日德兰纪念系列 - 军舰建造篇 - 第四章 - 英德造舰竞赛
本帖最后由 seven_nana 于 2023-3-5 21:54 编辑前言
1916年5月31日下午，英国海军的大舰队与德国海军的公海舰队，在北海东部、靠近丹麦及挪威的区域相遇，随即爆发了一场规模庞大的海战。双方交战的区域，从陆上来说临近日德兰半岛，而从海上来说临近丹麦与挪威之间的斯卡格拉克海峡，因此分别被参战双方称之为日德兰海战（英方叫法）和斯卡格拉克海峡海战（德方叫法）。这场海战是整个第一次世界大战中规模最大的海战，同时也是有史以来规模最大的以战列舰为主力的海战。
关于这场海战的前因后果，各国学者们早就发表了无数的研究文章和专著，其中既有研究战略战术的，也有研究技术细节的。而军舰建造的话题，则会同时涉及到战略战术及技术细节，并且还与整个国家的政治经济情况产生关联。因此，若想从宏观层面理解日德兰海战，军舰建造是一个非常好的切入点。在本篇中，我希望能覆盖到军舰建造所涉及的方方面面的话题，为读者提供一个纵览全局的视野。
索引
第一章 - 英国海军的两强标准
此章介绍了英国海军在19世纪末至20世纪初时推行的两强标准，及其对英国海军带来的影响。
第二章 - 威廉二世、提尔皮茨、舰队法
此章介绍了德国皇帝威廉二世及德国海军元帅提尔皮茨，以及后者所推行的舰队法，对德国海军带来的影响。
第三章 - 费舍尔与无畏舰革命
此章介绍了英国海军元帅费舍尔所推行的无畏舰革命。
第四章 - 英德造舰竞赛
此章介绍了英德两国间的造舰竞赛的前因后果，并就双方的建设成果进行了对比。
第五章 - 军舰设计的要求与取舍
此章对英德两国海军的部分军舰的设计进行了解读，并就设计背后的要求与取舍等因素进行了探讨。 本帖最后由 seven_nana 于 2025-4-2 20:13 编辑
日德兰纪念系列 - 军舰建造篇 - 第四章 - 英德造舰竞赛
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主要参考资料：
From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume II - The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, 1914-1916, 作者Arthur J. Marder
The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, Volume II（Publications of the Navy Records Society, Vol. 106），编辑P. K. Kemp
In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914，作者Jon Tetsuro Sumida
Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, 作者Nicholas A. Lambert
British Naval Policy 1913-1914 Financial Limitation and Strategic Revolution, 作者Nicholas A. Lambert
Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution Reconsidered: Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911-1914, 作者Christopher M. Bell
The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914，作者Ivo Nikolai Lambi
'Luxury' Fleet: The Imperial German Navy, 1888-1918，作者Holger Herwig
The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922，作者D. K. Brown
The British Battleship 1906-1946，作者Norman Friedman
British Cruisers: Two World Wars and After，作者Norman Friedman
British Destroyers: From Earliest Days to the Second World War，作者Norman Friedman
British Submarines in Two World Wars，作者Norman Friedman
The Kaiser's Battlefleet: German Capital Ships 1871-1918，作者Aidan Dodson
German Battlecruisers of World War One: Their Design, Construction and Operations，作者Gary Staff
From Ironclads to Dreadnoughts: The Development of the German Navy 1864-1918，作者Dirk Nottelmann
The Development of the Small Cruiser in the Imperial German Navy，作者Dirk Nottelmann
Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy，作者Patrick J. Kelly
The U-Boat，作者Eberhard Rössler
Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting，作者John Campbell
The Battle of Jutland，作者John Brooks
在第一章 - 英国海军的两强标准中，我们已经介绍过，在19世纪末至20世纪初时，为了应对法俄两国的威胁，英国海军重新确立了两强标准，并建造了大量的战列舰和装甲巡洋舰，从而导致其海军军费水涨船高。在第二章 - 威廉二世、提尔皮茨、舰队法中，我们则介绍了威廉二世和提尔皮茨对德国海军带来的变化，其中最关键的因素，是提尔皮茨所推行的舰队法。在第三章 - 费舍尔与无畏舰革命中，我们则介绍了当时担任英国海军第一海务大臣的费舍尔，为了降低海军军费，所进行了大刀阔斧的改革。其中围绕军舰方面，他的核心措施是推出了具备全重炮设计的新式战列舰和新式装甲巡洋舰，即无畏舰革命。在本章中，我们将介绍一战前夕的英德造舰竞赛。
一、两强标准、无畏舰革命、舰队法、以及英德海军竞赛的关系
首先我们有必要理清一个问题，一战前夕的英德造舰竞赛，与两强标准、舰队法、以及无畏舰革命，互相之间有什么样的关系？
1、英国海军的两强标准，原本是针对法俄两国的，但在德国海军崛起之后，为了遏制其威胁，英国海军选择按最高标准（即两强有余）来执行两强标准（详见第三章 - 费舍尔与无畏舰革命）。
2、提尔皮茨所推行的海军法，则是专门针对英国海军的（详见第二章 - 威廉二世、提尔皮茨、舰队法）。
3、英国海军的无畏舰革命，初衷是为了降低日益高涨的海军军费（详见第三章 - 费舍尔与无畏舰革命）。
4、在1905年1月，应第一海务大臣（费舍尔）的要求，海军情报局长查尔斯·奥特利（Charles L. Ottley）、副局长乔治·巴拉德（George A. Ballard）等人，对英国海军与德法俄三国海军之间的实力差异，进行了评估（此时旅顺围城战已经结束，俄国太平洋舰队已几乎损失殆尽，因此相比开战之前，俄国海军的整体实力已有较大程度的下滑）。
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为了维持海军力量上的平衡，在过去的多年间，我们一直沿用的政策是：英国海军的实力，必须能同时应对任意两个其他国家的海军。这个建军标准，得到了我国政坛上的两个党派（当时是保守党和自由党）的共同认可，并且在过去的近20年间，在维护欧洲国家间的和平上起到了重要的作用。
另一方面，两强标准，从来不意味着严格意义上的数量均等。无论是过去还是现今的经验都表明，但凡想要快速高效地结束海上战争，数量上的优势就是必不可少的。
因此，两强标准的合理的定义，是英国海军的实力，应当足以让我们像历史上的先辈们那样，在面对任意两个结盟的国家时，能够有较好的取得胜利的机会。
上一任海军情报局长（巴腾堡的路易斯）所负责的特别委员会，在其提交的报告中给出的建议是：在同时面对法俄两国或德俄两国时，我们都应在战列舰上占据至少10%的优势，同时在装甲巡洋舰上占据2:1的优势。
基于目前的情况来看，在战列舰方面，我国海军的实力是达到了两强标准的。假设一等战列舰、二等战列舰、三等战列舰的实力分别相当于1、½、¼，那么英国的战列舰实力是46，法俄两国之和是32¼，德俄两国之和是32，德法两国之和是34¼。
从以上数据来看，我们的战列舰实力是满足国防需求的，但我们也不能高枕无忧。在我们与法、俄、德三国中的任意两国进行对抗，而剩下的那个国家则并未与前两者结盟的情况下，这第三个国家可能会出于自身的动机，对我们提出非分的索求，例如英国势力撤出埃及、或撤出南非等。在这种情况下，我们就相当于要同时对抗这三个国家，此时英国的战列舰实力依旧是46，而法俄德三国之和则是49½。
在这种情况下，我们不仅不能在战列舰实力上占据至少10%的优势，即比对方多5艘战列舰，反而要比对方少3艘战列舰。显然，这种局面对英国是十分不利的。
如果说在战列舰方面，我们需要有一定的数量优势的话，那么在装甲巡洋舰方面，我们则需要更大的数量优势。我们之所以需要建造大量的装甲巡洋舰，主要是迫于应对其他国家所建造的大量同类舰艇的威胁。由于这类军舰能够对我国的海上贸易造成严重威胁，且我国的海上贸易规模非常之大，因此为了对抗这种威胁，我们需要建造特别多的巡洋舰。所以，针对巡洋舰的两强标准，一直以来都是有别于针对战列舰的两强标准的。对于巡洋舰，我们需要的是非常大的数量优势。
假设一等装甲巡洋舰、二等装甲巡洋舰的实力分别相当于1、¾，那么英国的装甲巡洋舰实力是27½，法俄两国之和是19¼，德俄两国之和是8¾，德法两国之和是18½，法俄德三国之和是23¼。
从以上数据来看，除了德俄之和实力较弱之外，在面对其他国家的组合时，我们的实力都远远达不到2:1的优势。
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在1905年6月，即对马海战结束之后，该报告中的数据得到了修正（此战中，俄国第二太平洋舰队全军覆没，导致俄国海军元气大伤）。
当前，各国已建成的战列舰实力对比是：英国46，法俄两国之和23，德俄两国之和22¾，德法两国之和34¾，法俄德三国之和是40¼。
由此来看，如果当下爆发战争，那么即便面对法俄德三国，我们也会在战列舰实力上占据10%的优势，即能够满足上一任海军情报局长（巴腾堡的路易斯）所负责的特别委员会，在其提交的报告中给出的建议。
至于装甲巡洋舰，各国当下的实力分别是：英国27½，法俄两国之和17，德俄两国之和6½，德法两国之和18½，法俄德三国之和21。
结论：在费舍尔开展无畏舰革命的同时，由于德国海军的规模在过去数年间得到了快速增长，而俄国海军则在日俄战争中大受损伤，导致规模大不如前。在这些因素的影响下，英国海军的两强标准，从先前的主要针对法俄两国，逐渐调整为针对法俄德三国中的任意两国。
二、战列舰与装甲巡洋舰/战列巡洋舰：从两强标准到对德六成优势
接下来，我们将会对英德海军竞赛的过程做出具体介绍。总体来看，这场竞争主要是围绕着战列舰和装甲巡洋舰/战列巡洋舰开展的。
在具体介绍这些军舰之前，首先有必要理清一下名称背后概念。战列巡洋舰这个词，是在1911年时才被英国海军正式采用的，在此之前，这些军舰依然是被称为装甲巡洋舰的（具体详见此链接）。至于德国海军的同类军舰，尽管通常也会被称为战列巡洋舰，但其正式名称是大型巡洋舰。
1、在前无畏舰时代，由于德国海军起步较晚，因此其战列舰和装甲巡洋舰的建造规模，是远不如英国海军的。根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.1-3）：
The first two ships of the Majestic class, authorised as part of the programme for the financial year 1893-94, established the characteristics of the British battleships for the next ten years: a primary armament of four 12in guns in two centre-line turrets, a secondary broadside battery of twelve 6in, an anti-torpedo-boat armament of 12pdr guns and, in the main, a speed of 18 knots. Up to the programme of 1900-01, twenty-nine vessels of this type had been authorised. They were followed for the next three programme years by the eight battleships of the King Edward VII class, which mounted 4-12in and 4-9.2in in turrets and also 10-6in and 14-12pdr. The two Lord Nelsons for 1904-05 reverted to three calibres: 4-12in, 10-9.2in in turrets and 24-12pdr. By the end of the programme year 1904-05, thirty-nine of these battleships (which would soon be known as ‘pre-dreadnoughts’) had been authorised. Beginning with the six Cresseys of the 1897-98 programme, thirty-five British armoured cruisers were authorised by the end of 1904-05.
在1893-94财年时，英国海军订购了最早的2艘威严级战列舰，她们奠定了后续10年间的英国战列舰设计的基本特征：4门12英寸主炮、12门6英寸副炮、12磅反雷击火炮、最大航速18节左右。截止至1900-01财年，英国海军总共建造了29艘这样的战列舰。在接下来的3年里，他们又建造了8艘爱德华七世级战列舰，她们配备有4门12英寸主炮、4门9.2英寸中间口径火炮、10门6英寸副炮、14门12磅反雷击火炮。1904-05财年时建造的纳尔逊勋爵级，则将火炮口径重新减少至3种：4门12英寸主炮、10门9.2英寸中间口径火炮、24门12磅反雷击火炮。截止至1904-05财年，上述这些战列舰，英国海军总共建造了39艘，很快她们都将被统称为前无畏舰。另外，自1897-98财年的克雷西级起，英国海军开始建造装甲巡洋舰。截止至1904-05财年为止，他们总共建造了35艘装甲巡洋舰。
Between 1894-95 and 1900-01, Germany authorised the construction of five each of the Kaiser Friedrich III and Wittelsbach classes. Compared with foreign pre-dreadnoughts , they were as well protected while, although their turret guns were of only 24cm (9.4in) calibre, they were quick-firers (QF); they also had a heavier secondary battery of 18-15cm (5.9in). In the same period, Germany also laid down three armoured cruisers. Five battleships each of the Braunschweig and Deutschland classes were authorised in the years between 1901-02 and 1905-06, together with a further five armoured cruisers. In these last two pre-dreadnought battleship classes, the turret gun calibre was increased to 28cm (11in) (also QF) and the heavier secondary battery mounted 14-17cm (6.7in).
在1894-95至1900-01财年间，德国海军建造了5艘腓特烈三世级战列舰，接着又建造了5艘维特尔斯巴赫级战列舰。与其他国家的战列舰设计相比，这些军舰的防护水准并不差，但其主炮口径仅为只24cm，不过区别在于，这些火炮是速射炮。此外，她们还配备了更为强大的副炮火力：18门15cm火炮。同一时期，德国海军还建造了3艘装甲巡洋舰。接下来，在1901-02至1905-06财年间，他们又建造了5艘布伦瑞克级战列舰和5艘德意志级战列舰，这两型军舰的主炮口径提升到了28cm（依然是速射炮），同时依旧具备强大的副炮火力：14门17cm火炮。除此之外，他们还建造了5艘装甲巡洋舰。
Thus between Britain and Germany, the final numerical ratios were 39:20 for pre-dreadnoughts and 35:8 for armoured cruisers.
因此，在前无畏舰方面，英德两国的数量对比是39比20（英国方面未计入一战爆发时已经退役的8艘君权级、2艘百夫长级、1艘声望号，以及原本是外贸舰的2艘敏捷级；德国方面未计入老旧的勃兰登堡级）；在装甲巡洋舰方面，英德两国的数量对比是35比8。
2、在英国海军开展无畏舰革命的同时，法俄两国海军却没能及时跟上这场技术变革。与此同时，在1904-1905年间的日俄战争中，俄国海军的实力又遭到了严重削弱。于是，英国海军的主要对手，由法俄两国变成了德国。根据Jon Tetsuro Sumida的说法（In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914, P.111-112 & P.158-159）：
The all-big-gun battleship H.M.S. Dreadnought was laid down on 21 October 1905...The three all-big-gun armoured cruisers of the Invincible class were laid down in the spring of 1906.
采用全重炮设计的无畏号战列舰，是1905年10月21日开工建造的。另外3艘采用全重炮设计的无敌级装甲巡洋舰，则是在1906年春天时开工建造的。
Other naval powers were slow to respond with equivalent vessels of their own for technical and financial reasons. France did not lay down any battleships in 1904, 1905 or 1906, and while the class of five battleships begun in 1907 and 1908, they retained a mixed-caliber armament. Russia did not lay down any new battleships between 1905 and 1909...The threat that had been posed by the combined naval might of France and Russia since the 1880s, was substantially diminished by the heavy Russian naval losses in the Far East in 1904 and 1905, which left Germany as Britain’s principal naval rival.
受制于技术及财政上的因素，其他国家的海军，未能对无畏舰革命做出快速响应。其中，法国海军在1904-06年间，并未建造任何战列舰，且其在1907-08年间建造的5艘战列舰，都不是全重炮设计的（而是准无畏舰）。俄国海军则是在1906-08年间，未曾建造战列舰。除此之外，由于俄国海军在1904-05年间的日俄战争中损失惨重，因此从1880年代以来持续存在的法俄同盟的海军威胁，自此大幅度降低了。在此情况下，德国海军成为了英国海军的主要对手。
3、在1906至1909年间，由于英国海军的实力，相比于法俄德等国拥有很大的优势，因此其每年新建造的军舰数量有所下降。根据Jon Tetsuro Sumida的说法（In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914, P.113）：
The delays in foreign battleship building programs, which came on top of the heavy Russian losses in the Far East, enabled Britain to lay down fewer all-big-gun battleships and armoured cruisers. Three slightly improved Dreadnoughts were laid down under the 1906-07 estimates, three more essentially similar vessels were ordered under the 1907-08 estimates and only one somewhat improved battleship and one slightly improved armoured cruiser were laid down under the 1908-09 estimates.
俄国海军实力的大幅下滑，以及各国的战列舰建造工作的延迟，使得英国在进入全重炮时代后，可以少建造一些战列舰和装甲巡洋舰。在1906-07财年时，他们建造了3艘小改款的无畏舰（柏勒洛丰级，主要区别是上层建筑布局、防护设计、以及反雷击火炮口径有所调整）。在1907-08财年时，他们又建造了3艘类似的军舰（圣文森特级，主要区别是主炮倍径从45倍增至50倍，防护设计有所改动）。在1908-09财年时，他们则只建造了1艘战列舰和1艘装甲巡洋舰，且与之前的军舰相比，两者的设计都只是略有改动（战列舰是尼普顿号，主要区别是主炮布局有所调整，舯部炮塔改为斜向布置；装甲巡洋舰是不倦级，主要区别是上层建筑布局调整、舯部炮塔的布置间距更大）。
As a consequence, the £8.4 million spent on battleship and armoured cruiser construction in fiscal year 1905-06 fell to £7.9 million in 1906-07, to £6.5 million in 1907-08 and to no more than £5.5 million in 1908-09. As a result of these reductions and those achieved through Fisher’s administrative reforms, and in spite of rising costs in other areas, the net naval estimates of 1906-07, 1907-08 and 1908-09 were kept between £31 and £32 million, which was £5 million less per year than the peak of £36.9 million that had been reached in fiscal year 1904-05.
其结果是，在1905-06财年时，英国海军在战列舰和装甲巡洋舰的建造上，花费了840万英镑，但在1906-07财年、1907-08财年、以及1908-09财年时，花费降低为790万英镑、650万英镑、以及不到550万英镑。尽管在其他的一些领域，英国海军花费了比以往更多的经费，但在造舰费用下降、以及费舍尔的其他行政改革手段的作用下，1906-07财年、1907-08财年、以及1908-09财年的海军军费，都控制在了3100万到3200万英镑之间。换句话说，相比于1904-05年时的3690万英镑的峰值水准，每年的海军军费减少了大约500万英镑。
4、另一方面，在新的国际形势下，两强标准本身，也遭到了财政大臣的挑战。根据Nicholas A. Lambert的说法（Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, P.129 & P.132）：
In early May 1906, the chancellor of the Exchequer resolved to scrutinize the naval budget...It was Asquith’s contention that since the signing of the Entente with France and the annihilation of the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese War, Britain’s two-power naval standard was no longer an appropriate yardstick by which to measure the strength of the Royal Navy and thus needed to be “revised.” He was careful not to propose an outright renunciation of the standard. The chancellor realized that plotting such a course would involve political dangers.
