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日德兰纪念系列 - 战略战术篇 - 第一章 - 战略规划
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主要参考资料：
The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916: Its Creation, Development and Work, 作者John Jellicoe
From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume I, The Road to War, 1904-1914, 作者Arthur J. Marder
From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume II - The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, 1914-1916, 作者Arthur J. Marder
Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, 作者Nicholas A. Lambert
Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909, 作者Nicholas A. Lambert
In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914，作者Jon Tetsuro Sumida
Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, 作者Shawn T. Grimes
An 'Intermediate Blockade'? British North Sea Strategy, 1912-1914, 作者David G. Morgan-Owen
The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics, and British War Planning, 1880-1914, 作者David G. Morgan-Owen
The Royal Navy and the German Threat 1901-1914: Admiralty Plans to Protect British Trade in a War Against Germany, 作者Matthew S. Seligmann
Failing to Prepare for the Great War? The Absence of Grand Strategy in British War Planning before 1914, 作者Matthew S. Seligmann
Fighting the Great War at Sea - Strategy, Tactics and Technology, 作者Norman Friedman
Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War，作者Reinhard Scheer
The Development of German Naval Operations. Plans against England, 1896-1914，作者Paul. M. Kennedy
The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914，作者Ivo Nikolai Lambi
Luxury Fleet - The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918，作者Holger H. Herwig
Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy，作者Patrick J. Kelly
一、英国海军的战略规划
在英国海军中，最高决策机构叫做海军部委员会（Board of Admiralty），而海军部委员会中最高阶的海军军官，即第一海务大臣（First Sea Lord），则是海军战略的主要负责人。但由于海军部委员会是一个集体决策机构，因此文职的海军大臣，以及其他几位海务大臣们，同样也具有一定影响力。
具体的工作，则是由海军参谋总局（Admiralty War Staff）负责的。不过，海军参谋总局是在1912年时才成立的，在此之前，英国海军内并没有设置最高参谋机构，但设有海军情报局（Naval Intelligence Department）。后者成立于1887年，其长官是海军情报局长（Directors of Naval Intelligence）。1909年后，海军情报局中负责战争准备和人员动员的机构独立了出来，成立了海军动员局（Naval Mobilisation Department）。至1912年，海军情报局和海军动员局重新合并，改组为海军参谋总局，下辖情报分局（Intelligence Division）、动员分局（Mobilisation Division）、作战分局（Operational Division），后来又先后增加了贸易分局（Trade Division）和反潜分局（Anti-Submarine Division）。在1912-1917年间，海军参谋总局由海军参谋长（Chief of the War Staff ）统领。1917年后，海军参谋长由第一海务大臣兼任，因此海军参谋总局相当于由第一海务大臣直接领导。
海军部制定的战略，会通过具体的作战力量得到执行。20世纪初时，英国海军麾下设置有以下几支舰队：地中海舰队（Mediterranean Fleet）、海峡舰队（Channel Fleet）、大西洋舰队（Atlantic Fleet）以及本土舰队（Home Fleet）。地中海舰队的规模，原本是非常大的，但随着英德海军竞赛的日益严峻，许多军舰都被调回了英国本土区域，因此地中海舰队的规模就大幅缩减了。而海峡舰队和大西洋舰队，则分别在1909年和1912年时，被并入了本土舰队。大战爆发后，本土舰队麾下的新锐军舰，被编入了大舰队（Grand Fleet）。至1915年时，又抽调了大舰队中的部分力量，组建了战列巡洋舰队（Battle Cruiser Fleet）。此外，英国海军还重新编成了海峡舰队（Channel Fleet），并将其驻扎在英国南部区域，但由于其麾下只有一些老旧军舰，因此只能起到辅助性的作用。这三支舰队，是英国本土水域最主要的作战力量，但除此之外，还另有一些小规模的部队，来辅助这三支舰队。
根据1914-1916年间担任大舰队司令，且1916-1917年间担任第一海务大臣职务的杰里科（John Jellicoe），在其著作中给出的描述（The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916: Its Creation, Development and Work，P.12-13）：
The main objects for which our Navy exists may be shortly summed up under four heads:
英国海军的主要职能，可简单归纳为以下四个方面：
1. To ensure for British ships the unimpeded use of the sea, this being vital to the existence of an island nation, particularly one which is not self-supporting in regard to food.
保证英国船只在海洋上畅通无阻。英国是一个岛国，并且还是一个粮食无法自给自足的岛国，因此这是至关重要的。
2. In the event of war, to bring steady economic pressure to bear on our adversary by denying to him the use of the sea, thus compelling him to accept peace.
在战争时期，阻止敌国利用大海，借此对其施加经济压力，最终迫使其停战求和。
3. Similarly in the event of war, to cover the passage and assist any army sent over seas, and to protect its communications and supplies.
在战争时期，保护向海外输送陆军的航线，保护其交通和补给线，并对陆军作战进行支援。
4. To prevent invasion of this country and its overseas Dominions by enemy forces.
阻止敌国入侵英国本土及海外领地。
The above objects are achieved in the quickest and surest manner by destroying the enemy’s armed naval forces, and this is therefore the first objective of our Fleet.
达成上述目标的最快捷也最彻底的方式，就是摧毁敌人的海上武装力量，这也是我们舰队的首要目标。
But history has always shown that it is a very difficult matter to impose our will upon a weaker naval adversary, and that, instead of giving us the opportunity of destroying his armed naval forces, he usually keeps the main body of those forces—the Battle Fleet—in positions of safety in fortified harbors, where they are a constant threat to the sea communications of the stronger naval power, and force upon that power a watching policy so that the enemy may be engaged, should he put to sea, before he is able to gain any advantage.
然而历史经验表明，我们很难将自己的意志加诸于一个比我们弱小的海上对手。他们通常会选择将其舰队核心力量，即战列舰队，保留在守备严密的港口内，因此我们很难摧毁他们的舰队，而他们则可以对我们的海上交通造成威胁。为了应对这种情况，我们就需要采用一种监视策略，力图在敌方舰队出海时，尽早发现其动向，并与其交战。
近、中、远距离封锁策略
杰里科所说的监视策略，实际上就是一种封锁策略。英国海军在战前设想过的对德封锁策略，主要有“近距离封锁”，“中距离封锁”，“远距离封锁”三种类型。
近距离封锁
所谓的“近距离封锁”，通常指英国海军在1912年前计划采用的，对德国西部的沿海地区进行抵近封锁的作战方法。
1. 近距离封锁，是一种沿袭自风帆海军时代的传统策略。根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume I, The Road to War, 1904-1914, P.368）：
Close blockade of the enemy's ports...had been brought to near perfection during the Napoleonic wars. Fast-sailing frigates were stationed off the ports where the enemy ships were lying, and farther out at sea cruised the British ships-of-the-line. The blockaded ships could not proceed to sea without the grave risk of being brought to action.
对敌方港口的近距离封锁，在拿破仑战争时期已经被发展到了炉火纯青的地步——英国海军会在敌方舰队驻扎的港口之外，布置航速较快的巡洋舰，更外围则布置有战列舰。被封锁的那只舰队若想要出海，很可能会被英国舰队抓住，从而爆发海战。
2. 在20世纪初时，英国海军拟定过多个针对德国的近距离封锁方案。根据Matthew S. Seligmann的说法（Failing to Prepare for the Great War? The Absence of Grand Strategy in British War Planning before 1914, P.6）：
In the era...the only means of knowing if an enemy navy was in harbour or at sea was to go and look. Thus...the Royal Navy had to keep the main German harbours and naval bases under regular observation. Only by such means could it be absolutely guaranteed that the British Isles were secure from a surprise German assault. The need to keep Germany’s ports under continuous observation accordingly became a central feature of British planning.
