日德兰纪念系列 - 战略战术篇 - 第一章 - 战略规划
本帖最后由 seven_nana 于 2023-3-5 21:49 编辑前言
1916年5月31日下午，英国海军的大舰队与德国海军的公海舰队，在北海东部、靠近丹麦及挪威的区域相遇，随即爆发了一场规模庞大的海战。双方交战的区域，从陆上来说临近日德兰半岛，而从海上来说临近丹麦与挪威之间的斯卡格拉克海峡，因此分别被参战双方称之为日德兰海战（英方叫法）和斯卡格拉克海峡海战（德方叫法）。这场海战是整个第一次世界大战中规模最大的海战，同时也是有史以来规模最大的以战列舰为主力的海战。
关于这场海战的前因后果，各国学者们早就发表了无数的研究文章和专著，其中既有研究战略战术的，也有研究技术细节的。在本篇中，我将结合各类参考资料，对日德兰海战相关的战略与战术话题，进行简明的介绍。希望能通过这篇内容，帮助各位读者更好地理解日德兰海战的全貌。
索引
第一章 - 战略规划
此章介绍了一战时期的英德两国海军的战略规划，并重点介绍了英国海军的对德封锁策略，以及德国海军的应对措施。
第二章 - 战术指挥
此章介绍了一战时期的英德两国海军的战术指挥方式，对当时的舰队是如何编组，如何通讯，如何与对方交战等话题进行了具体讲解。
第三章 - 战场决策
此章介绍了日德兰海战的具体过程，并对其中的关键节点上的决策得失，进行了评论。
第四章 - 后续影响
此章介绍了英德两国海军，在日德兰海战后所作出的调整与改变。 本帖最后由 seven_nana 于 2023-2-19 13:48 编辑
日德兰纪念系列 - 战略战术篇 - 第一章 - 战略规划
本帖内容未经允许不得转载
主要参考资料：
The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916: Its Creation, Development and Work, 作者John Jellicoe
From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume I, The Road to War, 1904-1914, 作者Arthur J. Marder
From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume II - The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, 1914-1916, 作者Arthur J. Marder
Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, 作者Nicholas A. Lambert
Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909, 作者Nicholas A. Lambert
In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914，作者Jon Tetsuro Sumida
Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, 作者Shawn T. Grimes
An 'Intermediate Blockade'? British North Sea Strategy, 1912-1914, 作者David G. Morgan-Owen
The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics, and British War Planning, 1880-1914, 作者David G. Morgan-Owen
The Royal Navy and the German Threat 1901-1914: Admiralty Plans to Protect British Trade in a War Against Germany, 作者Matthew S. Seligmann
Failing to Prepare for the Great War? The Absence of Grand Strategy in British War Planning before 1914, 作者Matthew S. Seligmann
Fighting the Great War at Sea - Strategy, Tactics and Technology, 作者Norman Friedman
Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War，作者Reinhard Scheer
The Development of German Naval Operations. Plans against England, 1896-1914，作者Paul. M. Kennedy
The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914，作者Ivo Nikolai Lambi
Luxury Fleet - The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918，作者Holger H. Herwig
Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy，作者Patrick J. Kelly
一、英国海军的战略规划
在英国海军中，最高决策机构叫做海军部委员会（Board of Admiralty），而海军部委员会中最高阶的海军军官，即第一海务大臣（First Sea Lord），则是海军战略的主要负责人。但由于海军部委员会是一个集体决策机构，因此文职的海军大臣，以及其他几位海务大臣们，同样也具有一定影响力。
具体的工作，则是由海军参谋总局（Admiralty War Staff）负责的。不过，海军参谋总局是在1912年时才成立的，在此之前，英国海军内并没有设置最高参谋机构，但设有海军情报局（Naval Intelligence Department）。后者成立于1887年，其长官是海军情报局长（Directors of Naval Intelligence）。1909年后，海军情报局中负责战争准备和人员动员的机构独立了出来，成立了海军动员局（Naval Mobilisation Department）。至1912年，海军情报局和海军动员局重新合并，改组为海军参谋总局，下辖情报分局（Intelligence Division）、动员分局（Mobilisation Division）、作战分局（Operational Division），后来又先后增加了贸易分局（Trade Division）和反潜分局（Anti-Submarine Division）。在1912-1917年间，海军参谋总局由海军参谋长（Chief of the War Staff ）统领。1917年后，海军参谋长由第一海务大臣兼任，因此海军参谋总局相当于由第一海务大臣直接领导。