在1906年5月初时，财政大臣决定要对海军预算进行详细审查。在赫伯特·亨利·阿斯奎斯（当时担任财政大臣，后来成为英国首相）看来，由于英法两国已经在1904年时签订了英法协约，而俄国海军又在日俄战争中遭到重创，因此两强标准，已经不再适合作为衡量英国海军实力的标杆了。换句话说，英国海军的建军标准需要得到修改。但为了避免政治上的风险，他并未直接宣称要放弃两强标准。
The essence of Asquith’s argument for revision was that a naval standard, which required Britain to build against “the two most powerful navies in the world,” was too rigid. He acknowledged that when France and Russia had been the second and third-ranking naval powers the standard had made sense. Since Germany’s promotion to the rank of third-ranking naval power in May 1905, however, the Royal Navy had been striving to overmatch the battle fleets of France and Germany. “Is it reasonable,” the chancellor asked of his colleagues, “to expect us to build a combination of that character, in the whole sphere of speculative politics by far the most improbable that can be conceived?”
阿斯奎斯之所以想要修改海军的建军标准，其核心论据是，以第二和第三强海军的实力之和作为英国海军的建军标准，过于死板了。他承认，在法俄两国位居世界第二和第三海军强国之时，这种建军标准是有意义的。但自1905年5月起（即对马海战结束后），德国已经超越了俄国，成为了第三海军强国，此后英国海军就一直以德法两国的海军实力之和作为建军标准。这位财政大臣，向他的同僚们发问道：“法德两国，是最不可能形成同盟的两个国家，在此情况下，以这两个国家作为海军建设的标准，这样真的合理吗？”
5、在1907年时，英国曾试图就海军建设问题，与德国进行谈判，但并未取得实质性结果。根据Norman Friedman的说法（The British Battleship 1906-1946）：
A Peace Conference was to convene at the Hague in 1907. In hopes that a general understanding might be arrived at among the sea powers. No understanding was reached...The British naval attaché in Berlin reported that the Germans refused to contemplate any change in their Navy Laws, claiming that any agreement would freeze them in a position of gross inferiority. Their press published claims that the British had a preposterously large margin of superiority. That was true of bare numbers of capital ships. However, if indeed Dreadnought and Invincible had made all existing capital ships obsolete, the British had given up their previous margin. If the Germans built aggressively enough, they might, it seemed, achieve superiority in this key type of ship.
1907年时，各国在海牙举办了一次和平会议。英国方面期望，能在这次会议上，就海军建设规模问题与各国达成共识。然而，他们并未如愿。驻柏林的英国海军武官汇报说，德国拒绝对舰队法做出调整，并声称与英国达成的任何协定，都会导致他们在海军实力上处于明显的劣势。德国媒体则发表文章称，英国海军的实力优势，已经巨大到不合理的地步了。如果单从总体数量来看，这个论点的确是站得住脚的，但考虑到以无畏号和无敌级为代表的新式设计，在实力上远超之前的主力舰，因此英国海军在此前建立起的优势，实际上被他们自己给放弃了。如果德国海军此后积极建造无畏舰，那么他们甚至有可能在这类军舰上占据数量优势。
6、另一方面，尽管德国海军开始建造无畏舰的时间要晚于英国海军，但他们的追赶步伐却很快。根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.8）：
Because of the time required to produce the radically new designs, no German capital ships were actually laid down in 1906 but, between June and August 1907, all four Nassau-class battleships were started. Armoured cruiser Blücher was built with twelve 8.3in guns arranged as in the Nassaus. Germany’s first ‘battlecruiser’, Von der Tann of the 1907-08 programme, were fast battleships by British standards of protection. She was the first German capital ship powered by turbines for a design speed of 24.75 knots.
由于准备全新的设计需要花费大量时间，因此在1906年时，德国海军实际并未建造主力舰，但在1907年6-8月间，他们开工了4艘拿骚级战列舰。同年建造的布吕歇尔号装甲巡洋舰，尽管火炮布局与拿骚级类似，但只配备了21cm火炮。德国海军的第1艘战列巡洋舰，是1907-08财年的冯·德·坦恩号。以英国海军的防护标准而言，该舰实际属于快速战列舰。另外，冯·德·坦恩号还是第1艘配备蒸汽轮机的德国主力舰，其设计航速为24.75节。
The first three battleships of the Helgoland class, laid down for 1908-09, were the first German dreadnoughts with 12in guns. The six turrets were arranged as in the Nassaus. Although the Helgolands still had reciprocating engines, they were designed for 20.5 knots, a performance that could only be obtained by an increase in displacement of almost 4,000 tons over the Nassaus. In 1909-10, Germany began a fourth Helgoland and the first two ships of the Kaiser class; another three Kaisers followed in 1910-11. The new class were the first German battleships driven by turbines, which gave them a design speed of 21 knots. They mounted ten 12in guns in three centre-line turrets, the after pair arranged for superfiring; the two amidships turrets were positioned en échelon. Their armour, with a maximum thickness of 13.8in, established a standard of protection that would never be matched by British dreadnought battleships but these advances required a further displacement increase of almost 2,000 tons. In the König class, of which the first three were built under the programme for 1911-12, all turrets were on the centre line, for the first time allowing the full main armament to fire without restriction on either broadside.
赫尔格兰级，是德国海军第一型配备30.5cm火炮的战列舰，但其炮塔数量与布局则与拿骚级保持一致（六座炮塔，六边形布局）。赫尔格兰级的动力系统，仍然采用的是往复式蒸汽机，不过设计航速提高到了20.5节。相对应的，其排水量相比拿骚级增长了4,000吨。该级的前3艘军舰，是在1908-09财年时开工建造的。在1909-10财年时，德国海军建造了第4艘赫尔格兰级，同时又建造了2艘皇帝级战列舰。至于另外3艘皇帝级，则是在1910-11财年时建造的。皇帝级是德国海军最早的采用蒸汽轮机的战列舰，其设计航速达到了21节。在炮塔布局方面，该级也有所调整，她们总共配备有10门30.5cm火炮：中轴线上布置了三座炮塔，其中舰艉的两座炮塔采用了背负式布局，而舯部则布置了两座呈斜向布局的炮塔。在防护方面，该级的装甲厚度最高可达350mm，确立了德国战列舰在防护水准方面的新标杆。作为对比，一战时期的英国战列舰，则从未配备过如此厚度的装甲。不过，相比于赫尔格兰级，皇帝级的排水量又增加了近2,000吨。在1911-12财年时，德国海军建造了3艘国王级战列舰，该级的所有炮塔都是布置在中轴线上的，是德国海军第一型所有主炮都能不受阻碍地向左右两舷开火的战列舰。
Germany laid down three battlecruisers in the three years 1908-11. Like Von der Tann, they were all turbine-powered and they were protected almost as well as contemporary British battleships. They retained the 11in gun but mounted ten of them, the extra two in a superfiring turret aft; the two turrets amidships were en échelon, as in Von der Tann and the Kaisers. The last of the three, Seydlitz, was, at 26.5 knots, a knot faster than Moltke and Goeben and her armour more than an inch thicker. She was followed in 1911-12 by Derfflinger; she had similar protection and the same speed, but mounted eight 12in guns, all on the centre line.
在1908-11年间，德国海军还建造了3艘战列巡洋舰。与冯·德·坦恩号一样，这些军舰也是由蒸汽轮机驱动的，并且其防护水准也都达到了几乎等同于英国战列舰的程度。这3艘军舰配备的仍然是28cm火炮，但数量提升到了10门，多出来的2门位于舰艉的背负式炮塔上。舯部的两座炮塔则采用斜向布置，与冯·德·坦恩级或皇帝级相同。在这3艘战列巡洋舰中，建造时间最晚的塞德里茨号，在动力及防护上都要优于建造时间较早的毛齐号和戈本号——前者的设计航速达到了26.5节，并且具备更厚的装甲。在1911-12财年时，德国海军又建造了德尔弗林格号战列巡洋舰，该舰的防护和动力水准与塞德里茨号大致相当，但搭载了8门30.5cm火炮，且都布置在中轴线上。
7、由于英国海军在1906-09年间放缓了造舰速度，但德国海军却并未放缓速度，因此至1909年时，英国人明显地感受到了威胁。根据Norman Friedman的说法（The British Battleship 1906-1946）：
As early as 1906 DNI had pointed out that the standard of naval strength was no longer simply the number of battleships, but rather the new type of dreadnought battleship. In DNI’s view, although the situation was so favourable in 1906 that the annual programme could and should be cut, from 1909 onwards it would worsen.
早在1906年时，英国海军情报局长就指出过，海军实力的衡量标准，不再是以战列舰数量来计算了，而是要计算无畏舰的数量。在他看来，尽管在1906年时，局势有利于英国，因此他们可以缩减每年的造舰规划，但从1909年起，局势就会恶化。
In December 1907 First Lord Tweedmouth pointed out that although for the moment the British position was sound, in 1909 they might find themselves forced to shift to a five-ship annual programme. The following year rumours that the Germans were not merely catching up with the British but might surpass them energised politicians and the public. At about the same time reform in government finances provided the resources for larger-scale construction.
在1907年12月时，时任海军大臣的第二代特威德茅斯男爵则指出，尽管在当前来看，英国海军占据了领先地位，但到1909年时，若想继续维持领先地位，可能就得每年造舰5艘主力舰。至1908年时，开始有传言说，德国海军不仅仅是想要追赶英国海军，甚至有可能想要超越英国海军。这引起了政客和公众的注意力。另外，在这一时期，政府进行了财政改革，因此英国海军重新具备了建造大量主力舰的前提条件。
The 1909-10 programme began with the same three armoured ships as in the past: two battleships and one battlecruiser. About April 1909 a battleship was added. By August 1909 there was a four-ship Contingency (supplemental) Programme, consisting of three battleships and one cruiser...The new programme was eventually shaped by the popular cry that ‘We want eight; we won’t wait’.
1909-10财年的造舰计划，起初只包括3艘主力舰，其中2艘是战列舰，1艘是战列巡洋舰。这个造舰规模，与以往几年是差不多的。但在1909年4月前后，又增加了1艘战列舰。至1909年8月时，又额外增加了一个应急的补充造舰计划，包括了4艘主力舰，其中3艘是战列舰，1艘是战列巡洋舰。之所以会有这个补充计划，主要是为了响应当时英国社会上传播甚广的“我们要八艘，我们不会等”的呼声。
Prime Minister Asquith engineered a compromise between the arms control advocates of his party and those demanding a much larger programme. He offered an initial four-ship programme plus a contingent four-ship programme, to be executed if there was evidence of rapid German construction. He told the Admiralty and its supporters that they could probably get the contingent ships. Although evidence of rapid German construction was derided by some, Asquith felt compelled to approve the contingent programme, hence the eight ships in the final 1909-10 Estimates.
这个补充造舰计划，是时任英国首相阿斯奎斯所提出的。一方面，他需要面临自由党内部的呼吁进行军备控制的声音；另一方面，他还要面对其他人提出的更大规模的造舰计划的设想。在此情况下，这位首相提出了一种妥协方案：先建造4艘主力舰，如果有证据表明德国海军在加速建造主力舰，那么就会通过补充造舰计划，再建造4艘主力舰。在提出这个计划时，首相告诉海军部及海军的支持者，他们很可能会得到那些补充造舰计划中的军舰。对于德国海军加速建造的证据，尽管有人嗤之以鼻，但阿斯奎斯还是认为，他有必要批准这个计划，因此在1909-10财年时，英国海军获得了8艘主力舰。
8、为了对抗德国海军的威胁，在1909-1912年间，英国海军的造舰规模有了很大的提高，并且还确立了新的海军建设标准。根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.14-16）：
In April 1909, the Controller, John Jellicoe, first proposed that a much simpler standard (though one that would not be made public until 1912) would be for Britain to aim for a 60% margin in dreadnoughts over Germany alone. By this criterion, the large programme of 1909-10 was clearly only the beginning. In terms of dreadnoughts laid down, the small programme of 1908-09 had allowed the margin to plummet to only 33%; the 14% margin in battleships alone was even narrower. The 1909-10 programme would only increase the margin to 54% while, if Germany did no more than adhere to her announced plans, by the end of 1911-12, Britain would need to lay down a further thirteen dreadnoughts to pass the 60% margin.
在1909年4月时，时任第三海务大臣的约翰·杰里科（即日德兰海战时的大舰队总司令），首次提出了一个比两强标准简单得多的海军实力衡量标准：相比于德国海军，英国海军应在无畏舰数量上具备60%的优势。不过，直到1912年时，这个标准才被公诸于世。按照这种衡量标准，1909-10财年的庞大的造舰计划，仅仅是个开端。由于1908-09年的造舰规模太小，因此以无畏舰的建造数量而论，英国海军只具备33%的优势，且在战列舰方面只有14%的优势。1909-10财年的造舰计划，也仅仅是将优势提升到了54%。另外，如果德国海军根据舰队法中规定的节奏开展建造工作的话，那么到截至至1911-12财年结束之时，英国海军还需要再开工13艘无畏舰，才能实现60%的数量优势。
Hercules and Colossus, the first two battleships of the new British programme, were laid down in July 1909. The later ships were considerably more powerful, not least because they would mount the heavier 13.5in gun. The battleship Orion, laid down in November 1909, carried ten of them in five centre-line turrets. Her lower belt was an inch thicker than her predecessors and she also had an 8in armour strake between the main and upper deck. However, her speed remained at 21 knots. The battlecruiser Lion was laid down in September 1909. Whereas previous battlecruisers had displaced slightly less than their battleship contemporaries, Lion was almost 4,000 tons heavier than Orion; she also cost 10% more than the battleship and 36% more than her predecessor, Indefatigable. She carried eight 13.5in guns in four centre-line turrets and was designed for 28 knots. Her protection was a significant improvement on the first generation of British battlecruisers. The ‘footnote four’ were laid down at the very beginning of the next programme year: three more Orions in April 1910 and the battlecruiser Princess Royal in May.
在1909年造舰计划中，最早建造的2艘军舰，是7月时开工的2艘巨像级战列舰。而另外6艘军舰，则配备有13.5英寸火炮，因此在实力上提升了一大截。1909年11月开工的俄里翁号战列舰，在中轴线上搭载了10门13.5英寸火炮，其主装甲带的厚度达到12英寸（巨像级为11英寸），并且还主甲板和上甲板之间增设了一道8英寸的上部装甲带（巨像级此处无装甲），但最大航速仍旧维持在21节不变。1909年9月开工的狮号战列巡洋舰，更是1艘前所未闻的巨舰：其排水量，要比俄里翁级多出了将近4,000吨。相比之下，此前的战列巡洋舰，排水量则要比同时代的战列舰略小一些。狮号的造价也是非常高的，相比俄里翁级高出10%，相比不倦号战列巡洋舰则高出了36%。狮号的中轴线上搭载有8门13.5英寸火炮，其防护水准相比第一代英国战列巡洋舰有了显著提升，设计航速也提高到了28节。补充造舰计划的那4艘军舰，则分别是3艘俄里翁级战列舰和1艘长公主号战列巡洋舰，但她们实际要到下一年才开工建造。
After Fisher retired from the Admiralty in January 1910, the Board agreed to programmes of four battleships and one battlecruiser in each of the next two years, although this would only increase the British margin over Germany in dreadnoughts laid down to 43%. However, in June 1910, two more battlecruisers, to be called Australia and New Zealand after the dominions that would pay for them, were laid down. In design, they were little different from the Indefatigable. But Australia was built to be the flagship of the Royal Australian Navy. At first, New Zealand was also intended for service in eastern waters but, upon her completion in 1912, she was presented to the Royal Navy. Yet, even if both ships are counted, the British dreadnought margin was no more than 52%.
1910年1月时，费舍尔离开了海军部。此后，海军部委员会批准，在接下来2年内，每年都会建造4艘战列舰和1艘战列巡洋舰。但即便如此，相比于德国海军，英国海军的无畏舰数量，也只会达到43%。不过在1910年6月时，他们又额外建造了2艘战列巡洋舰，分别是澳大利亚号和新西兰号。这2艘军舰是由自治领出资建造的，其设计与不倦号大致相同。其中，澳大利亚号将会担任澳大利亚海军的旗舰。而新西兰号，尽管一开始也打算部署至亚太区域，但在该舰于1912年完工之时，新西兰政府将其赠送给了英国海军。不过，即便将这2艘军舰都算上，英国海军在无畏舰方面的优势，也不过只有52%。
Four battleships of the King George V class and the battlecruiser Queen Mary were built under the 1910-11 programme. The 1911-12 dreadnoughts were the four Iron Duke battleships and the battlecruiser Tiger. In them, the 4in anti-torpedo-boat guns mounted in the superstructure were replaced by batteries of 6in guns in casemates.
在1910-11财年时，英国海军建造了4艘乔治五世级战列舰和1艘玛丽王后号战列巡洋舰。1911-12财年的造舰规划，则包括4艘铁公爵级战列舰和1艘虎号战列巡洋舰。这5艘军舰配备有6英寸火炮，而先前的主力舰配备的则是4英寸火炮，并且这些火炮的安装位置也是有所不同的——前者是安装在炮廓中的，而后者则是安装在上层建筑中的。
9、至1912年时，英国海军正式确立了以对德六成优势，作为其海军建设标准。根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.18-20）：
From 1909-10 onwards, the large British programmes left no doubt that the country had both the will and the financial and industrial resources to overmatch Germany. On 18 March 1912, Churchill, in his first speech to Parliament on the naval estimates as First Lord, publicly acknowledged that British policy aimed at a 60% margin over Germany. On 18 July, Parliament was informed that the British six year programme would be 4:5:4:4:4:4; without counting Australia, by 1917-18, Britain would have laid down fifty-six dreadnoughts to Germany’s thirty-five, a British margin of exactly 60%.
