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[战史档案] Pieter Bakels对萨沃岛海战的整理总结

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七年服役纪念章

发表于 2016-4-26 10:31 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
本帖最后由 deltyby 于 2016-4-26 23:45 编辑

这篇同样来自navsource,个人渣翻还请见谅,这篇文章里面有不少有争议的地方,还请各位看官酌情采纳
【转载请注明出处】Pieter Bakels(知名美国战史研究学者)对萨沃岛海战的整理总结
接下来的内容是Pieter Bakels(知名美国战史研究学者)对这次战斗的整理总结。

2300时,华盛顿号的SG海平面搜索雷达在340度位置发现除共同行动的美军舰艇编队(两艘战列舰、四艘驱逐舰)外的目标群,距离18千码。

华盛顿号战列舰主炮指挥仪将目标选定为该目标群中比较大的两个目标,其一是日军桥本少将指挥的川内号轻巡洋舰(隶属桥本信太郎的扫讨队),射程计算仪立刻做出反应得出了当前射击诸元,华盛顿号的三个主炮塔立刻将主炮转向右舷,瞄准距离11千码。

“开火!”开火命令在2317正式下达,“地狱的大门打开了”——二号指挥室中的HunterCeonin如是说。华盛顿号九炮齐发,16英寸炮弹向川内号扑去。

与此同时,华盛顿号右舷的副炮组在三号副炮指挥仪(原文sky 3)的指引下向敌方舰群中一艘驱逐舰“敷波”号展开了射击,一分钟后,南达科他号战列舰也加入了对“敷波”号的攻击。

1.在南达科他号的一号主炮指挥仪中,威廉姆.P.盖瑞担任瞄准手。他在他的回忆录中这样写道:“这是我们首次收到主炮任务,(李上将)命令我们对敌舰中较大的目标进行攻击,主炮组向敌舰发射了第一轮炮弹后,观察员喊道:‘诸元不变!诸元不变!(no change! no change!)’”。南达科他号舰桥和观察站在报告中表示观察到“敷波”号侧翻沉没。

注:然而,敷波号和川内号其实并没有被击中,两舰边释放烟雾边回旋,消失在了雷达和光学观测仪器的视野中。由于使用无焰火药,日本海军释放烟雾时开火还击的炮口火光在烟雾中很像是起火,在能见度极低的情况下导致了美军的观测失误,实际上两舰未受损害。

编队中美军的驱逐舰也加入了攻击这两艘敌舰的队列,他们也对萨沃岛近岸方向的光点展开了射击。

日军在萨沃岛上并没有布置炮位,美军驱逐舰收到的攻击来自此时正在绕萨沃岛西行的驱逐舰“凌波”、“浦波”,跟随着这两艘驱逐舰的尾流,日军轻巡洋舰“长良”(木村进上将的第十行动队旗舰)、驱逐舰“照月”、“雷”、“白雪”、“初雪”也向交火位置赶来。这场轻型舰只之间的对决进行得非常残酷、不对称且短暂。

出于缺乏夜战经验和希望节省鱼雷来对付大型目标的想法,四艘美军驱逐舰并没有投放鱼雷,而是使用舰炮进行还击,格温号驱逐舰发射照明弹试图照亮日舰所在位置,然而她的炮口火光成为了敌舰的靶子,“浦波”和“凌波”向格温号驱逐舰集中火力攻击,所幸没有得到命中。

但是在2330时,美军驱逐舰队旗舰“沃克”号受到了雨点般的5英寸和5.5英寸炮弹攻击,并有多枚命中左舷,紧接着又被一条鱼雷击中右舷,鱼雷的巨大爆炸炸飞了整个舰首,2345时舰长下达了弃舰命令,尽管已经在弃舰前检查过深水炸弹的保险,但是依然有几枚深水炸弹从轨道上滑落下来并爆炸并造成了严重伤亡,舰长和大量水手阵亡。

日舰向其余三艘驱逐舰:“本哈姆”、“格温”、“普列斯顿”上持续倾泻着炮弹,2336时普列斯顿被“长良”的一轮齐射命中,彻底报废,116名水兵阵亡。

格温号也被击中,她被两发五英寸炮弹击中,其中一发击中引擎室,另一发击中了舰艉,但是没有造成严重影响,格温号各炮位自由射击,持续对日舰还击。

本哈姆号也被一枚鱼雷命中,鱼雷撕扯掉了整个舰首,本哈姆号还能行驶,但是速度极低,她一边进行着损管作业,一边对向日舰发射炮弹。

沃克号和普列斯顿的残骸还在海面上燃烧着,她们的水兵在漂浮着燃油的海面上挣扎着。

沃克(上)和普列斯顿(下)在战斗不久前的最后一张照片

2333时,南达科他号上突发严重电力故障,线路超载,所有陀螺仪和电子火控设备失灵。

Ivant Musicant在他的作品《战争中的战列舰》中称,在萨沃岛海战之后,南达科他号和华盛顿号上面的水兵关系一直很紧张。在努美阿的海滩上,华盛顿号上的好事者称南达科他号为“shitty dick”(南达科他:South Dakota)并导致两舰水兵间爆发了一场情节严重的斗殴。尝试调解的李上将与水兵沟通失败,愤怒地说:“一场战争就够头疼的了!!”,他从此将两舰水兵的上岸活动时间错开了。

