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本帖最后由 第四弦 于 2020-10-14 19:51 编辑
在国外论坛上读到一篇关于勇敢级的文章，其中关于其4炮设计是这样描述的：
As previously stated Fisher’s eccentricity had initially very little to do with the number of guns as more ships were required then gun turrets existed to arm them and this is the main reason the ‘Courageous’ type ships were reduced to just two turrets. Naval experts to this day mostly fail to grasp it was not possible to arm them with any more as the gun mounts simply did not exist. Even for ‘Furious’ Fisher probably remained hopeful of diverting more turrets from the ‘Royal Sovereign’s’ so that she could complete faster: with twin 15 inch instead of single 18 inch.
However the gunnery situation with just four 15 inch was not the disaster traditionally claimed by gunnery experts such as Jellicoe who firmly believed that eight guns was the minimum number a capital ship should carry. The gunnery techniques developed (by Jellicoe among others) for the world’s first uniform calibre armament warship, H.M.S. Dreadnought, have been well described elsewhere and it is assumed by most critics of the light battle cruisers that these techniques are the only gunnery techniques possible to take full advantage of a uniform calibre ship. What the critics fail to grasp is that by 1904 Fisher himself had developed a radically different gunnery technique for uniform calibre ships: A technique that didn’t require large numbers of main guns to be effective.
When shown the techniques developed for uniform armament ships Fisher seems to have noticed that there were some major shortcomings inherent within them: Shortcomings brutally exposed as the war years wore on. First of all firing a ranging shell or ranging salvo and simply waiting for it to land before adjusting the aim and firing again gave the enemy an opportunity to get the first blow in. The second issue was that gunnery accuracy presumed that both ships were sailing on perfect parallel courses and identical speeds and Fisher was a far too experienced gunner and sailor to believe such a situation was ever likely to occur in war especially as the most obvious action any sane commander would do once the enemy as found the range is to alter course. Fisher seems alone in appreciating this blindingly obvious response. Fisher was very much aware of what later became known as “rate range” and he recognised that the techniques presented required a lot of precise instrumentation and mechanical aids (aids that didn’t actually exist in 1904) to develop them to their full advantage.
As far as Fisher was concerned the side that got the first hits in was the side most likely to win in a gunnery duel (as demonstrated by the Germans at Jutland during the phase of the battle known as “the run to the south”) and so he developed a gunnery technique that not only rapidly brought the guns on target but also completely bypassed the rate range problem; reducing it to an irrelevancy. Developed for his 1904 'Untakeable B’ design, which could only bring six of its eight guns to bear on any one target, the technique, at its most basic level, converted the multiple guns of a ships main battery into a single quick firing weapon which fired one shell every ten seconds. The exact details of Fisher’s technique are rather fuzzy as the only extensive description currently known is a fairly brief outline he gave in his 1904 ‘Naval Necessities’ but it is enough of a description to gain a good understanding of how it worked at a basic level (undoubtedly there was actually far more to it).
The Director (Fisher invented the first electric gunnery director way back in 1868) deliberately aims his first shell short with each subsequent shell fired at a spot closer and closer to the target. This allowed the Director to simply walk his fire into the target using the regular stream of shell splashes as his guide (there would be several shells in the air at the same time; ten seconds apart from each other. Presumably the ten seconds were what Fisher estimated the gunnery team required to adjust aim once spotting feedback from the previous shells fired started arriving). Each shell as it landed would probably be marked on a plot (Fisher was instrumental in the introduction of the plot into the Royal Navy) along with the estimated position of the target relative to that shell. As the gunnery team would have a fairly accurate idea of a circular area where their shells should land relative to their own ship (based on shell type, gun elevation, gun wear etc.) the plot provides the range and course and speed of the target. Although initially only guestimates, this data would quickly become more accurate as the fire is walked into the enemy vessel. As each shell provides a “marker” for the gunnery team to gather data on the targets changing profile every ten seconds, no matter how violently the enemy ship manoeuvres, the director by simply glancing at the continuously updating plot can keep his guns consistently on target without having to worry about rate range. A violently manoeuvring enemy would also be unable to shoot back effectively.
The above description is only a fairly basic overview of the technique Fisher developed and there are many details that need to be got right for it to work (such as the firing ship being level as each gun fires) but it appears to be a considerably simpler and more effective gunnery technique than that actually adopted by the Royal Navy. Also it should be noted that it does not require the sophisticated fire control gear later developed for the alternative techniques actually adopted; the all-important plot for instance could simply be a page of graph paper on a clipboard with the data entered manually with a pencil. Why this technique wasn’t more widely disseminated is unknown but it is probably due to Fisher’s mania for secrecy; although it could also be partly due to the fact Fisher rejected the near sacrosanct tactic of line of battle and preferred each ship to manoeuvre independently within the framework of an overall plan of engagement.