自1909-10财年起，英国海军的造舰规模一直很大，这无疑表明，英国既有意愿，也有足够的财政和工业实力，来打赢这场针对德国的造舰竞赛。1912年3月18日时，时任海军大臣温斯顿·丘吉尔，在其上任后首次于议会发表讲话时，就公开宣称，英国的建军政策，是要确立对德六成优势。至7月18日时，议会被告知，在接下来的六年间，英国海军分别会建造4艘、5艘、4艘、4艘、4艘、4艘主力舰。如果不计入澳大利亚号的话，那么到1917-18财年时，英国将会建造56艘无畏舰，而德国则会建造35艘，即英国刚好能达到60%的数量优势。
In 1912-13 Britain laid down the four fast battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class, armed with eight 15in guns and fourteen 6in. They were fuelled only by oil; it was hoped that they would reach 25 knots on overload power, but their best speed in service was 24 knots. At the end of 1912, the Federated Malay States undertook to pay for a fifth battleship of the Queen Elizabeth class; Malaya would be laid down in May 1913.
在1912-13财年时，英国海军建造了4艘伊丽莎白女王级快速战列舰，她们搭载有8门15英寸主炮和14门6英寸副炮，且完全依靠燃油作为动力来源。英国海军期望这些军舰能在过载状态下达到25节航速，但实际最高只能达到24节。至1912年底时，马来联邦又赞助建造了第5艘伊丽莎白女王级，该舰被命名为马来亚号，于1913年5月开工建造。
In his speech on the 1913-14 estimates on 26 March 1913, Churchill announced that the programme would include five new battleships. These became the Revenge class, of which Revenge herself and Royal Oak would be completed in time for Jutland. Like the Queen Elizabeths, they mounted eight 15in guns, but were designed for 21 knots and, initially, it was intended that they would revert to mixed coal and oil firing...Continuing the adherence to the six-year programme announced in 1912, the initial estimates for 1914-15 included three more Revenge-class battleships and one fast battleship, an improved version of the Queen Elizabeth class to be called Agincourt. However, by the outbreak of the War, two ships, one of them Agincourt, were cancelled.
在1913年3月26日时，丘吉尔表示，当年的造舰计划会包含5艘新的战列舰。这些便是复仇级战列舰，其中复仇号和皇家橡树号完工时间最早，因此得以参加了日德兰海战。与伊丽莎白女王级一样，复仇级也配备有15英寸主炮，但由于起初是按照油煤混烧动力设计的，因此其设计航速只有21节。按照1912年时拟定的规划，1914-15财年的造舰项目，也会有4艘战列舰，其中3艘是复仇级，还有1艘是改进版的伊丽莎白女王级快速战列舰，并且将被命名为阿金库尔号。然而，当大战爆发后，有2艘军舰的造舰计划被取消了，其中有1艘就是阿金库尔号。
When Fisher returned as First Sea Lord in October 1914, he insisted that the five Revenge-class battleships, already under construction, should be converted for oil firing only, and that the two suspended ships, already named Renown and Repulse, should be built rapidly as 32-knot battlecruisers with six 15in guns and armour no thicker than that in the Invincibles. Fortunately, neither ship was completed in time to face German battlecruisers at Jutland.
1914年10月时，费舍尔再度返回海军部担任第一海务大臣。他坚持要将5艘复仇级战列舰，更改为全燃油动力（因此航速也提升到了23节），并且要还将2艘未被取消的战列舰，即声望号和反击号，改建为战列巡洋舰——这些军舰将配备6门15英寸火炮，航速高达32节，但装甲厚度却仅与无敌级相当。幸好，这2艘军舰未能赶上日德兰海战，因此没有与德国战列巡洋舰进行对决。
10、另一方面，自1912年起，由于德国陆军的军费开始激增，因此德国海军开始跟不上英国海军的造舰节奏了。根据Norman Friedman（The British Battleship 1906-1946）和John Brooks（The Battle of Jutland, P.18-19）的说法：
In 1912 the British naval attaché reported that the Germans were no longer able to compete. Until then German naval spending matched or even exceeded spending on the army. From 1912 on, however, the army expanded enormously on the basis of a formal decision that year to be ready to fight in eighteen months, nominally against Russia. The German naval programme was no longer affordable, whatever the Navy Laws might say.
至1912年时，驻德国的英国武官汇报称，德国人无力再继续造舰竞赛了。截止至1912年为止，德国海军的军费都是非常高的，达到甚至超过了陆军的水准。但从1912年起，德国人决定，要做好在18个月内开展战争的准备（假想敌是俄国），因此德国陆军进行了大幅扩军。在此情况下，德国人已经无力继续大规模的造舰项目了。
By the end of 1911-12, Tirpitz was less than one ship away from his 3:2 objective - or, if Australia was discounted, he had surpassed it. But it was now clear that Britain would not allow her margin to shrink any further, and in February 1913, before a Reichstag committee, Tirpitz declared his acceptance of the British 16:10 standard. Germany laid down two dreadnoughts in 1912-13, the final König-class battleship and the battlecruiser Lützow; the latter was similar to her predecessor, Derfflinger.
至1911-12年底时，提尔皮茨只差1艘军舰，就能达到他的3比2的数量目标。如果不计入澳大利亚号的话，那么他已经超过了这个目标。但他也很清楚，英国人势必会重新找回优势，因此在1913年2月时，提尔皮茨对议会中的一个委员会表示，他愿意接受英国海军提出的16比10的比例。在1912-13财年时，德国海军建造了2艘主力舰，1艘是国王级战列舰，另1艘是吕佐夫号战列巡洋舰，后者与德尔弗林格号基本相同。
In 1913-14, the last complete programme before the outbreak of war, Germany laid down the authorised three dreadnoughts, the battlecruiser Hindenburg (generally similar to the Lützow) and two Bayern-class battleships, though none was completed in time for Jutland. The battleships mounted eight 15in and fourteen 5.9in guns.
在1913-14财年，即大战爆发前的最后一个年度造舰计划中，德国海军建造了3艘主力舰：1艘是与吕佐夫号基本相同的兴登堡号战列巡洋舰，另外2艘则是配备有8门38cm主炮和14门15cm副炮的巴伐利亚级战列舰，不过这3艘军舰都没赶上参加日德兰海战。
The 1914-15 programme initially comprised the battleship Sachsen (similar to the Bayerns) and the battlecruiser Mackensen; the latter would have been armed with eight 13.8in guns. During the War, three more Mackensens and one more Sachsen were started, but no ship of either class had been completed when the War ended.
1914-15财年的造舰计划，起初包括1艘与巴伐利亚级基本相同的萨克森号战列舰和1艘配备有8门35cm主炮的马肯森级战列巡洋舰。大战爆发后，又额外增加了1艘萨克森号的同型舰，以及3艘马肯森级，但这些军舰均未能在大战结束前完工。
11、截至大战爆发之时，从已建成军舰的数量来看，英国海军并未确立对德六成优势；但至日德兰海战时，英国海军在无畏舰方面的优势，已经非常明显了。根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.21-22）：
By the end of 1913-14, the last peacetime programme year, Britain’s margin in authorised dreadnoughts was 62%, though only if both Australia and Malaya were counted. In completed dreadnoughts, the margin, though still falling, was 59% without Australia. On the eve of the declaration of war, each country had commissioned one more battleship, so the global dreadnought ratio was 29:18, a satisfactory British margin of 61%. But three British battlecruisers and one German were stationed in the Mediterranean while Australia remained in the Pacific. Thus the British margins in home waters were 47% for all dreadnoughts, but only 43% for battleships.
截止至1913-14财年，即大战爆发前最后一个造舰计划时，如果计入澳大利亚号和马来亚号，那么以开工数量而论，英国海军在无畏舰数量上具备62%的优势。以建成数量而论，如果不计入澳大利亚号，那么英国海军仍将有59%的优势。至大战爆发前夕时，双方各自又建成了1艘战列舰，因此总体数量对比来到了29比18，英国海军具备61%的优势。但由于英德两国分别有3艘和1艘战列巡洋舰驻扎在地中海地区，而澳大利亚号则驻扎在太平洋地区，因此在本土海域，英国海军的无畏舰数量优势为47%，其中战列舰仅有43%。
As soon as war broke out, Britain seized two battleships that were on the point of being delivered to Turkey; these became the Erin (ten 13.5in guns) and the extraordinary Agincourt (fourteen 12in in seven turrets). A powerful battleship under construction for Chile was also purchased and, as Canada (ten 14in guns), she joined the Fleet in September 1915...By the eve of Jutland, the ratios had increased to 42:22 in dreadnoughts, 32:17 in battleships and 10:5 in battlecruisers. Britain’s dreadnought margin, however calculated, was now potentially overwhelming.
在战争爆发后，英国海军扣押了2艘原本即将要交付给土耳其的战列舰：爱尔兰号和阿金库尔号。前者配备有10门13.5英寸火炮，后者则破天荒地搭载了七座炮塔，并配备有14门12英寸火炮。此外，英国海军还购买了1艘由智利海军订购，当时正在建造的战列舰：加拿大号。该舰配备有10门14英寸火炮，并于1915年9月时加入了大舰队。至日德兰海战前夕，双方的无畏舰数量比是42比22，其中战列舰32比17，战列巡洋舰10比5。此时，无论怎么计算，英国海军都已经拥有了压倒性的数量优势（整体优势是91%，战列舰优势是88%，战列巡洋舰优势是100%）。
12、整体来说，双方的战列舰基本上是旗鼓相当的，但德方的战列巡洋舰，在防护水准方面要显著优于英国的同类军舰。根据John Brooks（The Battle of Jutland, P.24-25）、John Campbell（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.17 & P.20-21）以及D. K. Brown（The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922, P.188-189）的说法：
Until the Bayern-class battleships, the Germans preferred to mount guns of lesser calibre in their turrets; thus the guns themselves and their shells were lighter, though their muzzle velocities were greater...German dreadnoughts and battlecruisers all carried a secondary armament of 5.9in guns. The Royal Oak, Barham and Iron Duke classes the Tiger, Erin, Canada and Agincourt had 6in, but other British dreadnoughts and battlecruisers had only 4in.
在巴伐利亚级战列舰之前，德国海军都偏好配备较小口径的主炮，因此他们的炮弹重量要轻一些，但初速则要比英国火炮更高一些。在副炮方面，德国海军的无畏舰，都配备有15cm火炮，而英国方面则只有铁公爵级级、伊丽莎白女王级、复仇级、爱尔兰号、阿金库尔号、加拿大号战列舰，以及虎号战列巡洋舰，才配备有6英寸火炮，其余无畏舰则都只配备了4英寸火炮（无畏号配备的是12磅火炮）。
The German guns had a higher muzzle velocity but the lighter shell lost speed more quickly. The RN had a substantial advantage in fire control instrumentation but seemed incapable of capitalising on it, partly because of the use of 9ft base rangefinders and inadequate practice firing at long range.
德国火炮的初速，要比英国火炮更高，但由于其炮弹重量更轻，因此炮弹飞行速度下降的也更快。英国海军在火控系统方面有明显的优势，但却未能将这种纸面优势转化为实际优势，其原因，一方面可能是受到9英尺测距仪的限制，另一方面可能是因为缺乏远距离的射击训练。
For the Revenge and Bayern classes of 1913-14, British and German designs converged on very similar combinations of armament, speed and protection. But, until then, in general German battleships and battlecruisers were better protected than their British counterparts. This is most evident in a comparison of the maximum thicknesses of the main (waterline) belts and in the extent of side armour. German battlecruisers were almost as well armoured as their battleships, whereas the protection of the Invincible and Indefatigable classes was inadequate in thickness and extent while the Lions and Tiger still compared poorly with their German contemporaries. Continuous longitudinal bulkheads were designed into all German dreadnoughts but were omitted in all British battlecruisers and in too many battleships.
在1913-14财年的复仇级和巴伐利亚级上，英德双方在武备、防护、航速这三大性能上，都是旗鼓相当的。但在此之前，德国战列舰和战列巡洋舰的防护水准，一般都要高于同期的英国同类军舰。这一点，在双方的主装甲带厚度及舷侧装甲带的覆盖范围方面，体现得尤为明显。德国战列巡洋舰的防护水准，几乎与他们的战列舰相当。英国海军的无敌级和不倦级战列巡洋舰，在防护方面是较为欠缺的；而狮级与虎号的防护水准，相比于其德国对手，也依然存在一些差距。所有的德国无畏舰，都配备有完整覆盖舰体核心区域的防雷装甲；相比之下，英国方面在这个领域做的就要差很多了。
Other things being equal, the RN surely made the right choice since the chance of the bigger shell penetrating thick armour should have been about the same as that of the smaller shell penetrating thinner armour whilst the big shell would do far more damage when it burst after penetrating. But unfortunately, this was not so: British armour-piercing shells had weak casings which would break at the shoulder on oblique impact, and the Lyddite filling would detonate on hitting thick armour which concealed the fact that the fuse did not always function.
如果排除其他因素的话，那么英国海军选择更大口径的火炮，显然是一个正确的决定，因为口径较大的炮弹击穿较大厚度的装甲的概率，与口径较小的炮弹击沉较小厚度的装甲的概率，是差不多的，但口径较大的炮弹，在击穿装甲后能造成更为严重的破坏。然而，实际情况却并非如此：英国穿甲弹的弹体结构强度存在问题，会在倾斜命中装甲时发生破裂，而其装填的立德炸药则会在击中大厚度装甲时自行爆炸，并且英国穿甲弹所使用的引信，本身也有问题（缺乏延迟机制）。
All British dreadnoughts were powered by turbines. Both the Nassau and Helgoland classes were given reciprocating engines, so that the former were only capable of 19 knots and the latter 20.5 knots. However, the German navy was less conservative in choosing the lighter small-tube boilers, even though their ‘performance dropped off more rapidly with use and they required more frequent cleaning and repair’...The British were, however, further advanced in the use of oil fuel, the Royal Oak and Barham classes burnt oil only, and the other dreadnoughts and battlecruisers coal and oil, while the German ships were coal-fired, with a small amount of tar oil also carried, except in the König and Derfflinger classes where three or four of the boilers burnt oil only.
所有的英国无畏舰，都是由蒸汽轮机驱动的。德国海军的拿骚级和赫尔格兰级战列舰，却是由往复式蒸汽机驱动的，因此最大航速分别只有19节和20.5节。然而，德国海军普遍采用了小水管锅炉，而英国海军的无畏舰则普遍采用大水管锅炉。与后者相比，前者的重量更轻，但需要更多的清理与维修，且其高出力状态仅能维持较短时间。然而，在燃油锅炉的使用上，英国海军则要领先于德国：在日德兰海战的参战主力舰中，复仇级和伊丽莎白女王级，都是全燃油动力的，而其余的战列舰和战列巡洋舰，也都是油煤混烧的。相比之下，德国方面仅有国王级和德尔弗林格级，配备有少量燃油锅炉，其余各舰都是油煤混烧的。
German machinery spaces were more congested. German hull construction was also lighter, while some plating was much lighter. This may have saved weight but it necessitated elaborate scarphing and riveting, which added to both cost and building time.
双方在舰体设计和建造方面，也有一些区别。在德国军舰上，动力设备舱室的布局，要比英国军舰拥挤的多。德国军舰的舰体结构，也要比英国军舰轻量化一些，且部分区域上的钢板用料要比英国标准薄很多。不过，尽管这样能够减轻重量，但却需要搭配复杂的钢板拼接和铆接技术，因此会导致造价提高、工时增加。
结论：在20世纪初时，英国海军的主要对手是法国海军和俄国海军。但由于俄国海军在日俄战争中元气大伤，且在英国海军发起无畏舰革命后，法俄两国迟迟未能跟进，于是在接下来几年里，英国人削减了造舰规模。但另一方面，德国海军则在快速扩张规模，因此至1909年时，英国人发现，德国海军俨然有赶超英国海军的迹象。在此情况下，他们扩大了造舰规模，试图建立对德六成优势。至1912年时，由于德国海军无力再维持先前那般规模的造舰计划，因此在接下来几年里，英国海军的数量优势逐渐扩大了。至日德兰海战时，相比于德国海军，英国海军已经拥有了九成数量优势。
在单舰性能方面，双方的战列舰大体上是棋逢对手的，区别在于英国战列舰更强调火力，而德国战列舰更强调防护。然而，双方的战列巡洋舰则存在较大差异——英国的12英寸战列巡洋舰的防护水准显著低于战列舰，13.5英寸战列巡洋舰尽管防护水准有明显提升，但依然不如同时代的战列舰——作为对比，德国战列巡洋舰的防护水准，几乎都可以与同时代的英国战列舰媲美，因此她们本质上属于快速战列舰。 本帖最后由 seven_nana 于 2023-3-18 09:49 编辑
三、双方主力舰的设计演化趋势：火炮口径与炮塔布局的持续优化
自无畏舰诞生到一战时期，仅仅10年时间，双方主力舰的火炮口径都已经历了三轮变更——英方从12英寸到13.5英寸再到15英寸，德方从28cm到30.5cm再到38cm和35cm。与此同时，双方的主炮塔布局也发生了多次调整——双方最初都会将部分主炮塔布置在舷侧，但后来都逐渐往全中线的方向靠拢。可以说，火力方面的持续优化，是双方无畏舰设计进化的最明显的趋势。对于这些话题，我们有必要详细展开解读。
英国无畏舰的炮塔与上层建筑的布局变迁
对于无畏舰来说，如何合理地布置炮塔与上层建筑，是一个重要的设计课题。根据D. K. Brown的说法（The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922, P.37-42）：
Upper deck layout was the starting point of a battleship design. Blast from the big guns could affect exposed personnel in control positions, at secondary armament and, through the sighting hoods in the turret roofs, gun crews in other turrets, which seemed to rule out superfiring turrets in the early ships. Since increasing the length of the armoured citadel was very expensive, funnels and masts were very cramped and in many ships, the spotting top was in the hot, thick exhaust plume from the funnels. Great importance was also attached to the stowage and easy handling of boats.
上甲板的布局，是战列舰设计的起点。大口径火炮的炮口暴风，会对暴露在外的人员、火控设备、副炮造成影响，并且还会透过炮塔顶部的瞄准镜罩，对其他炮塔中的人员造成影响。正因如此，那些年代较早的战列舰设计，并没有采用背负式炮塔。另外，由于延长主装甲带的代价非常高昂，因此在许多战列舰上，烟囱和桅杆布局都是非常拥挤的，且有部分军舰的火控桅楼，会受到烟囱排出的烟雾的干扰。另外，小艇的摆放和吊运，也是上层建筑设计中的重要环节。
Dreadnought...the effectiveness of the fire control system was greatly degraded by positioning the mast abaft the forward funnel so that access to the top was difficult due to heat whilst visibility, particularly with a wind from astern, was bad. The mast was placed behind the funnel on Jellicoe’s advice to suit boat handling. There was a secondary control position on the signals platform, but this was of little actual value.