在那个时代，想要知道敌方舰队到底是在港口内，还是已经出港，只有一个办法，那就是过去看看。因此，为了确保英伦三岛不被德国人偷袭，英国海军必须要时刻紧盯德国的各个主要港口及主要基地。在这个背景下，如何确保对德国港口的不间断的监视，成为了英国海军作战计划的核心内容。
The 1909 war plan, to take but one example, called for the deployment of rotating flotillas of the newest and best British destroyers directly off the German North Sea littoral. Backed at a distance by lines of light cruisers and armoured cruisers to ensure that they could not be driven away by German light forces, these destroyers were there to notify the British naval command of any attempt by the German fleet to sortie into the North Sea. Should such a move take place, there would be two British fleets, one based in Scotland and one based between the Channel and the Wash, ready to intercept the emerging German forces and give battle.
以1909年的作战计划为例，他们计划将最新锐、最强大的英国驱逐舰中队直接布置到德国的北海沿岸地区，并安排这些中队进行轮流换岗。这些驱逐舰的作用，是在发现德国舰队试图驶入北海时，将情报汇报给英国海军的决策机构。在这些驱逐舰中队后方，则会布置一道由轻巡洋舰和装甲巡洋舰组成的支援线，以确保这些驱逐舰不会被德国海军的轻型舰艇们击退。如果德国舰队大举出动，那么英国海军的主力（一支部署在英国北部，另一支部署在英国东南部）将会做好准备，前去迎战这支德国舰队。
3. 在1910年时，威尔逊（Arthur Wilson）元帅接替了费舍尔（John Fisher）元帅的第一海务大臣的职务。在这个时期，英国海军的战略规划受到了重大的挑战。根据Shawn T. Grimes的说法（Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, P.159）：
Lacking Fisher’s political aptitude, Wilson could not combat further probes into naval policy by the Cabinet, Army, and CID. As a result, defects in the Navy’s war plans were revealed at the CID meeting over the Agadir crisis on 23 August 1911. Wilson’s poor performance before this caucus led to the Army’s ‘continental’ plan gaining wider acceptance, Churchill’s replacing McKenna as First Lord, the institution of a Naval War Staff, and Wilson’s removal.
威尔逊缺乏费舍尔那样的政治能力，因此无力抵挡内阁、陆军、以及帝国国防委员会对海军战略的刺探。其结果是，在帝国国防委员会为了应对第二次摩洛哥危机，而在1911年8月23日召开的会议上，海军作战计划上的缺陷被暴露出来了。在这场关键会议上，威尔逊的拙劣表现，导致了陆军的“进军欧洲大陆”方案得到了更广泛的支持，进而导致了丘吉尔取代麦肯纳担任海军大臣、海军设立参谋总局、以及威尔逊的离职。
4. 此后，英国海军放弃了近距离封锁策略。根据David G. Morgan-Owen的说法（The Fear of Invasion - Strategy, Politics, and British War Planning, 1880-1914, P.203）：
Admiral Wilson’s departure from the Admiralty in the autumn of 1911 precipitated six months of flux in naval strategy...The resulting uncertainty led to a period of debate and conjecture over the turn of the year...The Admiralty reached the conclusion that inshore operations would no longer be feasible early the following year, informing the Fleet that ‘the Blockade by the British Fleet of the whole German Coast on the North Sea is to be considered cancelled’. This decision represented a seismic shift in naval thought.
当威尔逊元帅在1911年秋天时，卸下第一海务大臣的职务后，在接下来的6个月内，海军战略经历了持续的变化。在1911年底至1912年初时，这种战略上的不确定性，导致了海军内部出现了各种讨论和推测。至1912年初时，海军部得出结论，认为近岸作战已经无法实现了，并告知舰队：“使用英国舰队封锁整个德国北海沿岸地区的做法，已经被取消了”。这个决策代表着海军战略上的巨大变迁。
5. 根据Arthur J. Marder的说法，对于这个决策，英国海军部向帝国国防委员会给出的解释是（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume I, The Road to War, 1904-1914, P.371）：
The continuous development of the mine and the torpedo make it impossible to establish a close watch on the exits from the Heligoland Bight with heavy ships. To do so for a long period of time would mean a steady and serious wastage of valuable units from the above causes, and, if prolonged, would effectually alter the balance of naval power.
随着鱼雷和水雷的不断发展，我们已经无法将大型军舰布置到赫尔格兰湾区域，来执行近距离封锁了。如果我们这么做的话，便意味着这些宝贵的军舰会接二连三的因鱼雷和水雷攻击而遭受损失，这显然是一种极大的浪费。如果这种情况持续下去的话，可能会打破英德两国之间的海军力量平衡。
On the other hand, torpedo craft, which cannot keep at sea like great vessels, and must every three or four days return to port for rest and replacement, have no base nearer than Harwich, 280 miles away. The operation of controlling the debouches from the Heligoland Bight by means of flotillas would require twice the number of oversea torpedo craft than we now possess. The watch would have to be maintained in three reliefs: one on duty, one in transit, and one at rest, and therefore only a third of the existing vessels would be available at any given time. Such a force could be overwhelmed by a sudden attack of two or three times their numbers by a well-chosen blow, opportunities for which would frequently recur.
另一方面，驱逐舰并不具备大型军舰那样的自持力，因此每隔3-4天就必须返回母港进行修整，但即便是距离德国最近的哈里奇基地，也有240海里之遥。如果要通过驱逐舰观察哨来封锁赫尔格兰湾，那么就需要两倍于我国现有数量的远洋驱逐舰。这些驱逐舰需要分为三班，一班在执行任务，一班在往返途中，还有一班在修整，因此在任何时刻，位于前线的军舰只有三分之一。德国舰队可能会用二到三倍于我方的力量，在精心选择的时刻发起偷袭，我方无力应对这样的偷袭。
中距离封锁
取代近距离封锁的，是一种被称为中距离封锁的策略。
1. 中距离封锁的巡逻线，后退到了北海中部。根据Shawn T. Grimes的说法（Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, P.176）：
As a replacement, Troubridge and the War Staff devised the so-called ‘Intermediate blockade’. It entailed a cruiser and flotilla blockade cordon across the North Sea from the Norwegian coast to a location near the latitude of Newcastle-upon Tyne (55°N). From there the line ran south to Texel Island and the Dutch coast. The British fleet would cruise off the Scottish coast, westward of the patrol line, in support of the cordons. Once contact with the German fleet was established, the main fleet would proceed to intercept and engage.
作为代替方案，海军参谋长欧内斯特·特鲁布里奇少将拟定了一种中距离封锁方案。由巡洋舰和驱逐舰组成的警戒线，将在北海区域展开，从挪威沿岸延伸至纬度相当于纽卡斯尔的地点（北纬55度），随后再向南延伸至特塞尔岛及荷兰海岸。英国主力舰队将会在警戒线以西的苏格兰海岸巡弋，并对前者进行支援。一旦发现德国舰队，英国主力舰队就会前去拦截，并与德国舰队交战。
2. 学界通常认为，中距离封锁是一种糟糕的策略，且存在时间很短。根据Nicholas A. Lambert的说法（Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, P.263）：
Even at the time the weaknesses of this plan were regarded as transparent. Other officers protested that Troubridge had ignored all the evidence of recent maneuvers. Practical exercises conducted by Admiral Bridgeman and the Home Fleets during 1911, it was pointed out, had conclusively shown that the navy's entire force of 48 modern destroyers, supported by 8 light cruisers, were unable to watch effectively a patrol line of 60 miles in length. Germany's North Sea coast was 150 miles long; while Troubridge's proposed blockade line was closer to three hundred miles in length.
