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原文如下,在navsource有的,但是没有图
其实在navsource可以轻松找到这两张图的。。。。
The following text by Pieter Bakels is a summation of the battle.
At 2300 exactly on the night of 14-15 November 1942, the "SG" surface search radar of the battleship Washington (BB-56), following the destroyers Walke (DD-416), Benham (DD-397), Preston (DD-377) and Gwin (DD-433) with another battleship astern, the new South Dakota, began tracking a target, bearing 340T, broad on the starboard bow, distant eighteen thousand yards.
The main battery Directors of Washington trained towards the larger of two targets, the Japanese cruiser Sendai under the command of Rear Admiral Hashimoto. Within seconds the rangekeeper had a firing solution and Washington's three Main Battery turrets swung to starboard, guns elevated for a range of eleven thousands yards.
"Commence Firing!" was ordered at 2317 and "all hell broke loose", as Washington blasted a nine杇un salvo at Sendai, Hunter Cronin in Secondary Conn, ("Battle 2") wrote.
Shikinami, the second target was taken under fire by the battleship抯 starboard Secondary Battery directed by "Sky 3". One minute later, South Dakota rained down shells on the destroyer Shikinami.
Aboard South Dakota, William P. Gray was assigned to Main Battery Fire Control Maintenance and Operations. His battle station was Main battery Director #1 as Director Captain/Pointer.
He wrote in his memoirs: "The first Main battery action, Savo Island, first sighting of enemy warships. We were ordered to pick out the biggest and commence firing. The closing of Main Battery. Firing key against enemy warships for the first time. Shells on the way and Spotting Officer calling: "No change! No change!"
Her bridge and spotting personnel saw Shikinami roll over and sink according to the Action Report.
However, Sendai and Shikinami retired in a loop behind a smoke screen, disappearing from view and radar in the closely confined waters of "Ironbottom Sound".
When the two Japanese ships retreated behind their smoke screens, the destroyers Walke, Benham, Preston and Gwin opened fire on them and on blobs of light, coming from the direction of the shoreline of Savo Island.
The Japanese had not emplaced batteries on Savo but the fire was coming from the destroyers Ayanami and Uranami, sent west around Savo; within their wake the cruiser Nagara (Rear Admiral Kimura) and the destroyers Teruzuki, Inazuma, Shirayuki and Hatsuyuki.
The duel was short, ferocious and uneven.
Unskilled in night fighting and saving their torpedoes for bigger stuff, the US destroyers opened up with their guns, Gwin firing starshell to illuminate the scene. Japanese spotters used their gun flashes as fine aiming points. The destroyers Ayanami and Uranami each fired a torpedo spread at Gwin but none hit.
However at 2330 Walke, the lead ship, began taking hits from 5- and 5.5-inch and fell off to port and took a torpedo eight minutes later in her starboard side, blowing off the forward part of the ship. "Abandon Ship" was ordered at 2345. Depth charges rolling off their tracks and exploding, killed its Captain and many of her hands as they cleared the ship.
The enemy cruisers rained down explosives on Benham, Preston and Gwin and a salvo from Nagara reduced Preston to a wreck and on 2336 she too had to be abandoned with 116 killed.
Then Gwin got hit, taking a pair of 5-inch shells, one in the after engine room and one on the fantail. Her guns continued firing in local control.
Benham took a torpedo in her starboard bow that blew most of it away but limped on with reduced speed, her guns firing rapidly.
Walke and Preston were enveloped in fire, their crews struggling in the oily water in the path of Washingtonand South Dakota.
At 2333 the South Dakota went blind and deaf due to a circuit overload and steamed on behind Washington towards the crippled Benham.
Ivant Musicant in his book "Battleship at War" wrote that there was bad blood among the crews of the battleships South Dakota and Washington after the night action of 14-15 November 1942, fought to prevent the final attempt of the Japanese navy to recapture Guadalcanal.
The Washington's sailors with a sneer declared war between the ships and enlisted men actually engaged in combat on the beaches at Noumea, calling the battleship South Dakota "Shitty Dick" after that battleship retired from the fight badly cut up, unable to communicate. Admiral Lee furiously dictated in a special order of the day that "One war at the time is enough!" and had the liberty days of the two ships staggered.
The South Dakota's Commanding Officer, Captain Gatch and his senior officers were ordered to report aboard Washington to go over the battle.
There it was learned that the South Dakota's Chief Engineer, contrary to established procedures, had tied down her circuit breakers, which had the effect that of putting the whole electrical system in series.