无畏号的桅杆，是位于前烟囱的后方的，因此烟囱排出的高温烟雾，会在视觉和温度环境上，对火控桅楼上的人员造成双重干扰。这种布局是杰里科（他是设计委员会的成员之一）提议的，他认为这种布局便于吊运小艇。另外，该舰的通讯塔可以作为备用火控指挥所使用，但其实际价值并不大。
These problems had been realised before she was completed since the generally similar ships of the Bellerophon and St Vincent classes had a different mast arrangement. The foremast, with spotting top, was forward of the funnels but there was a similar mast and secondary top between the funnels which was again almost useless. The Invincible class battlecruisers had a similar foremast with the main abaft all funnels.
在无畏号建成之前，英国海军就意识到，其上层建筑布局是有问题的，因此在接下来建造的柏勒洛丰级和圣文森特级战列舰上，采用了不同的桅杆布局。后两者的前桅位于烟囱前方，此外还在两个烟囱之间布置了主桅。前桅和主桅上，都布置有火控桅楼。不过，位于两个烟囱之间的那个火控桅楼，实际没有什么价值。无敌号战列巡洋舰的前桅布局，与柏勒洛丰级和圣文森特级战列舰类似，但其主桅是位于所有烟囱之后的。
Neptune had a very strange upper deck layout. The wing turrets were staggered so that they could fire across the deck on either beam. In order to achieve this the boats were stowed on flying decks over the midship turrets which would be a serious hazard in the event of damage causing the decks to collapse onto the turrets. This effort was largely wasted since it was found that cross-deck firing caused too much damage to the deck for it to be used except in emergency. Similarly, the bridge was positioned above the conning tower which would be obscured if the light bridge collapsed. The after two turrets were superfiring but X turret could not fire within about 30° of the stern because of blast effects on the lower turret through the sighting hoods...Indefatigable...The increased length compared with the earlier battlecruiser gave some scope for cross-deck firing if the damage to the deck was acceptable.
尼普顿号战列舰的上甲板布局是很奇怪的。舰体舯部的两个炮塔是斜向布局的，因此理论上可以向另一舷射击。同时，为了避免干扰到火炮射界，设计师还将小艇布置到了舰体舯部的飞桥上。但由于这个飞桥位于舯部炮塔的上方，因此如果受到损伤并发生坍塌的话，就会压在炮塔上面。不过，由于向另一舷射击时，炮口暴风会对甲板造成明显的损伤，因此只有在紧急情况下，才允许这么做。如此一来，大费周章地将小艇布置在飞桥上，似乎就没有太大意义了。另一方面，该舰的舰桥，是叠在司令塔的上方的，因此如果舰桥坍塌的话，是会干扰到司令塔的视野的。该舰的舰艉炮塔，采用了背负式设计。然而，位于背负位置的炮塔开火时，其炮口暴风会透过另一座炮塔上方的瞄准镜罩，对后者造成干扰，因此前者是不能在正后方约30度范围内开火的。同期建造的不倦级战列巡洋舰，由于舰体长度比先前的无敌级更长，因此其舯部炮塔互相之间离得更远，于是在向另一舷射击，可以拥有更大的射界。
By 1908 it was suggested by the C-in-C Home Fleet (Sir Francis Bridgeman) that masts were a hazard and that spotting should be carried out from an armoured position on the roof of the conning tower. Colossus and Hercules reverted to a single top arranged as in Dreadnought but had a spotting tower on the roof of the conning tower. The turret arrangement was similar to that of Neptune.
至1908年时，时任本土舰队司令的弗朗西斯·布里奇曼中将提议，桅杆是个危险源，因此应该在司令塔上方，设置一个具备装甲保护的区域，来开展校射工作。于是，巨像级一方面继承了尼普顿号的炮塔布局，另一方面却采用了无畏号那样的桅杆布局，同时又在司令塔上方增设了一个校射塔。
The Orion class introduced the 13.5in gun and were much bigger ships in consequence. To limit this increase in size, they were given superfiring turrets both fore and aft though the upper turrets could not fire near axial due to blast effects on the lower. The single mast and top was abaft the fore funnel with the usual problems. The much higher-powered steam plant of the battle-cruiser Lion made her original tripod mast between the first two funnels quite uninhabitable and she was rebuilt with a pole mast between the bridge and funnel. Later, this had to be modified into a tripod to carry the weight of a director.
俄里翁级配备了13.5英寸火炮，因此舰体尺寸明显有所提升。但为了不让舰体变得过大，这级军舰采用了全中线的炮塔布局，因此在舰艏和舰艉区域都布置有背负式炮塔。然而，位于背负位置的炮塔，是不能向正前或正后方向射击的。至于其桅杆，仍然位于两座烟囱之间，因此老问题依然存在。同年建造的狮级战列巡洋舰，同样也采用了桅杆夹在烟囱之间的设计，但由于其动力系统功率要比战列舰大得多，因此烟雾对火控桅楼的干扰也尤为明显。于是，英国海军不得不对其进行改造，拆除了原先的三脚桅，并在其舰桥和烟囱之间布置了一个单足桅。后来，为了承载指挥仪，这个单足桅又被改成了三脚桅。
The King George V class had the turret arrangement of the Orions and were designed with a pole mast forward of the funnels. This was changed to a narrow tripod in the last two ships when directors were added and the first two were modified later. The Iron Duke class were 25ft longer and completed with a proper tripod. At last, the correct style had been reached and it was followed in the Queen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign classes with the midships turret omitted.
下一年建造的乔治五世级战列舰，炮塔布局与俄里翁级相同，并采用了在烟囱前方布置一个单足桅的设计。为了承载指挥仪，这个单足桅后来也改成了三脚桅。至铁公爵级时，由于其舰体相比乔治五世级延长了25英尺，于是获得了足够的上甲板空间，得以配备结构更为坚固的三脚桅。至此，英国战列舰总算拥有了完善的上甲板布局。在后续的伊丽莎白女王级和复仇级战列舰上，该布局得到了延续，但去掉了舯部炮塔。
It is amazing that it took so long to attain a satisfactory arrangement, which was caused by the sighting hoods in the roofs of turrets and Jellicoe’s obsession with boat-handling arrangements. As DNO and then as Controller, Jellicoe must accept much of the blame for the unsatisfactory layout of the earlier ships. There is, perhaps, a further contributory factor. In the steady development of a fleet, it is desirable to feed the early lessons from one class into the design of the next but, during the period under discussion, there was a new design every year and a building time of 2½ years meant that the available lessons were two classes removed.
英国人花了很长的时间，才取得了令人满意的上甲板布局，这实在是有些不可思议。其背后的干扰因素，一是炮塔顶部的瞄准镜罩，二是杰里科提议的不合理的小艇吊杆布局。在那个时期，杰里科先后担任了军械局长和第三海务大臣，因此对于这些不合理的布局，杰里科是需要承担很大责任的。另一方面，由于当时每年都会设计新的战列舰，但一艘战列舰需要2年半的时间才能完工，因此上一年的战列舰的经验教训，是无法运用到本年度的战列舰设计的，而是只能运用到下一年的设计上。这可能也是导致不合理设计的一个重要原因。
德国无畏舰的火炮口径与炮塔布局变迁
与英国海军类似，德国无畏舰的炮塔布局，也经历过多轮调整，但由于他们最早采用的是单舷投射量更低的六边形炮塔布局，且变更至全中线的时间比英国海军更晚，因此遭到的诟病也更多。另一方面，他们对小口径火炮的坚持，无论在当时还是后世，都遭遇了非常多的批评。接下来，我们将对这些现象背后的决策原因做出解读。
战列舰的炮塔布局与火炮口径变迁——从六边形布局到斜向布局再到全中线布局，从28cm到30.5cm再到38cm
在第三章 - 费舍尔与无畏舰革命的附录中，我们已经介绍过，拿骚级之所以会采用六边形的炮塔布局，主要是因为拿骚级的设计是从准无畏舰的基础上发展而来的。而其后继舰，赫尔格兰级，也同样采用了六边形的炮塔布局。再后来的皇帝级，则采用了斜列炮塔布局。直至国王级时，德国海军才采用了全中线的炮塔布局。除了炮塔布局很晚才调整为全中线布局之外，火炮口径的迟迟不升级，也是德国海军的无畏舰屡遭诟病的一项缺陷。在拿骚级战列舰上，德国海军使用的是28cm火炮；在赫尔格兰级战列舰上，德国海军选择将主炮口径升级至30.5cm；但接下来建造的皇帝级和国王级战列舰上，他们并未升级火炮口径，导致其火力明显逊色于同期建造的英国战列舰。直到巴伐利亚级战列舰时，他们才选择一口气将火炮口径提升到38cm。从事后角度来看，这些设计选择显然都是有重大缺陷的。那么问题来了，这些决策是如何做出的呢？
1、尽管赫尔格兰级的实际建造方案，采用的是六边形炮塔布局，但在设计阶段，德国人其实还提出过不少其他风格的炮塔布局。根据Aidan Dodson（The Kaiser's Battlefleet: German Capital Ships 1871-1918）和Dirk Nottelmann（From Ironclads to Dreadnoughts: The Development of the German Navy 1864-1918）的说法：
Although it was early recognised that the 28cm-armed Nassaus were not adequate, the financial impact of another step-change closely following-on from the shift from the pre-dreadnought to the dreadnought made it impossible to contemplate any shift to the 30.5cm gun until the 1908 programme...at the end of February 1907, 'A' had presented a paper meant as decision-support as to whether the 1908-vessels should be equipped with 28cm or 30.5cm main artillery...The new gun was recommended for introduction even if the circumstances (i.e. the limited funds) would allow for the mounting of 5 twin-turrets...Tirpitz' decision came quickly. On 6 March 1907, he ordered 'K' to begin the construction of a ship-of-the-line armed with 30.5cm-armament immediately.
尽管德国海军很早就意识到，拿骚级配备的28cm火炮的威力有所不足，但由于无畏舰革命导致了战列舰造价的大幅提高，因此财政上的限制，导致他们无法立刻将火炮口径提升至30.5cm。但在1907年2月底时，海军部总务局提交了一份报告，其内容主要讨论的是1908财年的战列舰，到底是应该配备28cm火炮还是30.5cm火炮。他们的论点是，即便在受到财政限制，导致30.5cm火炮的数量不得不减少至5座炮塔的情况下，也还是应该采用这种口径。接下来，提尔皮茨很快就做出了决定，并要求造舰局立刻着手配备30.5cm火炮的战列舰的设计工作。
Immediately in the wake of Tirpitz' order, a discussion started about the preferable gun-layout on the basis of the Design 1 and the more sketchy 8, 9, and 10. The major problem arose from the fact that so far nobody had gained any experience regarding the firing of heavy guns in turrets in close proximity, not to say over-firing each other. The same could be said about muzzles discharging virtually on top of the casemate-guns. It was thus feared many of theoretically possible arcs of fire could, in fact, be reduced to a few degrees...Putting too many turrets on the centerline - except those at the vessel's ends-added to the problems: (...) the joint firing of the medium-caliber is at least considered as being doubtful as soon as the heavy turrets located amidships have started firing. Difficulties in the placement of boats, boat handling gear, searchlights, masts, ventilation intakes and more; Difficulties in finding locations for a proper placement of the light-artillery; If after the first phase of a fight the engaged side changes to the other, the possibility must be taken into account that some of the turrets may be hindered by obstructions due to damages to turn to the new engaged side. All these prescribed circumstances stand very strongly against the Designs 8, 9 or 10...Project 1 avoids nearly all of these disadvantages. (...) Even the fact that two of the heavy gun turrets will not be engaged in the major fight against the enemy's line seem to be no direct disadvantage in view of 'A'. In case of an enemy overtaking and circling around the head of the formation it might be highly advantageous to have some guns in reserve. That is why 'A' recommends very strongly the continuation of the work on Project 1.
在提尔皮茨下达该命令后，他们围绕着火炮布局问题展开了讨论。其中更受青睐的是方案1（布局类似于拿骚级），而方案8、方案9、方案10（在中线布置了较多炮塔）则不被看好。其中有一个很重要的问题在于，当时没有人知道，两座靠得很近的大口径炮塔在开火时会不会互相影响。至于背负式炮塔布局会带来什么样的影响，就更没有人知道了。另外，大口径火炮的炮口暴风，还会对炮廓中的中口径火炮造成影响。在此情况下，德国人担心，火炮的实际射界可能会大幅小于理论射界。另外，如果将炮塔布置在舰体舯部的中线上的话，还可能存在以下几个缺点：一、当舰体舯部的主炮塔开火后，中口径副炮可能就无法开火了；二、难以布置小艇、小艇吊运设备、探照灯、桅杆、通风管道等设备；三、难以为反雷击火炮找到合适的布置位置；四、如果在战斗过程中，交战方向切换到了另一舷，那么在舰体受损的情况下，布置在中线上的炮塔，可能无法指向另一舷。这些因素，都导致他们更偏向方案1，而不是方案8、方案9、方案10。在海军部总务局看来，尽管方案1的布局，会导致有2座炮塔不能投入战斗，但这都不算明显缺陷，因为敌方舰队可能从我方舰队的前方或后方穿过去，绕到另一侧与我们交战，在这种情况下，左右两舷都有炮塔是十分有利的。有鉴于此，海军部总务局强烈建议，下一步的设计工作，应在方案1的基础上展开。
But Tirpitz was not totally convinced. He ordered 'K' to work in parallel on a project with five turrets...Early in May 1907, 'K' emerged with the fruits of its labor ordered by Tirpitz. Two different groups of proposals were presented: "Line A" (Projects 12, 13, 14) the 12-gun-vessel and "Line B" (Projects 16, 17, 18) the 10-gun-vessel accordingly...The layout of the armor represented that of the 1906/07 vessels, as does the axis-height of the medium-caliber guns and their distribution in casemates on battery-deck level. Differences between the individual projects were only caused by the individual placement of the main-artillery and the subsequent distribution of the light-artillery, boats, projectors...The discussion regarding the distribution of the main armament was a repetition of the already known statements and the outcome-remaining with the hexagonal-pattern-came as no surprise. Only Tirpitz seemed not to be fully convinced anymore. Now he himself regarded the formerly so-called "lee-reserve" as not so important anymore as he rightly anticipated that both turrets on the disengaged side were as likely to be affected by the enemy's fire as those engaged. And in this case they would remain unnecessary "ballast" probably never to be used during the engagement. But at this occasion he finally gave way to the combined arguments of his subordinate heads of department.
然而，提尔皮茨却并未被完全说服。于是他命令造舰局，再额外设计一些采用五座炮塔的布局。1907年5月初时，造舰局拿出了设计方案，这些方案可以分为两类，第一类（方案12、方案13、方案14）是12炮射击，而第二类（方案16、方案17、方案18）则是10炮设计。这些方案的副炮布局及装甲布局与拿骚级类似，但在主炮布局上存在差异，进而导致反雷击火炮、小艇、探照灯等的布局也有所区别。然而，对主炮布局的讨论，还是延续了原有的基调，倾向于采用六边形的炮塔布局。不过，提尔皮茨自己倒是不那么坚信这种布局的优势了，此时的他觉得，左右两舷是否都有炮塔，并不是那么重要的，因为即便是位于非交战侧的炮塔，也可能会被从交战侧飞来的炮弹击伤或摧毁。在这种情况下，位于另一侧的炮塔，只不过是无用的压舱物罢了。但由于下属们的坚持，提尔皮茨选择了让步，于是最终还是采用了六边形布局。
The Emperor approved this result on 27 May, along with the choice of Project 12a - which, in fact, was a reduced version of Project 12 - for further development...From early on it was recognized that the different design between the centerline- and wing-turrets of the main artillery, like Ersatz -Sachsen, would affect the overall rate of fire. Whereas the centerline-turrets, because of the ammunition hoists attached to the turntable, could be expected to fire every 20sec. at best the wing-turrets, because of the split supply between fixed hoists up to the working chamber and a subsequent transfer into the revolving hoists leading to the gun platform, were expected to reach an interval of 30sec. only. Researches into the problem showed a solution by moving the wing turrets as much inward as possible...In mid-September 1907, 'K' presented the new Project 13c which ultimately, by including the changes required by the revised installation of the wing-turrets, became the major step to the final design...On 22 September, the project was presented to the Emperor and accepted but immediately underwent modification, which led to its designation 13d...On 22 February 1908, the official "Order of Construction" was signed by the Emperor.
1907年5月27日时，德皇选择了方案12a，即方案12的小改款，并要求在此基础上继续设计工作。然而，无论是拿骚级还是该方案，都存在一个问题：由于布置在左右两舷的炮塔与布置在中线上的炮塔，在弹药提升井的结构上有所不同，因此会导致前者的射速仅为2发/分，而后者的射速则可达3发/分。为了解决这个问题，设计师们进行了一番研究，他们提出的解决方案是，将炮塔尽可能向内侧挪。1907年9月中旬时，造舰局拿出了新设计的方案13c，该方案采用了新的舯部炮塔布局。1907年9月22日时，德皇批准了这个方案，但很快，造舰局又对其进行了调整，并产出了方案13d。1908年2月22日时，德皇签发了赫尔格兰级的建造命令。
2、与赫尔格兰级相比，皇帝级的设计改动较大，尤其值得注意的是，在其设计阶段，实际上已经出现了采用全中线布局的方案，但最终选择的却是斜向布局的方案。根据Aidan Dodson（The Kaiser's Battlefleet: German Capital Ships 1871-1918）和Dirk Nottelmann（From Ironclads to Dreadnoughts: The Development of the German Navy 1864-1918）的说法：
The Kaiser Class marked a major step forward in German battleship design. Work had begun in May 1908, with the assumption that the number of 30.5cm guns should be as per the Helgolands. However, there was to be scope to move away from the Nassau/Helgoland turret arrangement.