即便是当时的人也认为，这种封锁计划的缺点是显而易见的。其他海军军官们抗议到，海军参谋长忽略了近年来的海军演习中得出的各项证据。例如，1911年时，布里奇曼上将指挥的本土舰队举行的演习明确证明，当时英国海军所拥有的全部的新式驱逐舰（48艘），以及作为其支援力量的轻巡洋舰（8艘），连60海里的巡逻线都无法有效维持。德国的北海海岸线的长度达到了150海里，参谋长所提议的封锁线的长度则接近300海里。
Furthermore, with the number of modern flotilla craft then available there was a high degree of probability that a raiding force might slip past the observation line undetected (especially in misty weather); more seriously the patrolling British light cruisers would be vulnerable to counterattack by enemy submarines or battlecruisers. Effective support by heavier warships could not be provided to the observation line while the Grand Fleet remained concentrated in the north. Yet detaching a battle squadron for this purpose was seen as even more dangerous as it risked defeat in detail.
此外，由于当时的新式驱逐舰的数量很有限，因此敌方的袭击舰队很有可能会悄无声息的穿过我方的观察线，而没有引起我方的警觉（尤其是在迷雾天气下）。更为严重的是，巡逻的英国轻巡洋舰可能会遭到敌方潜艇或战列巡洋舰的袭击。如果大舰队全部集中于北方海域，那么大型军舰就没办法为观察线提供有效的支援。而如果派出一支战列舰中队作为支援力量，又有可能被敌人单独击破。
During the summer maneuvers of 1912, Troubridge's cordon system was completely exposed...Practical exercises had demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the Royal Navy had too few cruisers and destroyers to sustain an effective observation line across the North Sea.
在1912年夏季的演习中，参谋长的封锁线设想的弱点，完全被暴露出来了。这场演习无可置疑地证明，英国海军所拥有的巡洋舰和驱逐舰的数量，远远不足以维持一条穿越整个北海的有效的观察线。
3. 也有学者认为，现有的主流观点，对中距离封锁的解读是错误的，实际应该叫做中距离巡逻。根据David G. Morgan-Owen的说法（An 'Intermediate Blockade'? British North Sea Strategy, 1912-1914, P.1 & P.11）：
Historians have argued that, between 1912 and 1914, Britain's naval leadership projected a so-called 'intermediate blockade', a line of vessels strung across the mid-North Sea. This strategy has been widely criticized as impractical and unrealistic. However, the Admiralty never projected such an approach. Rather, the naval leadership intended to adopt a system of mid-North Sea patrols during this period.
历史学家们声称，在1912-1914年间，英国海军高层规划过一种所谓的“中距离封锁”，即在北海中部地区布置一连串的军舰。对于这种策略，历史学家们普遍给予了批评，认为这是不切实际的。然而，英国海军部实际上从未规划过这种策略。
The 'line' of vessels, commonly understood as the 'intermediate blockade', was never enshrined in war orders, nor was it developed specifically by the Admiralty. Rather it was the solution the flag officers of the cruiser squadrons allotted to observational patrols adopted for the purposes of the 1912 maneuvers.
事实上，当时海军部试图使用的策略，是在北海中部地区开展巡逻。在海军部下达的作战命令中，从未明确写明要把军舰组织成一条警戒线，即通常所说的“中距离封锁”，并且这种做法也不是由海军部发明的，而是由参加1912年演习的巡洋舰中队的指挥官们，为了达成演习目标而采用的策略。
远距离封锁
再后来，远距离封锁取代了中距离封锁，并成为了英国海军在战时所使用的封锁策略。
1. 远距离封锁的策略，在渊源上可以追溯到17世纪的英荷战争。根据Shawn T. Grimes的说法（Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, P.178）：
In late November - December 1912, war plans and orders were issued to Callaghan embodying the distant blockade scenario. The idea was to utilize Britain’s geographical advantage to cut off all German shipping from oceanic trade, secure England’s coasts from invasions and raids, and cover the BEF’s transport to France...This strategy resembled those which led to the successful battles in the Anglo-Dutch wars’,...A prolonged distant blockade would cause ‘serious economic consequences to Germany’, forcing the High Seas Fleet to break the blockade and instigating a fleet action closer to British bases than their own.
在1912年11月至12月时，本土舰队司令卡拉汉收到了基于远距离封锁策略的作战计划和命令。其核心思想是利用英国的地理位置优势，将德国的大洋贸易运输完全截断，保护英国海岸免遭入侵和袭击，以及掩护英国远征军前往法国。这种作战策略，与17世纪时英国海军在英荷战争中使用的策略颇为相似。旷日持久的远距离封锁，会对德国的经济造成严重的影响，从而迫使公海舰队试图打破封锁，让他们不得不在远离已方基地的位置与我们进行舰队交战。
2. 相比于中距离封锁，远距离封锁的范围会进一步后退。根据Shawn T. Grimes的说法（Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, P.178）：
A northern blockade of armoured cruisers would patrol between the Orkneys and Shetlands and on to the Norwegian coast, to prevent the passage of German shipping. Destroyer and submarine flotillas would patrol the Dover Straits to block the English Channel. The main British fleet, based on the Scottish coast, would support the northern cordon while the Channel Fleet reinforced the southern line. Grand Fleet cruiser squadrons would conduct North Sea sweeps to detect German sorties.
由装甲巡洋舰构成的北方封锁线，将沿着苏格兰的奥克尼群岛和设得兰群岛，与挪威海峡之间的航线进行巡逻，其目的是阻止德国方面的海上运输。由驱逐舰和潜艇组成的封锁力量，则会在多佛尔海峡进行巡逻，其目的是封锁英吉利海峡。英国主力舰队（由新锐军舰构成）的基地将设在苏格兰沿岸，并对北方封锁线予以支援，而海峡舰队（由老旧军舰构成）则会对南方的封锁线进行支援。大舰队下属的巡洋舰中队会在北海地区展开扫荡，其目的是寻找出击的德国舰队。
3. 与之前的作战方案相比，这种扫荡行动更为安全稳妥。根据David G. Morgan-Owen的说法（An 'Intermediate Blockade'? British North Sea Strategy, 1912-1914, P.20）：
Plans to rely primarily upon cruiser and flotilla patrols in the mid-North Sea were suspended in July 1914, in favor of using the fleet to support the navy's light forces in periodic 'sweeps' of the North Sea intended to deter hostile German sorties towards the British coastline. The decision...was due to their vulnerability to being overwhelmed in detail by a superior German force, with the Grand Fleet stationed away to the north, rather than to their inherent impracticality.