科学狂人李上将

最后南达科他号的舰长盖奇带着其余高级军官到华盛顿号上和华盛顿号舰长等人对瓜岛夜战详细情况交换了意见,暂时缓解了两舰间的紧张关系。

经过战斗之后的调查,断电前,南达科他号上的轮机长在调整出力时发生了误操作,他拉下了线路断路器(电闸),瘫痪了整舰的供电,紧接着,激烈的交火产生的震荡进一步破坏了已经瘫痪的电路——雷达、火控系统、驱动炮塔的马达、供弹机、无线电全部罢工,把南达科他号变成了一个完全的瞎子。

威廉姆.A.胡格在事后描述了船员拯救这一艘陷入瘫痪的巨舰的过程。

1942年14日夜的激烈交火中,胡格是南达科他号上一号配电盘的操作员,南达科他号上一共有四个配电盘,每个连接着两台1000千瓦的发电机。和他在一起的还有一名不明身份的少尉和舰上电力控制员霞飞。

舰上电力控制员卢斯科通过和三号炮塔附近的维修小组通话得知一发炮弹命中了三号炮塔附近的线路,导致局部短路,四号配电盘断开。

据胡格回忆,断路器的罢工在电路管理相关人员中引起了一阵恐慌。

指挥室下达命令要求切断三号四号配电盘间的母线,这导致三号配电盘也停止了工作,连锁效应没有到此停止,二号配电盘也被殃及。

胡格写道:“舰上没有人意识到这些连锁效应,除了我的队长,他无视舰桥的命令,要求不许切断到二号配电盘的母线,这才保住了二号配电盘。”

“如果我们切断所有的母线”他继续写道“我们的船会彻底失去电力,最后在敌军火力的无情打击下沉进铁底湾”

与南达科他号彻底失去联系时,华盛顿号战列舰正驶向沃克号和普列斯顿号驱逐舰的残骸,两艘驱逐舰幸存的水兵还在附近水面上漂浮着。亨特.雷在舰桥上下令改变航线,向左拐后向右拐进入一条和之前平行但更贴近瓜岛的航线,绕开了驱逐舰的残骸以避免在火光中显出轮廓,华盛顿号保持着在黑暗之中的潜行,并向驱逐舰残骸附近投放了救生筏。

南达科他在断电三分钟后,没有跟上华盛顿号的航线,而是从驱逐舰残骸的另一侧经过,从火光和敌舰之间经过的南达科他形成了巨大且清晰的舰影,成了绝好的目标。

日军没有放过这个机会,浦村号的探照灯立刻照亮了南达科他的上层建筑,长良号带领其他驱逐舰占据鱼雷发射站位,向南达科他号发射了34发鱼雷,但是最后全部脱靶。

华盛顿号用五英寸副炮向浦村号开火,迫使浦村号关闭探照灯,其他日舰在浦村号关闭探照灯后依次打开了探照灯以维持对南达科他号的照射,同样也遭到华盛顿号的压制被迫关闭。

此时南达科他号恢复了部分电力,但是依然无法和华盛顿号取得联系,萨沃岛对雷达侦查造成了影响,加上日军使用的无焰火药使其炮口闪光非常难观测到,南达科他的还击效果有限。

驻守在南达科他右舷一个40mm防空炮炮组中的水兵Arther.A.Aldred 回忆道,他们接到命令要求立刻寻找掩护,因为舰艉的三号主炮塔即将对正后方的目标开火,就在他刚刚找到位置躲避起来时,主炮开火了,炮口焰点燃了停放在舰艉的三架水上飞机,而第二轮炮击时,恐怖的炮口爆风直接将还在燃烧的水上飞机吹进了海里。

2340时,近藤信竹中将带领着他的主力来到了战场,麾下有两艘驱逐舰、“爱宕”和“高雄”号巡洋舰以及“雾岛”号战列舰。

华盛顿号的5英寸副炮正在向日方开火

华盛顿号使用16英寸主炮对“雾岛”号进行炮击

华盛顿号的雷达锁定了其中最大的“雾岛”,但是因为担心误伤南达科他号而暂时没有开火,2345时,格温号和本哈姆号驱逐舰接到李上将的命令全速撤离了战场。2355时,交火又开始了。

