

英德双方的交战态势，19时35分 - 20时15分

在完成第三次战斗回转之后，德国舰队的队形是颇为混乱的——原本分别位于战列舰队中央及后方的第1和第2战列舰中队，如今正在并排前进；而原本位于战列舰队前方的第3战列舰中队，则落到了整个舰队的后方，当时整个中队还处于斜队状态，并且各舰之间的位置也发生了不少调换。至于第1侦察群的战列巡洋舰，则仍然处于最靠近英国舰队的危险位置——此时他们已经不再位于整支舰队的前卫位置了，如今位于最前方的，是第2和第4侦察群的轻巡洋舰。

自19时45分起，德国舰队开始陆续将航向调整为正南方向。此后在20时10分时，第3战列舰中队加入了第1战列舰中队的后方，于是整个德国舰队形成了三股编队——在第2侦察群的新锐轻巡洋舰的引领下，第1和第3战列舰中队的无畏舰坐镇于整个舰队的中央位置；在其东侧，是第1侦察群的战列巡洋舰；在其西侧，则是第4侦察群的老旧轻巡洋舰，以及第2战列舰中队的前无畏舰。

另一方面，在19时35分时，杰里科下令向右舷方向转向5个罗经点，即将航向调整为南微西方向。1分钟后，他下令将队形调整为单列纵队。19时40分时，他又要求舰队向右舷方向再转3个罗经点，即转向西南方向。至20时00分，杰里科命令舰队再向右舷方向转4个罗经点，即转向正西方向。杰里科的这一系列机动，自然是为了向德国舰队的方向靠拢，但由于距离较远、能见度较低，他并未发现德国舰队的踪迹。至于贝蒂队，他们起初的航向是西南方向，随后在19时50分时，向右舷方向转了2个罗经点，即转向西南偏西方向。

交战态势图，19时35分 - 19时55分

从下图中可以看到，经过三次战斗回转之后，德国舰队的队形已经变得十分杂乱了。而英国战列舰队由于进行了一次规避雷击的机动，因此队形也同样有些杂乱。



交战态势图，19时55分 - 20时15分

从下图中可以看到，至20时左右，英国战列舰队已经重整了队形，而英国战列巡洋舰队则与德国舰队处于碰撞航线上，很快即将发生接触。



如何评价这个阶段时，贝蒂队与杰里科队之间发生的争议？

在这个阶段，由于贝蒂队位于更靠近德国舰队的位置，且贝蒂也相信自己能够抓住德国舰队并对其予以打击，因此他曾通过无线电联系杰里科，希望让战列舰队的前卫跟随自己行动。这个事件，在战后成为了一个具有争议的话题。

问题：这桩争议事件的前因后果，具体是怎么样的呢？

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, P.108）：

At 7.30 the Lion, which was about six miles to the south-westward, sent an important signal to the Commander-in-Chief stating that the enemy bore NW by W 10 to 11 miles. This was received in the Iron Duke at 7.40...At 7.45 Beatty made a signal by searchlight to the Minotaur telling her to inform the leading British battleship that the enemy bore NW by W course about SW, evidently in the hope that the 2nd Battle Squadron would shape course at full speed to support him. He followed this at 7.47 by a signal to the Commander-in-Chief: ‘Submit that the van of the battleships follow me; we can then cut off the whole of the enemy’s fleet’.
在19时30分时，狮号向杰里科汇报，敌舰在其西北微西方向，距离约10-11海里，当时狮号自己则在铁公爵号的西南方向约6海里处。在19时40分时，铁公爵号收到了这份情报。在19时45分时，贝蒂又通过探照灯，向米诺陶号（第2巡洋舰中队的旗舰，当时该中队正位于战列巡洋舰队与战列舰队之间的位置，适合执行中继通讯任务）传讯，要求其转告位于排头的英国战列舰，敌方舰队位于西北微西方向，航向东南。贝蒂这么做，显然是希望让第2战列舰中队能够全速赶来支援他。在19时47分，他又致电总司令：“请让战列舰队的前卫跟随我行动，我们可以切断整个德国舰队的归航路线”。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.123-124）：

Beatty was anxious to press hotly to the westward while daylight remained, but he felt that in the low visibility, alone and unsupported, this would have been excessively rash. He was steering two points more to the westward, that is, nearer to the enemy, than the van battleships. It seemed to those on the bridge of the Lion that the leading battleships were steering too far to the eastward. Beatty has written: 'I shall not forget our agony of mind seeing him [Jerram] three or four miles astern of us leading his division 4 points too much to the Eastward while we were in touch with the enemy.'
贝蒂当时的心态，是希望能赶在入夜之前尽快冲向西侧，但考虑到当时能见度较差，如果他在毫无支援的情况下只身前往的话，实在是过于冒险了。由于贝蒂队与杰里科队之间的航向，存在2个罗经点的差异，贝蒂队的航向更靠西，即更接近敌方舰队，因此在狮号看来，战列舰队的航向显然太偏向东侧了。贝蒂自己就写道：“当时我们正与敌人保持着接触，而位于我们后方3-4海里处的第2战列舰中队，航向却比我们偏东4个罗经点。当时我所感到的愤怒情绪，至今仍迟迟无法忘怀”。

The signal was transmitted at a time when, as a plot of positions at 7.45 unmistakably shows, the Lion could not possibly have had the enemy in sight. She was over 12 miles tram the German battle cruisers and 18½ from the leading German battleships. Yet there is a simple explanation. He may have lost touch with the enemy by the time he sent his wireless message, but he was endeavouring to regain it, and in any case he knew roughly the direction of the enemy.
有必要说明的是，当贝蒂发出上述请求之时，狮号实际上是看不见敌方舰队的——根据19时45分的航迹图来看，狮号与德国战列巡洋舰队的距离超过12海里，与德国战列舰队的距离则超过18.5海里。尽管如此，这件事并不难理解——尽管在发出无线电通讯时，贝蒂可能已经看不见敌舰踪迹了，但他至少是直到敌方舰队的大致方位的，并且也正在试图重新追上敌舰。

Admiral Drax tells us: The 7.47 signal, 'Submit van battleships..." was probably drafted only a few minutes after 7.40. What actually happened was this. Seeing the van ships (second B.S.) hauling off to port, I said to Beatty, 'Nelson would have signalled "Follow me.", He at once replied, quite rightly, 'I cannot do that, I am not the C. in C.' The second and longer signal was then drafted and at once approved by Beatty. As regards the argument that we could not know the enemy's position, I can only say that when drafting the signal neither Beatty nor I had the slightest doubt as to the position of the enemy's B.C.s and leading battleships.
德拉克斯上将（日德兰海战时他是贝蒂麾下的一名参谋军官）告诉我说：19时47分发出的那份无线电通讯，可能是在19时40分过后拟定的。当时的具体情况是这样的，我们看到第2战列舰中队的航向比我们偏东，于是我对贝蒂说，如果换做是纳尔逊的话，他会下令：“跟我走”。贝蒂立刻回答道：“我不能这么做，我不是总司令”。贝蒂无疑是对的。因此我们后来拟定了一条更长的无线电讯息，并在贝蒂批准后发了出去。至于别人质疑我们当时不知道敌方位置这件事，我只能说，在我们拟定那条无线电讯息的时候，无论是贝蒂还是我自己，都非常清楚敌方舰队的位置到底在哪里。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.343-344）：

It was received in Iron Duke’s wireless office at 7.54 but it required decrypting and Jellicoe later insisted that it ‘could not possibly...have reached the bridge before 8 p.m. and it was actually some minutes later than this’. Beatty’s next signal, which contained the important new information that the enemy, still at 7.45 bearing NWbyW, was steering about SW...received in Iron Duke at 7.59. Jellicoe now believed that Scheer’s course was similar to his own; it can be no coincidence that, to close the enemy, at 8.00 he ordered all divisions to turn separately in succession to W, speed 17 knots.
在19时54分时，铁公爵号收到了贝蒂所发出的无线电讯息，但解密需要花费一些时间，因此后来杰里科坚称：“这份讯息是在20时过后才被送到舰桥的”。另一方面，在19时59分时，铁公爵号收到了贝蒂发出的另一条讯息，即19时45分时发出的有关敌方位置与航向的信息。基于贝蒂给出的情报，杰里科认为舍尔的航向是与他一样的，因此在20时00分时下令，以分队为单位，向正西方向进行顺次转向，航速17节。

Jellicoe’s turn West at 8.00 was bolder than he knew since Scheer had already turned South, a course that might cross the British Ts. While the British course closed the range rapidly, the divisions were disposed quarterly on a line-of-bearing NE from King George V with the 5BS furthest from the enemy on the starboard wing. Thus, as had happened earlier, there was a risk that firing arcs would be blanketed by ships in adjacent columns. However, the visibility and light after sunset still favoured the British forces; Jellicoe could reasonably expect that, on sighting the enemy, he would be able to turn back into line-ahead.
杰里科在20时00分所做的转向机动，实际上要比他自认为的更加大胆——原因在于，舍尔当时已经转向正南方向了，因此如果双方沿着当时的航线继续航行下去，德国舰队可能会对英国舰队形成T头之势。另外，当英国舰队完成转向之后，他们与德国舰队之间的距离开始快速拉近，然而各分队之间却是沿着西南-东北方向，呈现为并列斜队的姿态，因此与第二次T头时类似，部分军舰的射界，可能会被相邻部队的军舰所阻挡。但考虑到能见度及光照环境对英国方面更有利，因此杰里科应当是打算在发现敌方舰队后，通过转向机动，将舰队调整为战列线。

At 8.14 or even earlier, the 2BS was ordered to ‘follow our Battle Cruisers’, though without any indication of how this might be done; perhaps Jellicoe hoped that the BCF had remained in sight from King George V. According to her chart, she altered course at 8.16 to WSW, which was one point to starboard of Lion’s actual bearing. However, the remaining battle squadrons soon altered course to the same heading, turning WSW at 8.21, Beatty being informed at once by wireless. Thus not only the van but the whole battlefleet was following his battlecruisers.
在20时14分或稍早些时候，杰里科命令第2战列舰中队跟随本方的战列巡洋舰行动，但并未说明具体怎么操作；或许杰里科认为，乔治五世号与战列巡洋舰队仍然保持着视觉接触。根据第2战列舰中队的航迹图，他们在20时16分时转向了西南偏西方向——相比于狮号的实际航向，这要偏西1个罗经点。不过，其他的战列舰中队，在20时21分时也将航向调整为西南偏西方向了，并且杰里科还通过无线电，将此事告知了贝蒂。换句话说，不单单是前卫，而是整个战列舰队，此时都在跟随贝蒂队行动了。

Beatty’s urgent submission that the van battleships should follow him became a part of the Jutland Controversy; in Jellicoe’s words, ‘the insinuation has been made that Sir David Beatty was imploring a reluctant Commander-in-Chief to follow him’.
贝蒂请求战列舰队的前卫跟随他行动这件事，后来成为了围绕着日德兰海战的争议中的一部分。用杰里科的话说就是：“这件事给人留下的印象，仿佛是贝蒂想让一位迟疑不决的总司令跟随他的行动”。

结论：贝蒂的初衷是好的，但在杰里科看来，这可能有些无礼了，因为这会让杰里科显得过于谨慎小心、甚至优柔寡断。但更为重要的是，双方之间的通讯，存在超过10分钟的延迟。除此之外，由于杰里科自己在接到情报后，也没有立刻根据贝蒂的建议行事，而是延迟了10多分钟后才选择听取贝蒂的建议。在这双重延误的影响之下，潜在的交战机会，就这么被浪费了。

英德双方的交战态势，20时15分 - 21时35分

自20时起，位于英国编队最前方的第3轻巡洋舰中队，就已经根据贝蒂的命令展开为搜索队形，并驶向西侧去寻找敌方舰队了。在20时18分时，他们发现了德国第4侦察群的踪迹，随后将队形调整为单列纵队，开始与敌舰进行交战——由于双方处于碰撞航线上，因此交战距离从最初的9,600码，降低到了最近时只有6,000码的程度。交战过程中，德舰被击中2次，而英舰则毫发无伤。在20时32分时，第4侦察群进行了大幅度的转向，试图脱离战斗。发现该状况后，英国第3轻巡洋舰中队追了上去，但还是跟丢了德舰的踪迹。

双方轻巡洋舰在进行交战的同时，也都向上级进行了汇报。很快，贝蒂队就发现了德国第1侦察群的踪迹，并在20时19分时对其开火了。当时，德国战巡的受损程度要比英国战巡更为严重，再加上能见度也对英方更有利，因此交战结果对德方不利。在此情况下，第1侦察群在20时25分时，进行了大幅度的转向，以脱离战斗。随后，原本航行在第1侦察群右后侧的德国第1和第3战列舰中队，为了避免与第1侦察群发生碰撞，也不得不进行了大幅度转向。此时，原本航行在第1和第3战列舰中队右前侧的第2战列舰中队的那些前无畏舰们，还没有进行转向，于是成为了贝蒂队的新目标——经过短暂的交火后，这些前无畏舰们也在20时35分时转向脱离了。这一次，贝蒂并没有选择继续追击。这场短暂的交火，同时也是第一次世界大战中，发生在主力舰之间的最后一次交战。

除此之外，在这个阶段中，伴随大舰队行动的英国轻型舰艇们，也与德国舰队有过几次交火。至于战列舰队本身，尽管曾短暂地发现过德国舰队的踪迹，但并未投入战斗。

交战态势图，20时15分 - 20时35分

从下图中可以看到，由于杰里科队在先前的一个小时内，先后进行了多次大幅度的航向调整，而贝蒂队的航向则相对更为稳定，因此互相之间的距离被拉大了。有必要说明的是，当时这两支舰队的航速差异并不大（贝蒂队当时航速为17-18节，杰里科队为16-17节），之所以会出现这种情况，主要原因还是由于双方之间的协同不够紧密。



交战态势图，20时35分 - 21时05分

从下图中可以看到，当时杰里科队与舍尔队之间的距离，其实并不算太远，但遗憾的是，他们错过了最后的主力交战机会。另一方面，英国第2轻巡洋舰中队则打退了德国驱逐舰的小股雷击企图。



交战态势图，21时05分 - 21时35分

从下图中可以看到，在日光彻底消失前的最后时刻，英国第4轻巡洋舰中队向德国舰队发起了雷击，但第11驱逐舰中队则并未把握住这次机会。

此时，由于天色即将完全变黑，需要为夜战阶段做准备了，因此在21时过后，根据杰里科的命令，大舰队麾下的战列舰们，已经将航向调整为正南方向，并将队形调整成了并列纵队。在收到了杰里科发来的通知后，贝蒂也将航向调整成了正南方向，以便配合杰里科的行动。



如何评价贝蒂队与杰里科队在该阶段中的表现？

在这个阶段，贝蒂队充分发挥了主动精神，重新与一度遁入迷雾中的敌舰建立了视觉接触，并与其发生了交战。相比之下，杰里科队麾下的战列舰们，则并未与敌方主力舰艇发生交战。这两支部队的截然不同的经历，在某种程度上也反映了各自指挥官的大相径庭的指挥风格。

问题：在此次交战之时，贝蒂队与德国舰队各自处于什么样的状态？交战过后，分别又遭到了什么样的损伤？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.345-346）：

The five light cruisers of the 3LCS...five light cruisers of the IVSG...both squadrons promptly opening fire...Visibility was bad for both sides, but it was worse for the Germans, only the two leaders Stettin and München being able to return fire to any extent. They made no hits but München was struck by two 6in shells.
英国第3轻巡洋舰中队和德国第4侦察群，分别都有5艘轻巡洋舰，发现对方后，他们都很快开火了。能见度对双方都不友好，但德国方面的情况更为糟糕，于是只有位于编队前方的斯德丁号和慕尼黑号能够组织起有效的反击，但他们并未取得命中，反倒是慕尼黑号被2枚英国6英寸炮弹击中。

根据John Campbell的说法（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.252 & 264 & 271-272）：

Of the six British ships, the Lion, Princess Royal and Tiger had all been frequently hit, but their hulls had escaped serious injury. In the Lion 2-13.5in were disabled, a third was on hand loading and the main cordite supply to a fourth not in use. The Princess Royal had 2-13.5in out of action from a hit, and another from a breakdown, while in the Tiger 1-13.5in was out of action from a defect, two were restricted in their speed of firing, and two more were on individual laying and director training. The New Zealand, Indomitable, and Inflexible were virtually unscathed, with 1-12in defective in the Inflexible, but capable of being fired.
在6艘英国战列巡洋舰中，狮号、长公主号以及虎号都被多次击中，但她们的舰体并未受到严重的损伤。狮号有1座炮塔（2门主炮）失去战斗力，1门主炮只能手动装填，还有1门的发射药供应机构存在问题。长公主号有1座炮塔（2门主炮）失去战斗力，1门主炮存在故障。虎号有1门主炮出了故障，2门的射击速度受限，另外还有2门的火控设备存在一些故障（只能由炮手独自进行俯仰操作，而无法跟随指挥仪进行俯仰）。至于新西兰号、不屈号以及不挠号，则基本上是毫发无损的（不屈号有1门主炮存在故障，但能开炮）。