1914年7月时，派出巡洋舰和驱逐舰去北海中部区域巡逻的计划被搁置了，取而代之的是得到大舰队支援的轻型舰艇对北海区域展开的周期性的扫荡，后者的目的是震慑那些试图袭击英国海岸的德国舰队。之所以做出这种决策，原因并不是因为巡逻计划本身缺乏可行性，而是因为当大舰队本身驻扎在苏格兰北部时，巡逻舰队得不到有效的支援，因此在面对实力占优的德国舰队时，可能会被单独击破。
近、中、远距离封锁的覆盖范围
下图中，分别展示了“近距离封锁”、“中距离封锁“、”远距离封锁”的覆盖范围。
基于轻型舰艇的本土防卫策略
对于英国海军的对德作战策略的研究，历史学家的关注点大多集中于封锁策略的演变过程。但Nicholas A. Lambert则重点强调了轻型舰艇防卫策略（Flotilla Defence）。
1. 根据Nicholas A. Lambert的说法，费舍尔之所以会设想出这种轻型舰艇防卫策略，主要是受到了法国海军的影响，后者在19世纪末时发展出了一种基于轻型舰艇的英作战策略。（Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909, P.10-12）：
Fisher envisaged the creation of a force comprised mainly of submarines and torpedo craft whose capacity to inflict serious losses on troop transports and their escorts would deter or prevent invasion across the narrow seas around the British Isles.
费舍尔想要创建一支主要由潜艇和雷击舰艇组成的部队，对于试图渡过狭海入侵英国的敌国运输船队及其护航舰队，这种轻型舰艇部队能够对其进行沉重的打击，从而打消敌方的入侵想法，或阻止他们的入侵行动。
Across the English Channel the Marine Française had been for many years investing heavily in the development of the torpedo craft...Towards the end of the 1890s, the French Navy adopted a coherent strategy for retaliating against a blockade of the French coasts which involved the extensive use of torpedo boats. The plan involved the building of large numbers of flotilla craft, to produce eventually a mosquito fleet capable of threatening any hostile warships which tried to operate in their territorial waters. French naval doctrine called for torpedo craft day and night "to harry" British warships, and especially the armoured vessels patrolling the English Channel in support of the blockade squadron.
在英吉利海峡对岸，法国海军多年以来都在致力于发展雷击舰艇。至1890年代末时，法国海军海军采用了一种使用大量的雷击舰艇，来对封锁法国沿海地区的英国舰队进行报复性攻击的作战策略。首先他们计划要建造大量的雷击舰艇，并将其组织为能够对任何在法国水域内活动的敌舰造成重大威胁的轻型舰队。法国海军的作战策略，是使用这些雷击舰艇，日以继夜地不断袭扰英国军舰，尤其是那些在英吉利海峡中巡弋，并对封锁舰队起到支援作用的英国大型军舰。
2. 潜艇的技术发展，也是费舍尔推行这种轻型舰艇策略的重要原因之一。根据Nicholas A. Lambert的说法（Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909, P.13）：
The advent of the submarine as a practical weapon of war had a profound impact upon Fisher's vision of the future. As Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean (1899-1902) he had been the first senior British officer forced to contemplate the threat of attacks on his fleet by submarines. Toulon was the main testing ground for French submarines. Later, while serving as Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth (1903-1904), he had been in a unique position to watch the development of the Royal Navy's own embryonic submarine service. Subsequently, he came to believe that technology could revolutionize the method of conducting war at sea.
潜艇技术的不断发展和成熟，在费舍尔对未来海战形态的想象中，也发挥了重大的影响力。在1899-1902年时，作为地中海舰队的指挥官，费舍尔成为了第一个需要面临潜艇攻击威胁的英国指挥官，原因在于，土伦是法国海军潜艇的主要测试基地。后来，他在1903-1904年时，又担任了朴茨茅斯港的指挥官，并亲眼目睹了雏形状态的英国海军潜艇部队的发展情况。随后，他开始相信，科技带来的变化，会对海战方式造成革命性的改变。
3. 有鉴于这些变革，费舍尔认识到了近距离封锁的策略变得不再可行了。根据Nicholas A. Lambert的说法（Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909, P.15-16）：
Fisher was convinced, "that in the course of a few years no Fleet will be able to remain in the Mediterranean or in the English Channel" for any period of time. Without supprt from armoured warships close blockade was impractical; without a blockade, the difficulties in protecting the trade routes and preventing invasion would be increased enormously.
费舍尔相信，在数年后的将来，大型舰队就无法在地中海或英吉利海峡区域进行持续活动了。而在失去了大型军舰的支援后，近距离封锁策略也就无法有效实施了。封锁失效之后，敌军入侵英国本土，或对英国的海上通商线路进行袭击的可能性，就会大大增加。
4. 费舍尔所提出的轻型舰艇防卫策略，既不同于传统的海军策略，也与法国海军的策略有所不同。根据Nicholas A. Lambert的说法（Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909, P.16-17）：
The concept of flotilla defense called for the narrow coastal waters around Britain to be saturated with torpedo craft, deployed offensively, forward into the middle waters of the Channel. Fisher argued that "offensive strategy must be held to include the circumspection of the free movements of the enemy". This was a completely new way of thinking. Equally radical was his assertion that the objective of flotilla defense was not to win or contest command of the sea but to achieve sea denial. In marked contrast to previous doctrines which identified the enemy main fleet as the principal objective, Fisher ordered that the flotilla craft should ignore escorting battleships and make straight for the troop transports. It followed that an invasion convoy would be deterred from approaching the English coast until the defense flotilla had somehow been neutralized.
费舍尔的轻型舰艇防卫策略，是在英国附近的狭海区域布置大量的雷击舰艇，并通过攻势性行动，将他们部署到海峡中线区域。费舍尔指出，采用攻势战略的目的，是妨碍敌军的自由行动。这是一种截然不同的思考方式。费舍尔希望达成的目标，同样也很激进——他并不想通过这种轻型舰艇策略来获取制海权，他想达到的是阻止对方利用大海。先前的策略都是以敌方的主力舰队作为主要目标的，而费舍尔的策略则是要求轻型舰艇忽略敌方的战列舰，直奔敌人的运兵船。费舍尔认为，除非敌方能够消灭这些轻型舰艇，否则他们便会受制于其带来的威慑，从而不敢驶向英国海岸。
通商保护策略
由于英国非常依赖海上贸易，因此早在风帆海军时期，与英国为敌的国家，如法国，就发展出了通商破坏作战（Guerre de Course）来对抗英国。因此，英国海军除了依靠封锁策略扼杀对方的海上贸易及军事行动之外，还要注意避免自身的海上贸易遭到对方海军的破坏。
1. 在风帆海军时代，英国海军常用的保护海上贸易的措施，是护航制度。但进入蒸汽时代后，英国海军放弃了护航制度。根据Norman Friedman的说法（Fighting the Great War at Sea - Strategy, Tactics and Technology）：
Convoy died by the 1870s because there was no hope of providing enough fast long-range cruisers to convoy most merchant ships. The only option was somehow to hunt raiding cruisers down. In December 1874 First Naval Lord Admiral Milne wrote an analysis of trade protection which shaped future policy. He argued that a commerce raider would be drawn into the areas where the great sea routes were concentrated - what were later called focal areas. Raiders would find themselves drawn into the focal areas, where they would meet British cruisers which would destroy them. Milne identified eighteen such areas. Even a focal area defence required numerous cruisers, which the British built. The focal area strategy was never made public, because implicit in it was acceptance of heavy early losses in exchange for the destruction of the enemy raiders.