在德国战列舰的设计史上，皇帝级具有重大的进步意义。其设计工作，是在1908年5月时开始的，他们起初的设想是，火炮口径和数量与赫尔格兰级保持相同，但主炮的布局则将有所调整。
However, six-turret projects proved unaffordable, further designs thus featuring one less turret...Before he presented the Projects to the Emperor in detail, Tirpitz had to ask the "all-highest" for general approval of the five- turreted design on 14 January, which was granted...These drawings are numbered consecutively from 8 to 16. The loss of one turret led to three different groups of proposed designs whose underlying ideas are to be traced through the forthcoming designs of the 1911 vessels. There was the omission of one forward turret (Projects "8," "9," "10," and "16"); the omission of one aft turret (Projects "11" and "12"); or the omission of one wing turret (Project "15"), which included the moving of the remaining turret onto the centerline combined with the athwart positioning of the two forward turrets (Projects "13," "14"). Except for the quite similar Projects "8" and "16," all others were sorted out without further explanation.
然而，6座炮塔的设计，造价过于高昂了，因此接下来的设计方案，将炮塔数量减少到了5座。在提交具体的设计方案之前，提尔皮茨在减少炮塔数量这件事上，事先征得了德皇的允准。这些新的设计方案的编号，从8一直延续到16，从炮塔布局上来说，它们大体可以分为三种不同的类别：第一类是砍掉1座舰艏炮塔（方案8、方案9、方案10、方案16），第二类是砍掉1座舰艉炮塔（方案11和方案12），第三类是砍掉1座舯部炮塔（方案15），其变体还包括将舰艏炮塔并排布置的设计（方案13、方案14）。在这些方案中，只有方案8和方案16被选中，其余则都落选了，但并未记录具体原因。
During a report on 27 January, Tirpitz presented both designs in a slightly modified form, "8a" and "16a," for approval. Project "16a" added the possibility of using a fifth turret in broadside directions. In turn, this measure would require a slight elongation of the vessels, consequently a raising of the costs...The Emperor marked the slightly better Design " 16a" with his approving signature.
1909年1月27日时，提尔皮茨将上述两个方案的小改款，方案8a和方案16a，提交给了德皇。这两个方案的区别点在于，方案16a的两座舯部炮塔的纵向间距更大，因此理论上可以让所有炮塔都指向单舷射击，但这么做的代价是，舰体长度有所延长，造价也略有提升。德皇批准了方案16a，这就是皇帝级的设计经过。
3、国王级，是德国海军最早采用全中线炮塔布局的战列舰。根据Aidan Dodson（The Kaiser's Battlefleet: German Capital Ships 1871-1918）和Dirk Nottelmann（From Ironclads to Dreadnoughts: The Development of the German Navy 1864-1918）的说法：
Much to Tirpitz' s surprise - who disliked the all-centerline mounting mainly because of his (antiquated) tactical views - and thus without his sanction, there had arisen a discussion about this most logical way of distributing the main artillery. This discussion was most probably initiated by the retired Fleet ADM Hans v. Koester...Furthermore, the head of “A” (VADM Paschen) expressed opinion in December 1909 that “the centerline-mounting of all the heavy guns would be the natural development for maximizing the broadside fire.”
提尔皮茨并不喜欢全中线炮塔布局，这主要是受到他的陈旧的战术观念的影响。但在没有得到提尔皮茨的允准的情况下，德国海军内部却有人开始讨论起了这种炮塔布局（以后见之明来看，全中线布局显然是最合理的炮塔布局）。最早发起这种讨论的，很可能是当时已经退役的汉斯·冯·克斯特元帅（德国海军的第一位海军元帅，资历比提尔皮茨更老）。而海军部总务局长，阿道夫·帕申中将，则在1909年12月时表示：“全中线炮塔，是最大化舷侧火力投射量的自然发展趋势”。
For the 1911 battleships, the initial feeling was to repeat Prinzregent Luitpold to minimise delays, but other options were considered, including triple turrets and a potential move to 32cm guns. However, cost considerations (and the continuing view that battles would be at short range) militated against any increase in calibre or other radical changes, the only concession being a final acceptance of an all-centreline main battery. Thus, the battleships under the 1911 programme were all built to a modified Kaiser design.
对于1911财年的造舰计划，德国海军原本打算沿用摄政王路易特波特号（皇帝级的五号舰）的设计，从而缩短设计周期，以便尽快开工建造。但是，他们也对其他方案进行了研究，这其中包括三联装炮塔的选项，以及将火炮口径提升至32cm的可能性。然而，受限于财政因素和近距离交战理念的影响，他们最终并未扩大火炮口径，也没有对军舰设计做出大幅变更，只是将炮塔调整成了全中线布局。所以，最终实际建造的国王级，只是在皇帝级的设计基础上做出了少许调整。
4、另一方面，德国海军之所以坚持使用口径较小的火炮，其背后的根源问题，可以追溯至舰队法本身。根据Ivo Nikolai Lambi（The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914, P.150）和Aidan Dodson（The Kaiser's Battlefleet: German Capital Ships 1871-1918）的说法：
The First Navy Law had a definite cost limitation. The Second Navy Law, however, left the financial appropriations to the Reichstag's annual approval.
第一部舰队法（1898年舰队法），对造舰金额的上限做出了规定。但第二部舰队法（1900年舰队法）则改变了这个做法，议会每年都需对造舰预算进行批准。
As Tirpitz himself admitted: The Reichstag's right of annual approval was fiscally an open hand. But the Reichstag bound itself morally much more strongly than through any financial limitation. For it had through law bound itself to a certain building program. If now the ships became bigger and costlier, then the Reichstag, which by virtue of the law had to approve the ships, could...never assume the responsibility for making the legally stipulated ships come out small and bad because of inadequate appropriations.
提尔皮茨认为，议会保留了预算批准权，相当于在财政上留了一手。但议会所需面对的，并不仅仅是财政问题，因为造舰项目本身，是得到法律保障的。即便军舰的吨位和造价不断上涨，议会也不得不批准这些军舰的造舰预算，如果海军因为财政上的限制，不得不建造吨位较小、战力较弱的军舰的话，那么这个责任可不是议会能够承担得起的。
The financial issue, however, was a coin with two sides: if the Reichstag found it difficult to refuse appropriations for the more expensive ships, Tirpitz found it more difficult because of greater cost to request ships necessary for his final aim that were not provided by the valid fleet laws. He therefore also continued to economize in requesting smaller ships with lighter guns, in avoiding innovations, and thus exposing himself to the charge from his contemporary and future critics of inadequately preparing for the showdown with Britain.
但是，财政问题本身是一柄双刃剑。一方面，在面对军舰预算上涨的情况时，议会难以行使否决权；另一方面，由于提尔皮茨希望通过舰队法的修正案，进一步扩大舰队的规模，因此他在与议会较量时，也不能表现得肆无忌惮。在此情况下，他不得不对设计部门做出了一系列的要求，如压低军舰的吨位、使用较小口径的火炮、以及避免技术和设计创新，来限制单舰的造价。自然的，他也为此遭受了不少批评，指责他未能做好充分的准备。
The dreadnought era saw each year’s ships having to provide a significant advance in capability over those of the previous generation. The invariable law of defence cost-inflation accordingly led to leaps of cost well in excess of previous planning assumptions. Attempts to mitigate these led to capability being sacrificed in the matter of gun calibre, battleships retaining 30.5cm guns even after the British had moved to 13.5in, although justified in part by reference to the expected low battle-ranges.
进入无畏舰时代后，每一级军舰的性能，都要比先前的更为强大，同时也不可避免地导致了造价的大幅提升。于是，在英国海军将火炮口径提升至13.5英寸之时，德国海军却不得不为了控制造价，而在战列舰上继续使用30.5cm火炮。不过，考虑到德国舰队的预想交战距离较近，因此会有这样的选择，也算是情有可原。
5、巴伐利亚级战列舰，之所以选择38cm火炮，其实是出于财政角度的考虑。根据Aidan Dodson（The Kaiser's Battlefleet: German Capital Ships 1871-1918）和Dirk Nottelmann（From Ironclads to Dreadnoughts: The Development of the German Navy 1864-1918）的说法：
The Bayern class: The main topic during the whole process of designing this future class of vessels was to balance the pressing demands for a considerable up-gunning with the limited funds available...as the 30.5cm-caliber now definitively became inferior to the 34.3cm- or the 35.6cm-caliber on the way of being introduced abroad...Three different calibers were to be investigated for possible employment: 35, 38 or 40cm. Of these the first named was the safest politically insofar that Germany would be seen by the outside world as just following the developments abroad whereas the other two might be seen - in the considerations of the day - as political dynamite for taking the lead in the “arms race”...At the beginning of September 1911, the options had been reduced to two: Either 10 x 35cm or 8 x 40cm in twin turrets would be mounted. Any other combination of a “mixed” installation of twins and triples had been rejected once more...In way of politics it was assumed that the major naval competitors were on the verge of introducing larger calibers anyway so that the unprecedented step by Germany would not be considered as unreasonable in the end. The general assembly in the R.M.A. firmly believed that the smaller step to the 35cm-gun could easily be countered by Great Britain by a further increase of their own whereas it was calculated to be most unlikely that the same would occur with the 40cm-gun.
由于其他国家的海军陆续开始配备13.5英寸或14英寸火炮，因此30.5cm火炮显然已经无法与之抗衡了。受此影响，在设计巴伐利亚级时，最主要的话题就是如何在更强大的火力与有限的经费之间取得平衡。当时，他们研究过三种不同的口径：35cm、38cm、40cm。其中，35cm被认为是在政治上更为安全的选项，因为这只是追随其他国家的口径升级的步伐；而38cm和40cm则被认为是在政治上颇为危险的选项，因为这意味着主动挑起军备竞赛。然而，至1911年9月时，38cm被弃置了，而35cm和40cm则仍然处于候选状态：要么是10门35cm火炮，要么是8门40cm火炮，且无论是哪一种方案，所有炮塔都是联装形式的。至于三联装形式的炮塔，则再一次被否决了。他们还认为，由于其他海军大国很快就会进一步提升火炮口径，因此即便德国海军大幅度提高火炮口径，最后也不会在政治上造成重大冲击。另外，海军部中的大部分人还坚信，英国人可以轻轻松松地将火炮口径提升至35cm以上，但想要提升到40cm以上，则没有那么容易。
On 26 September 1911 Tirpitz seems to have presented a first sketch-drawing of the proposed vessel to the Emperor...After gaining the general approval from the Emperor for the 40cm-gun-vessel in September 1911 the experts sat to work out detailed calculations which ended in a most unwelcome result in January 1912: At an uppermost limit of 58-59Mill.M. per vessel the 10-gun vessel came out at 59.7Mill.M. whereas the 8-gun vessel exceeded the 60Mill.M. mark already. Suddenly a third - so far neglected option became most desirable: the 8-gun vessel armed with the slightly smaller 38cm L/45-gun. Its cost was estimated at about 57.5Mill.M. which seemed to be the only logical way out of the calamity...On 6 January 1912 the Emperor approved the changes and the existing project was modified to the new caliber...The design for Battleship T (to be Bayern ) and Ersatz-Wörth (Baden ) completed in September 1912.
提尔皮茨似乎是在1911年9月26日时，向德皇提交了最初的设计方案，后者大体上同意了40cm火炮的设计。随后，专家们开始展开细节设计，但到1912年1月时，得出了一个令人失望的结果：海军部设定的造价上限是5,800-5,900万马克，10门35cm火炮的设计，造价是5,970万马克，8门40cm火炮的设计，造价则超过了6,000万马克。在此情况下，原先被弃置的38cm火炮，反而成为了最佳选择：8门38cm火炮的设计，造价约为5,750万马克。因此，这就成为了当时的局面下，唯一可行的发展方向了。在1912年1月6日时，德皇批准了这项改动，随后海军部在现有方案的基础上，把火炮口径调整成了38cm。至1912年9月时，他们完成了巴伐利亚级战列舰的设计工作。
战列巡洋舰的炮塔布局与火炮口径变迁——从斜向布局到全中线布局，从28cm到30.5cm再到35cm乃至38cm
与战列舰的情况类似，德国海军的大部分战列巡洋舰，同样也存在炮塔布局不佳、火炮口径较小的问题。自冯·德·坦恩号起，德国海军的战列巡洋舰一直使用斜向布局，直到德尔弗林格级才改用全中线布局；毛奇级战列巡洋舰是与赫尔格兰级战列舰同期建造的，但仍然在使用28cm火炮（但身管长度从45倍径提高到50倍径），且接下来建造的塞德里茨号战列巡洋舰依然在使用28cm火炮；与国王级战列舰同期建造的德尔弗林格级战列巡洋舰，尽管主炮口径从28cm升级至30.5cm，但火力明显逊色于同期建造的英国战列巡洋舰；在马肯森级战列巡洋舰的设计过程中，德国海军为火炮口径问题纠结了许久，但最终选择的是35cm火炮，而不是38cm火炮。这到底是为什么呢？
1、毛奇级战列巡洋舰的吨位要比冯·德·坦恩号更大，但并未搭载口径更大的火炮，而是选择了增加火炮数量。根据Aidan Dodson（The Kaiser's Battlefleet: German Capital Ships 1871-1918）和Gary Staff（German Battlecruisers of World War One: Their Design, Construction and Operations）的说法：
On 23 April 1907 the state secretary, Admiral von Tirpitz, declared verbally that the cruiser for 1908 should constitute an enlarged type of that of 1907...The General Office hoped that the 1908 cruiser companion of the Helgolands (Large Cruiser G, to be Moltke), would share their 30.5cm guns. However, although the Construction Office stated that the budget for the ship was sufficient for a 30.5cm version of Von der Tann, they preferred to retain 28cm guns but increase the number of barrels. The construction department suggested the number of guns be increased to twelve.
1907年4月23日时，提尔皮茨在口头上表示，1908财年的战列巡洋舰，应在1907财年的基础上进行扩大。海军部总务局希望，该年度的战列巡洋舰（毛奇级），能像同期的战列舰（赫尔格兰级）一样，采用30.5cm火炮。然而造舰局却表示，尽管从预算上来说，的确可以建造一艘30.5cm火炮版本的冯·德·坦恩号，但他们倾向于保留28cm火炮，同时建议将其数量增加至12门。
A conference at the RMA on 17 May 1907 set out the basic fundamentals for the cruiser of 1908. The displacement should be similar to that of the battleship. The main armament would be ten 28cm SK L/45, the medium artillery would consist of ten 15cm SK L/45. The turbine propulsion system should provide a speed of 24 to 24½kts. The armour should be about the same as with cruiser F...It was essentially an enlarged Von der Tann with a superimposed turret added aft; main guns were also lengthened to 28cm/50s.
1907年5月17日时，海军部内部召开了会议，并定下了1908财年的战列巡洋舰的基本指标——排水量与同期的战列舰相当，主炮采用10门28cm SK L/45型火炮，副炮采用10门15cm SK L/45型火炮，防护水准与冯·德·坦恩号相当，由蒸汽轮机驱动，航速24-24.5节。总的来说，毛奇级就是加大版的冯·德·坦恩号，在舰艉增加了1座背负式炮塔，火炮型号则变更为28cm SK L/50型。
2、塞德里茨号，在设计阶段有过30.5cm火炮的方案，但最终选择的依然是28cm火炮。根据Aidan Dodson（The Kaiser's Battlefleet: German Capital Ships 1871-1918）和Gary Staff（German Battlecruisers of World War One: Their Design, Construction and Operations）的说法：
Work on the design of Large Cruiser J, the 1910 ship of that category, began in March 1909, with an analysis of possible improvements to the Moltke design. Affordability considerations implied minimum changes, but a range of options were considered, starting in September 1909 with schemes I, II and III. The first two were essentially up-armoured, lengthened Moltkes, the third substituting eight 30.5cm, arranged as in Von der Tann. In October, modified versions of scheme II were prepared, along with a more radical scheme IVe, with all turrets on the centreline. While scheme IVe was assessed favourably against a number of criteria, the final decision went for the more modest changes incorporated in scheme IIc, which became the final design, scheme IIe, approved by the Emperor on 27 January 1910.
大型巡洋舰J，即1910财年的战列巡洋舰的设计工作，是在1909年3月开始的。他们对毛奇级的可改进余地做出了分析，但由于造舰预算受限，因此无法做出大幅度的改动。在1909年9月时，他们拿出了方案I、方案II、方案III，其中前两个本质上就是舰体延长、装甲防护加强的毛奇级，第三个方案则是将10门28cm火炮替换成了8门30.5cm火炮，火炮布局与冯·德·坦恩号相同。至1909年10月，方案II得到了小幅调整，同时他们又拿出了改动幅度更大的方案IVe，后者采用了全中线炮塔布局（但火炮口径仍然是28cm）。尽管方案IVe在许多方面都更占优势，但最终他们还是决定选择改动幅度较小的方案IIc，随后又对其做出了进一步调整，发展出了方案IIe。1910年1月27日时，德皇批准了这个方案，这就是塞德里茨号的设计经过。
3、直至德尔弗林格级时，德国海军才姗姗来迟地将战列巡洋舰的主炮口径升级成了30.5cm。根据Aidan Dodson（The Kaiser's Battlefleet: German Capital Ships 1871-1918）和Gary Staff（German Battlecruisers of World War One: Their Design, Construction and Operations）的说法：
Large Cruiser K marked a significant step forward from the evolutionary sequence seen from Von der Tann to Seydlitz. Discussions began in the spring of 1910, the General Office arguing that future large cruisers now needed a minimum of 30.5cm guns in the face of the 13.5in weapons fitted in the British 1909/10 programme Lion class (a position also taken by the Weapons Office).
从冯·德·坦恩号发展到塞德里茨号的过程，是循序渐进的，而大型巡洋舰K（德尔弗林格号）的设计，则出现了显著的进步。1910年春天时，德国海军内部开始就该舰的设计展开讨论，海军部总务局认为，考虑到英国海军在1909-10财年建造的狮级战列巡洋舰，已经配备了13.5英寸火炮，因此德国海军未来建造的战列巡洋舰，至少也需要配备30.5cm火炮。海军部军械局，同样也持这个观点。
Admiral von Tirpitz, arranged the first of a series of meetings for all parties regarding the questions for the four ships in the 1911 budget. At this meeting on 11 May 1910 Kontreadmiral Gerdes, from the weapons department (W), introduced the results of the latest firing trials and performance diagrams of 28cm, 30.5cm and 32cm guns, which gave a comparative examination of the projectile effect at long ranges. With a battle range of 8,000-10,000m and an assumed armour thickness of 250mm for the newest Royal Navy cruisers, Kontreadmiral Gerdes believed the 28cm gun was no longer sufficient for Großer Kreuzer K, especially as the cruiser was later expected to fight in the line of battle against battleships, with an armour thickness of 300mm. Admiral von Tirpitz held a contrary view and could not foresee a battle range of 10,000m or more, and even if fire was opened at such a great range he believed it would quickly reduce. He believed the real duel would occur at shorter range and that for this five 28cm double turrets would be more appropriate.