近藤的舰队驶过沃克号的残骸,逐渐逼近南达科他号战列舰,再次用探照灯照亮了她。两艘驱逐舰向她发射鱼雷,没有命中。“爱宕”、“高雄”、“雾岛”在仅仅1800码的距离上向南达科他号射击,多发炮弹击中了南达科他的上层建筑。

2。南达科他用16英寸主炮回敬日军,并击中了“爱宕”和“高雄”,而她的通讯天线被毁,无法使用无线电进行联络,六台火控雷达中的四台彻底报废。

三号主炮塔座圈被一发十四英寸穿甲弹击中,炮弹没有穿透但是三号炮塔操作员报告转动困难,并且有伤员出现。受苦受难的不只有三号炮塔,上层建筑多处发生火灾,一条供油线路破损,航迹上出现少许漏油。南达科他由于找不到华盛顿号,决定向计划中的撤离地点移动,此时她身上有42处战伤,38人阵亡,60人受伤。

0000时左右,一艘敌舰打开探照灯开始照射南达科他号,美军一开始以为这是一艘巡洋舰,但是实际上这是“雾岛’号战列舰,华盛顿号测得“雾岛”到华盛顿的距离为8400码。

0000时整,舰桥下达了开火命令。

华盛顿号的第一轮主炮齐射就对“雾岛”形成了跨射,舰上的五英寸副炮发射照明弹开始照明作业,一枚主炮炮弹命中雾岛号上层建筑,第三轮齐射命中“雾岛”号多处,引发大爆炸。

3.此时南达科他依然在承受“爱宕”和“高雄”的攻击,华盛顿号的副炮压制了这两艘巡洋舰,逼迫其关闭探照灯,“爱宕号”被击中起火。

华盛顿在迫使“爱宕”和“高雄”关闭探照灯后,向左转向藏身在埃斯佩兰斯海角的阴影中。

因为舰桥接到错误报告称敌舰已经被击沉,华盛顿号停止了对“雾岛”的射击,90秒后主炮恢复了射击。此时“雾岛”停止了对南达科他的射击,将炮口转向了华盛顿号并开始了第一轮齐射。

第一轮,过近

第二轮,过近

此时与南达科他保持平行行驶的日舰向南达科他发射了又一轮鱼雷,其中一枚驶向南达科他号中段,但是可能是击中了沉没的驱逐舰残骸,提前起爆了。

“雾岛”、“爱宕”、“高雄”将航向转向180度,向东南逃离华盛顿号。

恢复射击后,华盛顿用主炮和副炮在“雾岛”号中段引发大火,并接二连三地击毁了“雾岛”的炮塔。

不久后,“雾岛”号只剩尾部的一座炮塔能够工作,然而始终没有命中,而华盛顿号依然在用海量炮弹给“雾岛”洗澡。

0007时,华盛顿向雾岛号发射了最后一轮齐射,此时的“雾岛”号上大火已无法扑灭,近失弹造成了严重的船壳进水,船身右倾。方向舵锁死,只能在原地徒劳地打转。

南达科他号依然无法与华盛顿号取得联系,雷达也依然有问题,而且她正好处在华盛顿号尾部的雷达盲区中,两艘战列舰谁都找不到对方。

在维持真方位340度航行了一段时间后,华盛顿的雷达发现了左侧的敌舰舰影,那是日军“阳炎”号和“亲潮”号驱逐舰,两舰发射鱼雷后释放烟雾隐蔽。

华盛顿号以26节速度进行了180度的紧急大回旋以躲避鱼雷,舰桥目击到大量鱼雷航迹,其中四到五枚离华盛顿号非常近,最后被被华盛顿号的尾流引爆。

0044时李上将命令华盛顿号回到原航线,期间又有一枚鱼雷在尾流中爆炸。

0951时,瞭望台目视发现了南达科他号,南达科他号通过闪光信号报告她已失去战斗力,并且正在漏油。

瓜岛夜战第二天的华盛顿号战列舰

战斗宣告结束

这次战斗最大的疑问是:为什么南达科他号在沃克号的残骸附近选择右转,而不是跟随华盛顿号,结果把自己暴露在了日本人的火力之下?