1870年代时，护航制度变得难以为继了。原因在于，商船的数量非常多，而英国海军所拥有的具备大航程的巡洋舰，远远无法为这么多的商船提供护航。因此，唯一的可行方案，就是消灭敌方的破交巡洋舰。1874年12月时，当时担任第一海务大臣的米尔恩，撰写了一份关于通商保护的分析，这篇文章对后续的政策造成了深远影响。他提出，执行破交任务的军舰，会被吸引至海上交通非常密集的区域，即后世所说的焦点海域。当袭击舰进入这些焦点海域后，便会遭遇英国巡洋舰，随后被后者消灭。米尔恩识别出了18个焦点海域。即便采用这种焦点海域防御策略，英国海军也还是需要建造海里的巡洋舰。英国人从未将焦点海域策略公诸于世，原因在于，这种战略背后的潜台词，是用战争初期时沉重的航运损失，来换取歼灭敌方袭击舰的机会。
Unfortunately an attacker did not have to match the Royal Navy’s numbers; it could build a few cruisers which could overmatch the focal-point ships. Focal-point cruisers had to deal with whatever came their way.
不幸的是，袭击方并不需要英国海军那么多的巡洋舰，他们可以建造少量但强力的军舰，从而击败焦点海域内的英国军舰。而焦点海域内的英国巡洋舰，则需要对抗各种各样的敌舰。
全球范围内的焦点海域
下图中，展示了1885年前后时，英国海军判定的焦点海域，他们采取的海上巡逻线路，以及他们所拥有的加煤站。
2. 然而，维持焦点海域策略的代价也变得越来越昂贵了。根据Norman Friedman的说法（Fighting the Great War at Sea - Strategy, Tactics and Technology）：
In the 1890s new lightweight steels made it possible to build fast armoured cruisers. The British policy of maintaining a sufficient edge over the next two naval powers (France and Russia) meant maintaining a 2 to 1 advantage in armoured cruisers. Unfortunately a big armoured cruiser cost about as much as a battleship. The Royal Navy was the single largest item in the British budget and the budget exploded with the rise of armoured cruisers.
至1890年代时，新式的装甲钢出现后，各国海军纷纷开始建造具备高航速的装甲巡洋舰。当时英国海军采用的造舰政策，是两强标准，这意味着英国海军的实力应足以应对第二和第三海军强国（法国和俄国）。而在装甲巡洋舰的数量上，英国人的标准是两倍于法俄之和。然而，大吨位装甲巡洋舰的造价，几乎与战列舰相当。当时的皇家海军的军费，是英国政府预算中金额最大的一个项目，而装甲巡洋舰的兴起，导致了军费激增。
3. 有观点认为，在1904-1910年间担任第一海务大臣的费舍尔，甚至希望停止建造战列舰，并打造一支由巡洋舰和轻型舰艇作为核心力量的舰队，从而实现降低海军预算的目标，但当时的海军大臣并不认同这种做法，因此该策略并未得到落实。根据Jon Tetsuro Sumida的说法（In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914）：
By 1904, Fisher had come to the conclusion that torpedoes launched by submarines or fast surface craft had made battleships practically obsolete...By the summer of 1904, Fisher was willing to suggest that the construction of battleships be stopped altogether...Although destroyers and submarines arguably were capable of replacing the battleship in the role of coast defence, neither type possessed the range or sea-keeping qualities that would have enabled them to operate effectively along Britain’s far-flung lines of maritime supply, which thus meant that armoured cruisers were still required for commerce protection. Fisher was convinced, therefore, that a country’s naval strength had to be measured in terms of armoured cruisers, destroyers and submarines, rather than in terms of battleships. But Selborne rejected Fisher’s suggestion that battleships were no longer necessary and that Britain’s naval supremacy could be maintained with armoured cruisers and torpedo craft only.
至1904年时，根据费舍尔的观点，由于潜艇及快速水面舰艇带来的雷击威胁，战列舰实质上已经过时了。在1904年夏天时，费舍尔提出，战列舰的建造工作可以完全停掉。不过，尽管驱逐舰和潜艇或许可以替代战列舰，完成近岸防御的任务，但由于这些舰艇的航程和适航性都很有限，无法护卫遍及全球的英国海上交通线，因此出于通商保护的目的，装甲巡洋舰还是需要保留的。费舍尔认为，一个国家的海军实力，以后不再会根据战列舰来衡量了，而是会根据装甲巡洋舰、驱逐舰、以及潜艇来衡量。但是，当时担任海军大臣的第二代塞尔伯恩伯爵否决了费舍尔的建议，后者并不认可“英国不再需要战列舰，英国的海权可以通过装甲巡洋舰和雷击舰艇来保护”的观点。
实际采用的对德作战策略
1、英国海军在本土水域采用的对德作战策略，是以远距离封锁为主，以轻型舰艇防卫策略为辅。根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume II - The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, 1914-1916, P.4-6）：
The Grand Fleet (Churchill called it the 'crown jewels'), at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys, blocked the northern passage with the assistance of what became the famous Northern Patrol (10th Cruiser Squadron)...The Grand Fleet could move south if a powerful German force tried to attack the cross-Channel communications or to convoy an invading army...The Channel Fleet was the other main British force in Home waters. Based on Portland, it held the Straits of Dover, sealing the only outlet to the south. It composed of the older pre-dreadnoughts. At the southern end of the North Sea, between East Anglia and the Dutch coast, was a strong force of light cruisers and modern destroyers, based on Harwich. The functions of the Harwich Force, organically part of the Grand Fleet, were to patrol the waters between 52°N. and 54°N., assist in the sweeps of the Grand Fleet, and join the Channel Fleet if it moved north. Acting as an East Coast defence force were Patrol Flotillas, based on Dover, the Humber, the Tyne, and the Forth. The Grand Fleet guaranteed defence against an invasion in sufficient force to conquer the country, but could not guarantee preventing a landing in considerable force on the East Coast which might have done much harm in smashing up the shipbuilding industry, not to mention causing a panic, if the Germans were prepared to accept the fact that their troops would never get home again. This threat was taken quite seriously, and it was to discount it that the Patrol Flotillas were formed in 1912. The hope was that by attacking the transports they could prevent most of the soldiers from landing. The 6th Patrol Flotilla, or 'Dover Patrol', had the special duty of denying the Straits of Dover to the enemy...At the dockyard ports - the Nore, Portsmouth, Devonport, Pembroke, and Queenstown - were the Local Defence Flotillas. Their main duties were to support the shore defences of the dockyard ports against naval raids and to serve as night patrols off the ports. The vessels allotted to the Patrol and Local Defence Flotillas (with the latter getting the left-overs) were the older destroyers, the torpedo boats, and the older submarines ('A', 'B', and 'C' classes), which were fit for coastal work only. The newer submarines ('D' and 'E' classes) were based on Harwich and earmarked for offensive operations. Finally, the 12th Cruiser Squadron patrolled at the western end of the English Channel. This, then, was the disposition of the British Fleet in Home waters as the war got under way.