Of the four German ships, the Derfflinger and Seydlitz had be heavily hit and their hulls badly damaged. In the former 4-12in were disabled and another two without Director-pointer gear, while the Seydlitz had 4-11 in out of action, a fifth without Director-pointer gear, and two more with auxiliary training only. The Molike and Von der Tann had been damaged to some extent in their hulls, and though the Moltke had all her 11in guns, the Von der Tann had two out of action, two on handworking, and the remaining four liable to give trouble again.
在4艘德国战列巡洋舰（未计入已经受损严重、脱离编队的吕佐夫号）中，德尔弗林格号和塞德里茨号都饱受打击，舰体受损较重。其中，德尔弗林格号有2座炮塔（4门主炮）失去战斗力，2门主炮的指挥仪火控设备受损（无法跟随指挥仪进行旋回）；而塞德里茨号则有2座炮塔（4门主炮）失去战斗力，1门主炮的指挥仪火控设备受损，还有2门的主旋回机构受损。毛奇号和冯·德·坦恩号的舰体受损情况相对较轻，但只有毛奇号的主炮未受损伤，而冯·德·坦恩号则有1座炮塔（2门主炮）失去战斗力，2门主炮只能手动装填，剩下4门主炮也存在机械故障隐患。

The odds were thus far more in favour of the British than when Beatty's original six ships first faced Hipper's five, and in addition visibility was much against the Germans.
换句话说，相比于双方初次遭遇之时，如今贝蒂队的状况要比希佩尔队好得多，并且能见度也是对英方更有利的。

Two hits were recorded on British ships, and the Lion and Princess Royal the ships concerned...The estimated hits on German heavy ships: Derfflinger 1, Seydlitz 5, Schleswig-Holstein 1, Pommern 1.
英国方面，狮号和长公主号各被击中1次；德国方面，德尔弗林格号被击中1次，塞德里茨号5次，石勒苏益格-荷尔斯坦因号和波美拉尼亚号（均属于稍晚些时候加入战斗的第2战列舰中队，均为前无畏舰），也分别被击中1次。

问题：杰里科麾下的舰艇，当时在做什么？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.353-355）：

Firing broke out...but Jellicoe received no reports of the enemy’s heavy ships...he had to rely on what could be heard and seen from Iron Duke. A note made in B turret of the Iron Duke at 8.25 p.m. “Nine heavy ships ahead”...Bellerophon too observed the flashes from the German battleships...whether or not Jellicoe himself saw signs of ships of the High Seas Fleet, he did not know that they were still heading S. Nonetheless, although his turn SW was away from the enemy, the new course was still closing the range. But only for a couple of minutes, until all the German columns - except, for another five minutes, the IIBS - turned sharply away onto Westerly courses. But because the German dreadnoughts soon turned back in succession to the converging course S while the BCF and Grand Fleet continued SW, there would be one more contact between the battleships before darkness fell completely.
尽管发生了交火，但杰里科却并未得到有关敌方大型军舰的报告，于是他所能获得的信息，就只剩下在铁公爵号上所能看到、所能听到的内容了。在20时25分时，铁公爵号的B炮塔上有人记录道：“前方有9艘大型军舰”。与此同时，在柏勒洛丰号上，则有人看到了德国战列舰开火时的炮口火光。无论杰里科自己是否看到了公海舰队的踪迹，可以确定的是，他并不知道德国舰队的航向是正南方向。另外，尽管他当时将航向从正西方向调整为西南方向，但英国战列舰队与德国舰队之间依旧是在互相靠近的。然而，几分钟后，随着德国舰队大幅度转向西侧（其中第2战列舰中队的转向时机要比其余部队晚5分钟），双方距离又开始拉远了。但德国人很快又再度转回了正南航向，因此在英国战列巡洋舰队和战列舰队都采用西南航向的情况下，这便意味着在入夜之前，双方舰队还会有一次发生接触的机会。

根据John Campbell的说法（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.257-258）：

The Caroline and Royalist were on the King George V's starboard bow and ahead of the Castor and her destroyers, when at shortly before 2100, three German ships, thought to be pre-dreadnoughts, were sighted closing slowly. The ships sighted were actually the leading German dreadnoughts. The Caroline reported them to Jerram, and warned that they might be making a torpedo attack, but this signal made by flashing-lamp was apparently not taken in by the King George V.
卡洛琳号和保皇党号轻巡洋舰，当时正位于乔治五号战列舰的右舷前方区域。这两艘轻巡洋舰的后方，则是第11驱逐舰中队的卡斯托耳号轻巡洋舰及跟随其行动的驱逐舰们。在稍早于21时00分的时候，卡洛琳号轻巡洋舰发现，有三艘德国军舰，似乎是前无畏舰，正在慢慢向他们靠近。他们所看到的，实际上是德国位于编队前方的无畏舰。该舰将这一情况报告给了杰拉姆中将，并告知后者，自己可能会发动雷击。这组讯息是通过探照灯发出的，但乔治五世号似乎没有收到。

At shortly after 2100 several vessels were made out on the Westfalen's port bow in the uncertain twilight...A searchlight challenge was unanswered...The Westfalen and Nassau opened fire at 8100-7700yds on the Caroline and Royalist. Both the Caroline and Royalist attacked, the former firing two torpedoes at 7600yds and the latter one at 8000.
稍晚于21时00分的时候，威斯特法伦号战列舰透过暮光发现，在其左舷前方区域，似乎有几艘军舰。德国人用探照灯暗号进行了询问，但未得到答复，于是威斯特法伦号和拿骚号战列舰在7,700-8,100码距离上，对卡洛琳号和保皇党号开火了。后者则对前者展开了雷击，卡洛琳号在7,600码距离上发射了2枚鱼雷，保皇党号则在8,000码距离上发射了1枚鱼雷。

The Castor sighted on her starboard quarter what appeared to be the German battlecruisers, closing the British fleet. The King George V also sighted these ships and, in a wireless signal timed at 2105, reported them to Jellicoe as the British battlecruisers. The Caroline's signal to attack had been seen and at 2106 Jerram negatived this by searchlight, believing the ships to be Beatty's, but the attack had already been made. Jerram's signal, however, was intercepted by the Castor, and the 11th Flotilla fired no torpedoes.
卡斯托耳号，则在其右舷后方区域，发现有军舰在向他们靠近（可能是德国战列巡洋舰）。乔治五世号也看到了这些军舰，并在21时05分时，通过无线电向杰里科汇报，他们发现了英国战列巡洋舰。杰拉姆还看到了卡洛琳号发出的雷击命令，由于他认为那是英国军舰，于是在21时06分时，通过探照灯发去了否决命令，但此时雷击行动已经开始了。不过卡斯托耳号倒是看到了杰拉姆的命令，于是第11驱逐舰中队就没有发射鱼雷。

At about 2114 the Nassau fired a starshell, which positively identified her as German, the British fleet having none. However, fire was still not opened on the German ships, while the Castor did not attack for the curious reason that it was not dark enough to do so, unsupported by fire from the Fleet, and the enemy were soon lost to sight. The powerful 11th Flotilla missed a fine opportunity on this occasion, and in the prevailing conditions had a much better chance of inflicting serious damage than the 2nd BS.
大约在21时14分时，拿骚号打出了1发照明弹，这无疑表明了该舰是德舰，原因在于英国舰队当时并未配备照明弹。然而，英国战列舰仍未对德国军舰开火，而第11驱逐舰中队也没有对其发起雷击——后者给出的拙劣借口是，当时天还不够黑，并且也缺乏战列舰队的火力支援，再加上敌方很快就消失了，所以他们没有发起雷击。这支驱逐舰中队的实力是非常强的，但却错过了这个雷击的好机会——在当时的条件下，相比于杰拉姆的第2战列舰中队，驱逐舰雷击对敌舰造成伤害的概率，要高得多。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.470-471）：

The Germans were seen by at least a few people in the van of the Battle Fleet. In the “leading turret of the leading ship in the leading squadron of the Grand Fleet” (= A turret of Jerram’s flagship, King George V) Sub-Lieutenant ‘Smiler’ Cunliffe saw the silhouettes of three battleships in the mist about 8,000 yards away on the starboard bow and positively identified them as German by the distinctive cranes between their funnels. He reported them to the bridge, but no action was taken and the chance slipped away.
在第2战列舰中队里，有好些人都看到了德舰的踪迹。在乔治五世号战列舰的A炮塔上，坎利夫少尉发现，在其右舷前方约8,000码距离上，有三艘战列舰的侧影。通过其吊车的样式，他判断出这是德国军舰，并将这一发现汇报给了舰桥，然而长官们并未选择与之交战，机会就这样被错过了。

And it was about now that, in Orion, the subordinate flagship of Jerram’s 2nd BS, Arthur Leveson’s flag-lieutenant turned to the rear-admiral and said, ‘Sir, if you leave the line now and turn towards, your name will be as famous as Nelson’s.’ But Leveson had been schooled to obey; after a moment’s hesitation he answered: ‘We must follow the next ahead.’
与此同时，在莱文森少将的旗舰，俄里翁号战列舰上，有一名年轻军官开口道：“长官，如果您现在脱离编队，并转向敌人的方向，您的名字将会变得如纳尔逊一般广为人知”。但莱文森是一个习惯于遵守命令的人，经过短暂犹豫后，他回答道：“我们必须跟随前方军舰的行动”。

结论：在入夜前的最后时刻，英方虽然不具备两次T头时的姿态优势，但仍然具备能见度优势，因此原本是有机会对德国舰队造成沉重打击的。但由于只有贝蒂麾下的战列巡洋舰与德方大型军舰发生了交战，杰里科麾下的战列舰则并未参战，因此除了塞德里茨号的受损情况进一步恶化之外，德方实际受到的损伤并不大。这背后的原因有很多，但最重要的差异，在于贝蒂队鼓励主动性，而杰里科队则强调遵循命令与条例。

有必要说明的是，英国海军之所以没能抓住最后的交战机会，最主要的责任人并不是杰里科本人，而是第2战列舰中队的杰拉姆中将和莱文森少将，以及第11驱逐舰中队的霍克斯利准将。杰拉姆缺乏判断力、莱文森和霍克斯利则缺乏主动性。这三人之所以会有这样的表现，有一部分原因是源于杰里科的控制式的指挥风格，但杰里科本人也并非罪魁祸首，事实上他自己在某种程度上也是一名受害者——真正的元凶，是唯上命是从的保守文化。

seven_nana

十、夜战阶段

在21时30分左右，天色彻底变黑，此后直至次日3时左右，都属于夜战阶段。此时，杰里科与舍尔这两位总司令，各有各的打算——前者不希望冒险卷入夜战，但又想切断德国舰队的退路，并希望在次日天亮后再与德国人进行决战；而后者则迫切希望摆脱英国舰队，并返回母港。换句话说，在夜战阶段中，双方的作战目标几乎是完全相反的。

英德双方的交战态势，21时35分 - 22时50分

入夜之后，双方舰队都对编队队形进行了调整。杰里科将其队形调整成了并列纵队，而贝蒂和舍尔都将其队形调整成了单列纵队。至于希佩尔，由于他的第1侦察群已经伤害累累，无法再保持编队机动，因此实际上是各自单独行动的。此后，双方的轻型舰艇有过几次短暂的交锋，但双方的主力舰部队之间并未发生任何交火。

在夜战的复杂环境下，敌我识别是一桩非常关键的事项——在此方面，德国海军显然做的更好，而英国海军则在这方面吃了不少亏，在22时05分至22时20分之间，长公主号误将第1轻巡洋舰中队当做了敌舰，险些闹出误击事件。

交战态势图，21时35分 - 22时10分

从下图中可以看到，入夜之后，双方舰队都调整了各自的队形，进入了夜战巡航状态；与此同时，在德国第7驱逐舰中队和英国第4驱逐舰中队之间，爆发了夜战阶段中的第一次交锋，但双方均未取得战果。



交战态势图，22时10分 - 22时50分

从下图中可以看到，在这个阶段，德国轻巡洋舰们先后与英国第11驱逐舰中队及英国第2轻巡洋舰中队进行了交火。其结果是，英国海军的南安普顿号轻巡洋舰遭到德舰炮火重创，都柏林号和卡斯托耳号轻巡洋舰也遭受了较大损伤，德国海军的弗劳恩洛布号轻巡洋舰被英国鱼雷击沉。



如何评价英德双方的夜战能力？进入夜战阶段之时，双方指挥官又作出了哪些决策？

在日德兰海战之时，雷达尚未被发明，夜视仪也还没有出现，因此在当时的情况下，夜间的感知能力是要显著低于白昼环境的。受其影响，与白昼战相比，夜战是一个截然不同的话题——尽管在白昼战中，英国方面凭借更大的舰队规模，占据了明显的优势，但进入夜战之后，情况就有所不同了。因此，双方的指挥官都需要结合各自的情况，拟定相应的交战策略与队形。

问题：在夜战阶段中，双方舰队各自还剩下多少战斗力？

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, P.117-118）：

As a result of the fighting the British had lost the Queen Mary, Indefatigable and Invincible. The Lion and Princess Royal had each one turret out of action, but the battle cruisers were otherwise ready and fit to renew the action. The Warspite was returning to Rosyth, and the guns’ crews of the Malaya’s secondary battery had suffered heavy casualties, but with these exceptions the steaming and fighting qualities of the 5th Battle Squadron were practically unimpaired. In the Battle Fleet the speed of the Marlborough had been slightly reduced. The Defence and three destroyers had been sunk, and the Warrior and three destroyers disabled.
英国方面损失了玛丽王后、不倦、无敌三艘战列巡洋舰，狮号和长公主号也各自有一座炮塔失去战斗力，但其余的战列巡洋舰则仍然具备充分的战斗力。厌战号此时已经在返回母港的路上了，马来亚号的副炮组成员伤亡惨重，但除此之外，第五战列舰中队的战斗力依然是完整的。在战列舰队中，马尔伯勒号的航速有所下降（受雷击损伤影响），防御号装甲巡洋舰及三艘驱逐舰（涅斯托耳号、游牧民号、鲨鱼号）被击沉，勇士号装甲巡洋舰及三艘驱逐舰（阿卡斯塔号、昂斯洛号、防御者号）的动力系统受损（其中防御者号的损伤较轻，还能够拖带着昂斯洛号返航）。

On the German side, the Lützow and Seydlitz were incapable of renewing the action. Nor was the Derfflinger much better off. There remained only the Von der Tann and Moltke, and the latter had one turret out of action. The battleships had not suffered so severely as the battle cruisers, but the powerful 3rd Squadron had lost some of its fighting value. The 1st and 2nd Squadrons had escaped with little damage, but the Wiesbaden and four torpedo boats had been sunk.
德国方面，吕佐夫号和塞德里茨号战列巡洋舰已经失去战斗力，德尔弗林格号的情况也好不到哪去，冯·德·坦恩号有一座炮塔失去战斗力，毛奇号受损最轻。德国战列舰的受损程度不及战列巡洋舰那么重，但最强大的第3战列舰中队的战斗力遭到了削弱（其中国王号受损较重），第1和第2战列舰中队则基本未受损伤。在轻型舰艇方面，则损失了威斯巴登号轻巡洋舰及四艘驱逐舰（V27号、V29号、V48号、S35号）。

问题：当天夜间的能见度情况如何？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.369）：

The night was not only misty but dark with no moon and an overcast sky - promising conditions for surprise destroyer attacks.
当天夜晚，不仅迷雾并未散去，且由于天气阴沉而没有月光，因此是漆黑一片——这恰恰是非常适合发起驱逐舰突袭的环境。

问题：英德双方在夜战领域的技术差距有多大？

根据John Campbell的说法（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.368）：

The control equipment for the 5.9in guns of German capital ships and light cruisers was well in advance of that for the British 6in, as Director-pointers were used. German searchlights were better handled, star shells were entirely lacking in British ships, and there was also no equivalent to the German night identification system using coloured lights.
德国海军主力舰和轻巡洋舰所配备的15cm火炮，是搭配有指挥仪的，而英国海军的同类火炮当时还未配备指挥仪。德国海军的探照灯，具备更好的操作方式，同时还配备有照明弹，而英国海军则并未配备照明弹。最后，德国海军使用彩色灯光作为夜间识别设备，而英国海军则没有这类装备。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.481 & 680）：

The Germans had got hold of the Grand Fleet's two-letter challenge signal, and used it back, whereas their own recognition sign was an array of coloured lights (briefly switched on) which was impossible to replicate...It is often said that they acquired it at dusk, from Princess Royal's reminding Lion of what the current challenge was (Lion having lost it) and using an unshaded light. This seems to me implausible, for reasons of range, bearing, signalese, language etc, but, even if true, there is evidence that they had it already, and they would certainly have got it as soon as they were challenged.
德国人掌握了英国海军的夜战识别方式（使用探照灯打出两个事先约定的字母），并通过模仿这种方式欺骗了英国人；而德国人自己的识别方式，则是用一排短暂点亮的彩色灯光来实现的，英国方面无法模仿。有很多人说，德国人之所以能掌握英国方面的夜战识别方式，罪魁祸首是狮号和长公主号——在入夜之时，长公主号在没有使用探照灯遮光栅的情况下，将识别字母告知了狮号，于是被德国人偷窥到了。但在我看来，结合双方当时的距离方位以及通讯语言差异来看，这种说法是不可信的。但即便真的如此，也有证据表明他们之前就已经掌握了这种识别方式。退一步说，即便他们当时没有掌握，只要与英国海军进行应对，他们很快就能掌握这种方式。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.377）：