海军部制定的战略，会通过具体的作战力量得到执行。20世纪初时，英国海军麾下设置有以下几支舰队：地中海舰队（Mediterranean Fleet）、海峡舰队（Channel Fleet）、大西洋舰队（Atlantic Fleet）以及本土舰队（Home Fleet）。地中海舰队的规模，原本是非常大的，但随着英德海军竞赛的日益严峻，许多军舰都被调回了英国本土区域，因此地中海舰队的规模就大幅缩减了。而海峡舰队和大西洋舰队，则分别在1909年和1912年时，被并入了本土舰队。大战爆发后，本土舰队麾下的新锐军舰，被编入了大舰队（Grand Fleet）。至1915年时，又抽调了大舰队中的部分力量，组建了战列巡洋舰队（Battle Cruiser Fleet）。此外，英国海军还重新编成了海峡舰队（Channel Fleet），并将其驻扎在英国南部区域，但由于其麾下只有一些老旧军舰，因此只能起到辅助性的作用。这三支舰队，是英国本土水域最主要的作战力量，但除此之外，还另有一些小规模的部队，来辅助这三支舰队。
根据1914-1916年间担任大舰队司令，且1916-1917年间担任第一海务大臣职务的杰里科（John Jellicoe），在其著作中给出的描述（The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916: Its Creation, Development and Work，P.12-13）：
The main objects for which our Navy exists may be shortly summed up under four heads:
英国海军的主要职能，可简单归纳为以下四个方面：
1. To ensure for British ships the unimpeded use of the sea, this being vital to the existence of an island nation, particularly one which is not self-supporting in regard to food.
保证英国船只在海洋上畅通无阻。英国是一个岛国，并且还是一个粮食无法自给自足的岛国，因此这是至关重要的。
2. In the event of war, to bring steady economic pressure to bear on our adversary by denying to him the use of the sea, thus compelling him to accept peace.
在战争时期，阻止敌国利用大海，借此对其施加经济压力，最终迫使其停战求和。
3. Similarly in the event of war, to cover the passage and assist any army sent over seas, and to protect its communications and supplies.
在战争时期，保护向海外输送陆军的航线，保护其交通和补给线，并对陆军作战进行支援。
4. To prevent invasion of this country and its overseas Dominions by enemy forces.
阻止敌国入侵英国本土及海外领地。
The above objects are achieved in the quickest and surest manner by destroying the enemy’s armed naval forces, and this is therefore the first objective of our Fleet.
达成上述目标的最快捷也最彻底的方式，就是摧毁敌人的海上武装力量，这也是我们舰队的首要目标。
But history has always shown that it is a very difficult matter to impose our will upon a weaker naval adversary, and that, instead of giving us the opportunity of destroying his armed naval forces, he usually keeps the main body of those forces—the Battle Fleet—in positions of safety in fortified harbors, where they are a constant threat to the sea communications of the stronger naval power, and force upon that power a watching policy so that the enemy may be engaged, should he put to sea, before he is able to gain any advantage.
然而历史经验表明，我们很难将自己的意志加诸于一个比我们弱小的海上对手。他们通常会选择将其舰队核心力量，即战列舰队，保留在守备严密的港口内，因此我们很难摧毁他们的舰队，而他们则可以对我们的海上交通造成威胁。为了应对这种情况，我们就需要采用一种监视策略，力图在敌方舰队出海时，尽早发现其动向，并与其交战。
近、中、远距离封锁策略
杰里科所说的监视策略，实际上就是一种封锁策略。英国海军在战前设想过的对德封锁策略，主要有“近距离封锁”，“中距离封锁”，“远距离封锁”三种类型。
近距离封锁
所谓的“近距离封锁”，通常指英国海军在1912年前计划采用的，对德国西部的沿海地区进行抵近封锁的作战方法。
1. 近距离封锁，是一种沿袭自风帆海军时代的传统策略。根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume I, The Road to War, 1904-1914, P.368）：
Close blockade of the enemy's ports...had been brought to near perfection during the Napoleonic wars. Fast-sailing frigates were stationed off the ports where the enemy ships were lying, and farther out at sea cruised the British ships-of-the-line. The blockaded ships could not proceed to sea without the grave risk of being brought to action.