我不认为南达科他的行为失当,当南达科他面对在水中挣扎着,即便弃舰依然遭受日方火力攻击的的同胞(鬼子还干过直接用驱逐舰驶过落水水兵的事,海军和陆军马鹿切开一样黑),南达科他放弃绕过残骸保全自己,而决定从残骸和敌舰间横插过去的行为完全可以理解。

其次,他们冒着被击沉的危险,吸引了日军的注意力,就像他们的同僚VT-3还有VT-8中队飞行员所做的一样,他们将自己暴露在了敌军的火力之下,但是他们的奉献并没有白费,VT-3和VT-8中队失去战斗机掩护被日军零战屠杀,他们的壮举拉低了日本直卫战机的飞行高度,使得来自企业号的全部37架“无畏”式俯冲轰炸机得以毫发无伤地飞临日本航母上空展开攻击,最终得到了完全出乎日美双方指挥官预料的战绩:击沉日军4艘航母!而南达科他遭受攻击,最后几乎彻底丧失战斗力,换来的则是华盛顿号战列舰的成功隐蔽和数量劣势下的绝地反攻。




1.此处观测到被击沉的驱逐舰其实是“凌波”
2.南达科他的16英寸主炮没有击中这两艘巡洋舰
3.此处爱宕的起火是由南达科他的5英寸副炮造成的,一枚炮弹击中爱宕舰首左侧酱油储藏室造成火灾。





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上将

十二年服役纪念章TIME TRAVELER功勋勋章钻石金双剑金橡叶铁十字勋章行政立法委骑士团勋章政道纪念章旗手终身荣誉会员

发表于 2016-4-26 21:56 | 显示全部楼层
我给你发了论坛消息。

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七年服役纪念章

 楼主| 发表于 2016-4-26 23:28 | 显示全部楼层
mathewwu 发表于 2016-4-26 21:56
我给你发了论坛消息。

收到!谢谢前辈!

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七年服役纪念章功勋勋章

发表于 2016-4-26 23:34 | 显示全部楼层
你好,该帖中有数张图显示不出来(此图片来自QQ空间,未经允许不可引用),建议用新浪微博的传图功能或者用论坛的上传文件功能。

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七年服役纪念章

 楼主| 发表于 2016-4-26 23:41 | 显示全部楼层
benzheng 发表于 2016-4-26 23:34
你好,该帖中有数张图显示不出来(此图片来自QQ空间,未经允许不可引用),建议用新浪微博的传图功能或者用 ...

谢谢提醒!

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十二年服役纪念章TIME TRAVELER功勋勋章钻石金双剑金橡叶铁十字勋章行政立法委骑士团勋章政道纪念章旗手终身荣誉会员

发表于 2016-4-27 00:45 | 显示全部楼层
“瓜岛夜战第二天的华盛顿号战列舰 ”这张由原作者提供的照片说明是不对的。

这张照片后部主炮指挥仪顶上的火控雷达天线明显是Mk 8(天线支脚左右各一),而前部主炮指挥仪顶上的雷达天线是较旧型的Mk 3(中央单一支脚),这个反常的搭配符合华盛顿号的装备记录,至少到1943年12月太平洋战列舰队5艘所属战列舰(4艘南达科他级和华盛顿号)实弹测试Mk 8雷达时华盛顿号都还是这个装备。

而萨沃岛海战时华盛顿号的前后主炮火控雷达都还是Mk 3。

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七年服役纪念章功勋勋章

发表于 2016-4-27 09:49 | 显示全部楼层
mathewwu 发表于 2016-4-27 00:45
“瓜岛夜战第二天的华盛顿号战列舰 ”这张由原作者提供的照片说明是不对的。

这张照片后部主炮指挥仪顶上 ...

先生看图真是认真,我当时也被navsource的表述所迷惑到了现在
那样的话,那张图上的对空搜索雷达就是SK吧?

顺便问下先生,
http://navsource.org/archives/01/056/015610a.jpg
这张图右方的火控雷达是否是Mk 3?
我看了一些资料,说Mk 3火控雷达有两种天线形状,一种是3'x12'(Mod 1 or 3),另一种是6'x6'(Mod 0 or 2),那应该是后者?
http://navsource.org/archives/01/056/015610.jpg

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发表于 2016-4-27 11:13 | 显示全部楼层
benzheng 发表于 2016-4-27 09:49
先生看图真是认真,我当时也被navsource的表述所迷惑到了现在
那样的话,那张图上的对空搜索雷达就是SK吧 ...

是的,出发到南太前的照片都显示华盛顿号安装的是6'x6'天线,相信萨沃海战也还是这一型,而非顶楼的3'x12'。

顶楼那张前桅顶应是SK,但我放大来看,发现下半部结构貌似有一个对角的"X",而非常见的并排"XX"。需要再比对辨识。

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九年服役纪念章

发表于 2016-5-24 09:29 | 显示全部楼层
我是小白一只,不过看到第二张图片上“USS detroit”应该是底特律号?

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发表于 2016-5-24 12:48 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 benzheng 于 2016-5-24 12:53 编辑
请叫我王大锤 发表于 2016-5-24 09:29
我是小白一只,不过看到第二张图片上“USS detroit”应该是底特律号?