At 9.32pm, Lion breached signals security by asking Princess Royal for the challenge and reply then in force; these were recognition codes in the form of short letter sequences exchanged by searchlight or flashlight using Morse code...However, the recognition system was inherently insecure; as soon as a British ship made the challenge, it was known to the enemy and could be used to give the appearance of a British ship (and perhaps to obtain the response)...During the night actions, even when German ships flashed the wrong codes, they were enough to cause doubt and delay.
在21时32分时，狮号向长公主号询问了当时使用的识别字母，长公主号回复了。所谓的识别字母，就是用探照灯打出的，基于摩尔斯电码的一组字母。狮号的这种做法，是违背了保密原则的。但有必要说明的是，这种敌我识别方式本身就是很不安全的——只要英国军舰进行了问询，敌方就掌握了英方的问询方式，于是他们就可以冒充英国军舰去询问其他英国军舰，甚至有可能借此得到准确的回答方式。在夜战过程中，即便德国军舰打出的字母是错误的，也足以对英方造成困扰，并拖延对方的敌我识别工作了。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.145）：

Finally, the British destroyers suffered from being easily distinguishable in the night action because they were painted black, which, it was now realized, is the most visible colour at night. The German destroyers were painted grey, and the British were all repainted this colour immediately after the battle.
最后，英国驱逐舰当时还是采用黑色涂装的，当时他们并不知道，这是夜间环境下最容易被发现的颜色，因此这些军舰很容易就会被敌方发现。作为对比，德国驱逐舰则是采用灰色涂装的。在此战之后，英国驱逐舰立刻就改用了灰色涂装。

问题：杰里科为什么不希望卷入夜战？

根据杰里科（John Jellicoe）在其著作中给出的描述（The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916: Its Creation, Development and Work，P.370-371）：

The possibility of a night action was, of course, present to my mind, but for several reasons it was not my intention to seek such an action between the heavy ships. It is sufficient to mention the principal arguments against it.
我当然有考虑过夜战这种可能性，但基于多方面原因，我并不打算让主力舰参与夜战，其背后的因素主要如下：

Such a course must have inevitably led to our Battle Fleet being the object of attack by a very large destroyer force throughout the night...Neither our searchlights nor their control arrangements were at this time of the best type. The fitting of director-firing gear for the guns of the secondary armament of our battleships had also only just been begun. Without these adjuncts I knew well that the maximum effect of our fire at night could not be obtained, and that we could place no dependence on beating off destroyer attacks by gunfire. If destroyers got into touch with the heavy ships, we were bound to suffer serious losses with no corresponding advantage. Our own destroyers were no effective antidote at night, since they would certainly be taken for enemy destroyers and be fired on by our own ships. But putting aside the question of attack by destroyers, the result of night actions between heavy ships must always be very largely a matter of chance, as there is little opportunity for skill on either side...The greater efficiency of German searchlights at the time of the Jutland action, and the greater number of torpedo tubes fitted in enemy ships would give the Germans the opportunity of scoring heavily at the commencement of such an action.
如果让主力舰参与夜战，那么就需要面对大量驱逐舰发起的夜间袭击。当时，我们所装备的探照灯及其控制设备，都不是一流的产品。主力舰上的副炮，也还未配备指挥仪。在这样的情况下，我们无法在夜间打出有效的炮火，因此无法击退敌方驱逐舰的攻击。如果敌方的驱逐舰杀到了距离我方主力舰足够近的位置，那么我们必然会遭受沉重且毫无意义的损失。我们自己的驱逐舰，也无法在夜间有效保护己方的主力舰，因为他们会被误认为是敌方驱逐舰，从而遭到我方军舰的误击。但即便撇开驱逐舰雷击的话题不论，单论主力舰之间的夜战本身，那这也依然是一桩难以发挥战术的、充满着不确定性的事。此外，在日德兰海战时，德国海军在探照灯功效和鱼雷发射管数量上都占据优势，因此有机会在夜战开始之时，就对我方造成重大打击。

问题：杰里科打算如何切断舍尔的退路？

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, P.119-120）：

The Commander-in-Chief decided very rightly not to fight a night action, and the problem now before him was to intercept the enemy in daylight before he reached the shelter of his shore defences. This problem resolved itself into two main aspects - the danger of minefields and the probable route of the enemy. Reference to Diagram will show that minefields offered no real obstacle above the latitude of 55° N, whilst South of it only British minefields stood in the way of the pursuit of the German Fleet via the Horns Riff route. But the position of these was known.
杰里科所做的不参与夜战的决定，是十分正确的。在这种情况下，他需要解决的问题，就是如何在次日日出后，对敌方舰队进行拦截，并阻止其抵达近岸区域。而这桩任务，又可以细分为两方面：其一是雷场构成的威胁，其二是敌方可能选择的航线。从插图中可以看到，在北纬55度以北的区域，并没有会阻碍舰队行动的雷场，而北纬55度以南的区域，如果选择走合恩礁航线的话，那么是不会受到德国雷场的影响的，而英国雷场的位置则是已知的。

There was next the question of Scheer’s probable route. These were limited to four - the Kattegat and the three channels which the Germans kept regularly swept in the Bight in response to British minelaying. Return via the Kattegat was unlikely. Scheer was 344 miles from the Little Belt, and a choice of this route would give the British a whole day to chase and renew the action. The channels or ‘ways’ kept swept in the Bight were three in number - one past the Ems along the Frisian coast, one radiating to the North-West from Heligoland, and one by Amrum Bank and Sylt to Horns Riff. These ‘ways’ were known at the Admiralty and their general direction had been communicated to the Commander-in-Chief. The Ems route was improbable, for it was long and round about. Heligoland and Horns Riff were the most likely, and Horns Riff the more probable of the two.
接下来的问题，就是舍尔会选择哪条航线了。在当时的情况下，总共有四种潜在选项：走卡特加特海峡，或者走通往赫尔格兰湾的三条定期扫雷的安全航线中的一条。走卡特加特海峡是不太可能的，因为舍尔当时距离小贝尔特海峡还有344海里之远（抵达小贝尔特海峡之后，距离基尔港就不远了），并且如果选择走这条航线的话，那么英国海军就会有一整天的时间，可以对其进行追击。至于那三条定期扫雷的安全航线，一条是自埃姆斯河口起，沿着弗里西亚沿岸地区航行，一条是从西北方向通往赫尔格兰湾，最后一条是沿着合恩礁-叙尔特岛-阿姆鲁姆浅滩方向航行。对于这些航线，英国海军部是清楚的，并且也将其大致方向通报给了杰里科。

根据杰里科（John Jellicoe）所提交的战报（Battle of Jutland, 30th May to 1st June, 1916. Official Dispatches with Appendixes，P.21）：

I was loth to forego the advantage of position, which would have resulted from an easterly or westerly course, and I therefore decided to steer to the southward, where I should be in a position to renew the engagement at daylight, and should also be favourably placed to intercept the enemy should he make for his base by steering for Heligoland or towards the Ems and thence along the north German coast. Accordingly, at 9 p.m., the fleet was turned to south (speed seventeen knots).
我不愿意放弃位置上的优势，因此拒绝采用向东或向西的航线，而是决定向南航行。如此一来，等到天亮之后，我应当会处在一个能与敌人重新展开战斗的位置上。另外，如果敌人选择驶向赫尔格兰湾，或者沿着德国北部海岸驶向埃姆斯河的话，我也会处在一个能有效拦截敌方舰队的位置上。因此，在21时00分时，我下令将航向调整为正南方向，航速17节。

双方舰队在5月31日21时00分时的位置与航向、赫尔格兰湾外的雷场、以及德国海军开辟的安全航线

下图中，实线代表双方舰队在21时00分的位置与航向，虚线代表德国海军开辟的安全航线，雷场则主要位于北纬55度以下区域。



问题：对于夜战阶段，贝蒂有何打算？

根据贝蒂（David Beatty）所提交的战报（Battle of Jutland, 30th May to 1st June, 1916. Official Dispatches with Appendixes，P.138-139）：

At 9.16 p.m. I received a signal from the Commander-in-Chief that the course of the Fleet was South. In view of the gathering darkness and for other reasons, viz. : (a) Our distance from the Battle Fleet; (b) The damaged condition of the Battle Cruisers; (c) The enemy being concentrated; (d) The enemy being accompanied by numerous Destroyers; (e) Our strategical position being such as to make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favourable circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper to close the enemy Battle Fleet during the dark hours. I therefore concluded that I should be carrying out the Commander-in-Chief's wishes by turning to the course of the Fleet. My duty in this situation was to ensure that the enemy Fleet could not regain its base by passing round the Southern flank of our forces. I therefore turned to South at 9.24 p.m. at 17 knots.
在21时16分时，我收到了总司令的通知，因此得知大舰队的航向是正南方向。在我做出关于夜战的决策之时，我所考虑到的因素有以下几个方面：一，我们与战列舰队之间的距离；二，战列巡洋舰的受损程度；三，敌方军舰当时聚集在一起；四，敌方舰队中有大量的驱逐舰；五，我方占据了位置优势，应该能在次日日出后重新找到敌方舰队。基于以上各方面的考量，我认为在夜间环境下，我们应与敌方舰队保持距离。因此我决定，应遵循总司令的意图，将航向调整为与战列舰队保持一致。在当时的情况下，我的职责，是确保敌方舰队不会从我方舰队的南侧区域溜走。因此，在21时24分时，我将航向调整为正南方向，航速17节。

问题：舍尔为什么想要摆脱英国舰队并返回母港？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.378）：

Scheer did not even consider the Southerly return routes that Jellicoe and Beatty were trying to cover. His War Diary declared that ‘by dawn we must be at Horns Reef in order not to be cut off from the Bight by strong pursuing enemy forces coming up from the south...from bases in the south of England’. His despatch read that: It might be taken for granted that the enemy would endeavour to force us to the Westward by attacks with strong forces during the hours of dusk, and by destroyer attacks during the night, in order to force us to give battle at daybreak...The Main Fleet...had to make for Horns Reef, in close order, by the shortest route, and to maintain this course in defiance of all attacks of the enemy.
舍尔根本就没有考虑过杰里科和贝蒂所考虑的南线。他在作战日志中写道：“至日出之时，我们必须要到达合恩礁，否则的话，前往赫尔格兰湾的航线，就有可能遭到来自英国南海岸基地的援军的阻截”。在其提交的战报中，舍尔则表示：“在天黑之前，敌人会凭借其更为强大的部队来攻击我们，从而迫使我们驶向西侧区域。在黑天之后，他们则会试图用驱逐舰对我方发动袭击，从而迫使我们在天亮之后继续与其交战。因此，我国舰队必须要前往合恩礁，我们应采用密集队形，选择距离最短的的航线，并且坚持这条航线，即便遭到敌方攻击也绝不动摇”。

根据V. E. Tarrant的说法（Jutland, the German Perspective: A New View of the Great Battle, 31 May 1916, P.183）

Scheer ordered the High Seas Fleet to turn on to a course of SSE¼S, speed 16 knots, with the added injunction Durchhalten! (This course is to be maintained!') It led in the direction of Horns Reef, about 85 miles distant. The German Official History remarks: If he failed to get through (to Horns Reef], he would be in danger of being cut off from his base...It was, therefore, essential for him to be off Horns Reef by dawn. After that his decisions would have to depend on the outcome of the night actions and on the subsequent situation... Even when the Litzow was lost sight of from the last ship of the line, this did not alter Scheer's decision. Had the speed of the Fleet been determined by that of the damaged battlecruiser, or had the Fleet returned to her, it could not possibly have reached Homs Reef by dawn.
舍尔命令公海舰队，将航向调整为东南偏南1/4南，即直取合恩礁的方向，并要求以16节航速持续航行（当时他们距离合恩礁约85海里）。对此，德国官方战史评论道：“舍尔当时必须要在日出之前赶到合恩礁，如果他做不到的话，就会面临返回母港的航路被敌方切断的风险。至于到达合恩礁后，接下来怎么办，那就要取决于夜战的结果及后续的战况了。在此情况下，即便是在吕佐夫号因跟不上公海舰队，而从后者的视线中消失的情况下，舍尔的决心也没有动摇。如果整个舰队要为了迁就那艘受损的战列巡洋舰而降低航速，或者折返前去救援，那么就不可能在日出之前到达合恩礁了”。

问题：进入夜战阶段之时，双方海军分别是如何调整队形的？

根据杰里科（John Jellicoe）在其著作中给出的描述（The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916: Its Creation, Development and Work，P.372-373）：

I directed the Battle Fleet to assume the second organisation and to form divisions in line ahead disposed abeam to port, with the columns one mile apart. My object in closing the columns to one mile apart was to ensure that adjacent columns should not lose sight of each other during the night, and that therefore they would not mistake our own ships for those of the enemy.
我要求战列舰队将队形改为以中队为单位的并列纵队，每个中队之间相隔1海里。我之所以选择1海里的间距，主要是为了让各中队能在夜间环境下，与相邻的中队保持视觉接触，以免将友舰误认为敌舰。

The destroyer flotillas were directed to take station five miles astern of the Battle Fleet...If I put the destroyers astern, they would fulfil three conditions: first, they would be in an excellent position for attacking the enemy's fleet should it also turn to the southward with a view to regaining its bases during the night (which seemed a very probable movement on the part of the enemy) ; secondly, they would also be in position to attack enemy destroyers should the latter search for our fleet with a view to a night attack on the heavy ships; finally, they would be clear of our own ships, and the danger of their attacking our battleships in error or of our battleships firing on them would be reduced to a minimum.
至于驱逐舰队，我则要求他们待在战列舰队后方5海里处。将这些驱逐舰布置在战列舰队的后方，可以获得三方面的好处：第一，如果敌方舰队在夜间驶向南方，并试图返回基地（这种可能需很大），那么这些驱逐舰就会处在一个适合发起攻击的位置上。第二，如果敌方驱逐舰试图搜寻我方战列舰队，并向其发起雷击，那么我方驱逐舰也会处在一个适合进行拦截的位置上。最后，这些驱逐舰处在远离我方战列舰的位置上，因此这两支部队之间发生误击的可能性，也能降到最低。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.476）：

Apart from the breakup of the line-of-battle into squadrons, and the relegation of the destroyers, the night-time arrangement was mostly a case of living with existing dispositions. Owing to Marlborough’s speed problem, which grew worse during the night, her division of the 2nd BS (in the BF’s left-hand column) fell progressively astern until it was level with the 5th BS, which was following the main fleet with Goodenough’s 2nd LCS on its own starboard quarter. Ahead, and to the south-west of the Battle Fleet, ten miles out on Iron Duke’s starboard bow, Beatty’s six battlecruisers, the 2nd CS, and the 1st and 3rd LCSs conformed to Jellicoe’s course and speed.
在调整至夜战队形时，除了将队形从战列线转换为并列纵队，以及调整驱逐舰部队的位置之外，其余各舰的位置并未作出改变。由于马尔伯勒号在中雷受损后航速降低，且进入夜间后情况愈发严重，因此该舰所在的第2战列舰分队（其位置在大舰队中靠近左翼），逐渐落到了后头，最终与第5战列舰中队形成了并排前进的态势。而古迪纳夫的第2轻巡洋舰中队，当时则位于这两支部队的右后方。至于贝蒂麾下的6艘战列巡洋舰、以及跟随其行动的第1和第3轻巡洋舰中队、还有第2巡洋舰中队，则位于在大舰队的西南方向，距离铁公爵号约10海里。

根据V. E. Tarrant的说法（Jutland, the German Perspective: A New View of the Great Battle, 31 May 1916, P.185-187）

When Scheer ordered the High Seas Fleet to make for Horns Reef, II Squadron was still at the head of the line. Scheer, however, considered it inadvisable to keep the pre-dreadnoughts in the van because of their low powers of resistance against torpedoes. Consequently, Westfalen lead I and III Squadrons past II Squadron...Scheer made the order to assume the night cruising formation: II Squadron take station astern of III Squadron. Battlecruisers take station at the rear. II Scouting Group take station ahead and IV Scouting Group to starboard.
当舍尔下达前往合恩礁的命令时，位于整个战列舰队最前方的，是第2战列舰中队。在舍尔看来，由于这些前无畏舰抵御鱼雷攻击的能力很差，因此将他们摆在队列前方，是不可取的。于是在舍尔的命令下，威斯特法伦号战列舰带领着第1和第3战列舰中队，超过了第2战列舰中队。舍尔定下的夜间巡航队形是这样的：第2战列舰中队跟随在第3战列舰中队后方，战列巡洋舰则跟随在第2战列舰中队后方。第2侦察群在前方开路，第4侦察群则前往右舷方向负责侧翼掩护。

Meanwhile, Hipper and his staff were finally able to transfer from G39 to Molke. Hipper had not, apparently, received the signal directing the battlecruisers to take station at the rear of the line, for hardly had his flag been hoisted in Moltke when he ordered the four battlecruisers to proceed towards the head of the line at 20 knots. But only Moltke and Seydlitz were able to comply with this order. Derfflinger, owing to the damage she had received, and Von der Tann, owing to the dirty state of her fires, the cleaning of which could no longer be postponed, were unable to steam at more than 18 knots, so the interval between these two ships and Moltke and Seydlitz increased rapidly. When they drew abeam of Friedrich der Grosse, Derflinger and Von der Tann once more received orders from Scheer to take station at the rear of the line, and they eventually dropped into position astern of II Squadron.
另一方面，希佩尔和他的参谋们，此时终于从G39号驱逐舰上转移到了毛奇号战列巡洋舰上。希佩尔显然并未收到舍尔下达的战列巡洋舰跟在编队最后方航行的命令，因为在他登上毛奇号后不久，他就命令4艘战列巡洋舰以20节航速前往编队最前方。不过，只有毛奇号和塞德里茨号能执行这条命令，德尔弗林格号和冯·德·坦恩号则无法执行这条命令——前者是因为受损过重，后者则是因为锅炉积灰严重，必须要立刻进行清理，因此无法达到18节以上的航速，于是这两艘军舰与毛齐号和塞德里茨号之间的距离，就逐渐拉开了。当航行到腓特烈大帝号附近时，舍尔再次对德尔弗林格号和冯·德·坦恩号下令，让他们跟在编队最后方航行，于是他们最终待在了第2战列舰中队的后方。

