美国装甲巡洋舰的现代化改造计划
本帖最后由 第四弦 于 2022-3-19 21:37 编辑节选自弗里德曼U.S. Cruisers An Illustrated Design History第二章
The position of the eight big armored cruisers changed again with the Washington Treaty of 1922. Now they were to be, by law, more powerful than any new cruisers that might be built. Modernization became a meaningful option, although it was never exercised. In May 1922 C&R studied a conversion to increase the speed of the ships to 25 or perhaps 27 knots “without excessive expenditures of power or without taking a prohibitive amount of water aboard due to freeboard.” A study of weight distribution curves showed enough similarity between the armored cruisers and the scouts (Omahas) to suggest that, at the least, the former would behave no worse in a seaway. The bow would be flared and modified to approach that planned for the defunct battle cruisers. This study continued into 1923, a March memo of that year discussing conversion to oil burning and possible torpedo protection and armament improvement, such as the installation of triple 8-in/55 turrets. In the end nothing was done.
The modernization issue was raised again late in 1928. The war plans division of OpNav argued from the first that such an effort would be pointless. Modernization would entail the installation of new 8-in/55 guns, antiaircraft battery, fire controls, oil-fired boilers, and torpedo protection bulkheads. Ships in reserve would have to be reconditioned. The estimated cost, $6 million, did not include new engines; despite the 1922 study, War Plans claimed that any significant increases in speed would be extremely expensive, as “the underwater lines of these ships do not lend themselves to such increases.” Without any great improvement in speed, however, the ships had little tactical value.
They would probably be most useful in support of the battle fleet, where their speed would match that of the heavier ships. War Plans found them useful both in screening against cruisers and in supporting; destroyers against enemy cruisers. Massing them would offset their individual tactical deficiencies; War Plans estimated that a squadron of eight would probably be adequate to cover a destroyer attack in the face of four modern 8-in-gun cruisers.
The fundamental issue was political: War Plans feared that agitation for such reconstruction would upset navy plans for cruiser construction. “The mere fact of their superior tonnage would, in the public esteem, make them count as vessels comparable the modern cruiser,” which was expected to cost about $17 million. In January 1929 War Plans extended its argument to one of good faith: the new fifteen-cruiser program was intended to replace the eight elderly ships, and “it would not redound to the credit of the Navy Department if under these circumstances it had obtained an authorization for fifteen cruisers and then proposed the modernization of eight of the cruisers which were included in the replacement list.” Nor did it seem profitable to modernize ships of this age, which might be twenty-five to twenty-eight years old upon completion of their modernization. BuOrd considered it impractical to replace their guns, so that at the end of a forty-three-year career (fifteen-year postmodernization life), they might have to face weapons over four decades more advanced.
Detailed studies by C&R showed that a 58,000-SHP power plant, similar to that planned for the new carrier Ranger, could be installed without disturbing the existing shaft lines for a speed of about 26 knots, above which speed the speed-power curve rose prohibitively. BuOrd could increase 8-in elevation to 30 degrees, and 10-in elevation to 40 degrees. A modern fire control system would require a tripod foremast. It turned out that little could be done to improve torpedo protection, although the former large, open 6-in gunports would be sealed and compartmentation improved, for example, through elimination of the underwater torpedo room. Four 6-in guns would be moved from the second to the main deck, and two more mounted in the superstructure; four 5-in AA guns would also be mounted there. In addition, C&R made provision for two triple 21-in torpedo tubes.
The bureau also compared the two classes of armored cruiser with the new Pensacola. In effect, all of these ships would be unprotected. For example, the 10-in/40 gun could fire at up to 20,000 yards; it could penetrate the side of the Pensacola at any lesser range and her deck at any range beyond 18,000 yards. With increased elevation, the armored cruiser could penetrate the side armor of the Pensacola out to extreme range, 31,000 yards. However, the Pensacola could do about the same, penetrating the armored cruiser's deck at 18,000 and her side at 20,000 yards--and having more than twice as many guns. It could, however, be argued that the 6-in battery of the older cruiser would make up some of the difference. Pitted against the 8-in/45 armored cruiser, the Pensacola would actually enjoy a narrow zone of immunity (15,000 to 18,000 yards), and even with increased elevation she would outrange the earlier ship (35,000 versus 28,000 yards). Not surprisingly, the eight cruisers were put up for sale later in 1929.
Sketch of the proposed reconstruction of the armored cruiser Seattle (ex-Washington), 1929. All guns were to have been removed from her gun deck; the original plan shows either four 6-in guns or a pair of triple- torpedo tubes amidships (with four 6-in guns at the ends in either case) on the main deck above. She would have carried four 5-in/25 AA guns on her superstructure deck, with a pair of open 6-in guns at the forward end. Note the new oil-burning boilers, installation of which would have made space for torpedo protection bulkheads.
