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首先对于第一件事“战列舰并不能在比巡洋舰更远的距离开火，因为她们不一定能在更远的距离上发现敌舰”：
As radar contacts by our battleships multiplied, Admiral Lee ordered course changed to 300° T. and informed the South Dakota that she might open fire when ready. The Gwin, keeping station 5,000 yards ahead of the flagship, observed two ships in the target area. Bearing was 355° T., range about 14,000. They were thought to be of the Mogami type.
At 0016, before being fired upon or illuminated by the enemy, the Washington opened on the leading Japanese ship with her main battery at 18,500 yards, using radar ranges and optical train. In 3 minutes, 42 rounds of 16-inch armor-piercing mmunition were fired. At the time the first salvo landed, the secondary battery began firing on targets about 15,000 yards away, possibly three destroyers, and the main battery spotters were blinded by the flashes of the 5-inch guns. However, radar officers reported that the first salvo straddled and that the big guns were on target with the second or third. The signal of the enemy vessel, which had been coming in strong on the radar screens, flickered and became faint and fuzzy.
A minute or so after the Washington went into action, the South Dakota opened fire on the nearest ship of the main group at a range of 15,700 yards, using radar control. This vessel was not far from the targets of the Washington's secondary battery and was overlapping in deflection the more distant vessel astern of the battleship or heavy cruiser which our flagship's main battery was pounding. It seemed likely that the Japanese were not in battle formation and therefore that they had been surprised. The South Dakota's first or second salvo hit the mark. Tremendous fires blazed up both on this ship and on the Washington's main battery target. The South Dakota spotted up 100 and right 02 to get on the ship which was following the leader. This time also the first salvos crashed home.
At 0019, after the Washington's seventh or eighth salvo, her flaming target disappeared and was presumed to have sunk. The main battery stopped firing, while the secondary continued with undetermined results until it had expended 100 rounds.
At 0019 the flagship changed course to 300° T., and at 0020 speed was increased from 17 to 23 knots. Reports were received that our destroyers were opening fire. The Gwin picked one of the enemy cruisers as a target for her torpedoes. One of the tubes fired prematurely as a result of a short circuit. The ships proved to be beyond effective range for high-speed setting. Next the destroyer fired two star-shell spreads to illuminate the battleships' targets and followed with two salvos of anti-aircraft common. The range was excessive, so fire was checked.
The Benham had been unable to see the targets at first but finally distinguished two of them. They were not observed to be firing, and indeed the Japanese were slow to reply to our battleships and did no damage whatever in this first phase of the action. The Benham did not fire torpedoes because it was determined that the enemy vessels would be behind the protection of Savo by the time they arrived.
At 0024, after the South Dakota's eighth salvo, her target was seen to sink. The other cruiser, on which she had opened originally, was now only a doubtful pip on the radar screen. Several Japanese voice transmissions had ceased abruptly. Only the weaker ones continued.
引文描述了1942年11月25日夜战中美军战列舰的行动，其中华盛顿、南达科他号在18000码外就与敌舰进行了雷达或者目视接触，并开始向敌舰开火。其中被南达科他打沉的船是绫波号，当时她距离美军战列舰15000码左右。被华盛顿射击的川内因为施放烟幕加上美舰误以为该舰被击沉而逃过一劫。从日舰稍迟的反应来看，日方当时并没能在美方开火前发现美舰。可见美方战列舰不仅能在中远距离上观测敌舰并进行攻击，而且相当有效。相比之下，轻型舰艇在10000-7000码上的炮战并没有取得决定性战果，最后因为美方驱逐舰中雷而结束。
类似的状况在苏里高海峡也上演过，西弗吉尼亚在22000码外依靠雷达率先开火，而巡洋舰中最先开火的路易斯维尔在15600码上打出第一轮齐射（数据来自《Battle of Surigao Strait (Twentieth-Century Battles) by Anthony P. Tully》 ）
可见即便在夜间，战列舰也仍然可以凭借雷达、更好的火控与舰炮，从而在更远的距离有效地攻击敌舰，这一点是巡洋舰比不了的。以同年的塔萨法隆格海战为例：
At 2223 the cruisers changed course by head of column to 320° T., with the destroyers taking up parallel courses. About 15 minutes later, all ships formed on a line of bearing of 140°, on a course 280° T. At the same time SG radars began to search the Guadalcanal shoreline for indications of the enemy's presence.