问题：如何评价双方指挥官所选择的夜战策略与队形？

根据J. E. T. Harper的说法（The Truth About Jutland）：

Both Jellicoe and Beatty decided against a night action between capital ships and also that they both considered the position strategically good for intercepting the enemy. Beatty placed his battle-cruisers well ahead to ensure that the enemy could not pass round the southern flank of the battle fleet. The destroyer flotillas, being stationed astern, not only acted as a security for the battle fleet against attack by light craft from astern, but also as a menace to the enemy battle fleet if it attempted to cross astern.
杰里科和贝蒂，都不打算让主力舰参与夜战，且两人都认为，英国舰队当时正处于能够拦截德国舰队的有利位置上。贝蒂的战列巡洋舰们，处在很靠前的位置上，能有效阻止德国舰队从英国舰队的南侧绕过去。而将驱逐舰队布置在后方的做法，则不仅能保护战列舰队免遭敌方轻型舰艇的尾随攻击，更是能威胁到试图从后方绕过去的德国战列舰队。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.133-135 & P.138-139）：

Admiral Oliver claims to have been critical at the time over Jellicoe's refusal to seek a night action with the High Seas Fleet, and various writers have expressed the same opinion. Yet there is little ground for challenging the C.-in-C.'s decision. Given the circumstances of the moment, it was both natural and correct. To have fought the enemy at night would have been to court a catastrophe. Even the usually hyper-critical Naval Staff Appreciation accepts Jellicoe's decision as the right one...'Nothing', remarks Corbett of Beatty's appreciation, 'probably could have more nicely interpreted what was in Admiral Jellicoe's mind.
据说，对于杰里科拒绝与公海舰队进行夜战的做法，亨利·奥利弗代理中将（当时担任海军参谋长）是持批评意见的。除此之外，还有一些人也表达过类似的观点。但总的来看，杰里科的做法是立得住脚的。在当时的情况下，这么做是非常自然，也非常正确的。如果在夜间与敌方开战的话，那将会招致一场灾难。就连一贯持批评观点的【Naval Staff Appreciation】这本书，也认为杰里科这么做是正确的决定。至于贝蒂的做法，科贝特（著名的海军史学者）则评论道：“贝蒂非常准确地领会了杰里科当时的意图，在这件事上，恐怕无人能做的比他更好了”。

The course actually followed led in a direct line to the Ems and left the route to Horns Reef wholly uncovered. Actually, the C.-in-C. was not entirely unmindful of the Horns Reef possibility. In order not to leave the duty of barring this route solely to the three Harwich submarines patrolling off the Vyl lightship, which were scarcely equal to the task, he ordered the minelayer Abdiel (9.32) to proceed at full speed to strengthen the British minefields southward of the submarine patrol line...Jellicoe believed that he had barred Scheer's escape routes, and he looked forward confidently to a renewal of the action the next morning. The German fleet did not have the speed to cut across ahead of him, and if they attempted to pass astern of his battle line, the destroyers would wreak havoc with them.
杰里科所选择的航线，实际上是直接驶向埃姆斯河的，因此完全没有覆盖住通往合恩礁的航线。但杰里科并未忽略德国舰队取道合恩礁的可能性——当时，有3艘隶属于哈里奇舰队的潜艇，在合恩礁附近巡逻，但他们显然无法完成阻挡德国舰队的任务。因此，杰里科在21时32分，命令神仆号布雷驱逐舰全速前出，在潜艇巡逻线的南侧进行布雷。杰里科认为，他已经阻挡住了舍尔的逃跑路线，并自信地期待着能在次日天亮后再度与德国舰队交战。在他看来，德国舰队的航速，是不足以从英国舰队的前方绕过去的，而若是试图从后方绕过去，则会遭到英国驱逐舰的攻击。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.370-371）：

Jellicoe’s chosen column spacing was only about half the length of each column; thus changes of course could be made only by unequal-speed manoeuvres that took time and would have been difficult to execute in the dark. The formation also left little room for turning away from torpedo attacks whether from ahead or on the beam. It appears that the column separation was unusually close - the GFBOs assumed a default separation at night of five miles unless a different distance was specified - but that Jellicoe was prepared to accept its disadvantages in order to preserve visual contact between his battleship columns. The German Official Account, with justification, criticised this inflexible British disposition. Should one of the wing divisions become engaged or be forced, by a torpedo attack, to turn towards the next division, the whole fleet might easily be thrown into the most awful confusion.
杰里科所选择的各个纵队之间的间距，只相当于纵队长度的一半左右。换句话说，如果他们想要再进行队形调整，就只能通过非等速机动来完成，这种机动方式需要花费更多的时间，并且也很难在夜间完成。再者，如果遭遇来自前方或侧面的雷击的话，在这样的编队间距下，也是很难进行规避机动的。根据【大舰队战斗命令】中的规定，默认的夜战间距是5海里，由此来看，杰里科所选择的间距是非常近的。但为了保证各个战列舰中队之间能保持视觉接触，他还是选择了这种带有缺陷的队形。对于这种做法，德国官方战史进行了批评：“如果有一支位于侧翼的中队，与敌方发生交战，或者遭到了雷击，因而转向了靠近中央区域的中队的话，那么整个舰队很可能就会陷入混乱”。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.478-479）：

Scheer altered to a course which led directly to the Horns Reef. It is not clear what was in his head at the time. He was opting for the escape route which could bring the earliest, and most complete, success, but which was the least likely to succeed. Historians argue as to whether he was being very cool or had gone into auto-pilot. He said the former, his flag-lieutenant the latter. There is certainly something of the ‘riderless horse heading for home’ about the High Seas Fleet’s nocturnal movements; and if choosing the Horns Reef was not in itself an error, Scheer’s making a bee-line for it was his fourth ‘Jutland’ decision which could, had the British been on the ball, have cost him his fleet.
舍尔的决策，是直接驶向合恩礁的方向。我们不清楚他脑子里当时是怎么想的，他选择的是能以最快速度到达的线路，但这同时也是成功可能性最低的线路。舍尔当时能冷静思考吗？还是他已经进入了简单思维的状态？对此，舍尔自己持第一种观点，他的舰队通讯官持第二种观点，而历史学家们则是各有各的观点。对于公海舰队的夜间航行状态，有人将其形容为“无人驾驭的马儿，径自奔向了家的方向”。选择合恩礁作为目的地，本身或许并不是一个错误，但舍尔采用的笔直航线，则无疑是他在日德兰海战中犯下的第四个“自杀性”的错误——如果英国舰队当时表现地更机灵些的话，德国舰队可能就回不去了。

结论：在结束了白昼战斗后，双方舰队都有一些损伤，但除了双方的战列巡洋舰损失较重之外，其余部队并未折损太多实力。由于当时的英国海军并不适应夜战环境，因此杰里科所做的不进行夜战的决策，是基本没有争议的。至于他所做的拦截德国舰队的安排，站在后见之明的角度，固然是不够完善，但考虑到德国方面有四种逃跑的选项，而杰里科不可能顾全所有的可能性，因此我们也不宜过分苛责于他。倒是他选择的夜战队形，似乎有些不够灵活，万一真的发生夜战，这种队形很可能会是一个败笔。至于舍尔所做的决策，尽管以结果论而言的确是成功的，但这个决策本身，似乎并不是十分妥帖。

英德双方的驱逐舰部队在夜战阶段中的表现

一般认为，在日德兰海战的夜战阶段中，双方总共发生了七场具有一定规模的交战。除了先前已经介绍过的三场交战（德国第7驱逐舰中队与英国第4驱逐舰中队，德国轻巡洋舰与英国第11驱逐舰中队，德国轻巡洋舰与英国第2轻巡洋舰中队之间的交战）之外，另外四场交战，都是发生在英国驱逐舰部队与公海海军主力之间的。

英国第4驱逐舰中队的航迹图，22时00分至0时30分

在23时30分前后，英国海军第4驱逐舰中队，与德国舰队主力（包括战列舰和轻巡洋舰）不期而遇，于是爆发了一场混战。其结果是，英国海军损失了4艘驱逐舰（蒂珀雷里号、雀鹰号、命运女神号、热心号），同时还有3艘驱逐舰（布洛克号、喷火号、鼠海豚号）遭到重创；而德国海军则损失了埃尔宾号和罗斯托克号轻巡洋舰。



英国第9、10、13驱逐舰中队的航迹图，23时00分至3时30分

当第4驱逐舰中队与德国舰队交战之时，英国第9、10、12、13驱逐舰中队都在附近不远处。然而，第13驱逐舰中队的法里上校，在看到战斗场景后突然转向了东侧，不仅在匆忙间丢下了他麾下的部分驱逐舰，并且还冲撞到了位于他东侧的第12驱逐舰中队。此后，英国第9、10驱逐舰中队及第13驱逐舰中队中那些被抛下的军舰，汇聚到了一起。

接下来，在第9驱逐舰中队的戈德史密斯中校的带领下，这些英国驱逐舰从德国舰队的正前方横穿而过——戈德史密斯误将德国舰队误认为友军了，他的本意只是想跑到这些战列舰的另一侧，而德国人则认出了这些并非友军，于是对前方的英国驱逐舰们进行了攻击。其结果是，英国海军的湍流号驱逐舰被德舰炮火击沉，攻城雷号驱逐舰被德舰炮火重创。

至于那位慌不择路的法里上校，后来在听到英国第12驱逐舰中队与德国舰队之间的交战炮声时，再度选择了退避三舍。但他麾下的莫尔兹比号驱逐舰则加入了战斗，其发射的鱼雷，可能导致了德国海军的V4号驱逐舰的沉没。



英国第12驱逐舰中队的航迹图，23时00分至3时30分

在1时45分前后，英国第12驱逐舰中队发现了德国舰队的踪迹，他们的第一次攻击企图并未成功，但随后的第二次尝试则成功了，并击沉了德国海军的波美拉尼亚号前无畏舰。



如何评价双方轻型舰艇的夜战表现？

尽管在杰里科的设想中，布置在后方的驱逐舰部队能够打退德国驱逐舰的雷击企图，但实际上，他们遭遇的是德国海军的战列舰和巡洋舰们的攻击。那么问题来了，在这些战斗中，英国驱逐舰部队的表现到底如何呢？另一方面，德国海军一向以雷击能力著称，但在夜战阶段中，他们的驱逐舰部队可以说是未见寸功，这又是为何呢？

问题：英国驱逐舰部队的表现如何？

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.491）：

The British had lost five destroyers during the night, but they torpedoed (or otherwise caused the loss of) a pre-dreadnought battleship, three light-cruisers and a possible destroyer. Never again would so many destroyers and so many potential targets be found in a hundred-square-mile patch of sea. It had not been a defining night for flotilla warfare, although it had been a graphically educational one.
在夜战之中，英国方面损失了5艘驱逐舰（蒂珀雷里号、雀鹰号、命运女神号、热心号、湍流号），但英舰发射的鱼雷，也直接或间接导致德国方面损失了1艘前无畏舰（波美拉尼亚号）、3艘轻巡洋舰（弗劳恩洛布号、埃尔宾号、罗斯托克号）以及1艘驱逐舰（V4号）。在此之后，海战史上再也没有出现过如此多的驱逐舰和如此多的攻击对象，聚集在这样一小片海域中的场景。尽管日德兰海战的夜战阶段，并未取得决定性的战果，但无疑是有非常高的研究价值的。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.397-402 & P.507-510）：

The three concerted attacks by the 4DF were all made on similar converging courses at short ranges, so they were easy targets for the secondary armaments of the IBS. However, in the first attack, because the German ships had concentrated mainly on Tipperary, many of the other destroyers were able to fire torpedoes with little hinderance. The second was quickly disrupted as Broke was badly hit and she and Contest careered into Sparrowhawk. With both leaders already out of action, the third attack seems to have been more a collective than a coordinated effort. Thus neither attack resulted in any further torpedo hits.
第4驱逐舰中队总共发起了三次攻击波，但由于都是在近距离上的同航向交战，因此对于德国第1战列舰中队的副炮来说，这些军舰简直就是活靶子。不过，第一次攻击波和第二、第三次攻击波还是有所不同的。在第一次攻击波中，由于德舰炮火集中在蒂珀雷里号驱逐领舰上了，因此其余各舰得以从容发射鱼雷。而在第二次攻击波中，由于布洛克号驱逐领舰遭到攻击，并且英国驱逐舰还发生了碰撞事故，因此攻击波被打乱了。在第二次攻击波中，由于该中队的两艘驱逐领舰都失去战斗力了，因此这次攻击其实是余下的驱逐舰们发起的集体性行为，而不是一次有组织的行为。英国驱逐舰在第二和第三次攻击波中发射的鱼雷，均未取得命中。

As the boats of the 4DF hurled themselves at the IBS, three more British flotillas to the Eastward - the 13DF, 9DF and 12DF - were still heading S in sight of each other; they could also see the 4DF in action. Thus they were well placed to attack in their turn, even (since they were forewarned of the enemy’s approach) from ahead. Yet this, the best opportunity for a massed British night-time attack, was thrown away.
在第4驱逐舰中队与德国第1战列舰中队交火之时，位于其东侧的英国驱逐舰部队（第9、10、12、13驱逐舰中队），都在向南航行，互相之间都处在视线范围内，并且也能看见第4驱逐舰中队在与敌方交战。他们本可以对德国舰队发起有效攻击的，甚至有机会从前方对其发起攻击。这是英国驱逐舰部队发起大规模夜间雷击的最佳机会，但却被他们浪费了。

Farie’s flight Eastward at 11.30pm broke up the strong concentration of three flotillas that might otherwise have seriously disrupted the High Seas Fleet. And, at daybreak, when Alison of Moresby ‘considered action imperative’, Farie once again shied away from the enemy.
第13驱逐舰中队的法里上校，在11时30分突然转向东侧的骚操作，打破了英国驱逐舰部队原本聚集在一起，并且很有可能会对公海舰队造成严重干扰的局面。后来，在破晓时分，法里上校再度选择了避战，但他麾下的莫尔兹比号驱逐舰则投入了战斗。

After Champion disappeared, Lydiard ‘continued S. and eventually turned S.W. and W. to get on other side of the big ships...If Goldsmith or any of its other commanders realised that they had crossed ahead of the enemy van, and had therefore been in an ideal position to mount a torpedo attack from ahead, they did not say so in their despatches. The general situation was now that no British ships lay close to the course of the High Seas Fleet for Horns Reef. Apart from the 12DF and Champion’s small group to the NE’ward, all other British forces were SW’ward of the German advance.
在法里上校离去之后，戈德史密斯中校先是向南，再是向西南，最后转向了正西方向，并从一些大型军舰的前方横穿而过。戈德史密斯中校以及跟在他后面的多位舰长，似乎都未意识到他们正在跨越的其实是德国舰队，因为他们并未在事后提交的报告中提及此事。然而，他们实际上错过了一次从正前方发起雷击的绝佳机会。此后，德国舰队的返航路线上，就没有英国部队阻挡了。除了第12驱逐舰中队和第13驱逐舰中队的一部还位于德国舰队的东北方向之外，其余英国部队，全都位于德国舰队的西南方向了。

When the 12DF encountered the enemy fleet just before daybreak, Stirling’s first intention was to attack with just one division on a converging course, which would probably have been driven off with the same heavy losses suffered by the 4DF. Fortunately, the German battleships turned away, which gave Stirling the opportunity to reorganise, draw ahead and then turn to lead a determined attack by his 1st Division on an opposite course; in the poor light, his boats were particularly difficult gunnery targets. This was an almost textbook attack made on opposite course with a large number of torpedoes fired mostly from optimal positions ahead of the targets. But Maenad leading the 2nd Division turned back after she fired her first torpedo and she probably disrupted the approaches of the boats following her; whatever the reason, there was no attack by the rest of the flotilla.
当第12驱逐舰中队于破晓之前，与德国舰队发生遭遇之时，斯特林上校最初的打算，是带领1支分队以同航向方式进行攻击。如果他真的这么做的话，那很有可能会像第4驱逐舰中队那样，被德国舰队击退，并且还会受到严重损伤。幸运的是，德国战列舰进行了转向规避，于是给了斯特林上校重新组织攻击波的机会——他先是向前驶去，随后调转头来，带领第1分队进行了攻击。由于当时能见度很差，因此德国军舰很难击中这些英国驱逐舰——斯特林上校发起的攻击，几乎可以说是一次教科书版的雷击行动，因为他采取了逆航向，并且在有利的位置上发射了大量鱼雷。但是，第2分队的领头舰美娜德号，却在发射了1枚鱼雷之后就进行了掉头，并且很可能干扰到了后续其他军舰的攻击。总之其结果是，其余军舰并未加入攻击波。