是底特律,没错。。。。。不知道楼主从哪里搞来的照片,也没认真比对(不过我也没认真看就是了。。。。。)不过值得一提的是,远处就是USS Preston
USS Detroit (CL-8) at the Mare Island Navy Yard, California, 15 August 1942. Note her after 6"/53 guns and men lounging on the fantail. Circles mark recent alterations to the ship. Destroyers in the background include USS Preston (DD-379), at right, and USS Conyngham (DD-371), at left. On the far side of the pier from them are USS Caldwell (DD-605), in the far center distance beyond Preston's bow, and USS Walke (DD-416), at left beyond Conyngham. YOS-1 is in the far right distance. Photograph from the Bureau of Ships Collection in the U.S. National Archives. Photo #: 19-N-33050.

如果换个角度的话,也的确有的
http://www.navsource.org/archives/05/0537903.jpg

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九年服役纪念章

发表于 2016-5-24 17:39 | 显示全部楼层
benzheng 发表于 2016-5-24 12:48
是底特律,没错。。。。。不知道楼主从哪里搞来的照片,也没认真比对(不过我也没认真看就是了。。。。。 ...

多谢指教~原来后面那艘就是普林斯顿啊,还有后面的普林斯顿的照片,感谢+1
ps:是否有可能作者当时没找到普林斯顿的照片,然后就把这张带有普林斯顿的图放上去了?(只是猜想)

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七年服役纪念章功勋勋章

发表于 2016-5-24 17:52 | 显示全部楼层
请叫我王大锤 发表于 2016-5-24 17:39
多谢指教~原来后面那艘就是普林斯顿啊,还有后面的普林斯顿的照片,感谢+1
ps:是否有可能作者当时没找到 ...

原文如下,在navsource有的,但是没有图
其实在navsource可以轻松找到这两张图的。。。。

The following text by Pieter Bakels is a summation of the battle.

At 2300 exactly on the night of 14-15 November 1942, the "SG" surface search radar of the battleship Washington (BB-56), following the destroyers Walke (DD-416), Benham (DD-397), Preston (DD-377) and Gwin (DD-433) with another battleship astern, the new South Dakota, began tracking a target, bearing 340T, broad on the starboard bow, distant eighteen thousand yards.

The main battery Directors of Washington trained towards the larger of two targets, the Japanese cruiser Sendai under the command of Rear Admiral Hashimoto. Within seconds the rangekeeper had a firing solution and Washington's three Main Battery turrets swung to starboard, guns elevated for a range of eleven thousands yards.
"Commence Firing!" was ordered at 2317 and "all hell broke loose", as Washington blasted a nine杇un salvo at Sendai, Hunter Cronin in Secondary Conn, ("Battle 2") wrote.
Shikinami, the second target was taken under fire by the battleship抯 starboard Secondary Battery directed by "Sky 3". One minute later, South Dakota rained down shells on the destroyer Shikinami.
Aboard South Dakota, William P. Gray was assigned to Main Battery Fire Control Maintenance and Operations. His battle station was Main battery Director #1 as Director Captain/Pointer.
He wrote in his memoirs: "The first Main battery action, Savo Island, first sighting of enemy warships. We were ordered to pick out the biggest and commence firing. The closing of Main Battery. Firing key against enemy warships for the first time. Shells on the way and Spotting Officer calling: "No change! No change!"
Her bridge and spotting personnel saw Shikinami roll over and sink according to the Action Report.

However, Sendai and Shikinami retired in a loop behind a smoke screen, disappearing from view and radar in the closely confined waters of "Ironbottom Sound".
When the two Japanese ships retreated behind their smoke screens, the destroyers Walke, Benham, Preston and Gwin opened fire on them and on blobs of light, coming from the direction of the shoreline of Savo Island.
The Japanese had not emplaced batteries on Savo but the fire was coming from the destroyers Ayanami and Uranami, sent west around Savo; within their wake the cruiser Nagara (Rear Admiral Kimura) and the destroyers Teruzuki, Inazuma, Shirayuki and Hatsuyuki.
The duel was short, ferocious and uneven.

Unskilled in night fighting and saving their torpedoes for bigger stuff, the US destroyers opened up with their guns, Gwin firing starshell to illuminate the scene. Japanese spotters used their gun flashes as fine aiming points. The destroyers Ayanami and Uranami each fired a torpedo spread at Gwin but none hit.
However at 2330 Walke, the lead ship, began taking hits from 5- and 5.5-inch and fell off to port and took a torpedo eight minutes later in her starboard side, blowing off the forward part of the ship. "Abandon Ship" was ordered at 2345. Depth charges rolling off their tracks and exploding, killed its Captain and many of her hands as they cleared the ship.
The enemy cruisers rained down explosives on Benham, Preston and Gwin and a salvo from Nagara reduced Preston to a wreck and on 2336 she too had to be abandoned with 116 killed.
Then Gwin got hit, taking a pair of 5-inch shells, one in the after engine room and one on the fantail. Her guns continued firing in local control.
Benham took a torpedo in her starboard bow that blew most of it away but limped on with reduced speed, her guns firing rapidly.
Walke and Preston were enveloped in fire, their crews struggling in the oily water in the path of Washingtonand South Dakota.
At 2333 the South Dakota went blind and deaf due to a circuit overload and steamed on behind Washington towards the crippled Benham.