对敌方港口的近距离封锁，在拿破仑战争时期已经被发展到了炉火纯青的地步——英国海军会在敌方舰队驻扎的港口之外，布置航速较快的巡洋舰，更外围则布置有战列舰。被封锁的那只舰队若想要出海，很可能会被英国舰队抓住，从而爆发海战。
2. 在20世纪初时，英国海军拟定过多个针对德国的近距离封锁方案。根据Matthew S. Seligmann的说法（Failing to Prepare for the Great War? The Absence of Grand Strategy in British War Planning before 1914, P.6）：
In the era...the only means of knowing if an enemy navy was in harbour or at sea was to go and look. Thus...the Royal Navy had to keep the main German harbours and naval bases under regular observation. Only by such means could it be absolutely guaranteed that the British Isles were secure from a surprise German assault. The need to keep Germany’s ports under continuous observation accordingly became a central feature of British planning.
在那个时代，想要知道敌方舰队到底是在港口内，还是已经出港，只有一个办法，那就是过去看看。因此，为了确保英伦三岛不被德国人偷袭，英国海军必须要时刻紧盯德国的各个主要港口及主要基地。在这个背景下，如何确保对德国港口的不间断的监视，成为了英国海军作战计划的核心内容。
The 1909 war plan, to take but one example, called for the deployment of rotating flotillas of the newest and best British destroyers directly off the German North Sea littoral. Backed at a distance by lines of light cruisers and armoured cruisers to ensure that they could not be driven away by German light forces, these destroyers were there to notify the British naval command of any attempt by the German fleet to sortie into the North Sea. Should such a move take place, there would be two British fleets, one based in Scotland and one based between the Channel and the Wash, ready to intercept the emerging German forces and give battle.
以1909年的作战计划为例，他们计划将最新锐、最强大的英国驱逐舰中队直接布置到德国的北海沿岸地区，并安排这些中队进行轮流换岗。这些驱逐舰的作用，是在发现德国舰队试图驶入北海时，将情报汇报给英国海军的决策机构。在这些驱逐舰中队后方，则会布置一道由轻巡洋舰和装甲巡洋舰组成的支援线，以确保这些驱逐舰不会被德国海军的轻型舰艇们击退。如果德国舰队大举出动，那么英国海军的主力（一支部署在英国北部，另一支部署在英国东南部）将会做好准备，前去迎战这支德国舰队。
3. 在1910年时，威尔逊（Arthur Wilson）元帅接替了费舍尔（John Fisher）元帅的第一海务大臣的职务。在这个时期，英国海军的战略规划受到了重大的挑战。根据Shawn T. Grimes的说法（Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, P.159）：
Lacking Fisher’s political aptitude, Wilson could not combat further probes into naval policy by the Cabinet, Army, and CID. As a result, defects in the Navy’s war plans were revealed at the CID meeting over the Agadir crisis on 23 August 1911. Wilson’s poor performance before this caucus led to the Army’s ‘continental’ plan gaining wider acceptance, Churchill’s replacing McKenna as First Lord, the institution of a Naval War Staff, and Wilson’s removal.
威尔逊缺乏费舍尔那样的政治能力，因此无力抵挡内阁、陆军、以及帝国国防委员会对海军战略的刺探。其结果是，在帝国国防委员会为了应对第二次摩洛哥危机，而在1911年8月23日召开的会议上，海军作战计划上的缺陷被暴露出来了。在这场关键会议上，威尔逊的拙劣表现，导致了陆军的“进军欧洲大陆”方案得到了更广泛的支持，进而导致了丘吉尔取代麦肯纳担任海军大臣、海军设立参谋总局、以及威尔逊的离职。
4. 此后，英国海军放弃了近距离封锁策略。根据David G. Morgan-Owen的说法（The Fear of Invasion - Strategy, Politics, and British War Planning, 1880-1914, P.203）：
Admiral Wilson’s departure from the Admiralty in the autumn of 1911 precipitated six months of flux in naval strategy...The resulting uncertainty led to a period of debate and conjecture over the turn of the year...The Admiralty reached the conclusion that inshore operations would no longer be feasible early the following year, informing the Fleet that ‘the Blockade by the British Fleet of the whole German Coast on the North Sea is to be considered cancelled’. This decision represented a seismic shift in naval thought.