The concussion of 5-Inch hits and internal shocks of firing her own batteries overloaded the circuits and everything went out- radar, fire control stations, turret motors, ammo hoists and radio抯, leaving South Dakota blind.
William A.Hughes wrote how a ship mate, may have saved his ship (South Dakota).
On the evening of 14 November 1942 William Hughes was switchboard operator on # 1 switchboard.
South Dakota had 4 switchboards, each controlling two 1000 KW generators.
An unknown ensign and a Chief Electrician抯 Mate, Shaeffer, were there.
Electrician抯 Mate I.C. Lusk was a telephone talker with the After Repair party stationed on the second deck on the port side by the barbette of # 3 16-Inch turret.
When South Dakota took a hit to a large power panel mounted on that barbette it probably caused a short circuit to # 4 switchboard and caused her circuit breakers to kick out.
All switchboards were operating independent of each other.
Someone panicked, he wrote, either the switchboard operator or one of the Engineering Officer抯 who were stationed at # 3 Engine Room.
Orders were given to close the bus-ties between # 4 and # 3 switchboards and this knocked off # 3 switchboard which in turn closed it抯 bus-ties to # 2 switchboard and # 2 went off the line. (A bus-tie is a circuit breaker that ties two or more switchboards).
No one, but my Chief, Hughes wrote, realized what was happening and how to cure the problem. Against direct orders he ordered to hold the bus-ties to # 2 switchboard open, so that the other three switchboards could not tie in.
"If I had let them tie in, he wrote, we would have lost our power, leaving the ship with a total loss of power and would have ended up dead in the water and at the mercy of the enemy.
The Chief then told the ensign to tell the Chief Engineer to clear the problem of # 4 switchboard and then he would allow Hughes to close the bus-ties and restore power back to the ship. That Chief never got credit for saving the lives of the crew and the ship.
Ray Hunter on Washington's bridge, hearing that all communication with South Dakota had been lost, watching the burning remains of Walke and Preston ahead and hundreds of men swimming about, told the helmsman: "come left!" his exact words he later wrote.
He then straightened out on a parallel course to the one they were steaming. Leaving the burning destroyers to port and keeping them between Washington and the enemy, he avoided being silhouetted by the fires, an easy target. Dozens of men could be seen in the burning water, clinging to wreckage and life rafts were thrown at them.
South Dakota, silent now for three minutes, didn抰 follow in Washington's wake but sheered off to starboard of the sinking destroyers and presented an excellent silhouette.
At once, Hashimoto and Kimura抯 searchlights illuminated the South Dakota's superstructure. Nagara and four destroyers launched a spread of thirty-four torpedoes at point-blank range but none found their mark.
Washington's 5-inch mounts shot out the lights and took Nagara under fire and when her lights went out, switched fire to the accompanying destroyers, illuminating South Dakota. South Dakota began taking hits topside.
Savo Island抯 land mass made radar tracking difficult and the flashless powder that the Japanese used provided only small aiming points. South Dakota now had restored part of her electrical power and her guns were firing, but she was still unable to communicate with Washington.
Arthur A. Aldred抯 battle station was at the starboard 40mm quad on the fantail. Early in the action the 40mm crew was ordered to take cover forward of the # 3 16-inch turret because it was going to train around and fire at a target directly astern. He had just taken cover when a salvo was fired and instantly the fantail was ablaze. The muzzle blast had demolished and ignited the three Kingfisher catapult planes. "Had we not taken cover", he wrote, "most of us would have suffered the same fate."
The Japanese now had a new aiming point and their fire came in fast. The next 16-inch salvo blew the burning Kingfisher overboard.
At 2340 Admiral Kondo with his main body came up with two destroyers, the cruisers Atago and Takao and the Battleship Kirishima.
Washington had a fire solution for the biggest target, Kirishima within seconds but checked fire, afraid to hit South Dakota, last seen somewhere aft to starboard.
At 2345 Benham and Gwin, making best speed were ordered to retire out of the way. At 2355 fire was resumed.
Kondo抯 ships tracked South Dakota, passing inboard of the smoldering Walke and illuminated her again. Two destroyers launched a torpedo attack but none hit. The Japanese gunners on Kirishima, Atago and Takao at a range of fifty-eight hundred yards did and South Dakota took multiple hits in her superstructure and topside damage was considerable.
South Dakota replied with her 16-inch and hit Atago and Takao. However, within five minutes her radar plot was destroyed, radio communication was out and four out of six fire control radars.
