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少将
 
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本帖最后由 o平阳公主o 于 2013-9-11 07:38 编辑
After the battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, the still-unresolved debate carried
on. Rear Admiral George D. Murray, who had lost Hornet, his flagship, to Japanese
bomb and torpedo attacks, argued that two-carrier task forces were too slow
to take the offensive when that was imperative. Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid,
who had commanded the Enterprise task force, did not agree. His position was
that “by having two carriers together one carrier can take care of all routine flying
while the other maintains her full striking group spotted and ready to launch on
short notice.” As Lundstrom finds, there was no consensus among the carrier
and task force commanders, “with opinion almost equally divided between concentration
and dispersion.”
------上文引自Thomas C Hone的《REPLACING BATTLESHIPS WITH AIRCRAFT
CARRIERS IN THE PACIFIC IN WORLD WAR II》一文
南太之后,金凯德指出了两航母特混的好处:一艘全权负责舰队上空直掩,另一艘专门进行对敌舰队侦查和攻击队的持续发飞
日本人的小飞甲如果这么干恐怕是直掩也搞不好、攻击也搞不好吧(个人意见)
@akagizuo
静静快来 |
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There, only there,
in the annihilation of hate and anger, and ego,
is our salvation.
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