当威尔逊元帅在1911年秋天时，卸下第一海务大臣的职务后，在接下来的6个月内，海军战略经历了持续的变化。在1911年底至1912年初时，这种战略上的不确定性，导致了海军内部出现了各种讨论和推测。至1912年初时，海军部得出结论，认为近岸作战已经无法实现了，并告知舰队：“使用英国舰队封锁整个德国北海沿岸地区的做法，已经被取消了”。这个决策代表着海军战略上的巨大变迁。
5. 根据Arthur J. Marder的说法，对于这个决策，英国海军部向帝国国防委员会给出的解释是（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume I, The Road to War, 1904-1914, P.371）：
The continuous development of the mine and the torpedo make it impossible to establish a close watch on the exits from the Heligoland Bight with heavy ships. To do so for a long period of time would mean a steady and serious wastage of valuable units from the above causes, and, if prolonged, would effectually alter the balance of naval power.
随着鱼雷和水雷的不断发展，我们已经无法将大型军舰布置到赫尔格兰湾区域，来执行近距离封锁了。如果我们这么做的话，便意味着这些宝贵的军舰会接二连三的因鱼雷和水雷攻击而遭受损失，这显然是一种极大的浪费。如果这种情况持续下去的话，可能会打破英德两国之间的海军力量平衡。
On the other hand, torpedo craft, which cannot keep at sea like great vessels, and must every three or four days return to port for rest and replacement, have no base nearer than Harwich, 280 miles away. The operation of controlling the debouches from the Heligoland Bight by means of flotillas would require twice the number of oversea torpedo craft than we now possess. The watch would have to be maintained in three reliefs: one on duty, one in transit, and one at rest, and therefore only a third of the existing vessels would be available at any given time. Such a force could be overwhelmed by a sudden attack of two or three times their numbers by a well-chosen blow, opportunities for which would frequently recur.
另一方面，驱逐舰并不具备大型军舰那样的自持力，因此每隔3-4天就必须返回母港进行修整，但即便是距离德国最近的哈里奇基地，也有240海里之遥。如果要通过驱逐舰观察哨来封锁赫尔格兰湾，那么就需要两倍于我国现有数量的远洋驱逐舰。这些驱逐舰需要分为三班，一班在执行任务，一班在往返途中，还有一班在修整，因此在任何时刻，位于前线的军舰只有三分之一。德国舰队可能会用二到三倍于我方的力量，在精心选择的时刻发起偷袭，我方无力应对这样的偷袭。
中距离封锁
取代近距离封锁的，是一种被称为中距离封锁的策略。
1. 中距离封锁的巡逻线，后退到了北海中部。根据Shawn T. Grimes的说法（Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, P.176）：
As a replacement, Troubridge and the War Staff devised the so-called ‘Intermediate blockade’. It entailed a cruiser and flotilla blockade cordon across the North Sea from the Norwegian coast to a location near the latitude of Newcastle-upon Tyne (55°N). From there the line ran south to Texel Island and the Dutch coast. The British fleet would cruise off the Scottish coast, westward of the patrol line, in support of the cordons. Once contact with the German fleet was established, the main fleet would proceed to intercept and engage.
作为代替方案，海军参谋长欧内斯特·特鲁布里奇少将拟定了一种中距离封锁方案。由巡洋舰和驱逐舰组成的警戒线，将在北海区域展开，从挪威沿岸延伸至纬度相当于纽卡斯尔的地点（北纬55度），随后再向南延伸至特塞尔岛及荷兰海岸。英国主力舰队将会在警戒线以西的苏格兰海岸巡弋，并对前者进行支援。一旦发现德国舰队，英国主力舰队就会前去拦截，并与德国舰队交战。
2. 学界通常认为，中距离封锁是一种糟糕的策略，且存在时间很短。根据Nicholas A. Lambert的说法（Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, P.263）：
Even at the time the weaknesses of this plan were regarded as transparent. Other officers protested that Troubridge had ignored all the evidence of recent maneuvers. Practical exercises conducted by Admiral Bridgeman and the Home Fleets during 1911, it was pointed out, had conclusively shown that the navy's entire force of 48 modern destroyers, supported by 8 light cruisers, were unable to watch effectively a patrol line of 60 miles in length. Germany's North Sea coast was 150 miles long; while Troubridge's proposed blockade line was closer to three hundred miles in length.