The #3 16-inch turret had taken a 14-inch hit outboard of the roller path and locked in train. Gunnery stations took casualties, small fires raged in the upperworks and oil was leaking from a ruptured fuel line. Washington's location was not known to her, according to her reports and it was decided to withdraw to the rendezvous assigned by the Task Force Commander prior to the engagement. She had suffered forty-two hits, thirty-eight men were dead and sixty wounded.
Just before midnight a target, first thought to be a cruiser, illuminated South Dakota. The target was Kirishima, broad on the Washington beam, at a point-blanc range of eighty-four hundred yards.
At exactly midnight permission was given to open fire.
Washington's nine-gun salvo straddled Kirishima while her Secondary Battery began firing star shells. A hit was reported on the enemy抯 superstructure and the third 16-inch salvo landed squarely amidships, causing bright explosions.
South Dakota was still under fire from Atago and Takao and Washington's 5-inch mounts were directed against the two cruisers and shot out their searchlights, placing hits on superstructures and fires broke out on Atago.
Washington's turn to the left had made her invisible in the loom of Cape Esperance, taking the Japanese by surprise.
A report was received from Sky Control that the big target was sunk and fire ceased for ninety seconds. Kirishima checked her fire on South Dakota, leaving her to the other Japanese ships and trained her turrets towards Washington.
The first salvo was a short, short, over and over.
Their second salvo: over-short-on.
The Japanese, steaming parallel to Washington launched another torpedo spread and thirty-two separate reports of tracks were sent to Washington's bridge, one of them probably hit the debris from a sinking destroyer and blew up.
Kirishima, Atago and Takao had altered course 180 degrees and were now steaming away from Washington, north-eastwards, broad on the starboard quarter.
Washington resumed fire and hit Kirishima, smothering her with fire from both 16-inch and 5-inch. One by one her turrets were knocked out.
Finally only the after turret continued firing and she began to glow dull red amidships, brightening up as she took more hits.
At 0007 Washington, left alone, fired the last salvo at Kirishima, now a mass of flames with her underwater hull damaged by near misses, taking on water and listing to starboard.
Out of control and her steering gear shot away, she was steaming in circles.
"Cease fire" was given for the 5-inch guns since they had reached the limit of after train.
There were still multiple targets, but doubt still existed on the whereabouts of South Dakota and Washington's surface search radar could not see astern.
Unable to contact South Dakota, Washington steamed on alone.
After steaming five miles on course 340T, radar reported contacts off the port bow. They were the destroyers Kagero and Oyashio launching a spread of torpedoes. Washington, sighting their smoke screen, reversed course 180 degrees at twenty-six knots, throwing up an enormous wake.
She needed a good two minutes to settle in on her new course during which various lookouts spotted torpedo tracks, four or five of them very close and exploding in Washington's wake.
At 0044 Admiral Lee ordered Washington to steer generally southwest and she zigzagged back and forth on her base course, spotting another torpedo blow up in her wake.
At 0951 lookouts sighted South Dakota again, receiving her signal that she was not effective and she was leaking oil.
Captain Gatch was ordered to take station ahead of Washington. The ships went to general quarters again after sightings of unidentified aircraft to port which later turned out to be friendly.
The big question is: why did South Dakota turn to starboard, not following Washington, exposing herself to illumination by the burning destroyers, an easy target for the quick reacting experienced Japanese gunners?
I will not judge the men of South Dakota, seeing the survivors of their destroyers in the burning water, fellow Americans, going into harm抯 way, bringing their ship between them and an enemy, still firing on the hapless destroyers and the men in the water.
Secondly, by doing so, they attracted the attention of the Japanese, bent on the destruction of that ship, as their naval aviators had done before when they slaughtered the hapless "Devastators" of VT-3, VT-6 and VT-8 at Midway, but their sacrifice was not in vain!
It cleared the way for the final move, unexpected by both the American and the Japanese high command, that would cost them four carriers and their irreplaceable crews when CEAG: LCDR C. Wade McClusky led a total of thirty-seven Dauntless dive bombers from Enterprise (CVA-6) down to attack the enemy carriers, joined by VB-3 from Yorktown (CVA-3).
With the Zeros all at low level after dealing with the "Devastators" the SBD's had begun their attacks unhindered by enemy fighters.
And, just like McClusky, for some time, Washington could fire unobserved! Judging from the quick reaction of Sendai and Shikinami, faced with a battleship raining down shells on them, Washington was very lucky! |
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