根据Julian S. Corbett的说法（History of the Great War, Naval Operations, Volume III, May 1915 to June 1916）：

As a strategical expedient for barring the passage of a battle fleet the flotillas had failed. With all conditions of light and weather as favourable as could be expected, they had been simply overpowered by the enemy's searchlights, star‑shells and secondary armament. The spirit of attack had not been wanting, though some have thought that the organisation did not lend itself well to individual enterprise. Possibly with an organisation in smaller units they might have done more.
从战略角度来说，英国驱逐舰部队的表现无疑是失败的，因为他们没能挡住德国战列舰队的前进路线。尽管当时的光照和气候环境对驱逐舰夜战有利，但由于敌方具备更好的探照灯、照明弹以及中口径火炮，因此我方驱逐舰部队还是被打败了。从另一方面说，我国驱逐舰部队的攻击意识也是不到位的，并且还有人认为，驱逐舰部队的组织架构也不合理，不利于这些军舰投入小规模的战斗。如果采用更小规模的组织架构的话，或许他们能有更好的表现。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.146-148）：

That a flotilla of eighteen was too large for night work was subsequently agreed; the post-war flotillas had nine destroyers. A more serious shortcoming was the destroyers' lack of tactical training. Jellicoe's staff used them for a myriad of odd jobs, which seriously limited their opportunities for training. Some destroyers did no torpedo or gunnery practice for months at a time. Divisional training, too, was neglected, partly, it seems, because complete flotillas were not often available. This situation helps to explain the ineffectiveness of the flotillas throughout the battle.
大战结束后，英国海军对驱逐舰部队进行了改组，他们认为每个中队18艘驱逐舰的组织过于庞大了，不适合夜战环境，因此将其减少到了每个中队9艘驱逐舰。但相比于组织上的臃肿，更为严重的缺陷，则是战术训练方面的不足。杰里科麾下的参谋们，安排驱逐舰部队执行各种不同的任务，导致他们严重缺乏进行训练的机会。有些驱逐舰甚至一连几个月都无法参与炮术或雷击训练。而编队训练，同样也是很缺乏的——其中有部分原因，是因为中队里的军舰经常会被拆散开。由于这些原因，英国驱逐舰在夜战中的表现并不理想。

The operations of the destroyers were enormously hampered by the inability to distinguish instantly between friend and foe. This was accentuated by lack of knowledge of the dispositions of both British and German forces. As a result, the destroyers had, as the Spitfire reported, 'absolutely no idea of where the enemy was and only a very vague idea of the position of our own ships'. Lacking this information, they suffered the heavy handicap of difficulty in identifying any ships they sighted. The Germans made the British night recognition signal and opened fire practically simultaneously, thus throwing on the destroyer the responsibility of instantly proving her friendly character. Time and again this uncertainty delayed their action until too late. At any rate, in only one case (12th Flotilla) was an organized flotilla attack executed. The 4th, 9th, 11th, and 13th Flotillas all had opportunities for attacking with torpedoes. The action that these flotillas took was more defensive than offensive.
由于英国驱逐舰部队不具备无法快速辨别敌我的能力，因此他们的作战表现受到了很大的影响。还有一个很重要的因素，是他们不清楚敌我双方都处于什么位置。例如，喷火号驱逐舰就报告说：“我们完全不知道敌方军舰到底在哪，至于我方军舰在哪，也只有一个非常模糊的概念”。在这种情况下，他们在敌我识别环节，陷入了非常不利的位置。另一方面，德国海军则掌握了英国海军的夜间识别方式，并且他们的炮火不是零零散散的，而是多艘军舰同时开火，因此占尽了先机。最后，在所有英国驱逐舰部队里，只有第12驱逐舰中队，有效组织起了攻击波。而第4、第9、第11、第13驱逐舰中队，尽管都曾有过发起雷击的机会，但他们所参与的战斗，都是防御性的，而非进攻性的。

问题：德国驱逐舰部队为何未见寸功？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.383 & P.509-511）：

Apart from the brief encounter between the VIITF and the 4DF at 9.47pm, none of the German flotillas were able to attack British ships during the night, even though three flotillas and two half-flotillas still had sufficient torpedoes. Michelsen and Heinrich had little idea of the enemy’s position and they resorted to searching in sectors radiating from reference points astern of the German line.
在21时47分时，德国第7驱逐舰中队曾与英国第4驱逐舰中队有过短暂的交火。除此之外，尽管德国方面尚有三个中队和两个半中队的驱逐舰，具备足够的鱼雷火力，但他们均未在夜战阶段中与英国军舰交火。德国方面的两位驱逐舰部队指挥官，米切尔森准将和海因里希准将，都不清楚英国舰队的位置在哪，因此他们采用了分区域搜索的方式。

The first searches, by the IITF and the XIIHF in the sectors between ENE and SE, were ordered prematurely by Heinrich; they found the rear of the British line but too soon, while it was still twilight. This was the most difficult part of the line to attack and there was no shortage of defenders following just astern; the German boats were easily driven off by gunfire from the 2LCS. The smaller destroyers of the VII and V TFs were allocated sectors from SE to SSW but their searches were hampered by dirty fires. At 9.40, Michelsen initiated an attack by the boats that he had held back in reserve (five of the IXTF and G42); then, at 9.55, he assigned them to the sector SSW-SW.
最早出发前去搜索的，是第2驱逐舰中队和第12驱逐舰半中队，他们的搜索区域是东北偏东至东南方位。但由于海因里希下达命令的时间太早了，因此他们在还有些夕阳余光的情况下，发现了英国战列线的后卫。由于这个区域的守备甚是严密，因此这些德国驱逐舰很快就被英国第2轻巡洋舰中队击退了。接下来，第7和第5驱逐舰中队，被安排去搜索东南至西南偏南方位，但由于这些老式驱逐舰的炉膛中积累了大量灰渣，因此其搜索工作并不顺利。最后，在21时40分时，米切尔森派出了他的预备队（第9驱逐舰中队的5艘驱逐舰，外加G42号驱逐舰），并于21时55分时，命令他们前去搜索西南偏南至西南方位。

At 10.30pm, Michelsen ordered the flotillas to assemble at Horns Reef by 2am and the searches appear to have abandoned soon after midnight...The German scheme of searching in sectors was almost completely ineffective, while it spread the destroyer forces over too wide an area for mutual support if they had found any British forces.
在22时30分时，米切尔森下令，所有驱逐舰部队应在次日2时于合恩礁汇合，因此在午夜过后，德国驱逐舰就放弃了搜索行动。德国海军所开展的区域搜索，基本上是毫无作用的，他们将驱逐舰部队分散在了非常广阔的区域中，因此如果遇到英国部队的话，互相之间很难进行支援。

根据Julian S. Corbett的说法（History of the Great War, Naval Operations, Volume III, May 1915 to June 1916）：

The orders to the German destroyer flotillas for the night did not disclose the skill that is expected from a highly trained naval staff. Thus, the 2nd Flotilla, consisting of the fastest and most powerful boats, and, moreover, still having a full complement of torpedoes, was detailed for the area where it was least likely to have any chance of action. This flotilla returned via the Skagerrak, and reached Kiel the next day practically undamaged. The slowest boats, some with only one torpedo each, were detailed for the two most promising areas. Errors in reckoning and in signalling also contribu­ted to the failure of the enemy to demonstrate his claimed superiority in night fighting.
德国海军军官的技战术素质，并未在德国驱逐舰部队所收到的夜战命令中得到体现，第2驱逐舰中队配备有航速最快、战力最强的舰艇，且其鱼雷武备也是齐整的，但却被派去搜索一片最不可能与英国军舰发生交战的区域。这支部队最后是绕道斯卡格拉克海峡返航的，他们于次日到达了基尔港。另一方面，最有希望找到英国军舰的两片区域，却是交给一些老旧驱逐舰负责的，其中有些甚至只剩1枚鱼雷可用了。除此之外，航迹定位及通讯上的失误，也是导致德国舰队未能发挥出其所谓的“高超的夜战能力”的原因之一。

德国驱逐舰中队的夜间搜索区域

第2驱逐舰中队负责东北偏东至东南偏东方位，第12驱逐舰半中队负责东南偏东至东南方位，第7驱逐舰中队负责东南至南微东方位，第5驱逐舰中队负责南微东至西南偏南方位，第9驱逐舰中队负责西南偏南至西南方位。其中，最有希望与英国舰队发生交锋的区域，是第5和第7驱逐舰中队负责的。



结论：双方的驱逐舰部队未能完成预期任务，各有各的原因。英国驱逐舰部队在技术和战术方面都存在问题，他们既缺乏照明弹和有效的夜间识别设备，也缺乏主动组织夜间雷击的攻击意识，若不是被杰里科布置在了战列舰队后方，他们很可能会空手而归。至于德国驱逐舰部队，尽管他们具备良好的技术设备和战术训练，但由于搜索区域分配不合理，且部队指挥官们较为保守，主动攻击意识不强，因此取得的战果还不如英国驱逐舰部队。

英德双方在当日深夜至次日清晨之间的整体动向

在午夜前后的数小时内，德国舰队逐渐从英国舰队的后方绕了过去，驶向了合恩礁的方向。在此过程中，除了与英国驱逐舰部队发生过多次交锋之外，德国舰队还遇到了英国海军的黑王子号装甲巡洋舰——后者在第一次T头之时，与英国舰队走散了，直到夜间突然遇上德国舰队——在后者的集火攻击下，该舰很快就殉爆沉没了。除此之外，德国海军的吕佐夫号战列巡洋舰，由于进水过多，不得不在凌晨时分作弃舰处理；而英国海军的马尔伯勒号战列舰，则是因为受损情况加剧，因此在凌晨时分脱离了舰队，提前返航了。

另一方面，贝蒂和杰里科则依旧在向南航行，因此并未干扰到德国舰队的逃跑计划。在此情况下，英国海军失去了在次日天亮后继续与德国舰队交战的机会。

夜战阶段的宏观态势图，5月31日11时至6月1日3时

从下图中可以看到，由于双方舰队的航向存在差异，因此经过一个晚上的航行，至次日天亮之时，双方之间已经拉开了很长一段距离。



德国舰队为何能在英国舰队的眼皮底下溜走？

杰里科的夜战策略，并不能说是存在明显缺陷的，但尽管如此，德国舰队也的确是从其后方溜走了，这到底是怎么一回事呢？

问题：在从英国舰队后方横穿而过之时，德国舰队与多支英国驱逐舰部队发生了交战，那么后者是否有向杰里科汇报呢？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.144-145）：

During all the fighting in the fourth encounter no report was made to the C.-in-C. by any of the ships engaged. The fifth encounter...equally deplorable, no report was made to the C.-in-C. Two explanations have been advanced. One is that the destroyer captains were so preoccupied with the life-and-death struggle before them that they overlooked the importance of reporting to the C.-in-C. The other is that they were too used to working under their cruiser leader, and the importance of reporting direct to the C.-in-C. did not occur to them. I would also point out that the destroyers were not trained in reconnaissance work, and there is nothing in the G.F.B.O.s about the duty of the flotillas to keep contact with and report the enemy's fleet, whether by day or night.
第4、9、10、13驱逐舰中队，都与德国舰队发生过交战，但却没有一艘军舰向杰里科发出过报告。对于这种情况，存在两种解释。一种观点认为，驱逐舰的舰长们当时正处于生死攸关之际，因此未能向总司令汇报敌情。另一种观点则认为，他们习惯于听从领舰的命令，因此并未意识到自己应该直接向总司令汇报敌情。我还可以再加上一条解释，这些驱逐舰们并不从事侦察任务，并且在【大舰队战斗命令】中，也没有诸如“驱逐舰应该与敌方舰队保持接触，并将敌情汇报给上级”这样的内容。

Stirling reported by wireless to the C.-in-C. (1.56). The Faulknor was the only one of the dozens of destroyers that sighted the German fleet during the night which tried to pass this vital intelligence to the C.-in-C. And hers (the first signal she made) was the only known signal ordered that night reporting battleships. Unfortunately, neither this message, nor one of 2.08, nor a third at 2.13 got through. The primitive destroyer W/T sets of that time were too feeble to get through the constant enemy jamming. (The Germans had a special organization for jamming British signals.) The bad transmission because of a damaged aerial is another possible explanation. And there is a third that the Faulknor's messages were made on the wrong wave-length.
第12驱逐舰中队的斯特林上校，则通过无线电进行了三次汇报：第一次是在1时56分，第二次是在2时08分，第三次则是在2时13分。尽管当天夜间，有许多英国驱逐舰都看到了德国舰队的行踪，但只有福克纳号驱逐领舰向杰里科进行了汇报。并且，当天夜间也只有该舰汇报了德国战列舰相关的情报。不幸的是，这些汇报都没能成功送达铁公爵号。当时的英国驱逐舰，配备的无线电设备还很原始，很容易遭到德国海军的干扰（德国海军有专门的团队负责干扰英国通讯）。除此之外，也有观点称，该舰的天线可能受损了。甚至还有人认为，该舰当时可能没有选择正确的频段。

Then there came the seventh and final encounter. The light cruiser Champion, leading the 13th Flotilla...made no signal to the C.-in-C. and took no action.
在最后一次夜间交战中，第13驱逐舰中队的领舰，冠军号轻巡洋舰，不仅没有向杰里科汇报敌情，甚至都没有加入战斗。

问题：英国战列舰们是否有看到后方发生的交战？他们有向杰里科汇报吗？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.155-156）：

The British battleships repeatedly observed searchlight beams, gunfire, and star-shell, first in a north-westerly direction and later extending in an arc across their rear, without appreciating the significance of these engagements. The 5th Battle Squadron, at various times the nearest battle squadron to the enemy, was in an especially favourable position to detect the meaning of the enemy's movements. The Barham says in her report: 'During the night there appeared to be constant attacks by Torpedo Craft on ships, first to the westward and then to the northward...'
英国战列舰们，反复多次观察到了探照灯光束、炮火以及照明弹，这些战斗迹象最初出现在西北方向，随后则沿着舰艉方向逐渐进行了转移。尽管如此，他们却并未意识到这些战斗迹象的重要性。其中，第5战列舰中队由于距离敌方最近，因此也是最能有效观察到敌方动向的部队。巴勒姆号（中队旗舰）就在其报告中写道：“在夜战阶段中，似乎时常有驱逐舰发起攻击的迹象，一开始是在西侧区域，后来则转移到了北侧区域”。

The Malaya, the rear ship of the squadron, says that at 11.40 p.m. she caught sight abaft her starboard beam of 'what appeared to be an attack by our Destroyers on some enemy big ships steering the same way as ours...The leading ship ofthe enemy had two masts, two funnels, and a conspicuous crane.' She was the Westfalen. For some strange reason the Captain of the Malaya (A. D. E. H. Boyle) kept this information to himself. He should have reported it, Jellicoe maintained in his 'Errors Made in Jutland'. 'This would have given me a clue to Scheer's movement of cutting across the rear of the fleet.' Patrick Brind (then a lieutenant), who was on the bridge of the Malaya during the first watch, says that when the High Seas Fleet was sighted, all guns were trained and the Gunnery Officer asked permission to open fire. The Captain refused on the ground that the Admiral was only two ships ahead and therefore able to see everything that Malaya could!
马来亚号，当时位于编队最后方。在23时40分时，该舰发现，在其右舷区域，似乎有英方驱逐舰，在向德国大型舰艇发起雷击。后者的航向与我们相同，排头的那艘军舰有两根桅杆，两根烟囱，且其吊车的样式非常引人注目。该舰看到的，实际是威斯特法伦号战列舰。然而不知为何，马来亚号的舰长博伊尔上校，并未将这一发现报告给上级。杰里科后来表示：“博伊尔应该上报这一发现的，这样我就有可能意识到，舍尔正在从大舰队的后方穿过”。在马来亚号的舰桥上值第一个夜班的帕特里克·布林德上尉表示，当他们看到公海舰队时，所有火炮都指向了敌舰，炮术长也请求向敌舰开火了，但舰长拒绝开火，其理由是，中队指挥官就在前面再前面那艘军舰上，我们能看到的情况，他也能看到！

At 11.35, during the fourth encounter, the Valiant sighted, in a momentary gap in the mist, two enemy 'cruisers', though there could have been no doubt about them being battleships, owing to the crane amidships the Germans used for hoisting heavy boats in and out. (The British used derricks.) The Valiant passed the news of the cruisers on to the Malaya by shaded lamp, and the Malaya to the Admiral in the Barham. Evan-Thomas, thinking other ships ahead of him must have seen the German ships, took no action...The C.-in-C. did not receive a word of any of these sightings.
至于刚勇号（当时位于巴勒姆号和马来亚号之间），则在23时35分时，短暂看到了两艘敌方“巡洋舰”的踪迹。但由于这些军舰的中部区域设有吊车，因此实际上他们应该是德国战列舰（英国军舰则是使用吊杆的）。刚勇号将这一发现告知了马来亚号，马来亚号则又将其汇报给了巴勒姆号的埃文-托马斯，后者认为，在他前方的其他英国军舰肯定也能看到德国军舰，于是就没有采取任何行动。以上的这些观察结果，没有一条被发给杰里科。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.404-407）：