即便是当时的人也认为，这种封锁计划的缺点是显而易见的。其他海军军官们抗议到，海军参谋长忽略了近年来的海军演习中得出的各项证据。例如，1911年时，布里奇曼上将指挥的本土舰队举行的演习明确证明，当时英国海军所拥有的全部的新式驱逐舰（48艘），以及作为其支援力量的轻巡洋舰（8艘），连60海里的巡逻线都无法有效维持。德国的北海海岸线的长度达到了150海里，参谋长所提议的封锁线的长度则接近300海里。
Furthermore, with the number of modern flotilla craft then available there was a high degree of probability that a raiding force might slip past the observation line undetected (especially in misty weather); more seriously the patrolling British light cruisers would be vulnerable to counterattack by enemy submarines or battlecruisers. Effective support by heavier warships could not be provided to the observation line while the Grand Fleet remained concentrated in the north. Yet detaching a battle squadron for this purpose was seen as even more dangerous as it risked defeat in detail.
此外，由于当时的新式驱逐舰的数量很有限，因此敌方的袭击舰队很有可能会悄无声息的穿过我方的观察线，而没有引起我方的警觉（尤其是在迷雾天气下）。更为严重的是，巡逻的英国轻巡洋舰可能会遭到敌方潜艇或战列巡洋舰的袭击。如果大舰队全部集中于北方海域，那么大型军舰就没办法为观察线提供有效的支援。而如果派出一支战列舰中队作为支援力量，又有可能被敌人单独击破。
During the summer maneuvers of 1912, Troubridge's cordon system was completely exposed...Practical exercises had demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the Royal Navy had too few cruisers and destroyers to sustain an effective observation line across the North Sea.
在1912年夏季的演习中，参谋长的封锁线设想的弱点，完全被暴露出来了。这场演习无可置疑地证明，英国海军所拥有的巡洋舰和驱逐舰的数量，远远不足以维持一条穿越整个北海的有效的观察线。
3. 也有学者认为，现有的主流观点，对中距离封锁的解读是错误的，实际应该叫做中距离巡逻。根据David G. Morgan-Owen的说法（An 'Intermediate Blockade'? British North Sea Strategy, 1912-1914, P.1 & P.11）：
Historians have argued that, between 1912 and 1914, Britain's naval leadership projected a so-called 'intermediate blockade', a line of vessels strung across the mid-North Sea. This strategy has been widely criticized as impractical and unrealistic. However, the Admiralty never projected such an approach. Rather, the naval leadership intended to adopt a system of mid-North Sea patrols during this period.
历史学家们声称，在1912-1914年间，英国海军高层规划过一种所谓的“中距离封锁”，即在北海中部地区布置一连串的军舰。对于这种策略，历史学家们普遍给予了批评，认为这是不切实际的。然而，英国海军部实际上从未规划过这种策略。
The 'line' of vessels, commonly understood as the 'intermediate blockade', was never enshrined in war orders, nor was it developed specifically by the Admiralty. Rather it was the solution the flag officers of the cruiser squadrons allotted to observational patrols adopted for the purposes of the 1912 maneuvers.
事实上，当时海军部试图使用的策略，是在北海中部地区开展巡逻。在海军部下达的作战命令中，从未明确写明要把军舰组织成一条警戒线，即通常所说的“中距离封锁”，并且这种做法也不是由海军部发明的，而是由参加1912年演习的巡洋舰中队的指挥官们，为了达成演习目标而采用的策略。
远距离封锁
再后来，远距离封锁取代了中距离封锁，并成为了英国海军在战时所使用的封锁策略。
1. 远距离封锁的策略，在渊源上可以追溯到17世纪的英荷战争。根据Shawn T. Grimes的说法（Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, P.178）：
In late November - December 1912, war plans and orders were issued to Callaghan embodying the distant blockade scenario. The idea was to utilize Britain’s geographical advantage to cut off all German shipping from oceanic trade, secure England’s coasts from invasions and raids, and cover the BEF’s transport to France...This strategy resembled those which led to the successful battles in the Anglo-Dutch wars’,...A prolonged distant blockade would cause ‘serious economic consequences to Germany’, forcing the High Seas Fleet to break the blockade and instigating a fleet action closer to British bases than their own.