Ivant Musicant in his book "Battleship at War" wrote that there was bad blood among the crews of the battleships South Dakota and Washington after the night action of 14-15 November 1942, fought to prevent the final attempt of the Japanese navy to recapture Guadalcanal.
The Washington's sailors with a sneer declared war between the ships and enlisted men actually engaged in combat on the beaches at Noumea, calling the battleship South Dakota "Shitty Dick" after that battleship retired from the fight badly cut up, unable to communicate. Admiral Lee furiously dictated in a special order of the day that "One war at the time is enough!" and had the liberty days of the two ships staggered.
The South Dakota's Commanding Officer, Captain Gatch and his senior officers were ordered to report aboard Washington to go over the battle.
There it was learned that the South Dakota's Chief Engineer, contrary to established procedures, had tied down her circuit breakers, which had the effect that of putting the whole electrical system in series.
The concussion of 5-Inch hits and internal shocks of firing her own batteries overloaded the circuits and everything went out- radar, fire control stations, turret motors, ammo hoists and radio抯, leaving South Dakota blind.

William A.Hughes wrote how a ship mate, may have saved his ship (South Dakota).
On the evening of 14 November 1942 William Hughes was switchboard operator on # 1 switchboard.
South Dakota had 4 switchboards, each controlling two 1000 KW generators.
An unknown ensign and a Chief Electrician抯 Mate, Shaeffer, were there.
Electrician抯 Mate I.C. Lusk was a telephone talker with the After Repair party stationed on the second deck on the port side by the barbette of # 3 16-Inch turret.
When South Dakota took a hit to a large power panel mounted on that barbette it probably caused a short circuit to # 4 switchboard and caused her circuit breakers to kick out.
All switchboards were operating independent of each other.
Someone panicked, he wrote, either the switchboard operator or one of the Engineering Officer抯 who were stationed at # 3 Engine Room.
Orders were given to close the bus-ties between # 4 and # 3 switchboards and this knocked off # 3 switchboard which in turn closed it抯 bus-ties to # 2 switchboard and # 2 went off the line. (A bus-tie is a circuit breaker that ties two or more switchboards).
No one, but my Chief, Hughes wrote, realized what was happening and how to cure the problem. Against direct orders he ordered to hold the bus-ties to # 2 switchboard open, so that the other three switchboards could not tie in.
"If I had let them tie in, he wrote, we would have lost our power, leaving the ship with a total loss of power and would have ended up dead in the water and at the mercy of the enemy.
The Chief then told the ensign to tell the Chief Engineer to clear the problem of # 4 switchboard and then he would allow Hughes to close the bus-ties and restore power back to the ship. That Chief never got credit for saving the lives of the crew and the ship.

Ray Hunter on Washington's bridge, hearing that all communication with South Dakota had been lost, watching the burning remains of Walke and Preston ahead and hundreds of men swimming about, told the helmsman: "come left!" his exact words he later wrote.
He then straightened out on a parallel course to the one they were steaming. Leaving the burning destroyers to port and keeping them between Washington and the enemy, he avoided being silhouetted by the fires, an easy target. Dozens of men could be seen in the burning water, clinging to wreckage and life rafts were thrown at them.
South Dakota, silent now for three minutes, didn抰 follow in Washington's wake but sheered off to starboard of the sinking destroyers and presented an excellent silhouette.
At once, Hashimoto and Kimura抯 searchlights illuminated the South Dakota's superstructure. Nagara and four destroyers launched a spread of thirty-four torpedoes at point-blank range but none found their mark.
Washington's 5-inch mounts shot out the lights and took Nagara under fire and when her lights went out, switched fire to the accompanying destroyers, illuminating South Dakota. South Dakota began taking hits topside.

Savo Island抯 land mass made radar tracking difficult and the flashless powder that the Japanese used provided only small aiming points. South Dakota now had restored part of her electrical power and her guns were firing, but she was still unable to communicate with Washington.
Arthur A. Aldred抯 battle station was at the starboard 40mm quad on the fantail. Early in the action the 40mm crew was ordered to take cover forward of the # 3 16-inch turret because it was going to train around and fire at a target directly astern. He had just taken cover when a salvo was fired and instantly the fantail was ablaze. The muzzle blast had demolished and ignited the three Kingfisher catapult planes. "Had we not taken cover", he wrote, "most of us would have suffered the same fate."
The Japanese now had a new aiming point and their fire came in fast. The next 16-inch salvo blew the burning Kingfisher overboard.

