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本帖最后由 kentwong5a28 于 2021-6-22 22:15 编辑
当时保守的主流海军战略不认可全能主力舰。
英美日等国都重视决战(USN上脑尤其严重）。高速主力舰的位置是前卫兵力和制海兵力。在高速舰投入过多，就要牺牲慢速主力本队的建设，把1艘普通高速舰加码成全能大船，导致战列线上少1艘大船少十几门重炮，这是保守派难以接受的。
费舍尔提倡「战巡制大海」海军战略（具体看科贝特的海军战略一书），这战略里只需要无畏X4这样的全能大船。费舍尔其中一个重要动机是要节约军费，虽然单艘舰艇成本飘升，但全局上能省不少钱，因为不用再建造和维护只能打决战的铁乌龟。
保守派反对费舍尔，一方面是不愿意放弃「决战情怀」，另一方面虽然海军竞赛代价已经很高，但勒紧裤腰带还能把快速主力舰+慢速主力舰这一套玩下去。
假如没有华盛顿条约，各国在海军竞赛上继续狂奔，最终竞赛的高昂代价会无情地碾碎一切对铁乌龟决战的幻想，只能造高速舰放弃铁乌龟，要不然制海方面大失败。下面是Norman Friedman英国维多利亚时期巡洋舰一书中，序章结尾的原文
The multi-year approach did not quite capture the effect of headlong changes in technology. For example, in 1891 the Royal Navy had not one effective cruiser completed before 1878-79, and at least fifteen of the twenty built between 1879 and 1884 would be obsolete in 1894. Ships became obsolete long before they wore out. To make matters worse, the unit size, hence the unit cost, of ships continued to rise; what had paid for an adequate first-class cruiser in 1890 could hardly pay for a second-class cruiser in, say, 1898. Ships’ machinery was a particular problem. Guns could be replaced by better ones, but it was entirely impractical to re-engine (and re-boiler) a ship in order to maintain her speed relative to more modern ships. The speed issue particularly affected cruisers.
Battleships did not grow very much over the decade following the Naval Defence Act, but cruisers did. Once battleships also began to grow the Royal Navy felt increasing financial pressure. Until 1909 there was, moreover, no corresponding change in British finances to relax that pressure. Admiral Sir John (‘Jacky’) Fisher was appointed First Sea Lord in 1904 specifically to solve the problem. In the Mediterranean he had shown that he could prevail over the French and the Russians with limited forces, relying on fast striking forces directed by intelligence rather than on the blocking concepts of the past. In the Admiralty Fisher sought to cut costs by ending the focal area cruiser strategy, substituting a limited number of large fast cruisers working with smaller ones. Fisher also sought deep cuts in the smaller deployed ships which were used mainly to police the Empire and to deal with peacetime threats to shipping, such as pirates. He was certainly aware that these roles mattered, but he also probably felt that they should have been paid for out of the Foreign Office budget.
Fisher’s savings on cruisers made capital ships the single largest item in the British naval budget. They followed the same trajectory as the cruisers. Successive classes grew larger and much more expensive, so that by 1913 the Royal Navy again faced crisis, despite changes in its financing. The attempts to resolve this problem are beyond the scope of this book. |
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发表于 2021-6-22 19:00
。当时海军观念保守，不喜欢全能主力舰。费舍尔和科贝特这类有超前眼光的人终究是少数。
楼主
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