按丘吉尔的说法，对于英国海军而言，大舰队就相当于王冠上的明珠，其驻地是奥克尼群岛的斯卡帕湾，主要职责是封锁了北海北部的海域，但在德国对英国本土发动入侵，或试图扰乱英吉利海峡的航运的话，大舰队也可以南下对抗德国舰队。海峡舰队，是除了大舰队之外的另一支驻扎在英国本土的主要舰队，但其麾下都是些老旧的前无畏舰。这支舰队的驻地是波特兰，主要职责是扼守多佛海峡，即从北海南部驶向大西洋的必经之路。在英格兰东部至荷兰沿岸水域，还有一支由轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰组成的哈里奇分舰队，这支部队是隶属于大舰队的，其职责是在北纬52度至北纬54度的水域内进行巡逻，协助大舰队的扫荡行动，并在海峡舰队北上时伴随其共同行动。另外，尽管大舰队的实力足以抵挡大规模的入侵部队，但并不能保证德国入侵部队绝对无法登上英国海岸。如果德国人打算发起有去无回的自杀性攻击的话，那么他们是有可能对英国东海岸造成严重的破坏的。为了抵御这种威胁，英国海军在1912年时成立了一支巡逻部队，由驻扎在多佛海峡、亨伯河口、泰恩河口、以及福斯湾的多支巡逻中队共同构成。在面对德国的入侵部队时，这些巡逻中队会攻击敌方的运输船，从而阻止德国士兵登陆。其中的多佛巡逻中队，另外还承担一项特殊的任务，那就是阻止敌方进入多佛海峡。除此之外，在诺尔、朴茨茅斯、德文波特、彭布罗克、昆士敦等军港，还设有港口防御部队。这些部队的主要职责，是与岸防部队一起守护港口，并在夜间执行巡逻任务。巡逻部队和港口防御部队，是由老旧的驱逐舰、鱼雷艇、以及老旧的近岸潜艇组成的（巡逻部队的舰艇还相对较新一些，港口防御部队的舰艇则是最老旧的）。至于新式的潜艇，则是驻扎在哈里奇，用于执行攻势任务的。最后，第10和第12巡洋舰中队，则分别协助大舰队和海峡舰队，完成对北海的封锁（另见下文）。以上这些，就是开战之时的英国本土的舰队部署情况。
2. 根据英国海军官方资料，在第一次世界大战时，他们实际采用的通商保护策略如下：
大西洋海域的通商保护任务，是英国海军部的重点关注对象——原因在于，英国所需要的食品及工业原材料，很多都来自北美，而南美也是非常重要的食品来源地。此外，来自南非和西非的物资、以及大部分来自澳新的物资，也是通过大西洋航线来运输的。尽管大舰队可以阻止大规模的德国舰队突破北海封锁线冲向大西洋，多佛尔海峡的水雷和潜艇也可以有效阻止敌舰的行动，但小规模的敌舰，还是有可能绕过大舰队的封锁的。此外，德国人也可能会对商船进行改装，并将其投入通商破坏作战。这些操作可能会对英国的海上贸易造成严重影响。为了解决这一问题，英国海军部研究过各种不同的方法，最终确立的作战方案，是通过一份叫做“对执行通商保护任务的舰船的战时命令”的文件下达的。其确立的作战方案，是以攻击敌方破交军舰为主，以拦截敌方商船并查抄违禁品为辅。而具体的操作，则是建议在多条海上交通线汇集的焦点海域进行巡逻，而不是在单一航线上巡逻，并且最好能与指挥部保持无线电联络。
大西洋海域的各个巡洋舰中队的负责区域划分
为了加强保护力度，英国海军在大西洋海域部署了多支巡洋舰中队，包括：第4巡洋舰中队、第5巡洋舰中队、第9巡洋舰中队、第10巡洋舰中队、第11巡洋舰中队、第12巡洋舰中队。这些部队，都有各自的划分明确的巡逻区域。其中，第10巡洋舰中队负责在设得兰群岛附近巡逻，扼守北海的北部出海口，而第12巡洋舰中队则负责在英吉利海峡以西的水域巡逻，扼守北海的南部出海口。其余的四支部队，则都是在远离英国本土的大洋上巡逻的。
地中海区域的战略情况
地中海区域的海上贸易也非常繁荣。但由于德国海军在地中海区域部署的力量非常有限，而法国和俄国则已经在1907年时，与英国签订了三国协约（Triple Entente），因此在这个区域，英国海军面临的压力是远不如北海区域那么大的。此外，在1912年时，英法两国的外交部还达成了共识，未来在遭遇第三国的无端攻击时，英法两国军队可以联合行动。在此共识的基础上，地中海舰队司令米尔恩上将制定了他的作战计划。为了在战时协调英法两国的海军力量，他们还准备了一套通讯手册。后来，当意大利加入协约国之后，地中海区域的防务，则改为由英法意三国共同负责。
地中海地区的各国负责区域划分
下图中，展示的是1916年1月1日时，英法德三国在地中海区域的负责区域划分情况。
亚非及澳新区域的各个海外司令部的负责区域划分
在亚非及澳新区域，英国海军则设立有四个地区性司令部，分别是：好望角司令部（Cape of Good Hope Station）、东印度司令部（East Indies Station）、中国司令部（China Station）、以及澳大利亚司令部（Australian Station）。各自防区内的通商保护任务，主要由这些地区司令部负责。在有需要的情况下，这些地区性司令部麾下的部队，可以合并为东方舰队（Eastern Fleet），并由中国司令部的总司令担任东方舰队的总司令。
结论：英国海军的对德战略，核心部分是海上封锁策略，这能够有效遏制德国舰队出击，并阻止德国利用海上交通线。除此之外，他们还采用了轻型舰艇防卫策略，以及围绕着焦点海域的通商保护策略，前者能为英国港口及近岸区域提供额外的保护，而后者则能较为有效地拦截敌方的破交舰。
二、德国海军的战略规划
在德国海军中，最高统帅是皇帝本人。具体的工作，则是由海军总参谋部（Admiralstab）、海军部（Reichsmarineamt）、以及海军内阁（Marinekabinett）分别负责的。
其中，海军战略是由海军总参谋部的长官——海军总参谋长（Chef des Admiralstab）负责的。但由于海军建设是由海军部负责的，而海军建设与海军战略是息息相关的，因此海军部的长官——海军部国务秘书（Staatssekretär des Reichsmarineamt），对海军战略也有很大的影响力。
至于德国海军麾下的作战力量，最主要的是公海舰队（Hochseeflotte）。公海舰队麾下的军舰，可以借助基尔运河（Nord-Ostsee-Kanal），在北海和波罗的海之间快速转移。在本土以外的区域，也有一些小规模的作战力量，其中最主要的，是以青岛作为母港的东亚分舰队（Ostasiengeschwader）。
关于德意志第二帝国的海军战略，有一个非常流行且非常直白的说法：在北海海域内，泰晤士河口与赫尔格兰岛之间的地方，与英国海军决一死战（Entscheidungsschlacht in the North Sea, "between the Thames and Helgoland"）。这个说法来自于提尔皮茨在1894年时撰写的IX号备忘录（Dienstschrift IX），反映了提尔皮茨强调海上决战的战略思想。提尔皮茨长期担任海军部国务秘书，在德国海军中具有非常强大的影响力，他的战略思想，通常也被认为是德国海军内部的主流思想。
决战策略：进攻 vs 防御
一般认为，德国海军所设想的这种决战，是计划在距离赫尔格兰岛不远的区域展开的。其背后的原因在于，德国人认为英国海军会采取近距离封锁战略。不得不说，这种战略规划是非常一厢情愿的——如果英国海军不采用近距离封锁策略，德国人就很难实现其削弱对手的目标。但是，故事的全貌并不仅仅是如此。
1. 德国人并非完全没有想到英国人可能会采用远距离封锁策略。事实上，早在1902年时，德国海军总参谋长，威廉·贝赫塞尔（Wilhelm Büchsel）中将，就认识到了这个问题。根据Ivo Nikolai Lambi的说法（The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914, P.220-221）
Biichsel made an ominous observation which threatened the basis of all German operational planning: "We must keep in mind that the most dangerous tactic of the enemy is to blockade us from a distance and to avoid any offensive actions." This appears to be the first anticipation on the part of the German navy of a wide blockade on the part of Britain.