At 2340 Admiral Kondo with his main body came up with two destroyers, the cruisers Atago and Takao and the Battleship Kirishima.
Washington had a fire solution for the biggest target, Kirishima within seconds but checked fire, afraid to hit South Dakota, last seen somewhere aft to starboard.
At 2345 Benham and Gwin, making best speed were ordered to retire out of the way. At 2355 fire was resumed.
Kondo抯 ships tracked South Dakota, passing inboard of the smoldering Walke and illuminated her again. Two destroyers launched a torpedo attack but none hit. The Japanese gunners on Kirishima, Atago and Takao at a range of fifty-eight hundred yards did and South Dakota took multiple hits in her superstructure and topside damage was considerable.
South Dakota replied with her 16-inch and hit Atago and Takao. However, within five minutes her radar plot was destroyed, radio communication was out and four out of six fire control radars.
The #3 16-inch turret had taken a 14-inch hit outboard of the roller path and locked in train. Gunnery stations took casualties, small fires raged in the upperworks and oil was leaking from a ruptured fuel line. Washington's location was not known to her, according to her reports and it was decided to withdraw to the rendezvous assigned by the Task Force Commander prior to the engagement. She had suffered forty-two hits, thirty-eight men were dead and sixty wounded.
Just before midnight a target, first thought to be a cruiser, illuminated South Dakota. The target was Kirishima, broad on the Washington beam, at a point-blanc range of eighty-four hundred yards.
At exactly midnight permission was given to open fire.

Washington's nine-gun salvo straddled Kirishima while her Secondary Battery began firing star shells. A hit was reported on the enemy抯 superstructure and the third 16-inch salvo landed squarely amidships, causing bright explosions.
South Dakota was still under fire from Atago and Takao and Washington's 5-inch mounts were directed against the two cruisers and shot out their searchlights, placing hits on superstructures and fires broke out on Atago.
Washington's turn to the left had made her invisible in the loom of Cape Esperance, taking the Japanese by surprise.
A report was received from Sky Control that the big target was sunk and fire ceased for ninety seconds. Kirishima checked her fire on South Dakota, leaving her to the other Japanese ships and trained her turrets towards Washington.
The first salvo was a short, short, over and over.
Their second salvo: over-short-on.
The Japanese, steaming parallel to Washington launched another torpedo spread and thirty-two separate reports of tracks were sent to Washington's bridge, one of them probably hit the debris from a sinking destroyer and blew up.
Kirishima, Atago and Takao had altered course 180 degrees and were now steaming away from Washington, north-eastwards, broad on the starboard quarter.
Washington resumed fire and hit Kirishima, smothering her with fire from both 16-inch and 5-inch. One by one her turrets were knocked out.
Finally only the after turret continued firing and she began to glow dull red amidships, brightening up as she took more hits.
At 0007 Washington, left alone, fired the last salvo at Kirishima, now a mass of flames with her underwater hull damaged by near misses, taking on water and listing to starboard.
Out of control and her steering gear shot away, she was steaming in circles.
"Cease fire" was given for the 5-inch guns since they had reached the limit of after train.
There were still multiple targets, but doubt still existed on the whereabouts of South Dakota and Washington's surface search radar could not see astern.
Unable to contact South Dakota, Washington steamed on alone.
After steaming five miles on course 340T, radar reported contacts off the port bow. They were the destroyers Kagero and Oyashio launching a spread of torpedoes. Washington, sighting their smoke screen, reversed course 180 degrees at twenty-six knots, throwing up an enormous wake.
She needed a good two minutes to settle in on her new course during which various lookouts spotted torpedo tracks, four or five of them very close and exploding in Washington's wake.
At 0044 Admiral Lee ordered Washington to steer generally southwest and she zigzagged back and forth on her base course, spotting another torpedo blow up in her wake.
At 0951 lookouts sighted South Dakota again, receiving her signal that she was not effective and she was leaking oil.
Captain Gatch was ordered to take station ahead of Washington. The ships went to general quarters again after sightings of unidentified aircraft to port which later turned out to be friendly.

The big question is: why did South Dakota turn to starboard, not following Washington, exposing herself to illumination by the burning destroyers, an easy target for the quick reacting experienced Japanese gunners?

I will not judge the men of South Dakota, seeing the survivors of their destroyers in the burning water, fellow Americans, going into harm抯 way, bringing their ship between them and an enemy, still firing on the hapless destroyers and the men in the water.
Secondly, by doing so, they attracted the attention of the Japanese, bent on the destruction of that ship, as their naval aviators had done before when they slaughtered the hapless "Devastators" of VT-3, VT-6 and VT-8 at Midway, but their sacrifice was not in vain!
It cleared the way for the final move, unexpected by both the American and the Japanese high command, that would cost them four carriers and their irreplaceable crews when CEAG: LCDR C. Wade McClusky led a total of thirty-seven Dauntless dive bombers from Enterprise (CVA-6) down to attack the enemy carriers, joined by VB-3 from Yorktown (CVA-3).
With the Zeros all at low level after dealing with the "Devastators" the SBD's had begun their attacks unhindered by enemy fighters.
And, just like McClusky, for some time, Washington could fire unobserved! Judging from the quick reaction of Sendai and Shikinami, faced with a battleship raining down shells on them, Washington was very lucky!