Both the 5BS and Marlborough’s subdivision had better views of the fighting to the Northward, though there are still many detailed differences between their reports. Nonetheless, all describe much the same sequence of engagements, ‘the first on the starboard beam, the others taking place in succession towards the stern’ (Burney)...Burney’s despatch stated that four night attacks were observed from Marlborough. They were distinct enough to be plotted on her chart with times of 10.05pm (bearing abeam), 10.40, 11.25 and 0.10am, the last, seven points abaft the beam, being accompanied by a heavy explosion. The plotted points give a clear impression of enemy forces heading about SSE on a course that crossed Marlborough’s wake at around 0.30.
在英国战列舰队中，对发生在北侧区域的交战情况看得最清楚的，是第5战列舰中队和马尔伯勒号所在的那个分队（第6战列舰分队）。尽管这些军舰给出的报告中，互相之间仍存在一些出入，但他们所描述的交战过程，总体来看是大同小异的，用伯尼中将的话说就是，战斗最早是从右舷方向打起的，后来则逐渐转移到了舰艉方向。根据伯尼中将提交的战报，马尔伯勒号观察到了四次夜间战斗，并且还在航迹图上明确地标出了这四次战斗的位置——第一次交战发生在侧面，时间是22时05分，接下来则分别是22时40分、23时25分以及0时10分，其中最后一次发生在舰艉方向7个罗经点处，并且过程中还发生了一次大爆炸。从这张航迹图上，明显可以看出，敌方舰队的航向就是东南偏南方向，而且在0时30分前后，从马尔伯勒号的后方穿了过去。

Despite all that was seen from the battlefleet, not a single ship reported its observations to Jellicoe. Most were well aware that the actions astern had moved from the starboard beam and quarter soon after 10pm to the port quarter by about 0.30am. Six supposed they had sighted large enemy cruisers, three, German battleships. The most egregious reporting failures must be by Malaya and by Vice-Admiral Burney in Marlborough, whose plot of the successive actions astern had given a very good indication of the course of the High Seas Fleet towards Horns Reef.
尽管英国战列舰队看到了不少夜战场景，但没有任何一艘军舰，将其所观察到的情况，汇报给了杰里科。他们中有许多人都清楚，他们后方所发生的战斗，最初是在22时左右，发生于右舷或者右舷后方，但至0时30分左右，已经转移到了左舷后方。有6艘军舰自认为看到了德国战列巡洋舰，还有3艘则自认为看到了德国战列舰。在这些错误当中，最为糟糕的，显然是马来亚号，还有马尔伯勒号和伯尼中将——后者的航迹图中所记录的一系列的交战地点，能够清楚的指出，公海舰队的航线，就是指向合恩礁方向的。

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.484-487）：

On the compass-platforms of the 5th BS and Marlborough’s division of the 1st BS officers watched the fireworks and drank cocoa. Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas recorded "heavy firing [at 10.15] a little abaft the starboard beam, which I surmised to be attacks by enemy destroyers on our light-cruisers and destroyers...At 10.39, heavy firing was observed on the starboard quarter, and destroyers appeared to be attacking the cruisers. At 11.35, a further attack was seen further off nearly right astern." A witness in the foretop of Vice-Admiral Burney’s flagship later wrote of signs of actions being fought to starboard or astern of us most of the night. And in Agincourt, the rearmost ship of that group, Lieutenant Cunninghame-Graham could see and hear heavy firing on our starboard quarter and we also saw a large ship passing down our starboard side.
在第5战列舰中队及第6战列舰分队（马尔伯勒号所在的分队）的那些军舰上，舰桥上的军官们，正在一边喝着可可饮料，一边观看着后方的“烟火表演”。埃文-托马斯少将记录道：“在22时15分时，右舷方向稍靠后的区域，出现了猛烈的炮声，我认为这是敌方驱逐舰在向我们的轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰发起攻击。在22时39分时，在右舷后方有猛烈的炮声，似乎是驱逐舰在攻击巡洋舰。在23时35分，我又在更靠近正后方的区域看到了战斗迹象”。在伯尼中将的旗舰上，一名位于火控桅楼上的目击者事后写道：“几乎一整个晚上，我们的右舷或后方区域，都有战斗发生”。而在整个战列舰队中位置最靠后的阿金库尔号战列舰上，坎宁安-格雷厄姆上尉能看见和听见右舷后方区域有猛烈的炮火，并且还看到有一艘主力舰从右至左跨过了英国舰队的后方。

Even battleships in the main body, six or seven miles further away from the fighting and formed around Iron Duke - Vanguard, Conqueror, Colossus and Bellerophon - certainly saw the loom of gunflashes and star-shell astern, although, for reasons of distance and mist, details were not discernible.
即便是那些位于铁公爵号周围，即距离交战区域有6-7海里之远的军舰们，如前卫号、征服者号、巨像号、柏勒洛丰号等，也都看到后方区域有炮火和照明弹的迹象。不过，由于距离较远，且迷雾重重，因此他们所了解到的信息并不是很详细。

The critical failure was the omission of those senior officers in the rear of the Grand Fleet, who were in a position to observe, to alert the Commander-in-Chief to the possibility that this was more than just his destroyers defending the fleet from German torpedo-boats; and on those officers must rest much of the blame for Scheer’s blundering through the rear of the British fleet ‘undetected’.
最严重的问题，还是出在战列舰队中那些位置靠后的高级军官们身上。他们身处于能够有效观察到战斗情况的位置上，本可以向杰里科发出警示，告诉他后面正在发生的状况，并不仅仅是英国驱逐舰在抵挡德国驱逐舰的攻击。舍尔之所以能从英国舰队的后方“悄悄”地溜过去，这些军官们需要为此承担很大一部分的骂名。

Nearly twenty years later, Barham’s captain was goaded into writing this defence of RA5BS in the RUSI Journal: It is doubtful whether the various observations of enemy ships made by ships of our battlefleet ought to have been reported to the C-in-C. I was on the bridge all night with my Admiral, and we came to the conclusion that the situation was known to the C-in-C and that the attacks were according to plan. A stream of wireless reports from ships in company with the C-in-C seemed superfluous and uncalled for. The same reasoning probably influenced the Marlborough’s division. This may have been an error of judgement but cannot be termed ‘amazing neglect’. In any case the impression in the 5th BS was that the enemy were following astern of our fleet and that we were in the best position to resume action at daylight. It is very doubtful whether, if the C-in-C had got the reports from the Malaya and the Valiant, he would have been in a position to conclude definitely that the enemy were making for the Horns Riff.
直到近20年后，巴勒姆号的舰长还特意撰文，从而为第5战列舰中队的行为辩解。他写道：“我国战列舰队中的各舰，的确观察到了不少敌情，但我不认为这些必须要汇报给总司令。当天晚上，我就在舰桥上，跟我的中队指挥官在一起，我们得出的结论是，总司令是清楚现在的局面的，这些战斗是按照他的计划在开展的。在这种情况下，如果各舰发送一堆无线电报告给总司令，似乎是多余的行为，且总司令也并未要求我们这么做。马尔伯勒号所在的中队，想的可能也跟我们一样。我们的行为或许可以算作判断失误，但决不能称之为极大的疏忽。不管怎么说，当时第5战列舰中队的认知是，敌方正跟在我国舰队的后方，并且我们正处在一个能在天亮之后有效拦截敌方的位置上。最后，即便刚勇号和马来亚号对总司令进行了汇报，他也未必能准确地判断出敌方舰队正在驶向合恩礁”。

Jellicoe’s criticism was muted. He always tried to be loyal to subordinates (notably to Evan-Thomas), and he was, of course, incriminated through his failure to train them in their wider duties. He ventured that “Captain Boyle of Malaya should have reported sighting enemy large ships”, but directed disproportionate ire at the Admiralty for withholding information which, he claimed, “would have led me to alter course during the night for the Horn reef”. (The Admiralty told Jellicoe Scheer’s correct course and speed at 10.41 p.m., and Jellicoe was exaggerating the Admiralty’s omissions.)
对于这种情况，杰里科并未进行过多批评。他一直是一个对下属非常讲义气的上司（尤其是对埃文-托马斯）。并且在这件事情上，杰里科自己也是有责任的，因为下属对自己的职责理解有误，与长官的日常训导是脱不开干系的。尽管杰里科曾对马来亚号的舰长博伊尔上校提出批评，但是他将绝大部分的责任，都推给了海军部的官僚。杰里科表示：“如果他们没有将情报留在自己手中，而是将其与我分享的话，我就能在夜间调整航向，直奔合恩礁了”。但事实上，在22时41分时，海军部就已经将舍尔的准确航向和航速告知了杰里科，因此杰里科实际上是在夸大海军部的责任。

问题：杰里科所说的海军部未将情报分享给他，具体是指的什么？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.413）：

At 9.55, the Admiralty transmitted the first of three signals that were based on German messages that had been deciphered by Room 40. The first signal can only have added to Jellicoe’s apprehensions about night-time torpedo attacks. The second was despatched at 9.58, it gave the position of the rear ships of the enemy battlefleet and their approximate course - ‘Southerly’ - at 9.00 (Jellicoe was not told that it was based on a report from Regensburg). The course did not agree with those reported by Beatty but it did conform with one of Jellicoe’s scenarios - that Scheer would follow him Southwards. The course also matched what might have been inferred from Lion’s enemy bearings. But the position located the rear of the High Seas Fleet at 9.00 some nine miles WSW from Iron Duke and closer still to King George V and to either of Lion’s possible positions. Jellicoe concluded that the ‘Admiralty position was obviously incorrect’ and that, since the enemy ‘would obviously have been in action with some of our ships, the information was disregarded as inaccurate’. Yet very soon some ships had indeed ‘obviously...been in action’, since from Iron Duke herself heavy firing was heard at 9.09 and a star shell was seen at 9.14, both on the starboard beam, that is, W after the flagship turned S. Thus the enemy bearing implied by the Admiralty’s second signal - WSW at 9.00 - was about three points South of what Jellicoe and his staff heard and saw for themselves.
在21时55分至22时41分之间，海军部向杰里科发来了三条由40号房间所破译的德国海军通讯。第一条的内容，进一步加深了杰里科对于夜间雷击的担忧。第二条是在21时58分时发出的，这条情报中包含了敌方战列舰队的后卫部队在21时00分时的位置与航向（向南航行），不过海军部并未告知杰里科，这份情报是破译自雷根斯堡号（德国侦察舰队的驱逐舰部队旗舰）的报告的。海军部的情报中所描述的航向，与贝蒂早先汇报的有所出入，但的确是与杰里科所设想的情况相同的——即舍尔会跟随杰里科南下。并且，海军部所给出的情报，与狮号所报告的敌舰方位也是相符的。但是，海军部情报中的所给出的德国舰队位置，位于铁公爵号的西南偏西方向9海里处，且更靠近乔治五世号和狮号的位置。因此杰里科的判断是，海军部的情报是不准确的。再加上杰里科认为，敌方舰队肯定会与部分我方军舰发生交战，因此就将海军部的情报置之不理了。事实上，双方军舰的确有发生交战，在21时09分时，铁公爵号就看到了炮火，并且还在21时14分时看见了照明弹，这些都是位于其右舷方向的。由于铁公爵号当时已经转向了正南航向，因此这些交战迹象是出现在其正西方向的。也就是说，海军部发来的第二条情报中给出的敌方舰队位置，相比于杰里科及其幕僚们亲眼看到亲耳听到的位置，往南偏了3个罗经点。

The third Admiralty signal was timed at 10.41, and it gave a clear indication of Scheer’s general intentions and a precise course and speed. German Battle Fleet ordered home at 9.14 p.m. Battle Cruisers in rear. Course S.S.E. ¾ E. Speed 16 knots.
海军部发来的第三条情报，是在22时41分时发出的，并且写明了舍尔的准确航向与航速——德国舰队在21时14分时，将航向改为东南偏南3/4东，航向16节，战列巡洋舰跟在主力舰队后方行动——这条情报，实际上明确揭示了舍尔的意图。

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, P.125 & P.129）：

Three of the German signals (Nos. 25, 28 and 32), made between 9.06 pm and 10.32, indicated clearly that Horns Riff was the destination of the High Sea Fleet. Only one of these - No. 25 - was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief at 10.41. Nos. 27, 31, 37 and 38, which gave Scheer’s course at 9.46 pm, 10.32 pm, 11.30 pm and 11.36 pm respectively, were not passed on. Of three signals, Nos. 35, 43 and 45, fixing the position of the High Sea Fleet at 11 pm, 12.30 am and 2.30 am respectively, only No. 45 was transmitted at 3.29 am. It is true that No. 25 (received in the Iron Duke at 10.41 pm) was enough for the purpose, but the Commander-in-Chief might justifiably complain that other signals of great importance, confirming the enemy’s destination and giving his position and course at various times during the night, were not sent to him. Precisely what happened at the Admiralty is obscure, but we know that information of vital importance remained gazing blankly upwards from an Admiralty table whilst the fate of the war hung in the balance.
在21时06分至22时32分之间，海军部截获了三份能明确表明公海舰队打算驶向合恩礁的德国通讯。但是，海军部只将其中的一份，在22时41分时发给了杰里科。在21时46分至23时36分之间，海军部截获了四份有关公海舰队航向的德国通讯，但并未将其发给杰里科。在23时至次日2时30分之间，海军部还截获了三份有关公海舰队位置的德国通讯，但只在3时29分时，将最后一份发给了杰里科。海军部在22时41分发出的那份情报，的确是有其作用，但杰里科抱怨海军部未将其他情报发给他，也并非毫无理由——因为其他那些情报，也同样具备很重要的意义，能够让杰里科知晓公海舰队在不同时间点上的航向及位置，并让他确信，敌方的目的地的确是合恩礁。当时海军部内到底发生了什么，我们并不清楚，但可以确定的是，当整场战争的命运悬于一线之时，这些主要的情报，当时就摆在海军部的桌子上。

双方舰队在5月31日22时41分时的位置与航向，以及相关情报的误差

下图中，展示了双方舰队当时的实际位置与航向，以及基于各类情报所推断出来的德国舰队位置。可以看到，这些情报或多或少都存在一些误差。

J点是22时41分时，铁公爵号的航迹图所记录的自身位置，可以看出与实际位置有一些偏差。

A点是德国舰队在21时14分时的位置，B点是基于A点位置及海军部给出的航向航速情报，推断出的德国舰队在22时41分时的位置。

C点是根据海军部在22时23分发来的情报，推断出的德国舰队后卫在21时00分时的位置；D点是根据C点位置推断出的德国舰队前卫在21时14分时的位置；E点是根据D点位置推断出的德国舰队在22时41分时的位置。



问题：杰里科为何不相信海军部给出的那些情报呢？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.148-150）：

For one thing, Jellicoe's confidence in the reliability of Admiralty intelligence had been shaken by the Admiralty signal of midday, 31 May, that had put the High Seas Fleet in the Jade. More to the point now is that Jellicoe knew that the German fleet could not be in the position given in an earlier signal of 9.58. The disastrous consequence of the 9.58 signal was that it increased Jellicoe's distrust of the information he was getting from the Admiralty and caused him to discredit the enemy's course given in the 10.41 signal.
在5月31日中午时，海军部曾告知杰里科，公海舰队当时还在亚德湾中，并未出港。鉴于这种情况，杰里科队海军部情报的信任程度是有限的。而海军部在21时58分时给出的德国舰队位置，也与杰里科的认知不符，因此进一步降低了杰里科对于海军部情报的信任程度，其结果就是，他选择不相信海军部在22时41分时发来的情报。

Finally, a message dispatched from the Birmingham (2nd L.C.S., Captain A. A. M. Duff) and received at about 11.30 reported sighting an unknown number of battle cruisers to the north-east steering south, that is, on a course practically parallel to that of the Grand Fleet. (They were actually German battleships of the 1st Squadron engaging the 4th Flotilla.) A few minutes later, at 11.38, the C.-in-C. received a signal from Goodenough via the Nottingham: 'Have engaged enemy cruisers at 10.15 bearing W.S.W.' These ocular reports, of more recent vintage than the information in the Admiralty's 10.41 signal, strengthened Jellicoe's opinion that the German fleet was still to his westward, making to the southward, and had therefore not yet shaped course for their base.
另外，在23时30分时，铁公爵号收到了一份由第2轻巡洋舰中队的伯明翰号发出的报告，后者表示，在其东北方向，有不明数量的战列巡洋舰，正在向南航行。换句话说，这些军舰的航向是与大舰队大致平行的（该舰所看到的，实际上是正在与英国第4驱逐舰中队交战的德国第1战列舰中队）。在23时38分时，杰里科又收到了古迪纳夫通过诺丁汉号发来的报告：“在22时15分时，我们曾与位于西南偏西方向的敌方巡洋舰进行过交战”。在杰里科看来，这些情报的时效性要高于海军部于22时41分时发出的情报，并且还是目击情报，因此进一步加强了杰里科的判断——德国舰队仍然在他的西侧，并且在向南航行，因此并未调整航向驶向基地。

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.411 & P.413）：

In his published ‘Remarks’ of 1924, Jellicoe insisted: ‘The deduction to be drawn from the Admiralty message depended largely on the time...that the course S.S.E. ¾ E. was adopted.’ Jellicoe insisted that: It should be realised that implicit reliance could not be placed on ‘Intercepts’. I could not assume, for instance, that because the High Seas Fleet had steered a course S.S.E. ¾ E. at some time between 9 and 10 p.m., that this course would be maintained.
对此，在1924年时，杰里科写道：“我们能从海军部的情报中总结出什么样的结论，关键点在于德国舰队的东南偏南3/4东的航向，到底维持了多久”。杰里科还强调道：“我们不能根据截获的碎片信息，来做出判断。例如，我不能因为公海舰队在21时至22时之间的某个时间点上，的确采取了东南偏南3/4东的航向，就认为他们始终会维持该航向不变”。