在1912年11月至12月时，本土舰队司令卡拉汉收到了基于远距离封锁策略的作战计划和命令。其核心思想是利用英国的地理位置优势，将德国的大洋贸易运输完全截断，保护英国海岸免遭入侵和袭击，以及掩护英国远征军前往法国。这种作战策略，与17世纪时英国海军在英荷战争中使用的策略颇为相似。旷日持久的远距离封锁，会对德国的经济造成严重的影响，从而迫使公海舰队试图打破封锁，让他们不得不在远离已方基地的位置与我们进行舰队交战。
2. 相比于中距离封锁，远距离封锁的范围会进一步后退。根据Shawn T. Grimes的说法（Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, P.178）：
A northern blockade of armoured cruisers would patrol between the Orkneys and Shetlands and on to the Norwegian coast, to prevent the passage of German shipping. Destroyer and submarine flotillas would patrol the Dover Straits to block the English Channel. The main British fleet, based on the Scottish coast, would support the northern cordon while the Channel Fleet reinforced the southern line. Grand Fleet cruiser squadrons would conduct North Sea sweeps to detect German sorties.
由装甲巡洋舰构成的北方封锁线，将沿着苏格兰的奥克尼群岛和设得兰群岛，与挪威海峡之间的航线进行巡逻，其目的是阻止德国方面的海上运输。由驱逐舰和潜艇组成的封锁力量，则会在多佛尔海峡进行巡逻，其目的是封锁英吉利海峡。英国主力舰队（由新锐军舰构成）的基地将设在苏格兰沿岸，并对北方封锁线予以支援，而海峡舰队（由老旧军舰构成）则会对南方的封锁线进行支援。大舰队下属的巡洋舰中队会在北海地区展开扫荡，其目的是寻找出击的德国舰队。
3. 与之前的作战方案相比，这种扫荡行动更为安全稳妥。根据David G. Morgan-Owen的说法（An 'Intermediate Blockade'? British North Sea Strategy, 1912-1914, P.20）：
Plans to rely primarily upon cruiser and flotilla patrols in the mid-North Sea were suspended in July 1914, in favor of using the fleet to support the navy's light forces in periodic 'sweeps' of the North Sea intended to deter hostile German sorties towards the British coastline. The decision...was due to their vulnerability to being overwhelmed in detail by a superior German force, with the Grand Fleet stationed away to the north, rather than to their inherent impracticality.
1914年7月时，派出巡洋舰和驱逐舰去北海中部区域巡逻的计划被搁置了，取而代之的是得到大舰队支援的轻型舰艇对北海区域展开的周期性的扫荡，后者的目的是震慑那些试图袭击英国海岸的德国舰队。之所以做出这种决策，原因并不是因为巡逻计划本身缺乏可行性，而是因为当大舰队本身驻扎在苏格兰北部时，巡逻舰队得不到有效的支援，因此在面对实力占优的德国舰队时，可能会被单独击破。
近、中、远距离封锁的覆盖范围
下图中，分别展示了“近距离封锁”、“中距离封锁“、”远距离封锁”的覆盖范围。
http://www.warships.com.cn/data/attachment/album/202104/12/185027td2s6jq6s6c6s3zq.jpg
基于轻型舰艇的本土防卫策略
对于英国海军的对德作战策略的研究，历史学家的关注点大多集中于封锁策略的演变过程。但Nicholas A. Lambert则重点强调了轻型舰艇防卫策略（Flotilla Defence）。
1. 根据Nicholas A. Lambert的说法，费舍尔之所以会设想出这种轻型舰艇防卫策略，主要是受到了法国海军的影响，后者在19世纪末时发展出了一种基于轻型舰艇的英作战策略。（Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909, P.10-12）：
Fisher envisaged the creation of a force comprised mainly of submarines and torpedo craft whose capacity to inflict serious losses on troop transports and their escorts would deter or prevent invasion across the narrow seas around the British Isles.