贝赫塞尔似乎是德国海军中，最早意识到应该海军可能会采取远距离封锁的人。这种情况，实际上会威胁到德国海军作战计划的根基。他表示：“我们必须要认识到，敌人最危险的策略，是对我们进行远距离封锁，并避免采取任何攻势行动”。
2、贝赫塞尔的两位继任者，同样也认识到了这个问题。根据Holger H. Herwig的说法（Luxury Fleet - The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918, P.190）：
As early as 1908, the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, Vice-Admiral Count Friedrich v. Baudissin, had cautioned that the British would be content to sit back and guard the distant exits to the Atlantic Ocean; it would remain for Germany to force access to the world's maritime arteries.
在1908年时，海军总参谋长，弗雷德里希·冯·波迪辛中将表示：英国人可能会选择退至后方，守卫前往大西洋的通道。在此情况下，德国方面需要强行突破封锁，才能打通全球海洋运输路线。
One year later, Baudissin's successor, Admiral Max Fischel, put it well: In the final analysis we are fighting for access to the ocean, whose entrances on that side of the North Sea are in England's hands. However the war may be fought, we are therefore basically the attacker, who is disputing the enemy's possession.
一年之后，波迪辛伯爵的继任者，马克思·菲斯切尔上将则说道：在战争模拟中，我们力图打破封锁，但通过北海前往大洋的出口，被掌握在英国人手中。无论我们选择何种作战策略，我们本质上都是进攻方，我们都是在争夺敌方所拥有的东西。
3. 为了解决可能的远距离封锁的困境，波迪辛和菲斯切尔曾提出过进攻性策略的设想。根据Patrick J. Kelly的说法（Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy, P.320-321）：
During 1908 Baudissin campaigned for a more aggressive plan for a war with Britain. If the High Seas Fleet were passive, German Atlantic commerce would be cut off. He therefore favored attacks on the blockaders with the whole fleet as far north as Scotland, ideally on the night before war broke out...Fischel tried to keep an offensive spirit.
1908年时，波迪辛提议，在与英国爆发战争时，应采用更为积极主动的作战计划。如果公海舰队被动等待，德国的大西洋贸易路线就会被切断。在此情况下，他希望动用整支舰队，对封锁者发起攻击，攻击范围最远可达苏格兰，攻击时间则是以战争爆发前夜为最佳。继任的菲斯切尔同样也试图保持进攻精神。
4. 菲斯切尔的继任者，奥古斯特·黑林根中将，则拟定了一种不同的作战计划。根据Patrick J. Kelly的说法（Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy, P.362 & P.365）：
In 1912 the prevailing assumption was that, upon the outbreak of war, the Royal Navy would rush to the Helgoland Bight and quickly set up a close blockade of the North Sea ports. The operations plan of November 1912 incorporated this assumption. Rapid British mobilization was expected to send large numbers of light units to positions off the North Sea coast, with more powerful ships lurking further out at sea. Such a course of action would preclude the Baudissin/Fischel fantasies of a German attack on the British coast immediately upon the outbreak of war. A further complicating factor was that, by 1912, the fleet was so large that it took two high tides to pass the shoals of the Jade. Heeringen’s obvious counter to such an aggressive British strategy would be Kleinkriegstyle mine, torpedo, and U-boat attacks to whittle down the blockading forces - in other words, a policy of a strategic defense combined with a tactical offense.
在1912年时，主流的假设是，当战争爆发后，英国海军会冲入赫尔格兰湾内，并对德国的各个北海港口，迅速拉起近距离封锁线。德国海军的1912年11月的作战计划，就是基于这个假设的。德国人预计，英国人会进行快速动员，并将大量轻型舰艇派遣至北海沿岸，而更为强大的战舰则会在埋伏在更后方的水域。在这种情况下，波迪辛/菲斯切尔所设想的德国海军在开战时主动进攻英国沿岸的做法，是不可能实现的。此外，还有一个因素导致了德国海军采取守势策略：至1912年时，德国海军的舰队规模已经非常大了，需要两次涨潮才能使整个舰队通过亚德湾的浅滩区域。有鉴于英国人可能会采取的这种攻势行动，黑林根的应对策略是通过鱼雷、水雷、潜艇等方式袭击封锁舰队，以削弱其力量——换句话说，他采用的是战略性防御与战术性进攻相结合的策略。
Heeringen, in a casual but prophetic remark about a war game, said: “If the English really adopt a distant blockade, with a consequent holding back of their battleships, the wartime role of our beautiful High Seas Fleet would be a very unhappy one. The U-boats would then have to [carry on the war].”
黑林根曾在一场作战推演后评论道：“如果英国海军真的采用远距离封锁，不把他们的战列舰给派出来，那么当战争爆发后，我们的公海舰队，就无法起到多大作用了。在这种情况下，我们可能需要依靠潜艇来完成作战任务”。
5、黑林根的继任者，胡戈·波尔（Hugo Pohl）上将，同样选择了战略性防御与战术性进攻相结合的策略。根据Paul. M. Kennedy的说法（The Development of German Naval Operations. Plans against England, 1896-1914, P.24）
It is true that the British fleet manoeuvres in 1913 were clearly postulated upon the policy of a wide blockade and that this caused the Admiralty Staff to think of a 'distant offensive'; but this alternative appeared upon closer investigation to be far too risky whilst the High Seas Fleet was so numerically inferior. Only the U-boats and torpedo-boats should be deployed offensively, Pohl recommended in May 1914.
英国海军在1913年时举行的舰队演习，明确表明了他们并不打算采用近距离封锁，这使得德国海军总参谋部一度考虑转而采用进攻策略。但在仔细研究过其可行性后，他们认为，考虑到公海舰队在数量上处于明显劣势，因此这么做的风险实在太大了。在1914年5月时，波尔上将建议，只应派出潜艇和鱼雷艇，去执行攻击性的任务。
小规模作战
如前所述，在德国海军中，以提尔皮茨为首的主流观点，是强调与英国海军进行决战（Grosskrieg）。另有一批军官，则支持采用小规模作战（Kleinkrieg）来对抗英国海军。所谓的小规模作战，是一个源自德国近代军事史上的概念，最初是描述陆军的小股作战行为，后又被引申到了海军领域，并融入了法国的新学派（Jeune École）的思想——新学派是相对于旧学派（Vieille École）而言的，前者强调运用鱼雷艇和潜艇打击敌方舰队，同时运用巡洋舰打击敌方交通线，而后者则是传统的战列舰派。
1. 提尔皮茨本人，显然认为巡洋舰作战不适合德国海军。根据Patrick J. Kelly的说法（Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy, P.313）：
Tirpitz argued that the ability to conduct a worldwide Kleinkrieg varied among states. France, for example, with two coastlines and many foreign bases with coaling stations, could pursue such a war with prospects of success; Germany, however, “to a certain degree is in a geographical corner, and has only one [major] foreign base [Tsingtau].”
提尔皮茨认为，不同的国家，在全球范围内开展小规模作战的能力是不一样的。举例来说，法国有两条海岸线，还有大量的海外基地和煤炭补给站，因此开展小规模作战是有成功希望的。而德国，从某种意义上来说是一个地理位置上的边缘国家，并且只有一个大型海外基地（青岛）。
2. 对于潜艇作战，提尔皮茨也是不甚热衷的。根据Patrick J. Kelly的说法（Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy, P.354）：
Tirpitz’s reaction to early U-boat development was not enthusiastic...Perhaps the decisive reason was that U-boats did not fit in with his original design as outlined in the Navy Law. A fleet of battleships and large cruisers, meant for decisive battle, could use torpedo boats and U-boats only as auxiliaries in a North Sea Armageddon. A large-scale commitment to U-boats, especially if they were designed for Kleinkrieg that focused on commerce war, could undermine the painfully constructed edifice of the Navy Law.