Although in 1904 Fisher was allowing a full minute to reload (hence the six guns capable of being brought to bear in ‘Untakeable B’), by 1915 the 15 inch gun could be reloaded in less than 40 seconds meaning that the technique only required four 15 inch guns to work. When criticising the limited number of heavy guns on the wartime light battle cruisers it should be noted that with ‘Renown’ and ‘Repulse’, from Fisher’s point of view, he actually provided two reserve guns that weren’t strictly required. Fisher’s ‘Citadel’ design required six guns for the technique as the 18 inch gun had a 60 second reloading cycle.
It should also be noted that included within his 1904 ‘Naval Necessities’ Fisher actually describes how he believed a ship with superior speed should engage an enemy vessel. The enemy would be approached in a shallow curve with the range gradually decreasing as the battle developed. The enemy would always be kept at least 30º of the bow which meant that a ship could mount all her guns on the centreline and still bring all of them to bear on the enemy: probably a major factor in the design of ‘Untakeable C’ with its all centre line armament of twelve 12 inch guns in six super-firing twin turrets (theoretically ‘Untakeable C’ could effectively engage two separate targets simultaneously using Fisher’s gunnery technique). The shallow approach curve would present the enemy gunners with a high rate range target making accurate shooting for the enemy using standard gunnery techniques very difficult.
Contrary to popular belief Fisher was not advocating standing outside the range of enemy guns and shooting them without reply (the British 12 inch gun never actually had any range advantage as the German 11 inch outranged it) when he wrote about “outranging” the enemy he was clearly referring to the superior ability of his gunnery technique to hit them first. It is also clear that Fisher had no intention of fighting a standoff battle as his tactics, although requiring the Royal Navy vessel to start the engagement at long range, had the ship continuously closing with the enemy. Fisher emphasised the effect of hitting the enemy early and continuously which combined with the high rate range approach would give the Royal naval vessel a high degree of immunity to enemy hits. Only a vessel with a clear superiority of speed could actually utilize this tactic and this appears to be one of the true meanings behind Fisher’s dictum: Speed is armour. By the time the battle is reduced to short range the enemy vessels ability to shoot back should have been smashed and she could be dispatched with torpedoes at close range.
我个人的一些理解和疑问：
按这篇文章所述，费舍尔在1904年为未来主力舰以及后来的勇敢级构思的这种射法，实际上就和@mathewwu 前辈在这个贴里面说的这段差不多（http://www.warships.com.cn/forum ... =%E4%B8%80%E7%A7%8D）：
“如装填发射循环是45秒：炮弹入水时间60秒，则每隔15秒发射2门的方式在开始试射后60+15+15+15=105秒后就可获得4次弹着观测结果。如果每次都要等炮弹入水时间60秒，那么不论采用几门炮试射，获得4次弹着观测结果的时间肯定不少于240秒。”
区别是费舍尔的这种方法每次只发射1门，每隔10秒开火一次。另外，如果说正常的校射是让平均弹着点尽量与目标重合，那么费舍尔对火炮的使用似乎更接近于单纯的测距仪。
那么：
1.这种单炮试射，效果如何？狮号在多格尔沙洲之战就用过这种以火炮测距的方法，但它是不是一种普遍的做法呢？另外，费舍尔这种是基于快射的单炮连续试射，一般用火炮来测距的似乎都是慢射或者说计划射，前者有实际操作的案例么？
2.我个人对费舍尔这种远程射击方法的理解是，它既是一种用火炮本身充当测距仪的测距射法，又有些接近于后来发展出来的阶梯射法。这样理解是否恰当？
3.如何评价费舍尔的思路呢？单纯的理解为对火控发展缺乏认识是否合适？也可以引申开来，他既不指望未来的交战会是呆板的平行战列，也不把希望全寄托在种种精密火控设备上面。结合RN间战的战术发展，我觉得其实是很务实的，也很有前瞻性，但如果这种想法确实落地，会不会反而一塌糊涂呢？
4.假设这样的一个场景：两艘战舰都是4炮舰，敌舰实际距离25000码，炮弹在这个距离下的飞行时间为45秒，装填时间30秒；战舰A连续齐射4轮，每轮4弹，标定距离分别是24100码、24500码、24900码、25300码；战舰B以费舍尔式方法连续开火，前后4弹为1组，每发炮弹标定距离同上，考虑实际的干扰因素（哑火、不规弹之类），后者能否比前者更快地抓准目标实际距离？后者操作起来会有哪些困难？（这个假想很粗糙，有什么问题也望指正）
望各位方家不吝赐教，谢谢。
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发表于 2020-10-14 19:39
发表于 2020-10-14 21:54
楼主
发表于 2020-10-18 20:58
