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其实弗里德曼也有类似叙述：
British (and foreign) pre-1914 thinking about capital ship tactics was based on the perception that guns were cumulative weapons: it would take considerable time and considerable battering to destroy or neutralise a ship. British officers had ‘knock-down’ tables showing how many minutes of fire it would take to disable particular ships. Required time was set partly by the hitting rate, so as range increased it was assumed that knock-down time would increase considerably. Success in protracted battle was expected to depend not so much on armour penetration as on smashing effect. The British also hoped that their high explosive Lyddite would create disabling toxic effects.
Thus the destruction of the three British battlecruisers at Jutland by a few hits (possibly one each) was a shocking surprise. Afterwards the Germans claimed that their superior shells had penetrated British armour with devastating effect. However, it seems clear in retrospect that these penetrations would not have been fatal had the British not adopted what amounted to suicidal turret practices. The British were also surprised that German commander Admiral Scheer was concerned mainly with disengaging once as he spotted the main British fleet. The British needed a different kind of shellfire which could quickly immobilise an enemy so that he could be pounded to pieces or sunk by torpedoes. That was the significance of the new generation of armourpiercing shells introduced at the end of the war.
The battlecruisers blew up at Jutland not because the Germans had magic shells, but because the British had adopted extremely dangerous magazine practices because German shellfire had been so ineffective in the previous Dogger Bank battle. Moreover, British shells did penetrate German magazines (for example in the battlecruiser Seydlitz) in both battles, causing devastating fires. The Germans never took special anti-flash precautions because their powder, always contained in metal cases, could not generate the kind of flash which detonated British bagged powder. However, had the British followed the accepted precautions at Jutland, ships would have lost individual turrets without blowing up. The evidence is that HMS Lion lost ‘Q’ turret from a hit probably much like that which blew up her nearsister HMS Queen Mary; Lions captain and gunnery officer refused to relax the rules in order to fire more rapidly. After the First World War, the Royal Navy reverted to its earlier view that shell damage would be cumulative. Once the magazine problems revealed at Jutland had been cured, it sought to fight at a range (about 15,000 yds) at which it expected to achieve a high hitting rate. It doubted that the long range fire practised by the US and Imperial Japanese Navies was practical in this sense.
不过他显然把重点更多地放在发射药安全上
另外最后这个说法挺有意思【After the First World War, the Royal Navy reverted to its earlier view that shell damage would be cumulative. Once the magazine problems revealed at Jutland had been cured, it sought to fight at a range (about 15,000 yds) at which it expected to achieve a high hitting rate.】
似乎可以拿来解释KGV偏弱的炮座和炮塔正面
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发表于 2021-1-18 01:53
发表于 2021-1-20 07:45
楼主