The SG on the Minneapolis, which had played a large part in navigating the Task Force through Lengo Channel, picked up the first contact with the enemy. At 2306 what appeared to be "a small wart on Cape Esperance" became visible on the PPI screen. It grew larger until it finally detached itself from the outline of the land mass. It bore 284° T., at a distance of 26,000 yards. Admiral Wright immediately informed the rest of his Force of the radar contact. Gradually the number of ships on the Minneapolis' SG screen increased, until by 2315 seven were clearly perceptible. They were proceeding at 15 knots on a southeasterly course.12
Shortly after learning of the Minneapolis' contact, the Fletcher picked up two enemy vessels, bearing 285° T., 14,000 yards off her port bow. Tracking immediately commenced, revealing five ships, four about one mile and a quarter off Guadalcanal, the fifth half a mile outside and abreast of the second ship. A solution of 15 knots on a course of 140° T. was obtained. At 2316, as the enemy formation bore 243° T. at a range of 7,000 yards, Comdr. Cole in the Fletcher requested permission to launch torpedoes. Admiral Wright inquired if the targets were within range, and, upon receiving an affirmative answer, authorized the torpedo attack.
Two other van destroyers noted the presence of the enemy. The Drayton's SG picked up five ships after the Fletcher reported contact, but for some reason the plot was erratic, giving a target speed of zero. No Japanese ships were visible from the Perkins until 2315, when the SC equipment revealed five vessels bearing 284° T., approximately 3,000 yards from Tassafaronga Point and 14,480 yards from the destroyer. Radar plot determined the course of this target as 125° T. and the speed 15 knots. Although the number of ships appearing on the Perkins' screen was the same as that on the Fletcher's, the discrepancy in bearings was so great (Perkins 284°; Fletcher, 243°) that if the bearings were accurate the two groups of ships must have been widely separated. The Maury had no SG equipment and could not locate the enemy at this time.
Steaming 1,000 yards astern of the flagship was the New Orleans. Her SG also failed to discover the Japanese ships for several minutes after their appearance on the Minneapolis' screen at 2306. Eight minutes later, however, what appeared on the SG screen to be a reef close to Guadalcanal was identified as a column of ships, with a single vessel on the flank. This Japanese formation stood 14,000 yards from the New Orleans, and although the bearing was not recorded, it was doubtless the same formation as that observed by the Fletcher.
The experiences of the other cruisers in the column varied. The Pensacola, third in line, lacked SG equipment, and made no radar contacts until well after the Minneapolis had opened fire. Next came the Honolulu, which, despite constant SG search on the bearings and ranges reported by the Minneapolis and Fletcher, observed no enemy ships for several minutes.13 Last in the column was the Northampton, which had no SG radar, and had to depend on the reports of the other ships. Neither of the two rear destroyers, also lacking SG equipment, was able to locate the Japanese.
At approximately 2320, having received authority to launch a torpedo attack, the Fletcher fired 10 torpedoes in two half salvos by SG control. The center of the Japanese line bore 267° T., at a distance of 7,300 yards--a torpedo range of 9,600 yards from our leading destroyer and 8,200 yards from the Drayton in the rear. Simultaneously the Perkins launched eight torpedoes, recording the range as 5,000 yards. Because she still could not obtain a target speed of more than zero, the Drayton only fired two. The Maury had no positive contacts and did not fire at all.
Barely a minute after the torpedoes were launched, Admiral Wright ordered all ships to open gun fire, and the van destroyers began firing 5-inch shells and starshells. The Fletcher selected the selected the rear enemy ship as her target. It was 7,500 yards distant on a bearing of 188° T. After firing about 60 rounds in two minutes, the Fletcher lost her target from the FD radar. She therefore ceased firing and retired to the northwest around Savo Island, followed by the other three destroyers astern.14
At the time Comdr. Cole reported the target range from the Fletcher as satisfactory for a torpedo attack, seven enemy ships could be seen on the Minneapolis' radar screen, and their range had decreased to about 10,000 yards. The flagship selected a target 9,200 yards off her port bow on a bearing of 260° T. This vessel stood farthest right in the Japanese formation; the ship farthest left bore 239° T.
Assisted by starshells from the port 5-inch battery, the main battery of the Minneapolis fired four salvos at what was finally identified as a transport. The first salvo was somewhat over, but the next three were directly on. After the fourth salvo, the transport "violently disintegrated," and the flagship momentarily checked fire.
尽管在20000码外就已经通过雷达发现了敌舰，美方的第一轮开火也在10000码以内（明尼阿波利斯，9200码或是弗莱彻，7500码），而在这个距离上，日舰已经可以使用鱼雷了，实际上日方也这么做了，结果是美方遭受了很严重的损失。可见战列舰能够在更远处损伤敌舰的优势在夜战中也是存在的（不过也有前提：这些战列舰需要有相对可靠的雷达以发现敌舰，但对于二战时期的英美而言这并不是什么难事）
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发表于 2024-6-15 19:37
发表于 2024-6-17 13:52