针对1911财年的四艘主力舰（3艘国王级和1艘德尔弗林格级）的设计问题，提尔皮茨召集有关各方举行了一系列的会议。在1910年5月11日的会议上，军械局的格迪斯少将表示，对他们最近开展的实弹射击测试，以及28cm、30.5cm、32cm火炮的穿深曲线进行了介绍。在格迪斯少将看来，假设英国海军最新的战列巡洋舰拥有250mm舷侧装甲带（实际是9英寸），那么在8,000-10,000米距离上，28cm火炮是难以对抗这种防护水准的。考虑到战列巡洋舰可能需要与敌方战列舰交战，且后者拥有300mm（12英寸）的舷侧装甲带，那么28cm火炮的威力就更是杯水车薪了。然而，提尔皮茨却不这么认为，他不认为交战距离会增加到10,000米以上，且即便在如此远的距离上开火，接下来的交战距离也会快速减少。在提尔皮茨看来，真正的决战会在近距离上展开，在此距离上，5座28cm联装炮塔是更为合适的选择。
However, in September it was finally agreed to go to 30.5cm guns. It was also suggested that an arrangement of superimposed turrets fore and aft should supersede the en-échelon one hitherto used. Thus scheme 1 (essentially a 30.5cm-gunned flush-decked Von der Tann, with Seydlitz armour), gave way to schemes 2 and 3, with superimposed guns, the former with the after turrets separated by the engine room, the latter with them arranged close together. The two designs also differed in that scheme 3 placed its secondary battery at upper deck level, rather than main-deck level, giving it better command. A combination of the two resulted in scheme 4, with separated after turrets, but an upper deck secondary battery - and also the new feature of a flush deck...Design 4 was approved by the Kaiser on 26 September. On 18 March 1911 (K I E) proposed a further improved design, design 5. For the same displacement and cost, this design showed many improvements...Scheme 5d was approved in June 1911.
不过，到了1910年9月时，提尔皮茨的态度有所转变，终于同意将火炮口径提升至30.5cm了。同时还有人建议，不必再沿用先前的炮塔布局，而是应在舰艏和舰艉采用背负式炮塔布局。在此情况下，方案1（30.5cm火炮版的冯·德·坦恩号，装甲防护与塞德里茨相当）输给了方案2和方案3，后两者都采用了背负式炮塔布局。方案2的两座舰艉炮塔，中间隔着蒸汽轮机舱，且副炮的布置位置较低；而方案3的两座舰艉炮塔则是布置在一起的，且副炮的布置位置较高。将两者结合之后，产生了方案4，其舰艉炮塔布局沿袭自方案2，而副炮布局则沿袭自方案3，同时还改成了平甲板布局。1910年9月26日时，德皇批准了方案4。至1911年3月18日时，海军部造舰局又提出了进一步优化的方案5，其造价和吨位与方案4相同，但有许多细节得到了优化。1911年6月时，德皇批准了方案5d，即德尔弗林格级的最终方案。
4、在马肯森级战列巡洋舰上，德国海军终于为其配备了35cm火炮，但该级拥有一个非常曲折的设计过程，并且还在其基础上衍生出了配备38cm火炮的约克代舰级。根据Aidan Dodson（The Kaiser's Battlefleet: German Capital Ships 1871-1918）和Gary Staff（German Battlecruisers of World War One: Their Design, Construction and Operations）的说法：
The gestation period for the design of the Mackensen class cruisers was the longest of all the Panzerkreuzers...in August 1912, the first sketches were commissioned from the Construction Office, for a ship with eight 35cm guns. In fact, a range of schemes was produced in early September, with guns of 34cm (A-prefixed), 35cm (B) and 35.5cm (C) calibres. Scheme C was rapidly dismissed as unaffordable, with the 34cm designs the least-bad option from the point of view of size and cost.
在所有的德国战列巡洋舰中，马肯森级的设计周期是最长的。在1912年8月时，造舰局画出了第一张设计草图，当时配备的是8门35cm火炮。至9月初时，他们又拿出了一些别的设计草图，按火炮口径差异，可分为34cm（代号A）、35cm（代号B）、35.5cm（代号C）。考虑到财政和吨位上的因素，35.5cm很快就被否决了，而34cm则被认为是最不糟糕的选择。
Another complication was an emerging desire by the Emperor to enhance the torpedo armament of capital ships, paralleling an international tendency to promote the torpedo as a significant capital ship weapon - cf. the torpedo battleships envisaged in the USA and Russia at this time.. As a result, three new schemes were produced at the end of September, scheme 8 with the six tubes, and schemes 9 and 10 with eight tubes. To pay for this significant additional below-water space the main battery had to revert back to 30.5cm guns. Scheme 9 received Imperial approval on 30 September 1912.
然而，由于在那个时期，国际上出现了一股将鱼雷作为主力舰的主武器的倾向（美国和俄国都在设想鱼雷战列舰），因此威廉二世又提出，要加强鱼雷配置。在此情况下，至9月底时，造舰局又拿出了3个新的设计方案，其中方案8配备有6具鱼雷发射管；方案9和方案10则都配备有8具鱼雷发射管。由于鱼雷配置需要占用大量的舰体内部空间，因此这些方案的火炮配置有所削弱，采用的是30.5cm火炮。1912年9月30日时，德皇批准了方案9。
However, during the winter of 1912/13, the question of larger main guns was re-visited...This was prompted in particular by not only the 13.5in/14in guns planned for British, Japanese and Russian battlecruisers, but also the first hints of the 15in guns of the Queen Elizabeth class battleships. Thus, a reversion to scheme A3 was proposed, although discussions soon moved to the possibility of going to 38cm guns, although it seemed clear that eight guns would produce too large a ship. A3 was thus refined as the A16.
然而，至1912年冬天时，又出现了增大火炮口径的呼吁声。一方面，这是因为英国已经建造了配备13.5英寸火炮的战列巡洋舰，而日本和俄国则计划要建造配备14英寸火炮的战列巡洋舰；另一方面，还因为德国人得到了消息，英国的伊丽莎白女王级战列舰，将会配备15英寸火炮。在此情况下，海军部又重新提议选择34cm火炮。后来，还有人提议使用38cm火炮，但考虑到8门38cm火炮意味着巨大的吨位，因此这种提议的可行性显然不高。于是，海军部在原先的A3方案的基础上进行了改良，从而得出了A16方案。
In May 1913, it was decided that the ship should now have six 38cm guns, and as a result schemes D9 and D10 were produced (refined as D47 and D48), differing externally as to which end the superimposed pair of turrets were placed (D47 forward; D48 aft, separated by the engine room). Of these schemes, D48’s arrangement was preferred, as minimising the danger of a single hit knocking out two turrets, further work leading to the definitive 38cm version, scheme D48a.
至1913年5月时，他们又决定，将火炮配置更改为6门38cm火炮，具体的设计方案则是D9和D10（D是38cm的代号），后来又分别被优化为D47和D48。后两个方案的主要差异，是炮塔布局有所不同（D47是舰艏布置有2座炮塔布置在一起，D48是舰艉布置有2座炮塔，但中间被蒸汽轮机舱隔开）。由于D48方案的炮塔布置，不太可能被1发炮弹击毁2座炮塔，因此这个方案被选中，随后又进一步优化成了D48a，既38cm版本的最终方案。
The Emperor approved scheme 48a on 28 June 1913, but at the end of October a report from the German naval attaché in London suggested (correctly) that British battle-cruiser construction would terminate with the 13.5in -gunned Tiger, and also (incorrectly) that forward British construction of battleships would revert to 13.5in-armed vessels. Accordingly, in November, it was decided to switch back to smaller guns for Ersatz-Victoria Louise, at first to 34cm, but then back up to 35cm. A new eight 35cm-gunned scheme 58 was presented at the end of the month, and although a formal decision was not taken until the following spring. It was agreed that the armour deck slopes could be omitted; this led to the definitive scheme 60.
1913年6月28日时，德皇批准了方案D48a，但到了10月底时，又出现了新的变化：驻伦敦的德国海军武官报告说，在配备13.5英寸的虎号之后，英国人接下来就不再建造战列巡洋舰了（这个情报是正确的），并且接下来建造的战列舰，火炮口径也会回归至13.5英寸（这个情报是错误的）。在这份情报的影响下，至1913年10月时，他们又决定把火炮口径降下去，一开始打算用34cm，后来又改成了35cm。至10月底时，他们拿出了配备有8门35cm火炮的方案58，随后又在其基础上进行了调整，例如取消了防护甲板倾斜段，其结果就是马肯森级的最终方案，方案60。1914年春天时，这个方案得到了正式批准。
As originally planned there were to be seven ships in this class: Ersatz Victoria Louise - Mackensen, Ersatz Blücher - Graf Spee, Ersatz Freya - Prinz Eitel Friedrich, Ersatz Friedrich Carl, Ersatz Yorck, Ersatz Gneisenau and Ersatz Scharnhorst. However...it became known that the new British battlecruisers Renown and Repulse would be armed with 15in guns, and that the projected US battlecruisers might have 16in guns, meaning that the calibre of the guns of the Mackensens was once again revisited. Accordingly, Ersatz-Yorck, Ersatz-Gneisenau and Ersatz-Scharnhorst were redesigned to take eight 38cm guns. The redesign was kept to the absolute minimum to allow the material already assembled on the slip for Ersatz-Yorck to be employed. Thus, although displacement rose by 2500t, and the hull was slightly lengthened, machinery remained unaltered (with speed reduced by 0.75kt), but with the uptakes now trunked into a single funnel, A pair of 15cm guns was deleted amidships, while the torpedo tubes were reduced to three.
马肯森级原本计划要建造7艘，分别是：维多利亚·露易丝代舰（既马肯森号）、布吕歇尔代舰（既斯佩伯爵号）、芙蕾雅代舰（既埃特尔·腓特烈王子号）、腓特烈·卡尔代舰、约克代舰、格奈森瑙代舰、沙恩霍斯特代舰（所谓的代舰，指的是根据舰队法的规则，在某艘军舰过时或沉没后，用来替代其名额的新军舰）。但后来，德国人发现，英国海军新建造的声望号和反击号战列巡洋舰，配备了15英寸火炮，而美国计划要建造的战列巡洋舰，更是打算搭载16英寸火炮。在此情况下，马肯森级的火炮口径话题，再度被提了出来。于是，约克代舰、格奈森瑙代舰、沙恩霍斯特代舰这三艘，得到了重新设计，其火炮配置变成了8门38cm火炮。为了尽可能利用已经准备好的材料，设计改动被控制在了尽可能小的范围，其结果是，吨位上涨了2,500吨，舰体被略微延长，动力系统保持不变，烟囱数量减少为1根，航速下降0.75节，15cm副炮减少了2门，鱼雷发射管也减少了2具（这三艘也被称为约克代舰级）。
All fell victim to a shortage of manpower, which delayed the launch of Mackensen and Graf Spee into 1917, with the next three still on the stocks at the end of the war, all having been essentially suspended since the beginning of 1918...The other two were never laid down.
战争爆发后，由于劳动力短缺的缘故，马肯森号和斯佩伯爵号的下水时间推迟到了1917年，但进入1918年后，其建造工作基本就停止了。接下来的三艘，虽然有开工，但截止至战争结束，也还没有达到能够下水的状态。至于最后那两艘，则并未实际开工。
结论：在无畏号和无敌级之后，英国海军的无畏舰设计又得到了持续发展。最明显的变化，当然是火力、防护、机动性的持续提升。与此同时，这型军舰的炮塔和上层建筑布局，也得到了持续优化，至铁公爵级、伊丽莎白女王级、复仇级这些战前开工建造的最为新锐的一批主力舰时，其设计已经达到了很完善的形态了。
另一方面，从德国海军的无畏舰的设计发展史中，我们可以发现，在后世之明的角度看来并不合理的设计，往往是由于两种原因导致的：其一是财政限制，其二是错误的军事思想。一方面，军舰设计不但要满足性能要求，同时也需要在财政限制下开展。在这两个通常是互相矛盾的因素的影响下，自然就出现了不少较为保守、不符合后续发展趋势的设计，例如坚持使用较小口径的火炮。但在考虑到他们当时所受到的财政限制因素后，有很多还是可以理解的。另一方面，还有一些不符合后续发展趋势、甚至可以说颇为愚蠢的设计，并不是受到了财政限制的影响，而是的的确确就是受到了错误的军事思想的影响，例如早期的六边形炮塔布局。两者相比，错误的军事思想导致的不合理设计，要比财政限制导致的不合理设计，更让人感到惋惜。 本帖最后由 seven_nana 于 2023-3-18 08:40 编辑
四、轻巡洋舰与驱逐舰：先发数量优势与后发质量优势
与战列舰和装甲巡洋舰/战列巡洋舰的情况类似，在轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰方面，英德两国之间也存在一定的竞争。
在具体介绍轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰，首先有必要理清一下名称背后概念。轻巡洋舰这个词，是在1913年时才被英国海军正式采用的，并用来指代原先的二等、三等、侦察巡洋舰（具体详见此链接）。此后，在英语类的著作中，德国海军的小型巡洋舰，往往也会被称为轻巡洋舰。英国海军的驱逐舰的驱逐舰的起源，我们已经在第一章 - 英国海军的两强标准中介绍过了。另一方面，在英语类的著作中，往往会使用驱逐舰这个词，指代德国海军的大型鱼雷艇，但严格意义上来说，德国海军自己并不会将这些军舰称之为驱逐舰。
1、在世纪之交时，德国海军就已经在轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰设计上，取得了令人瞩目的成就。根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.3）：
The first of the ten light cruisers of the Gazelle class had been designed in 1896; all but Gazelle herself were designed for 21½ knots. They were followed in the four years 1902-06 by seven Bremens and four Königsbergs. Britain, on the other hand, continued to lay down third-class cruisers - none were capable of more than 20 knots - until the programme years 1902-04, in which four Gems (22 knots, except for the 22½-knot Amethyst) and eight Scouts were authorised. The 25-knot Scouts had a three-knot advantage over the contemporary Bremens, but their endurance was poor.
自1896年起，德国海军开始建造瞪羚级轻巡洋舰。该级总共建造了10艘，其中除了瞪羚号以外，其余都具备21.5节的航速。在1902-06年间，德国人又建造了7艘不来梅级和4艘科尼斯堡级轻巡洋舰。作为对比，当时的英国海军，还在建造航速不超过20节的三等巡洋舰。直到1902-04年间，他们才建造了4艘宝石级三等巡洋舰（其中紫水晶号的航速为22.5节，其余3艘为22节）和8艘侦察巡洋舰。与不来梅级相比，英国海军的侦察巡洋舰，尽管具备3节的航速优势，但也存在续航能力差的缺点。
The Imperial German Navy was an innovator in surface torpedo vessels. The boats of the S90 class were designed for a new role, to work with the fleet, and were accordingly given raised forecastles so that they could continue to operate in rough seas; forty-two were laid down between 1898 and 1905. Their success was recognised in Britain, where the Admiralty had also accepted the need for more seaworthy destroyers. The outcome was the 25½-knot River class, with raised forecastles and heavier scantlings than in previous British designs; thirty-four were built in the three programmes from 1901 to 1904. In comparison with the S90s, the Rivers were bigger, nominally slower and more heavily gunned: though they carried two rather than three torpedo tubes.
在鱼雷舰艇的设计上，德国海军做出了很大的创新。他们的S90型驱逐舰，是设计用来伴随舰队行动的，具备抬高的艏楼结构，因此能适应较高的海况。在1898至1905年间，他们总共建造了42艘同型舰。这种舰艇引起了英国海军的注意，英国海军部意识到，他们也需要适航性更佳的驱逐舰。其结果，就是具备抬高的艏楼结构，舰体用材更为厚重，但设计航速降低至25.5节的河流级驱逐舰。在1901-04年间，英国海军总共建造了34艘该级军舰（后来又额外购买了2艘，因此总数为36艘）。与S90型相比，河流级的吨位更大、火炮配置更为强大，但设计航速更慢、鱼雷发射管数量更少。
2、此后，德国海军的轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰建造工作，也一直根据提尔皮茨的规划，持续而稳定的开展着。根据John Brooks（The Battle of Jutland, P.10-11）和Dirk Nottelmann（The Development of the Small Cruiser in the Imperial German Navy）的说法：
In the four years 1902-06, Germany had laid down light cruisers at the rate almost three per annum. But, for 1906-07, the rate of construction was cut to an average of two per annum; this rate was then regularised for the years up to 1916-17. Although turbines had been tried in earlier classes, they were first fitted uniformly in the Kolberg class (1907-09); these ships which were bigger than their predecessors, had twelve rather than ten 4.1in guns and a speed of 25.5 knots. The next class, the Magdeburgs were not started until 1910-11. They were designed for 27 knots with, for the first time, mixed coal and oil firing. They carried the larger 50cm torpedo and were given a capacity of 120 mines...60mm waterline belt of low percentage nickel steel...The following Karlsruhe and Graudenz classes (1911-13) were similar though they were the last German light cruisers to mount 4.1in guns.
在1902-1906年间，德国海军每年通常会建造3艘轻巡洋舰，但在1906-07财年时，他们只建造了2艘轻巡洋舰。此后直至1916-17财年，他们每年都会建造2艘轻巡洋舰。1907-09年间建造的科尔堡级，是第一型统一配备蒸汽轮机的德国轻巡洋舰，此前则只有个别几艘轻巡洋舰，实验性地配备过蒸汽轮机。与之前的科尼斯堡级相比，科尔堡级的吨位更大，航速提升到了25.5节，并且其配备的10.5cm火炮的数量，也从原先的10门增加到了12门。再接下来的马德堡级，则要到1910-11年时才开工建造，她们采用了油煤混烧锅炉，设计航速达到了27节，并且在武备和防护方面也有所提升：她们配备了由60mm厚度的镍钢构成的舷侧装甲带（此前的德国轻巡洋舰只有防护甲板，而没有舷侧装甲带），搭载了50cm鱼雷（此前的德国轻巡洋舰搭载的是45cm鱼雷），并且能够携带120枚水雷。接下来建造的卡尔斯鲁厄级和格劳登茨级，在设计上与马德堡级类似，她们是最后一批配备10.5cm火炮的德国轻巡洋舰。
Until 1905-06, Germany authorised six destroyers for each year but in 1906-07 the annual rate of production doubled from six to twelve; this was then maintained until 1913-14. Turbines were fitted as standard from 1908-09, giving design speeds of 32 knots or more. German destroyers in general displaced less, a difference that became particularly marked in 1911-13, when, as a result of requests from the German fleet, displacement was cut to obtain greater manoeuvrability. However, the first trials revealed a serious loss of seaworthiness and, from 1913-14, displacement was increased to nearer British tonnages. From 1911-12 onwards, German destroyers were also equipped to carry eighteen, later twenty-four, mines.