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发表于 2016-5-24 20:02 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 mathewwu 于 2016-5-24 20:25 编辑

既然12楼把原文贴出来了,楼主要不要斟酌一下这句话里"tied down her circuit breakers"这几个字的意思,而不要人云亦云的把它们翻成“拉下了线路断路器(电闸)”——也就是”拉闸”?

---There it was learned that the South Dakota's Chief Engineer, contrary to established procedures, had tied down her circuit breakers, which had the effect that of putting the whole electrical system in series. ---

断路器的作用本来就是在短路时断开以保护线路,和人工拉闸是一个意思,那和轮机长拉闸有什么差别?南达“被拉闸”这件事其实是大陆海武界长久以来的误区,在贴吧或其他地方早就传开了,有识者也没力一个个反驳,不过我想论坛应该有正本清源的任务。

南达级的配电系统有缺陷而容易跳闸,马萨在北非也出现过跳电状况。南达的轮机长的错误不是“拉闸”,而是怕系统轻易跳闸而违反准则“把断路器绑住“在出现战损短路时不给断电以致引发线路连续过载。

我把我所了解的背景说明在此,欢迎懂机电的网友检视我的看法。如果大家意见一致,楼主可以考虑改译。



又,正因为断路器无法断开,所以按原文应译为”指挥室下达命令要求连接close三号四号配电盘间的母线,这导致三号配电盘也停止了工作,连锁效应没有到此停止,二号配电盘也被殃及。胡格写道:“舰上没有人意识到这些连锁效应,除了我的队长,他无视舰桥的命令,要求断开open到二号配电盘的母线。”而非“断开三号四号”和“不许断开到二号”。

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十二年服役纪念章杰出服役十字勋章

发表于 2016-5-25 18:08 | 显示全部楼层
mathewwu 发表于 2016-5-24 20:02
既然12楼把原文贴出来了,楼主要不要斟酌一下这句话里"tied down her circuit breakers"这几个字的意思,而 ...

啊~~
[举手]
是我的错。
原文是:
On South Dakota, crews were patching minor holes from 5-inch hits by Ayanami when at 11:33 the chief engineer tied down her circuit breakers, violating safety procedures. The system instantly went into series, and the big ship lost electrical power.
我承认是我学识不足,不过当时能参照的资料也不多。
破坏他人睡眠和爱情的人是不能上天堂的。

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发表于 2016-5-25 20:32 | 显示全部楼层
Candybag 发表于 2016-5-25 18:08
啊~~
[举手]
是我的错。

楼主和你是神马关系?为何他错要你来顶罪?

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十二年服役纪念章杰出服役十字勋章

发表于 2016-5-25 21:06 | 显示全部楼层
mathewwu 发表于 2016-5-25 20:32
楼主和你是神马关系?为何他错要你来顶罪?

拉闸说法的最初起源,我估计是我的责任。
破坏他人睡眠和爱情的人是不能上天堂的。

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发表于 2016-5-25 21:47 | 显示全部楼层
Candybag 发表于 2016-5-25 21:06
拉闸说法的最初起源,我估计是我的责任。

是吗?拉闸说流传久远,那你也算得上是前辈咯。

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十二年服役纪念章杰出服役十字勋章

发表于 2016-5-25 22:13 | 显示全部楼层
mathewwu 发表于 2016-5-25 21:47
是吗?拉闸说流传久远,那你也算得上是前辈咯。

我主要看战史,不过只看那些文笔好的。
技术方面由于感觉枯燥,其实不甚爱好。
破坏他人睡眠和爱情的人是不能上天堂的。

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发表于 2016-5-25 22:23 | 显示全部楼层
在南达的战报里,断路器被"tie down"这个动作是写做"lock in"——锁住。下面是原文第12-13页有关部分,你既然是系铃人,不妨拿着这干货去解铃:




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十二年服役纪念章杰出服役十字勋章

发表于 2016-5-26 07:30 | 显示全部楼层
mathewwu 发表于 2016-5-25 22:23
在南达的战报里,断路器被"tie down"这个动作是写做"lock in"——锁住。下面是原文第12-13页有关部分,你既 ...

网站早已不在,网名早已不用,文章转来转去,作者名都难以觉察。
任重道远任重道远。
破坏他人睡眠和爱情的人是不能上天堂的。

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