We can consider here two factors that may have influenced his decisions up to midnight. The first was the close spacing he had chosen for his columns, which meant that a three- or fourpoint turn to port could only have been made by the unequal-speed manoeuvre signalled by Compass Pendant. While there were comprehensive instructions for such turns in the General Signal Book 1915, executing them in the dark without lights was not without risk; even one ship making a mistake might throw the whole battlefleet into confusion, so Jellicoe may have been very reluctant to alter course. Second, by the time the signals from the Admiralty and from Birmingham reached him, he may have been too tired to choose correctly between their contradictory courses. His flag-captain recalled that, probably after midnight: During the night Jellicoe lay down for a few hours in all his clothes on a settee in the small house on the bridge...in which his tactical plot was kept.
另外，在杰里科所做的决策背后，可能还有两方面因素值得考虑。第一，由于他选择的夜间巡航队形，是非常紧密的队形，因此哪怕是3-4个罗经点的转向，也必须要借助非等速转向才能完成。尽管在1915年的通讯手册中，的确有对这种转向方式的详细描述，但在不开灯的情况下，于夜间实施这种机动，必然是存在一定风险的。而只要有一艘军舰犯了错误，那么整个舰队就可能会陷入混乱状态，因此杰里科可能是非常不愿意在夜间调整航向的。第二，当他收到海军部和伯明翰号发来的情报之时，他可能已经非常疲劳了，难以在这两份互相矛盾的报告之间进行抉择了。对此，他的旗舰舰长回忆道，在夜战阶段，杰里科曾在舰桥上的战术绘图室内的长靠椅上，和衣而眠了几个小时。

问题：如何评价杰里科在夜战阶段中的指挥表现？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.159-160）：

Since not a single report reached the C.-in-C. about any of the various important sightings to warn him that the enemy's battle fleet was crossing his stern, he remained under the impression that the engagements were only due to enemy destroyers attempting to break through his destroyer screen to attack the battle fleet. As dawn approached, therefore, Jellicoe had no doubt that he was still between Scheer and his base, and consequently still in a position to force an action when dawn broke.
尽管有许多军舰都看到了后方发生的战况，但由于无人向杰里科进行汇报，因此杰里科并不知道，敌方战列舰队正在从他的后方穿过。于是，他还一直以为，后方所发生的交战，只是敌方驱逐舰试图突破英方驱逐舰的阻拦，从而袭击英国战列舰队的企图。因此当太阳即将升起之时，杰里科还以为，他仍然挡在舍尔的返航路线上，能够在破晓之后，与敌方继续交战呢。

Since information regarding the presence of heavy ships did not reach JeIlicoe, 'it was', concludes Ramsay, 'impossible for him to appreciate the situation in any other way than he did'. I am not disposed to quarrel with this judgement; yet I do wonder why the C.-in-C., who had asked for reports of the enemy's movements during the day action, and continued to do so until 10.45 p.m., did not ask for enemy reports during the night. This remains unexplained. Lord Chatfield has emphasized this point. 'No signal was made by C.-in-C. to impress on all the importance of keeping touch and of keeping Iron Duke informed.'
对于这种状况，伯特伦·拉姆塞（英国海军军官，曾在海军学院开展过有关日德兰海战的讲座）表示：“由于杰里科并未收到相关情报，因此他显然无法掌握局势”。对于这种观点，我并不打算进行挑战，但让我感到好奇的是，杰里科为何没有向下属询问敌情呢？自昼间交战之时，以及夜战阶段中直至22时45分为止，他可是一直在这么做的呀？这个问题，杰里科并未解释过。而查特菲尔德（狮号舰长）则表示：“杰里科并未向下属强调，需要与敌方保持接触，并将情报反馈给铁公爵号”。

根据Kenneth Dewar & Alfred Dewar的说法（Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland, P.125 & P.129）：

Beyond the avoidance of a night action, it is difficult to trace any definite purpose in the British movements during the night. No instructions were issued as to the Commander-in-Chief’s intentions, no organised attempt was made to obtain information of the enemy’s movements, and when definite intelligence from the Admiralty supplied absolute confirmation of the enemy’s course, nothing was done to intercept him. This is the darkest part of the battle. The question of deployment and the question of turning away from torpedo attack are points which belong to the sphere of tactics, but the question of pursuing the enemy was a very different one.
我们可以确定的是，英国舰队不想卷入夜战。除此之外，他们的夜战阶段中的举动，很难说是有什么明确的目标。杰里科并未将他的意图明确告知下属们。他们也没有通过有组织的侦察行动，来探察敌方的动向。即便在收到来自海军部的有关敌方动向的确切情报后，杰里科也没有试图进行拦截。这是整场海战中，最为黑暗的时刻——如何展开战列线、或者在面对雷击时是否应该转向，都属于战术层面的话题，但是否应该对敌方进行追击，就是一个完全不同的话题了。

The official despatches throw no light on the subject, but Lord Jellicoe states that when he decided to steer to the southward, it had been his intention to close Horns Riff at daylight, but the scattered state of the fleet next morning prevented his doing so. This, however, would not have solved the problem, for course had to be altered to the eastward not later than about 0.30 am in order to intercept the High Sea Fleet. But no one was told the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief nor the disposition of the fleet. Course South, speed 17 knots, were the only instructions issued.
对于这个问题，官方战报中只字未提。杰里科自己则声称，他原本是想在天亮后，再驶向合恩礁方向的，可由于天亮之后，舰队处于一个东零西散的状态，因此他最终没有这么做。但是，杰里科并未将他的想法告知他人，他所下达的唯一的命令，就是航向正南，航速17节。另外，杰里科所描述的做法，其实也是无法解决问题的，因为如果想拦截公海舰队的话，那么最晚也得在0时30分之前，转向东方航行。

双方舰队在6月1日2时45分时的位置与航向、合恩礁附近的雷场、以及德国海军开辟的安全航线

下图中，展示了双方舰队在02时45分的位置与航向，虚线代表英国海军，实线代表德国海军。另外，图中还展示了两条德国海军开辟的安全航线（合恩礁路线与赫尔格兰湾路线），以及英国海军的神仆号布雷驱逐舰在合恩礁附近布下的两个雷场。

可以看到，由于北纬55度以南属于雷场区域，而北纬55度以北也有两个英国海军自己布下的雷场，因此如果在天亮后再向东侧展开追击，那么英国舰队很可能会陷入雷场，而德国舰队却能凭借安全航线逃回母港。



结论：在夜战阶段中，英国海军最大的敌人，并不是德国海军，而是他们自己——如果位于舰队后方的第5战列舰中队和第6战列舰分队上的那些舰长、将军们，能将他们所看到的情况汇报给杰里科的话，或许他就能意识到德国舰队正在试图从其后方穿过。如果英国海军部将有关于德国舰队航向和位置的情报，全都分享给杰里科的话，除非他坚决不相信海军部的情报，否则必然能意识到德国海军的意图。另一方面，如果杰里科给各部队指挥官下达了更为明确的夜战要求的话，或许他们会有更好的表现也未可知。但历史没有如果，因此英国海军自己的保守和保密主义，最终让他们失去了与德国舰队再度决战的机会。

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十一、返航阶段

由于日德兰海战的交战区域，位于北半球的中高纬度地区，因此不仅日落时间较晚，日出时间也格外的早（铁公爵号所在位置的日出时间是3时09分）。且由于在日出之前的破晓时分，天色已经没有那么黑了，因此日德兰海战的夜战阶段，其实是比较短的。

但即便如此，由于双方舰队的夜间航线区别较大，因此至日出之时，双方之间的距离已经拉得比较远了。此后，德国海军沿着合恩礁航线返航，并于6月1日当天回到了母港，但在返航过程中遇到了一场意外的挫折——东弗里斯兰号战列舰触雷受损（那枚水雷是神仆号布雷驱逐舰在5月5日时布下的）；而英国舰队则是先对战场进行了一番打扫，随后也返航了，并于6月2日回到了母港。在返航过程中，有部分英舰遭遇过德国潜艇的伏击，但最终是有惊无险，无一受损。

双方舰队返航时的宏观态势图，6月1日3时至6月2日8时

从下图中可以看到，在返航之前，英国舰队在交战区域中进行了一番搜索，其目的是搜寻受伤落单的德国军舰。在一番徒劳无功的尝试之后，他们最终还是意兴阑珊地踏上了归途。



如何评价杰里科在日出后的决策？

日出之后，杰里科选择了向北折返，随后又在战场上进行了多番扫荡，其目的是什么呢？对于德国潜艇的伏击威胁，杰里科又是如何处理的呢？

问题：杰里科为何要向北折返？

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.493-494）：

At 2.30 a.m., with daylight gaining strength, Jellicoe turned his fleet round towards the north. It was a misty morning, he did not know where the enemy are, but he supposed them to be somewhere to the north-west (Beatty supposed them to be south-west). Anyway, the C-in-C wanted to gather together and redeploy his destroyers: a process which proved more protracted than he had expected, so scattered and disorganized had the flotillas become during the night. At 3.0, a few minutes before sunrise, he reverted the fleet to ‘action-stations’, and reformed it from squadrons disposed-abeam into line-of-battle: “in order to be ready for the enemy’s Battle Fleet if suddenly sighted”.
2时30分时，天色已经微微变亮，杰里科命令舰队向北进行掉头。当天清晨的迷雾颇为浓厚，杰里科并不知道敌人身在何处，但他认为德国舰队在西北方向某处（贝蒂则认为在西南方向）。杰里科想要收拢他麾下的驱逐舰，并重新予以部署。但由于在夜战阶段中，英国驱逐舰部队被打散了，有不少军舰都与原本所在的部队分开了，因此收拢部队的过程花费了较长时间。至3时00分，即太阳即将升起之时，杰里科命令舰队进入战斗状态，并将并列纵队调整成了单列纵队，以便在突然遭遇到敌方战列舰队时，能有效地投入战斗。

For a while nothing happened, and then a Zeppelin appeared and hovered at a range of three or four miles, at the edge of visibility. Starting with Revenge, a number of battleships emptied their guns at it, at extreme elevation. A dozen miles away a salvo from this sport fell into the sea not far from Malaya, causing Captain Boyle to shout “Where are they? Where are they?”, a question which nobody around him was able to answer. Now, the significance of the Zeppelin dawned: it must be telling Scheer where the Grand Fleet was.
过了一阵子之后，天边出现了1艘齐柏林飞艇，距离3-4海里，这也是当时的能见度范围极限了。复仇号战列舰打响了第一炮，随后又有不少战列舰也开火了。在他们打出的炮弹中，有一些落到了距离马来亚号不远处的海里，这使得其舰长博伊尔上校发出惊呼：“敌人在哪？敌人在哪？”，然而他身边的人却无法回答这个问题。直到此刻，齐柏林飞艇才发挥出了作用，他显然会将大舰队的位置，汇报给舍尔。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.159）：

An Admiralty telegram of 3.29, received in the Iron Duke at 3.45 and handed to Jellicoe about twenty minutes later, placed Scheer at 2.30 on a S.E. by S. course, speed 16 knots, about 30 miles north-eastward of the Iron Duke, and 16 miles westward of the Horns Reef lightship, that is, only an hour's steaming from it. 'This signal made it evident that by no possibility could I catch the enemy before he reached port, even if I disregarded the danger of following him through the minefields.'
3时29分时，海军部向铁公爵号发出了一封电报，铁公爵号在3时45分时收到了这封电报，而杰里科则要到接近4时左右，才拿到这封电报。基于这份情报，在2时30分时，舍尔的航向是东南偏南，航速是16节，当时德国舰队位于铁公爵号东北方向30海里处，但距离合恩礁灯塔只有16海里，即只需要1小时航程就能到达合恩礁灯塔。杰里科写道：“这份情报表明，即便我无视雷场的威胁，对敌方舰队进行追击，我也不可能在敌方回港之前追上他们了”。

问题：在返航之前，杰里科为何要打扫战场？

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.494）：

With a new fleet-encounter ruled out, the usual fear of the U-boat menace now resurfaced, and Jellicoe re-formed his fleet in cruising formation, and then led it hither and thither for a few hours, raking through the wreckage, the oil-slicks and the bodies of the battleground, looking for survivors to rescue or stragglers to sink.
在排除了舰队决战的可能性后，长期以来对德国潜艇的恐惧，又在杰里科的心中冒了出来，因此他又重新将舰队恢复为并列纵队的巡航队形。此后，他又在遍布残骸、油渍以及浮尸的战场上四处晃悠了几个小时，一来是为了搜寻幸存者，二来是为了看看有没有落单的敌舰。

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.162）：

At 10.44 the C.-in-C. reported to the Admiralty that nothing more could be done, and soon after 11 a.m. he turned N. W. and headed for Scapa Flow...It was not until 2 June that the Grand Fleet completed the long journey to their bases. That morning the battle cruisers arrived in the Forth, and in the afternoon the battle fleet reached Scapa Flow. At 9.45 that evening Jellicoe reported the fleet was ready for sea at four hours' notice.
至10时44分时，杰里科向海军部汇报，他们能做的都做了。随后在11时过后，杰里科带领大舰队转向西北方向，驶向了斯卡帕湾。在6月2日早晨，战列巡洋舰们回到了福斯湾，而战列舰队则要到当天下午，才抵达斯卡帕湾。至6月2日21时45分时，杰里科向海军部汇报，战列舰队已经处于4小时待命状态，可以随时出海了。

结论：杰里科在6月1日天亮之后所做的各项决定，并没有什么大问题。当时他已经不可能再追上德国舰队了，因此在打扫完战场后尽快返回母港，是非常合理的决策。

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十二、事后评价

在日德兰海战中，英国海军损失了3艘战列巡洋舰（玛丽王后号、不倦号、无敌号）、3艘装甲巡洋舰（防御号、勇士号、黑王子号）、8艘驱逐舰（游牧民号、涅斯托耳号、蒂珀雷里号、命运女神号、热心号、湍流号、鲨鱼号、雀鹰号），有6,094人死亡、674人受伤、177人被俘；而德国海军则损失了1艘战列巡洋舰（吕佐夫号），1艘前无畏舰（波美拉尼亚号）、4艘轻巡洋舰（威斯巴登号、弗劳恩洛布号、埃尔宾号、罗斯托克号）和5艘驱逐舰（V27号、V29号、S35号、V48号、V4号），有2,551人死亡、507人受伤、无人被俘。

幸存下来的军舰中，受损程度最重的，是英方的狮号战列巡洋舰和德方的德尔弗林格号和塞德里茨号战列巡洋舰。其中，狮号尽管在7月下旬时已经完成修理工作，但由于有1座炮塔被毁，需要更换，因此当时该舰只有3座炮塔可用。直到9月下旬时，才获得了1座新炮塔，从而恢复了全部战斗力。而德尔弗林格号和塞德里茨号则都被超过20发大口径炮弹击中，因此分别要到10月中旬和9月中旬时才完成修理工作。

除了以上3艘之外，双方其余的受损主力舰，截止至8月上旬时，都已经完成了修理工作。

对于英德双方来说，这场海战的结果都不够理想。对于英国海军来说，他们并未取得民众期待已久的辉煌胜利，反而被弄得有些灰头土脸；而对于德国海军来说，尽管他们在交换比上占据了上风，但却丝毫未能改变他们在战略上的不利态势。

作为本章的收尾，我们将结合多位历史学家的观点，对双方的表现和得失进行点评。

问题：Arthur J. Marder是如何评价希佩尔、舍尔、贝蒂、以及杰里科的？

根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III, Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.180-187）：

How are we to evaluate the performances of the leading commanders on both sides? Hipper was superb. He led his force with confidence, skill, and verve in the face of decided odds. What of his Chief? It is the general opinion of writers that Scheer's tactics were highly imaginative and displayed an almost miraculous dexterity. I must enter a reluctant dissent Scheer may have been a great tactician. But if so, he had a very bad off-day at Jutland, since every time he came within sight of the British fleet, he did so by accident and was so completely taken by surprise that on each occasion he found the British battle line across his 'T'. Of course he did brilliantly in extricating himself; but an exceptionally able tactician would never have twice got his fleet into such suicidal situations. Furthermore, it was not merely retiring tactics that Scheer adopted, for that implies some hope and endeavour to win the battle eventually. His only concern was to get out of range and out of sight as soon as he could...In other words Scheer was much like any other admiral and by no means the tactical genius.
我们应该如何评价双方舰队指挥官的表现呢？希佩尔的表现是非常优秀的，他充满自信，且技巧娴熟，在大场面下并未软脚。那他的上司呢？历史学家们通常认为，舍尔的战术富有想象力，并且表现出了近乎于奇迹的灵活性。可舍尔真的是一个优秀的战术家吗？对于这个问题，我是存在一些异议的。在日德兰海战中，舍尔每次遇上英国舰队时，都是碰巧才遇上的。并且，他曾先后两次在毫不知情的情况下，撞上了英国海军的T头之势。这些情况，真的只是因为他运气不佳吗？尽管他在这些局面下，完成了漂亮的撤退，但如果他专业化的是一位非常优秀的战术家的话，他又如何会先后两次，率领他的舰队驶入英国海军布下的杀阵呢？另外，在当时的局面下，舍尔并未表现出任何试图赢得战斗的企图，他所做的，仅仅是尽可能驶离英国海军的视线及火力范围。换句话说，舍尔并不是一位战术天才，他的能力，实际上是比较平庸的。