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要点：
1.随着华盛顿海军条约的签订，8艘装甲巡洋舰（所谓的BIG TEN，战争期间损失2艘）可能强于之后建造的任何巡洋舰，对其实施改造也就成为了一个值得考虑的选择。
2.1928-1929年拿出了相对正式的研究方案。在不影响现有轴系的情况下，可以安装最高5.8万马力的动力装置，类似于突击者号航母，预计航速26节。10英寸/8英寸主炮可以增大仰角，6英寸副炮保留部分并抬高安装位置，另外增加5英寸防空炮和鱼雷发射管。除了TDS，防护没有调整，很可能是因为动力表现已然不佳，增强防护需要额外增重，意味着突出部和更进一步削弱的航速。
3.10英寸炮装巡与彭萨科拉级互相都没有免疫区；彭萨科拉级对8英寸炮装巡的免疫区为15000-18000码。考虑到航速与火炮数量差距，这种改造最终被认为没有多大意义。
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一点想要讨论的内容：
美国人的这些讨论表明，在华盛顿海军条约下，旧装巡这里其实是有空子可以钻的；他们的装巡改造效果不好是另一回事。
如果说，存在某种更适合改造的装巡，比如说变更了武备的德雷克级，这种改造思路似乎大有可为。德雷克级的高速动力表现远强于美国装巡（设计上是30000马力23节，但试航时在31450马力下达到24.11节，服役中也经常轻松突破24节），其轴系容许的功率上限也高于美国装巡。而参照蒙默斯级到德文郡级的转变，如果RN没有选择小装巡路线，德雷克级的后续舰出现全7.5英寸/9.2英寸的火力配置也并非不可能。实际上早在设计强大级的时候，就隐约有这样的倾向：
Controller (Rear Admiral Fisher) considered DNC's ship a particularly bad bargain compared with the new American armoured cruisers Brooklyn and New York, with their twin 8in turrets and 8in wing guns (twins in Brooklyn) firing right ahead.……DNO responded that ammunition supply might be poor, but it would be quite enough to decide an action. How could the Royal Navy build cruisers 6000 tons larger, supposedly superior to any other cruiser in the world, yet inferior to the American armoured cruiser, at least in armament?
换个方向的话，高速特化版的爱丁堡公爵/勇士/米诺陶级也可以作为备选项。对于美国来说，这可以是BIG TEN的后续舰，对于日本来说则可以是筑波、鞍马的另一形态。
总之，如果在华盛顿海军条约签订之时有这样的一种装巡，符合如下特征：
1.线型优良，动力舱巨大，高速性潜力良好，不改动轴系的前提下通过更换动力系统可达到28-30节航速；
2.火炮口径能对条约巡洋舰构成优势，但又不至于被条约划入战列舰行列；数量可以稍逊（比如单舷6门，具体布局可能性太多，不多说）；
3.侧舷防护6英寸起步，水平防护有调整空间（比如说可以通过放弃副炮以及对应的炮位防护，把重量转移给额外的水平装甲）。
那么她基本上就具备了现代化改造的价值。而且，这并非瞄准未来、牺牲当下战力、刻意打造的所谓“保值舰”，从历史时间线来看，符合以上特征的装巡是完全有可能的，其战力不会逊于、甚至还可能略优于史实一等装巡。
好了，前置设定做完，提两个问题供讨论：
1.霍金斯级不划算，这点无须多说。如果在设计建造霍金斯级的时间点，用类似上述的装巡改造方案取而代之，会不会是一个比较划算的选择？
2.如果英美日任意一方在1920年代实施了上述的装巡改造，会对之后的一系列海军军控谈判产生什么样的影响？（比如说，伦敦海军条约会不会向日内瓦谈判那样不欢而散）？
条约上可能会单独列个老舰改装份额吧....做到这点不难，其实各国适于改装的大型装巡大致级别是相当的，圈出一个特定范围专门给它们并不困难，至于说划进主力舰还是巡洋舰其实无所谓，反正就是特设的一个舰种。 相比于改老装巡，英日改老战巡性价比也才更高吧，美国装巡底子太差了。 英国的无敌日本的鞍马意大利的埃琳娜女王我觉得底子都不错。 本帖最后由 海上君主 于 2022-3-21 13:12 编辑
老装巡没人理就是因为够人畜无害，造得好恐怕就得占主力舰吨位，出现在废弃名单里了。也请注意末代装巡和霍金斯的时间差，各国会无视一些老又慢，但怎可能对刚完工没几年的准战巡视而不见？条约指标可能就卡在你而不是霍金斯身上了，或者其他方面让步。
楼主这个指标很难比布吕歇尔小多少，恐怕比霍金斯更不划算。战巡无疑是当时更好的选择。这种装巡1905年可能可以自然形成（不知道有战巡这码事），1915年就不太可能了。
如果真有那么个一万多吨、舰况不错的老装巡，要动武备和动力也挺贵的，未必真的划算。为改造老装巡不欢而散应该不至于，估计要占重巡总吨位。还可能因为单舰吨位过大，别国要求额外建造1.2万吨重巡之类的，你也很难找到反驳的理由。
另外很好奇的一点是船体寿命
这么老的船 还有余寿可以出海吗？
前无畏舰或者无畏舰的寿命相比现代军舰似乎满普通的
经历过多次大改造的金刚似乎也有船壳铆钉老化的问题
船壳开个洞再给海浪打一打就裂开沈船了 oopsgeez 发表于 2022-3-21 14:06
另外很好奇的一点是船体寿命
这么老的船 还有余寿可以出海吗？
前无畏舰或者无畏舰的寿命相比现代军舰似乎 ...
六六舰队的不是二战还能用吗？ 这种老装巡改完了在美国海军里没啥战术地位和价值，就连亚洲舰队都要换新CA撑门面。但要是放在德国海军里，还可以陪着袖珍战舰一起去搞破交。便宜处理给小国海军当主力舰摆设其实最佳，但我大英不会容许二表弟公然扩大影响力。
日本那票旧装巡也就在沿海欺负了一下果党，剩下时间都是当训练舰用，基本没发挥啥作用。它们主机烧煤不用油才是最大的优点。即便如此，鬼子还是造了香取和香椎。 我感觉这脑洞就跟计划给衣阿华用列克星敦的旧炮一样，阿米经常有很外行的不可思议的想法
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