截止至1905-06年为止，德国海军每年会建造6艘驱逐舰，但从1906-07年起，他们的建造数量翻倍了，提高到了每年12艘，并且这种建造节奏一直延续到了1913-14财年。自1908-09财年起，蒸汽轮机成为了标准配置，从而将设计航速提升到了32节或更高。整体来说，与英国驱逐舰相比，德国驱逐舰的排水量要更低一些，尤其是1911-13年间建造的德国驱逐舰（V1型），为了响应舰队提出的对机动性的需求，其吨位被进一步缩减了。但是，在试航过程中，这种小吨位设计的适航性不足的问题，被充分暴露了出来，因此自1913-14财年起，德国驱逐舰的吨位又提高到了与英国驱逐舰几乎相当的水准。另外，自1911-12财年起，德国驱逐舰还具备了水雷搭载能力，起初能搭载18枚水雷，后来提升至24枚水雷。
3、另一方面，尽管在费舍尔的带领下，英国海军在战列舰和战列巡洋舰方面取得了领先，但由于他并不重视轻巡洋舰，且根据他的设想而建造的驱逐舰也并不成功，于是英国海军在这些领域的建造进度受到了影响。根据John Brooks（The Battle of Jutland, P.5-7 & P.11）和Norman Friedman（British Destroyers: From Earliest Days to the Second World War）的说法：
Fisher began his time as First Sea Lord...promptly cancelled the orders for four additional cruisers of the Gem class and no small cruisers were laid down in Britain in the three years 1904-07...In 1907-08 programme...authorised the construction of Boadicea, a small 25-knot light cruiser mounting only six 4in guns...she restarted light cruiser building after a gap of three years...The Boadiceas were the last of the series of cruiser-destroyer leaders begun with the scouts of 1903-4. They were adequate for the strategy of blockading the German North Sea ports, but too slow to lead destroyers in fleet actions or to deal with German destroyers attacking a fleet.
在费舍尔上台之前，英国海军原本计划再建造4艘宝石级三等巡洋舰，但在费舍尔担任第一海务大臣之后，他取消了这个计划。此后，在1904-07年间，英国海军没有建造任何轻巡洋舰。在1907-08财年时，英国海军建造了1艘博阿迪西亚号侦察巡洋舰，该舰具备25节航速，但只配备了6门4英寸火炮。该舰是持续三年的空档期后，英国海军建造的第1艘轻巡洋舰。博阿迪西亚号及后续建造的同类舰艇，属于1903-04年间建造的侦察巡洋舰的后续舰型，她们虽然被称为巡洋舰，但实际担任的是驱逐领舰的职能。然而，这些军舰是基于对德国北部港口进行封锁的战略背景下设计的，但如果用于舰队决战的话，其航速是不足以伴随驱逐舰行动的，并且也不足以对抗德国方面的驱逐舰部队。
The Tribal class cost much more than the last batch of the River class. Only five, two and five Tribals respectively were built in the three programme years 1905-08...They were not good sea boats, their endurance was poor, and throughout the War, they served as part of the Dover Patrol; thus they fell far short of the ocean going fleet destroyers imagined by Fisher...The Cricket class...twelve were ordered in each of the years 1905-08. They lacked beam and were too lightly built to undertake destroyer duties. After the trials of the first two in 1906, they were reclassified as torpedo boats numbered TB1-TB36 and employed only in coastal patrol and local defence flotillas. Thus they added nothing to the Royal Navy’s strength of destroyers...The large destroyer Swift was too frail for service in northern waters, and in 1915 she too joined the Dover Patrol.
1905-08财年间建造的部族级驱逐舰，造价要比先前的河流级贵得多，因此在这三年间，分别只建造了5艘、2艘、5艘（总计12艘）。这些军舰的适航性和续航能力都不好，因此在大战时，是驻扎在多佛海峡区域的。因此，相比于费舍尔所设想的远洋驱逐舰，部族级的实际能力有很大的差距。在1905-08财年间，英国海军还建造了36艘蟋蟀级近岸驱逐舰，这些军舰的舰宽太小，结构强度也不足，因此无法胜任驱逐舰的任务。在1906年时，首舰和次舰完成试航之后，该级被重新归类为鱼雷艇，随后用作近岸巡逻和海港防御了。换句话说，她们并未能提升英国海军的驱逐舰部队的实力。至于大吨位的敏捷号驱逐舰，也存在结构强度不足的问题，不适合在北海区域活动，因此从1915年起，也被部署在了多佛海峡区域。
4、自1909年起，英国海军的轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰建造工作，逐步走向了正轨。根据John Brooks（The Battle of Jutland, P.13）和Norman Friedman（British Cruisers: Two World Wars and After）的说法：
British 1908-09 programme...The light cruisers and destroyers initiated a real effort to make up for the small numbers that had been built during Fisher’s earlier years as First Sea Lord.. Of the six cruisers, one, Bellona, was a repeat Boadicea. However, the remaining five, of the new Bristol class, were larger than their German contemporaries, the Kolbergs, and were armed with two 6in as well as ten 4in guns...Boadicea was essentially a destroyer leader, but the new cruiser was much more powerful. The principal role was a variety of roles. For the fleet, it meant backing up blockading destroyers against a stronger German cruiser threat. It also meant trade protection. The new ships were rated as Second Class Protected Cruisers because they were powerful enough to fight the last British cruisers with that rating...They and their immediate successors were called the ‘Town’ class.
1908-09财年时，英国海军的轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰建造数量有了较大提升。在此情况下，费舍尔此前犯的错误，一定程度上得到了缓解。在这一年，他们总共建造了6艘轻巡洋舰，其中有1艘柏洛娜号，是博阿迪西亚号的同型舰。另外5艘，则是全新的布里斯托级，她们的尺寸比德国海军同期建造的科尔堡轻巡洋舰更大，并且具备强大的火力：2门6英寸主炮及10门4英寸副炮。博阿迪西亚级本质上只是驱逐领舰，但这些新式巡洋舰的战斗力则要强大得多，并且她们需要承担多种不同的任务：在伴随舰队时，这些军舰需要支援驱逐舰，并对抗德国海军的巡洋舰。此外，她们还需要执行通商保护任务。这些新式军舰，被归类为二等防护巡洋舰，因为其战斗力的确足以与之前的二等巡洋舰相媲美。布里斯托级与其后继舰型，被统称为城级。
With the sixteen 27-knot destroyers of the Beagle class, the Royal Navy reverted to the pre-Fisher emphasis on seaworthiness rather than extreme speed; they also carried the new 21in ‘heater’ torpedo. However, while they retained turbine propulsion, they were coal-fired, because facilities for refuelling with coal were more widely available than for oil...In effect the new ships were the improved Rivers planned for the 1904 Programme and aborted in favour of the Tribals.
在这一年，英国海军还建造了16艘小猎犬级驱逐舰。这些军舰的设计，不再追求费舍尔所强调的极速，而是强调适航性，即回归至费舍尔上台以前的设计要求了。因此，她们的最大航速只有27节。此外，这型军舰还配备了21英寸鱼雷（之前的驱逐舰配备的是18英寸鱼雷）。不过，尽管小猎犬级也是搭载蒸汽轮机的，但却换回了燃煤锅炉，原因是煤炭补给设施的数量，要比燃油补给设施多得多。这型驱逐舰，本质上就是费舍尔上台之前，英国海军打算在1904财年时建造的河流级的后继型号。
5、在1910-1912年间，英国海军的轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰的建造工作，进入了有条不紊的状态。根据John Brooks（The Battle of Jutland, P.15-17）和Norman Friedman（British Cruisers: Two World Wars and After）的说法：
The 1909-10 programme again increased the construction rates for light cruisers and destroyers. As in 1908-09, it included two types of light cruiser, both with improved armament. The two small Blondes mounted ten 4in guns, while, in the four larger Weymouths, the mixed calibres of the Bristols was replaced with a uniform armament of eight 6in. The programme also included the twenty-strong Acorn class destroyers. Being oil-fuelled, they were smaller and less expensive than the coal-fired Beagles, but even so they were better armed, with two 4in and two 12pdr guns.
在1909-10财年时，英国海军的轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰建造数量，又有了进一步提高。与上一年类似，这一年他们也建造了两种不同类型的轻巡洋舰，并且都在武备方面进行了升级：第一种，是2艘金发女郎级侦察巡洋舰，她们搭载了10门4英寸火炮；另一种，是4艘韦茅斯级（城级）轻巡洋舰，她们搭载了8门6英寸火炮。在这一年，英国海军还建造了20艘橡子级驱逐舰，与小猎犬级的区别在于，橡子级采用了全燃油锅炉，吨位和造价也都有所下降，但武备方面则有所提升：她们搭载了2门4英寸主炮和2门12磅副炮。
Under the 1910-11 programme...Five light cruisers were laid down, two of the smaller Actives and three larger Chathams of an improved design...A 3in belt extending to the upper deck over the whole length of the machinery spaces, with a 2½in belt forward and a 2in belt aft instead of a thick protective deck...The programme also authorised twenty-three Acherons. The fourteen built to the standard Admiralty design were repeats of the 27-knot Acorns, but in addition there were nine ‘specials’ with speeds up to 32 knots.
在1910-11财年时，英国海军建造了5艘轻巡洋舰，其中2艘是吨位较小的积极级侦察巡洋舰，另外3艘则是吨位较大的查塔姆级（城级）轻巡洋舰，后者不再单纯依靠防护甲板，而是在动力舱段配备了3英寸厚的舷侧装甲带，动力舱之前及之后的舰体区域，则分别配备了2.5英寸及2英寸厚度的舷侧装甲带。这一年，他们还建造了23艘阿刻戎级驱逐舰，其中有14艘是按照海军部的规格建造的，本质上就是橡子级的同型舰，其航速是27节；另外还有9艘，则是采用特殊设计的，具备32节的航速。
The 1911-12 programme for light cruisers and destroyers was a little smaller than that for 1910-11, but it was still sufficient to ensure that, by the end of the programme year, Britain had overtaken Germany, though only just, in the numbers of these vessels laid down. It included the final Active and three larger Birminghams, the latter mounting an additional 6in gun. The twenty destroyers of the Acasta class were a marked advance on previous classes in displacement, speed (29 knots) and armament (three 4in guns and two additional torpedoes as reloads). There was an even greater contrast with their German contemporaries, which were barely more than half the displacement of the new British boats.
在1911-12财年时，英国海军的轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰建造量，略微有所下滑。但以开工数量而论，英国海军至此终于超过了德国海军。具体来说，他们建造了1艘积极级和3艘伯明翰级（城级），后者搭载的6英寸火炮，要比查塔姆级多1门（从8门增加至9门）。另外，他们还建造了20艘阿卡斯塔级驱逐舰。该级的吨位，相比之前有了明显的提升，火炮配置提升为3门4英寸火炮，增加了2条用于再装填的鱼雷，且航速也达到了29节。与同期建造的德国驱逐舰相比，该级的吨位几乎是前者的两倍。
6、自1913年起，英国海军的轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰，无论是在设计水准上还是在建造规模上，都开始大幅超越德国海军。根据John Brooks（The Battle of Jutland, P.19-21）和Norman Friedman（British Cruisers: Two World Wars and After）的说法：
In 1912-13...Oil alone was also the fuel for the light cruisers of the programme. The Royal Navy did not need any more of the larger cruisers fully armed with 6in, but it was still very short of small, fast, light cruisers that could work with, and also oppose, the latest destroyers. Thus the cruiser programme for the year comprised the eight ships of Arethusa class...At earlier stage the ship was called a Third Class Cruiser...They mounted two 6in and six 4in guns; their double thickness of side plating proved capable of resisting German 4.1in shells, and they were powered by destroyer-type machinery. This enabled Arethusa to reach 29 knots on overload power during her curtailed trials at the beginning of the War...The destroyers for 1912-13 were the 22 boats of the Laforey class. Like the preceding Acastas, they were 29-knot boats armed with three 4in guns. They also mounted a pair of the new twin torpedo tubes; thus, in action, they would have four torpedoes immediately available, just like the contemporary German boats.
在1912-13财年时，英国海军建造的轻巡洋舰，也换用了全燃油锅炉。此时，英国海军已经建造了不少吨位较大、装备6英寸火炮的轻巡洋舰了，但却缺少具备高航速、能够跟得上驱逐舰的轻巡洋舰。因此在这一年，英国海军建造了8艘林仙级轻巡洋舰。在设计之初时，这种军舰被归类为三等巡洋舰。她们配备有2门6英寸主炮和6门4英寸副炮，具备能够抵挡德国10.5cm炮弹的舷侧装甲带。另外，由于该级采用了驱逐舰式的动力系统，因此在试航中，能够在过载状态下跑出29节的最高航速。这一年的驱逐舰，是22艘拉弗雷级（准确的来说，起初只建造了20艘，开战后又补充建造了2艘，因此总数为22艘）。与之前的阿卡斯塔级一样，她们也具备29节航速，配备有3门4英寸火炮。区别点在于，拉弗雷级配备了新式的联装鱼雷发射管，因此能够像德国驱逐舰一样，搭载4枚待发鱼雷。
The light cruisers of the 1913-14 programme were the six Carolines and two Calliopes, the last two having more efficient geared turbines. Being somewhat larger than the Arethusas, all eight were less cramped and had more stability; their two 6in guns were both mounted aft while, of their eight 4in, two were placed side-by-side on the forecastle. The original programme also contained sixteen destroyers of the M-class; they had the same armament as the Laforeys, but, at Churchill’s insistence, they were much faster. Later, three of the class were cancelled.
在1913-14财年时，英国海军建造了6艘卡洛琳级和2艘卡利俄佩级轻巡洋舰（统称C级），其中后2艘搭载了推进效率更高的带有减速齿轮的蒸汽轮机。C级轻巡洋舰的尺寸，要比林仙级略大一些，因此舰内空间不那么拥挤了，且稳定性也提高了一些。她们搭载有2门6英寸主炮和8门4英寸副炮。在驱逐舰方面，原本英国人打算建造16艘M级驱逐舰，不过后来砍掉了3艘。M级的武备与拉弗雷级相同，但在丘吉尔的要求下，她们的航速提高了很多（从29节提升到了34节）。
7、在大战前夕时，英国海军还在驱逐舰的基础上，发展出了驱逐领舰。根据D. K. Brown的说法（The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922, P.106）：
The Captain ‘D’ commanding a flotilla would normally be accommodated in a ‘Scout’ cruiser. It was clear that this arrangement would be unsuitable for the much faster ‘M’ class destroyers and in 1913 a design was begun for a flotilla leader which, after the usual consideration of options, appeared as the Lightfoot. They provided the space for the Captain, his staff and the communications team. Two ships were ordered in December 1913, two more under the 1914-15 Estimates and a further three in November 1914.
在M级驱逐舰问世之前，英国海军会为每个驱逐舰中队配备1艘侦察巡洋舰，来充当中队领舰。不过，由于M级的航速非常高，因此侦察巡洋舰已经不再适合担任她们的领舰了。于是在1913年时，造舰局开始设计一种能容纳中队指挥官和他的参谋军官及通讯团队的驱逐领舰，其结果，就是飞毛腿级。1913年10月时，英国海军订购了2艘驱逐领舰。在1914/15财年的造舰计划中，也包括了2艘驱逐领舰。后来，在1914年11月时，又增购了3艘。
8、在大战前夕时，德国海军拿出了比先前更为优秀的轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰设计，但在建造规模上，已经无法与英国海军相提并论了。根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.18-19）：
For her 1913-14 programme, Germany laid down two light cruisers, Wiesbaden and Frankfurt; they were larger than previous classes and were armed with eight 5.9in guns and two additional torpedo tubes. They were the last purely German designs to be completed before the Battle of Jutland but, at the beginning of the War, Germany also took over two cruisers being built for Russia; though somewhat smaller, Pillau and Elbing also mounted eight 5.9in. For the twelve V25-class destroyers, Germany reverted to a larger and more seaworthy type which was also the first to be fuelled only by oil. Their design then became the mainstay of the wartime emergency programme. With the usual German emphasis on torpedo armament, they had six torpedo tubes and two reloads; the majority, including all that had been commissioned by May 1916, mounted three 3.5in guns.
在1913-14财年时，德国海军建造了2艘威斯巴登级轻巡洋舰。她们的吨位有所增加，并且搭载了8门15cm火炮（之前的德国轻巡洋舰，搭载的都是10.5cm火炮）。这2艘军舰，是德国海军在日德兰海战之前完工的最后2艘纯粹的德国风格的轻巡洋舰。不过，在大战爆发之时，德国海军还扣押了2艘原本为俄国海军建造的皮劳级轻巡洋舰，尽管其吨位较小，但也搭载有8门15cm火炮。在驱逐舰方面，他们建造了12艘V25型驱逐舰，这型军舰的吨位较大，具备较好的适航性，且采用了全燃油锅炉。她们的鱼雷搭载量有了进一步提高，增加到了6枚待发+2枚再装填，火炮配置则通常是3门8.8cm火炮。战时建造的德国驱逐舰，就是以该级作为母版的。
9、截止至大战爆发为止，在轻巡洋舰方面，英德两国海军的建成数量都是大致相当的，但英国海军的军舰普遍更为新锐，而德国海军则仍有许多老旧的军舰；战争爆发后，英国海军又建成了不少轻巡洋舰，而德国海军则损失了不少轻巡洋舰；因此，至日德兰海战时，英国海军在轻巡洋舰方面的优势已经非常明显了。根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.21-23）：
Counting from the German Gazelles of 1896-1902 and the British Gems and Scouts of 1902-04, Britain had only just drawn ahead (by one) in commissioned light cruisers at the beginning of the War: the completion ratios were 34:33...By 31 May 1916, the six Carolines, two Calliopes and four Cambrians - the last were repeat Calliopes from the 1914-15 programme - had been completed. Also, two light cruisers built for Greece were taken over in 1915 and named Birkenhead and Chester; they were armed with ten 5.5in guns that could fire more rapidly than the standard British 6in.