On the British side, I find it extremely difficult to evaluate fairly Beatty's overall performance as a tactician. Certainly it would be going too far to credit him with the highest grade of tactical excellence. Basing his tactics largely on the follow-my-leader methods suitable for a squadron of ships fully imbued with his ideas, he had paid too little attention to the niceties of signalling and had put up with a signal staff which did him little credit. But in the staunchness and skill with which he handled his battle cruisers once they were in action he left nothing to be desired.
再来看英国方面的将领。在我看来，贝蒂的整体战术表现，是非常难以做出公正的评价的。要说他的战术表现非常优秀，那显然是不符合实际的。贝蒂的战术，主要建立在“跟我上”的战术原则上。将这种方式用在带领战列巡洋舰队时，是非常合适的，毕竟这支部队下属的各舰舰长们，都很熟悉贝蒂的战术观念。然而，贝蒂对通讯问题的重视度，显然是有所不足的，而他麾下的通讯人员的表现，也很难用正面语言来形容（言下之意就是，由于埃文-托马斯不熟悉贝蒂的战术观念，所以没能领会贝蒂的意图，且通讯又出了问题，因此对于第5战列舰中队的两次转向迟到，贝蒂显然是要负一定责任的）。但在率领战列巡洋舰们投入战斗之后，贝蒂的勇气和技巧，都是无可指摘的。

Jellicoe's tactics have been the subject of much controversy. German historians consider that he waited on events rather than controlled them, and they speak of his 'cautious handling' of the fleet and his 'excessive passivity'...A number of high-ranking officers in the Royal Navy have always believed that Jellicoe 'failed to seize the great opportunity before him on the afternoon of the 31st May'.
杰里科的战术，遭到了许多的非议。德国历史学家们认为，杰里科是被动等待事态发展，而非主动去控制事态发展，认为他的指挥方式过于谨慎而被动。英国海军中，则有部分高阶军官认为，杰里科没有把握住战机。

The specific criticisms of Jellicoe's conduct of the fleet in battle feature among them these two. One, as expressed by a distinguished Admiral who served at Jutland, is that 'centralisation made its way into our system of tactics and stiffened the joints of that monster the Grand Fleet to such an extent that it became unwieldy and never possessed the flexibility essential for success in battle.'...Reviewing the battle, it is not obvious, except in a very few cases (as at the time of Jellicoe's turn-away and when Jerram let slip opportunities in the last hour of daylight), where less rigidity of formation and greater freedom of action could have been employed with much advantage. Yet, even if we concede this much...the lesson of Jutland is clear enough. It is the unwisdom of the C.-in-C. manoeuvring a big fleet in battle and allowing little initiative to subordinates. The Germans did not need the lesson. Division commanders were expected to use their initiative in forwarding the C.-in-C.'s intentions without waiting for orders, and at Jutland they did just that. For example, without waiting for orders the 2nd Squadron detached itself from the line at 8.25 p.m. and moved down to support the battle cruisers.
对杰里科的战术指挥上的批评，主要围绕两方面展开。其一，是中心化的指挥机制，使得大舰队变得过于僵化，导致其无法灵活应对战场局面。从实际情况来看，排除少数几个特例（例如第二次T头之后，以及入夜之前的最后交战），其余情况下，较为松散的队形及更具有自由度的战术，也未必能产出更好的结果。尽管如此，日德兰海战的教训显然是很清楚的：在指挥一支庞大的舰队时，总司令应该给予下属一定的主动权。德国人显然就不需要这样的教训，因为在他们的中队/分队指挥官们，在贯彻总司令的意图时，本就有一定的自主决定权，而不需要事事等待上级命令。例如，在日德兰海战中，在入夜之前的交战过程中，德国海军的第2战列舰中队，就曾脱离编队，前去支援战列巡洋舰。

The other common criticism of Jellicoe's tactics at Jutland fastens on the unwieldy long rigid line. Should it have been axiomatic, the critics ask, that the battle fleet must keep in one compact body and that divided tactics should never be attempted? It combined with the centralization of command, they say, to rule out independent tactics by squadrons and divisions designed to concentrate superior force on a part of the enemy's line or to cut his retreat by surrounding the van or rear...It may be advisable to depart from a Close single-line formation if the enemy offers a really favourable opening, but until he docs, the closer-knit the formation, the more powerful it is; and the great majority of senior officers, until Jutland anyway, were against losing the coherence of the battle line.
杰里科在日德兰所采取的长而僵硬的战列线战术，则是另一个主要的批评话题。批评者们问道：”难道战列舰队一定要组织在一起吗？分队战术为何就成了禁区呢？在中心化的指挥机制和战列线战术的组合之下，中队/分队指挥官们就无法做出独立的战术行动了，因而就无法集中力量打击敌方舰队中的一部分，也无法对其前卫/后卫进行包抄，从而阻止其撤退”。但话又说回来，尽管在一些特殊情况下，分队战术有一定的价值，但在大部分情况下，还是密集的战列线，具备更强的战斗力。至少在日德兰海战时，绝大部分的高阶指挥官们，还是反对将战列线散开的。

It seems to me that the criticism of Jellicoe's tactics, ignores a basic principle of war, namely, that tactics are governed by strategy. Jellicoe's primary object was retention of the command of the sea, and this was accomplished. His secondary object was the destruction of the High Seas Fleet; it was highly desirable, but it was not essential. Jellicoe had the offensive spirit, I am convinced, but he knew that he could, as Churchill said, 'lose the war in an afternoon'. A crushing defeat of the Grand Fleet would have brought the end of the war in sight by enabling the Germans to raise the so-called blockade of Germany, clear the oceans of Allied transports and supply ships, cut the communications of British armies overseas, and starve out Great Britain. And so Jellicoe had to temper his eagerness to bring the Germans to battle with caution.
在我看来，对杰里科的战术提出批评的人，忽略了战争的基本原则，即战术是从属于战略的。杰里科的首要目标，是确保英国海军的制海权，他的次要目标，则是摧毁公海舰队。这个次要目标当然是很有价值的，但却不是必须的。我相信，杰里科是有进攻精神的，但就像丘吉尔的那句名言所说的那样，杰里科很清楚，自己有可能在一个下午的时间里，就输掉整场战争。如果大舰队遭遇重大失败，那就意味着德国海军能够突破英国海军的封锁，切断正在欧洲大陆作战的英国军队与英国本土之间的交通线，捣毁协约国的海上运输线，并让英国本土陷入饥荒。因此，杰里科必须要谨慎行事。

问题：John Brooks是如何评价希佩尔、舍尔、贝蒂、以及杰里科的？

根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.517 & P.520 & P.532 & P.543）：

At the beginning of the battle, Hipper took the initiative against superior forces and inflicted two serious losses on the BCF. But thereafter, when threatened by torpedo attacks or under damaging fire in worsening visibility, he was less determined, responding to rather than controlling events. Even so, the loss of a third British battlecruiser...a further testament to Hipper’s leadership of the German scouting groups.
在战斗爆发之初，希佩尔面对强敌而不惧，采取了积极主动的姿态，并使得英国方面损失了2艘战列巡洋舰。但在此之后，无论是在面对英方的鱼雷威胁（前卫战第一阶段的末尾时刻）时，还是在能见度变差、并遭到英方火力痛击（前卫战第二阶段的末尾时刻）时，他的表现都没有那么坚定，并不能主动控制事态，而是只能被动做出响应。尽管如此，他麾下的部队后来又再度击沉了1艘英国战列巡洋舰，这里面也是有希佩尔的功劳的。

Scheer pursued Beatty and Evan-Thomas Northwards, apparently without recognising the immediate danger into which he was being led. But, as soon as it became apparent that the German van was at risk of envelopment, Scheer confidently made use of the well-practised action-turn-about to withdraw. Unfortunately for his reputation as a tactician, this success was followed by his greatest tactical error, the premature second action-turn-about by which he crossed his own T. Yet, by ordering a third Gefechtskehrtwendung, he extracted his ships from their predicament; the covering attacks by the battlecruisers and by destroyers, though with only a fraction of his flotillas, were enough to ensure that the British fleet turned away...Once darkness had fallen, Scheer showed an iron determination to return to his bases by the most direct route...Scheer enjoyed a measure of good fortune and he made misjudgements and mistakes. But, when the dangers were greatest, he acted coolly and promptly to extricate his forces. He engaged a stronger enemy force, inflicted considerably greater casualties than he suffered and brought most of his ships safely to their havens.
在向北追击贝蒂和埃文-托马斯的过程中，舍尔显然并未意识到，自己正在被英国人带入陷阱。但在意识到己方前卫有被英国舰队包夹的风险后，舍尔自信地运用了德国海军早已训练纯熟的战斗回转技巧，从而脱离了险境。然而此后不久，他犯下了一个最为严重的战术失误，他的第二次战斗回转，将德国舰队主动送到了英国舰队的炮口之下。接下来，他又下达了第三个战斗回转命令，并命令驱逐舰和战列巡洋舰发起攻击，从而掩护主力部队撤退。在德国驱逐舰部队的鱼雷威胁下，英国舰队做出了规避激动，从而使得德国舰队再次得以逃出生天。在入夜之后，舍尔则展现出了钢铁般的决心，他没有进行任何绕路，直接驶向了返回母港的路线。在这场海战中，舍尔有判断错误、犯错误的时候，也有走好运的时候，但他在面临危险局面时，能够冷静而迅速地带领部队撤出险境。他的对手实力比他更为强大，但他对敌方造成的伤害，却远大于他所遭受的损失，并且还将麾下绝大部分的军舰，都带回了母港。

Beatty's approaches in the Run to the South were rash and careless, and the crews of Indefatigable and Queen Mary paid the price. He bore their loss with fortitude but, after he encountered the High Seas Fleet, rashness gave way to caution. During the Run to the North, he drew out of range, leaving the 5BS to receive the full weight of enemy fire; also he neglected to position his destroyers for an attack or in preparation for his meeting with the battlefleet. After the deployment, BCF was barely engaged when Jellicoe crossed the enemy T for the second time. At the end of the day, Beatty closed with excessive caution and then did not keep hold of the enemy when they withdrew.
在前卫战开始之时，贝蒂所的战术指挥，是鲁莽而粗心的，因此不倦号和玛丽王后号的舰员为此付出了代价。贝蒂经受住了这两次打击，但在遭遇公海舰队后，他不再鲁莽，而是变得谨慎了。在前卫战的第二阶段，他跑到了敌方舰队的射程以外，使得第五战列舰中队独自承受了德国舰队的炮火打击。另外，在这个阶段，他也没有组织驱逐舰发起攻击，并且在与战列舰队汇合一事上处理的也不够好。在主力决战阶段，贝蒂在第二次T头时几乎毫无作为。在日落之前，贝蒂的表现也过于谨慎，因此在德国舰队撤退时，没有进行追击。

With little information to go on, Jellicoe's deployment achieved all that could be hoped for. Perhaps Jellicoe should then have turned S earlier but nonetheless his tactical intuition again served him well, enabling him to cross the German T for the second time. When Scheer ordered some of his flotillas to attack as cover for his third action-turn-about, the rather ragged formation of the Grand Fleet added to Jellicoe’s tactical dilemma; he chose simply to turn the whole battlefleet away but thereby lost touch with the enemy for good...After dark, Jellicoe was badly let down by the reporting failures of his own ships and the Admiralty.
杰里科在情报非常有限的情况下，做出了非常优秀的战术指挥，有效的展开了战列线。在接下来的战斗中，他或许应该更早向南转向，但整体来说，他的战术直觉还是非常优秀的，这也使得他能够两次对德国舰队形成T头之势。当舍尔命令麾下的驱逐舰发起进攻，以掩护主力舰队的第三次战斗回转时，大舰队的略有些混乱的队形，让杰里科的战术决策变得更为困难，他的决策是转向规避，但这也使得他们脱离了与敌方舰队的接触。在天黑之后，杰里科麾下的舰长和指挥官、以及海军部，都未能及时向他通报军情（因此使得他错过了战机）。

问题：Andrew Gordon是如何评价英德双方的战略和战术的？

根据Andrew Gordon的说法（The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, P.562-566）：

For their part, the Germans could claim victory in Ausfallsflotte terms - that is, in terms of an erosion of British numerical superiority...However, the concept behind Ausfallsflotte was to bring about an equalization of forces towards an ultimate trial of strength, and claims of victory are conditional on that future battle. The Germans knew on the day after Jutland that there must be no such event, hence their need to claim that Der Skagerrak had been Der Tag - by which more demanding yardstick it was a strategic defeat.
从消耗战的角度说，德国海军的确可以宣称自己获得了胜利（因为英方的人员伤亡和军舰损失都更多）。然而，消耗战的目的是为了缩小乃至于抹平双方在实力上的差距，从而在未来取得最终的胜利。但通过日德兰海战，德国人意识到，这一天永远都不会到来，因此他们不得不宣传，日德兰海战就是他们所谓的“决战日”了。从严格意义上来说，日德兰海战的结果，实际上是德国海军的战略性失败。

To Scheer (allegedly, the only man on either side who could win the war in an afternoon)...Had the mist lifted ahead of him to reveal a shadowy six mile line of cardboard cut-outs crossing his T, he would have done his emergency Gefechtskehrtwendung just as smartly as he did at Jutland. The German Navy was never going to put into practice the ‘risk fleet’ threat of a naval Armageddon.
对于舍尔（他可以说是交战双方中，唯一能在一个下午的时间里赢得战争的人）来说，如果迷雾散去，使得他能够及时发现自己正在向长达6海里的战列线迎头驶去的话，他就会像历史上一样，立刻下达战斗回转的命令。德国海军从来都没打算将“风险舰队”的理论付诸实际。

It cannot be said that the Grand Fleet really gave Jutland its best shot, or that Sir John Jellicoe filled “each unforgiving minute with sixty seconds’ worth of distance run”. Did he need to? This, for the British, is the real Jutland debate...If the odds favour you, deliberation makes sense.
另一方面，我们也需要承认，在日德兰海战中，大舰队并未做到尽善尽美，杰里科也并未拼尽全力。但话又说回来，他真的有必要拼尽全力吗？对于英国海军来说，这才是关于日德兰海战的真正值得探讨的话题。在局势有利于你的时候，谨慎行事是有道理的。

Jellicoe’s actions at Jutland can all be explained, more or less...Anyone re-fighting the battle as a war-game will find it difficult to behave differently unless they cheat by empowering themselves with departures from the tactical doctrine, standing orders, and battle-training which prevailed in the Grand Fleet at the time. That is really the point. The way Jellicoe fought Jutland had to be consistent with the action-principles with which he had imbued his forces. To hope to achieve a significantly different result one would need to change the rules in tendentious and perhaps contemporarily discordant ways.
另外，杰里科在日德兰海战中所作出的决策，或多或少也都是可以解释的通的。如果在战棋中重新推演一遍日德兰海战的话，无论换谁来指挥，只要不脱离日德兰海战时的战术准则、作战命令、官兵训练情况等现实条件，他就不可能做出明显不同的战术决策。这才是问题的关键。杰里科在日德兰海战中的指挥方式，必然是遵循他在舰队中推行的战术理念。如果想要取得明显不同的结果，那么就需要对战术准则做出明显的改动。

Tactics must always be the servants of strategy. However, war is infinitely unpredictable in detail, nobody can expect to control it, and the power of a military force must include its capacity to respond rapidly and effectively to unscripted eventualities. Jellicoe’s battle-orders bear some fanciful resemblance to a tedious naval board-game called ‘The Duel’, which Philip Colomb invented in 1879 for two players and an umpire. In 1916 the High Seas Fleet disregarded the rules, and where the hell was the umpire?
战术当然是应该服从于战略的。然而，战场上有太多的不可控的因素，没有人能完全掌控这些细节，因此一支军队，必须具备快速有效地应对计划外的局势的能力。杰里科的作战命令，与菲利普·哥伦布（维多利亚时代的英国海军将领及海军史学者）于1879年时发明的一套无聊的海战桌面游戏颇为相似。区别在于，那套游戏需要有2名玩家和1名裁判参与，但在1916年时，公海舰队没有遵循规则，可真实的海战中，哪里又有裁判呢？

Jellicoe’s desire for control and centralization caused his command style to be signals-orientated. “A ceaseless stream of signals from the flagship was required to regulate the movement of the fleet”; and, as Jellicoe himself implicitly acknowledged after Jutland, “in the smoke, confusion and uncertainty of battle the process was far too elaborate.”
另外，杰里科对于中心化指挥的追求，使得他的指挥风格非常依赖通讯技术。为了掌控舰队的行动，旗舰需要持续不断的发出各种命令。然而，就连杰里科自己也在日德兰海战后承认：“在烟雾重重、一片混乱的战场环境下，在面对战场上的各种未知因素时，这种指挥方式过于精密了”（换句话说，就是容错性太低）。

结论：在日德兰海战的四位主要指挥官中，希佩尔的表现可能是最好的。舍尔和贝蒂的表现，则是既有充满勇气和决断的闪光点，也有鲁莽而缺乏深思的错误判断。至于杰里科，他很好的履行了自己的战略职责，他的战术决策也没什么严重的失误，但他所订立的战术准则，显然是有改进空间的。

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