对于早期的潜艇发展情况，提尔皮茨并不怎么关心。最主要的原因，可能是潜艇并不能融入提尔皮茨在舰队法中规划的设想——战列舰和大型巡洋舰构成的舰队，是用于在北海战场进行决战的，而在这种决战环境中，鱼雷艇和潜艇只是起辅助作用的。如果选择大规模建造潜艇，尤其是用于小规模作战，起到通商破坏用途的潜艇，则有可能危害到舰队法和舰队建设工作——那可是提尔皮茨好不容易才实现的杰作。
3. 对于那些支持巡洋舰作战或潜艇作战的军官，提尔皮茨会想尽办法予以打击。根据Holger H. Herwig的说法（Luxury Fleet - The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918, P.190）：
Opponents of battleship construction were not tolerated at the Leipzigerplatz. Tirpitz viciously attacked proponents of cruiser warfare such as Admiral Hollmann, Admiral v. Koester, Admiral Oldekop, Vice-Admiral Valois, and Captain v. Maltzahn, denouncing them to Admiral v. Muller as "dangerous to the Navy". Nor was the Supreme War Lord spared: Tirpitz opposed Wilhelm's blueprint for the "fast capital ship", a combination of cruiser and battleship. And in 1904 the state secretary denounced submarines as only local and secondary weapons, and refused to create what he termed a "museum of experiments". Lieutenant-Commander Franz Rust in 1904, Vice-Admiral Karl Galster in 1907, 1908 and 1909, Captain Lothar Persius between 1908 and 1914, and Vice-Admiral v. Schleinitz in 1908 all felt Tirpitz's wrath for supporting submarine warfare (Kleinkrieg). Young officers who associated too closely with cruiser or submarine tactics could be assured of short careers in the Imperial Navy.
反对战列舰建造的人，在莱比锡广场（指代德国海军部）是不会得到容忍的。提尔皮茨恶毒地攻击过巡洋舰作战的支持者，例如弗雷德里希·冯·霍夫曼上将、汉斯·冯·克斯特上将、伊万·奥尔德考普中将、维克多·瓦卢瓦中将、库特·冯·玛尔赞上校等。提尔皮茨告诉格奥尔格·冯·穆勒上将（海军内阁长，负责人事），说这些人会危害海军。提尔皮茨连皇帝本人都没有放过，对于威廉二世提议的“快速战列舰”概念，提尔皮茨也是持反对意见的。至1904年时，提尔皮茨又表示潜艇只是一种只能在近岸使用的次要的武器，并认为如果花钱建造潜艇，最后只会建成一个实验品的展览馆（提尔皮茨认为早期潜艇技术不完善）。提尔皮茨在1904年时攻击过弗朗茨·鲁斯特少校，在1907-09年间攻击过卡尔·加斯特中将，在1908-14年间攻击过洛塔尔·佩修斯上校，在1908年时攻击时格奥尔格·施莱尼茨中将，原因都是因为这些人支持潜艇战。与巡洋舰或潜艇作战派走的太近的年轻军官，在德国海军中的职业生涯肯定不会很长。
4. 不过，作战策略并不属于提尔皮茨的负责范围，而是由海军总参谋部负责的。后者尽管总体来说是支持海上决战的，但也没有完全忽视小规模作战，例如，他们认真的研究过使用辅助巡洋舰进行通商破坏作战，并将其写入了作战计划。根据Matthew S. Seligmann的说法（The Royal Navy and the German Threat 1901-1914: Admiralty Plans to Protect British Trade in a War Against Germany, P.13 & P.19-20）：
The earliest indication in the German naval records of serious consideration being given to the possibility of using merchant vessels as auxiliary cruisers comes from March 1902, when the Admiralty Staff began a comprehensive survey of the resources available for waging a war on commerce with converted fast liners.
从相关记录来看，德国海军最早是在1902年3月时，开始认真考虑使用商船作为辅助巡洋舰的。当时海军总参谋部对德国所拥有的高速轮船进行了细致的研究，以确定哪些船只可在改装之后，用作通商破坏作战。
Despite the manifold efforts of the Admiralty Staff to advance its agenda on economic warfare with auxiliary cruisers, significant changes in Germany’s capabilities were slow in coming. The principal reason for this was the dogged opposition of the Imperial Navy Office. Nevertheless, the enhancement of Germany’s commerce raiding capabilities did slowly advance...At the start of 1912...a system had been created for commerce raiding by converted merchant ships.
为了推动辅助巡洋舰的破交作战，海军总参谋部做出了许多努力，但进展还是比较缓慢。主要原因，还是由于海军部的顽固抵抗。尽管如此，德国的破交战能力还是在进步的。至1912年初时，德国人已经建立起了一套体系，能够将改装过的民用船舶，用于通商破坏作战了。
5. 至于潜艇，在一战爆发前并未被视为破交战的利器。根据Norman Friedman的说法（Fighting the Great War at Sea - Strategy, Tactics and Technology）：
Submarines could not effectively attack commerce under the universally-accepted Prize Rules, which required that a raider examine a ship and protect its passengers and crew before sinking it. Navies became interested in submarines as elements of, or adjuncts to, fleets. For example, the German navy were interested in tactics which would lead an opposing fleet over a submarine trap.
根据当时被广泛接收的交战规则，潜艇是无法有效攻击海上通商的。原因在于，根据当时的国际法，袭击方首先应登船检查，随后确保船员和乘客的安全，随后才能击沉船只。因此，当时人们更感兴趣的是将潜艇作为舰队中的一个组成部分，或附属力量。例如，德国海军就对潜艇设伏，并将敌方舰队引诱至伏击圈的战术很感兴趣。
实际下达的作战命令
根据日德兰海战时担任公海舰队司令的舍尔（Reinhard Scheer），在其著作中给出的描述（Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World Wark，P.25）：
In the War Orders which were issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet the task before him was framed as follows : The objective of the operations must be to damage the English Fleet by offensive raids against the naval forces engaged in watching and blockading the German Bight, as well as by mine-laying on the British coast and submarine attack, whenever possible. After an equality of strength had been realised as a result of these operations, and all our forces had been got ready and concentrated, an attempt was to be made with our Fleet to seek battle under circumstances unfavourable to the enemy. Of course, if a favourable occasion for battle presented itself before, it must be exploited. Further, operations against enemy merchant ships; were to be conducted in accordance with Prize Court regulations, and the ships appointed to carry out such operations in foreign waters were to be sent out as soon as possible.
根据下发给公海舰队司令的作战命令：作战行动的目的，是对英国舰队造成损失，具体方式可以是：对监视并封锁德国湾的英国海军力量进行袭击，对英国海岸进行攻势布雷，使用潜艇攻击英国海军等。当这些行动有效削弱了英国的海军力量，使得英德双方海军力量达到均等，且我国所有海军力量都集结和准备就绪时，我们就会试图在对敌方不利的情况下，与其进行舰队决战。如果在达成均势之前，出现了有利于我方的作战机会，则应抓住机会出击。针对敌方商船的袭击行动，则应遵照国际法开展。那些位于海外地区的，计划用于执行此类任务的船只，应尽快开始作战行动。
结论：德国海军的对英战略，核心思想是先设法削弱英国舰队的实力，随后在有利条件下与其进行决战。另外，他们也会安排巡洋舰在海外进行破交作战。 |
发表于 2021-4-12 15:54
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