自1896-1902年间的瞪羚级小型巡洋舰、以及1902-04年间的宝石级三等巡洋舰和侦察巡洋舰算起，截止至大战爆发为止，以建成数量而论，英国海军在轻巡洋舰方面只有1艘的数量优势，具体来说，是34比33。至日德兰海战之时，1913-14财年的6艘卡洛琳级和2艘卡利俄佩级已经完工了，且1914-15财年的4艘坎布里安级（C级）也完工了。此外，英国海军还在1915年时，购买了2艘原本为希腊建造的轻巡洋舰：伯肯黑德级。她们配备有10门5.5英寸火炮，这种火炮的射速，要比英国海军的6英寸火炮更快。
Germany, by contrast, did not complete any of the cruisers laid down in 1914-15 in time for Jutland. By then, she had commissioned thirty-nine light cruisers compared with fifty-five by Britain. But Germany’s situation was worse than the bare numbers suggest. Because she started earlier and Fisher had stopped British light cruisers construction for three years, Germany had a greater proportion of older ships; if only turbine powered cruisers were counted, then the ratio was 44:19 in Britain’s favour. Furthermore, Germany effectively lost fifteen cruisers before Jutland, of which six were turbine-powered; Britain lost three, two with turbines. Thus on the eve of Jutland, the ratios of light cruisers were 52:24 for all types and 42:12 for those with turbines.
另一方面，德国海军在1914-15财年时建造的轻巡洋舰，却并未能在日德兰海战之前完工。截止至日德兰海战为止，双方建成的轻巡洋舰数量对比，是55比39。但由于德国海军有不少轻巡洋舰，都是老旧的型号，而由于在费舍尔任期的前3年，英国海军并未建造轻巡洋舰，因此英国海军的轻巡洋舰，整体要更为新锐一些。于是，如果只计算配备蒸汽轮机的轻巡洋舰的话，那么数字就会变为44比19。另外，在大战爆发至日德兰海战之间，德国海军陆续损失了15艘轻巡洋舰，其中有6艘都是配备蒸汽轮机的；作为对比，英国海军只损失了3艘，其中只有1艘是配备蒸汽轮机的。在此情况下，至日德兰海战时，双方实际拥有的轻巡洋舰数量，变成了52比24，其中配备蒸汽轮机的轻巡洋舰数量，则是42比12（英方优势分别是117%和250%）。
10、在大战爆发之时，英德两国的驱逐舰建成数量相差不大，此后也能设法追赶英国人的步伐；但从质量方面来看，总体来说英国军舰要比德国军舰更为新锐一些。根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.23-24）：
When the War began, Britain had just nosed ahead in the number of completed destroyers: the completion ratios were 143:133. Both countries took over boats that had been built or designed for other navies: Britain from Greece, Chile and Turkey; Germany from Argentina. Germany also built four large destroyers of the B97 class around four sets of powerful machinery that had been intended for Russia, then four more to the same design. Both also expanded their 1914-15 programmes into large wartime emergency programmes based on designs already being built. Between the beginning of the War and the eve of Jutland, Germany completed sixty destroyers to Britain’s seventy-eight; thus, unlike in dreadnoughts and light cruisers, Germany’s wartime destroyer construction rate had not fallen much behind Britain’s.
在大战爆发之时，英国海军刚刚在驱逐舰数量上赶超德国海军，具体的数字是143比133（只计算具备远洋航行能力的舰艇，英国海军从河流级算起，德国海军从S90级算起）。开战之后，双方都购买或扣押了一些原本为其他国家建造的驱逐舰——英国海军得到了原本为希腊、智利以及土耳其建造的军舰，而德国海军则得到了原本为阿根廷建造的军舰。德国海军还用原本为俄国海军准备的四套动力系统，建造了4艘B97级驱逐舰，此后他们又额外再建造了4艘。另外，在1914-15财年时，他们都拿出了规模庞大的战时应急造舰计划，并根据已有的成熟设计，建造了大量的驱逐舰。在大战爆发至日德兰海战之间，德国海军又建成了60艘驱逐舰，而英国海军则建成了78艘。因此，与无畏舰和轻巡洋舰的情况不同，在战争时期，德国在驱逐舰建造上，并未落后英国太多。
By the eve of Jutland, Germany had commissioned 193 seaworthy destroyers since introducing the type with the S90 class, and Britain had commissioned 221 since the Rivers. However, because construction rate was reduced while Fisher’s Tribals and Crickets were being built, Britain had a greater margin in more modern boats if only turbine-powered boats are counted, the ratio was 188:124. As with light cruisers, Britain’s losses had also been lighter; 8:27 in all types, 5:16 in those with turbines. Thus, just prior to the Battle of Jutland, the ratios of surviving commissioned boats stood at 213:166 for all types, 183:108 for those with turbines. In destroyers Britain’s superiority was not as commanding as it was in other types.
至日德兰海战之时，双方建成的驱逐舰数量对比，是221比193。但由于费舍尔任期之初，英国海军只建造了少量真正的驱逐舰，因此在新锐舰艇方面，英国海军要更占优势一些。如果只计入配备蒸汽轮机的驱逐舰的话，那么数字就会变为188比124。与轻巡洋舰的情况类似，英国海军损失的驱逐舰数量，也比德国海军更少，前者损失了8艘，后者损失了27艘，其中配备有蒸汽轮机的，分别是5艘和16艘。在此情况下，至日德兰海战之时，双方实际拥有的驱逐舰数量，是213比166，其中配备有蒸汽轮机的，是183比108（英方优势分别是28%和69%）。所以，在驱逐舰方面，英国海军的领先优势，并不如无畏舰和轻巡洋舰方面那么明显。
11、由于英国海军的轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰相对更新一些，因此在质量方面，也具备一定的优势。根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.27）和John Campbell（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.23）：
Germany started building light cruisers earlier, adopted turbines rather slowly and persisted with designs that mounted the 4.1in gun. Britain restarted construction of the type after turbine propulsion was well established, soon increased the annual building rate and adopted the larger 6in gun five years before the first German class with the 5.9in...The twelve Carolines and Galateas and the Chester burnt oil fuel only.
德国海军很早就开始建造轻巡洋舰了，但采用蒸汽轮机的时间较晚，且主炮口径长期停留在10.5cm。英国海军采用蒸汽轮机的时间较早，但他们开始大规模建造轻巡洋舰的时间，要比德国方面晚上不少。尽管如此，英国方面开始配备6英寸火炮的时间，却要比德国方面早了5年。另外，在日德兰海战的参战轻巡洋舰中，英国海军的林仙级、C级、切斯特号，是全燃油动力的。
German designs carried more torpedoes, the British a heavier gun armament...All the destroyers that fought at Jutland were turbine powered. But, whereas all the British boats were oil-fired, two of the German flotillas still had to contend with mixed coal-and-oil firing.
德国驱逐舰的鱼雷搭载量更大，而英国驱逐舰则具备更强的火炮配置。在日德兰海战时，双方参战的驱逐舰，都是由蒸汽轮机驱动的，但英国方面都是采用全燃油动力的，而德国方面则有两支驱逐舰中队，采用的是油煤混烧动力。
结论：在轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰方面，相比于英国海军，德国海军要更早产出成熟的设计。因此在20世纪最初的10年间，他们始终在这两个领域占据着优势。但在费舍尔任期的后期，英国海军也开始奋起直追了，于是至大战爆发之时，双方的轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰数量几乎持平了。具体来说，在轻巡洋舰方面，由于德国的建造规模和进度赶不上英国，而损失数量又超过英国，因此至日德兰海战时，德国海军的轻巡洋舰规模已经远远落后于英国；在驱逐舰方面，由于德国的建造规模和进度并未明显输给英国，因此英国海军在这个领域的数量优势，并不如轻巡洋舰领域那般明显。另外，由于德国海军自19世纪末期起，就一直在有计划地批量建造轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰，而英国海军直到费舍尔任期的后期，才开始大量建造轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰，因此他们的军舰，整体而言要比德国海军的更为新锐一些。
五、潜艇：并未形成明确竞争的领域
与战列舰、战列巡洋舰、轻巡洋舰、驱逐舰的情况不同，截止至大战爆发为止，英德两国并未在潜艇领域形成明确的竞争。
1、尽管从后世的角度看，德国潜艇部队要比英国潜艇部队出名的多，但事实上，在20世纪初时，德国海军的潜艇发展情况，是要落后于英国的。根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.3-4 & P.7 & P.11 & & P.16-17）：
As soon as France and America achieved some successes with submarines, the Admiralty moved decisively, in the three years 1901-04 ordering from Vickers five ‘Holland’ boats to a licensed American design, thirteen ‘A’-class boats (still largely experimental) and then eleven of the ‘B’ class. Thirty-eight C-class boats were authorised in the four years from 1905-06, and all had been commissioned before the end of 1910.
在潜艇领域，最早取得进展的国家，是法国和美国。此后，英国海军果断出手，在1901-04年间，先后向维克斯公司订购了多批潜艇：首先是5艘实验性质的霍兰德型潜艇，接下来是13艘A级潜艇和11艘B级潜艇。在1905-09年间，英国海军又购买了38艘C级潜艇。
However, even in 1904 the need had been recognised for a substantially larger ‘overseas’ type that could operate for some days on an enemy coast. Though delayed, the prototype D1 was ordered in 1906 and she ran her trials in late 1908. D2 was built under the programme for 1908-09 and the rest of the class (D3-D8) under that for 1909-10...E-class were enlarged and improved versions of the overseas D-type.
不过，在1904年时，英国海军就意识到，他们需要一种吨位较大的、能够在敌国沿海地区潜伏多日的远洋潜艇。尽管相关工作延迟了不少，但在1906年时，他们终于订购了1艘原型艇，即D1号潜艇（D级使用的是柴油发动机，此前的英国潜艇使用的则是汽油发动机）。在1908年时，D1号完成了试航。同时，在1908-09财年，英国海军订购了D2号潜艇。至1909-10财年时，他们则一口气订购了6艘潜艇：D3号、D4号、D5号、D6号、D7号、D8号。再后来，他们又在D型的基础上，设计出了舰体更大的改进款设计：E级潜艇。
Germany did not complete her first experimental coastal submarine, U1, until December 1906 because of Tirpitz’s refusal to create ‘a museum of experiments’. She was followed by three more experimental boats and then, up to the commissioning of U18 in November 1912, by a series of designs of similar displacement to the British D-class. But, because of problems in developing suitable lightweight diesel engines, all were powered by kerosene (paraffin) engines.
由于提尔皮茨不愿意建造一堆实验品，因此直到1906年12月时，德国海军才获得其第一艘潜艇：U1号。并且这也只是1艘实验性质的近岸潜艇。接下来，德国人又建造了3艘实验性质的潜艇。再接下来，他们又建造了14艘吨位与英国海军的D级相仿的潜艇。不过，由于德国人起初未能研发出适合潜艇使用的、可靠且轻量化的柴油机，因此上述的这18艘潜艇，使用的都是煤油发动机。
By the end of 1911-12, Britain had commissioned forty-nine coastal submarines of the B and C classes and seven of the overseas D-class...Excluding the experimental U1-U4, Germany had commissioned nine U-boats but, while they were similar to the D-class in displacement, all were powered by the unsatisfactory kerosene engines...The change to true diesels began in 1910 with the order for U19.
至1911-12年底时，英国海军已经建成了49艘B级和C级潜艇（此前还有5艘霍兰德型和13艘A级），外加7艘远洋潜艇，即D级。而德国方面，如果排除U1-U4号这四艘实验性潜艇的话，德国海军还建成了9艘潜艇。不过，尽管这些潜艇的排水量都与D级相当，但配备的却是煤油发动机（D级是柴油发动机）。1910年开工建造的U19号，是德国海军第1艘配备柴油发动机的潜艇。
2、截止至日德兰海战为止，英国海军的潜艇部队规模，要比德国海军更大。根据Norman Friedman（British Submarines in Two World Wars）、Eberhard Rössler（The U-Boat, P.38）以及Patrick J. Kelly（Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy, P.408）的说法：
British submarines grew enormously after 1914. At that time it comprised 62 submarines. On 30 June 1916 there were 130 submarines.
在1914年时，英国海军总共有62艘潜艇；开战之后，英国海军的潜艇数量增长很快，至1916年6月30日时，他们总共拥有130艘潜艇。
At the outbreak of hostilities, U1-U28 were in service, and U29-U41 would have been if the promised delivery dates had been met...On 1 March 1916 Germany had 54 boats at the Front, with another 149 in construction, trials, or refit.
在大战爆发之时，德国海军总共有28艘潜艇（U1到U28号）已经入役，另有13艘潜艇（U29-U41号）即将完工。至1916年3月1日时，德国海军总共有54艘潜艇处于现役状态，另有149艘处在建造、试航、或者修整状态。
结论：潜艇是一种新兴产物，其相关技术直到大战前夕时才达到初步成熟的状态，且潜艇的运用战术也仍处在摸索阶段，因此在大战爆发之初时，双方舰队所拥有的潜艇数量都不太多。战争爆发后，双方潜艇部队在实战中展现出了强大的能力，于是英德两国都建造了大量的潜艇，不过在日德兰海战中，潜艇并未发挥出实质性的作用。
六、造舰费用与规模
最后，让我们通过造舰费用与规模上的对比，来对英德海军竞赛的话题进行总结。
英德海军竞赛的背后，是英德两国的国力的此消彼长。根据D. K. Brown的说法（The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922）
Sea power must always be based on economic power. During the nineteenth century the United Kingdom became the leading European industrial power and just maintained that position until the outbreak of war. Germany was, however, catching up fast, leaving the two nations level. In the early years of the century, Great Britain was spending more on the services than Germany but this position was soon reversed. However, a much larger proportion of the German budget was spent on the army since the navy was always a secondary consideration and the RN was therefore consistently able to out-build them. The diagram below compares the funds devoted by each navy to new construction.
经济实力，是海军实力的基础。截止至一战爆发为止，英国依然是工业实力最强的欧洲国家，不过德国的追赶脚步也很快，因此两国的国力，当时几乎已经持平了。在20世纪初年时，英国的军费开支是超过德国的，但后来局面就发生了逆转。不过，由于德国的军费，大部分是花费在陆军上的，而海军只能屈居于次席，因此英国海军的军费，还是大大超出德国海军的。下文中的图表，就双方海军的造舰经费进行了对比。
The cumulative total number of ships launched year by year from 1906 to the end of 1914 for each navy is shown in the graphs. The Pie Charts attempt to show how the new construction funds were split between ship types by the rival navies. The proportions differ only slightly with both concentrating on capital ships; 65 per cent by the RN, 72 per cent by Germany. Germany was building as many capital ships as was possible. The British response in capital ships was close to the planned ratio of 1.6:1 and absorbed so much of her resources that there was little to spare for trade protection, minesweeping etc. Any shift of funds would mean fewer capital ships and the margin was narrow. It is interesting that neither navy was spending much on submarines.
下文中，还列出了双方海军在1906-1914年间开工建造的军舰数量。此外，下文中的饼图，则展示了双方海军的造舰经费的分配情况。双方的经费，主要都是集中在主力舰上的：英国造舰费用的65%、德国造舰费用的72%，都是花在这些军舰上的。换句话说，德国海军在建造主力舰方面花了很多钱，而英国海军也在努力实现其设想的六成优势，因此能分配给其他类型军舰的经费就很少了。如果将经费挪作他用的话，那么其在主力舰方面的优势就会缩小。值得注意的是，双方在建造潜艇方面，花费的军费都很少。
1906-1914年间的英德两国的造舰费用对比
通过下图，我们可以看到，在这些年间，德国海军的造舰费用，大约只有英国海军的一半左右（最高达到过七成，最低则只有四成）。
http://www.warships.com.cn/data/attachment/album/202205/25/112124z1d7gjulfvdznlul.png
1906-1914年间的英国海军的造舰情况
下表中，列出了1906-14年间，英国海军在每个财年内批准建造的军舰数量（不含自治领出资建造的军舰）。从左至右，每一列分别是：财年、战列舰、战列巡洋舰、轻巡洋舰、驱逐舰、潜艇。我们可以看到，自1908-09财年起，英国海军的轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰建造，明显有所提速；自1909-10财年起，战列舰的建造也明显提速了。此后，他们每年都会建造4-5艘主力舰（战列舰和战列巡洋舰）、6±2艘轻巡洋舰、以及20±5艘驱逐舰。
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1906-1914年间的德国海军的造舰情况
下表中，列出了1906-14年间，德国海军在每个财年内批准建造的军舰数量。从左至右，每一列分别是：财年、战列舰、大型巡洋舰、小型巡洋舰、驱逐舰。我们可以看到，在这些年间，德国海军每年建造2-3艘战列舰、1艘大型巡洋舰、2艘小型巡洋舰、12艘驱逐舰。
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1906-1914年间的英德两国海军的造舰情况对比
下图中，列出了1906-14年间，英德两国海军累计开工建造的主力舰、轻巡洋舰、以及驱逐舰的数量。我们可以看到，自1909年起，英国海军的军舰建造数量开始大幅超越德国海军，从而有效地巩固了其海军优势地位。
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1906-1914年间的英德两国的造舰费用分配情况对比
通过下图，我们可以看到，在这些年间，英国海军的造舰费用，有47%用于战列舰，18%用于战列巡洋舰，15%用于轻巡洋舰，15%用于驱逐舰，5%用于潜艇；另一方面，德国海军的造舰费用，则是51%用于战列舰，21%用于战列巡洋舰，11%用于轻巡洋舰，11%用于驱逐舰，6%用于潜艇。
换句话说，相比于英国海军，德国海军的造舰费用，花费在战列舰和战列巡洋舰上的比例更高，花费在轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰上的比例则更低一些。
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为了在海军经费总额明显低于英国海军的情况下，尽可能建造更多的主力舰，德国海军不得不在轻型舰艇的数量上有所牺牲。其结果就是，英国海军的舰队配置，要比德国海军更为平衡——尤其是在轻巡洋舰的数量上，前者明显要比后者更多。
结论：在英德海军竞赛的过程中，战列舰和战列巡洋舰的建造，是双方竞争的核心赛道。而轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰，则是舰队体系下的非常重要的辅助舰艇，因此双方在此领域也投入了较多资源。由于德国海军的造舰费用，始终难以企及英国海军的规模，因此在战列舰和战列巡洋舰的数量上，他们始终只能维持在英国海军的六到七成规模。至于轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰，尽管德国海军起初是占据优势地位的，但在海军竞赛陷入白热化之后，他们在这两个领域，也逐渐输给了英国海军。至于潜艇，截止至大战爆发为止，双方并未进行造舰竞赛。
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