费舍尔想要创建一支主要由潜艇和雷击舰艇组成的部队，对于试图渡过狭海入侵英国的敌国运输船队及其护航舰队，这种轻型舰艇部队能够对其进行沉重的打击，从而打消敌方的入侵想法，或阻止他们的入侵行动。
Across the English Channel the Marine Française had been for many years investing heavily in the development of the torpedo craft...Towards the end of the 1890s, the French Navy adopted a coherent strategy for retaliating against a blockade of the French coasts which involved the extensive use of torpedo boats. The plan involved the building of large numbers of flotilla craft, to produce eventually a mosquito fleet capable of threatening any hostile warships which tried to operate in their territorial waters. French naval doctrine called for torpedo craft day and night "to harry" British warships, and especially the armoured vessels patrolling the English Channel in support of the blockade squadron.
在英吉利海峡对岸，法国海军多年以来都在致力于发展雷击舰艇。至1890年代末时，法国海军海军采用了一种使用大量的雷击舰艇，来对封锁法国沿海地区的英国舰队进行报复性攻击的作战策略。首先他们计划要建造大量的雷击舰艇，并将其组织为能够对任何在法国水域内活动的敌舰造成重大威胁的轻型舰队。法国海军的作战策略，是使用这些雷击舰艇，日以继夜地不断袭扰英国军舰，尤其是那些在英吉利海峡中巡弋，并对封锁舰队起到支援作用的英国大型军舰。
2. 潜艇的技术发展，也是费舍尔推行这种轻型舰艇策略的重要原因之一。根据Nicholas A. Lambert的说法（Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909, P.13）：
The advent of the submarine as a practical weapon of war had a profound impact upon Fisher's vision of the future. As Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean (1899-1902) he had been the first senior British officer forced to contemplate the threat of attacks on his fleet by submarines. Toulon was the main testing ground for French submarines. Later, while serving as Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth (1903-1904), he had been in a unique position to watch the development of the Royal Navy's own embryonic submarine service. Subsequently, he came to believe that technology could revolutionize the method of conducting war at sea.
潜艇技术的不断发展和成熟，在费舍尔对未来海战形态的想象中，也发挥了重大的影响力。在1899-1902年时，作为地中海舰队的指挥官，费舍尔成为了第一个需要面临潜艇攻击威胁的英国指挥官，原因在于，土伦是法国海军潜艇的主要测试基地。后来，他在1903-1904年时，又担任了朴茨茅斯港的指挥官，并亲眼目睹了雏形状态的英国海军潜艇部队的发展情况。随后，他开始相信，科技带来的变化，会对海战方式造成革命性的改变。
3. 有鉴于这些变革，费舍尔认识到了近距离封锁的策略变得不再可行了。根据Nicholas A. Lambert的说法（Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909, P.15-16）：
Fisher was convinced, "that in the course of a few years no Fleet will be able to remain in the Mediterranean or in the English Channel" for any period of time. Without supprt from armoured warships close blockade was impractical; without a blockade, the difficulties in protecting the trade routes and preventing invasion would be increased enormously.
费舍尔相信，在数年后的将来，大型舰队就无法在地中海或英吉利海峡区域进行持续活动了。而在失去了大型军舰的支援后，近距离封锁策略也就无法有效实施了。封锁失效之后，敌军入侵英国本土，或对英国的海上通商线路进行袭击的可能性，就会大大增加。
4. 费舍尔所提出的轻型舰艇防卫策略，既不同于传统的海军策略，也与法国海军的策略有所不同。根据Nicholas A. Lambert的说法（Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909, P.16-17）：
The concept of flotilla defense called for the narrow coastal waters around Britain to be saturated with torpedo craft, deployed offensively, forward into the middle waters of the Channel. Fisher argued that "offensive strategy must be held to include the circumspection of the free movements of the enemy". This was a completely new way of thinking. Equally radical was his assertion that the objective of flotilla defense was not to win or contest command of the sea but to achieve sea denial. In marked contrast to previous doctrines which identified the enemy main fleet as the principal objective, Fisher ordered that the flotilla craft should ignore escorting battleships and make straight for the troop transports. It followed that an invasion convoy would be deterred from approaching the English coast until the defense flotilla had somehow been neutralized.
费舍尔的轻型舰艇防卫策略，是在英国附近的狭海区域布置大量的雷击舰艇，并通过攻势性行动，将他们部署到海峡中线区域。费舍尔指出，采用攻势战略的目的，是妨碍敌军的自由行动。这是一种截然不同的思考方式。费舍尔希望达成的目标，同样也很激进——他并不想通过这种轻型舰艇策略来获取制海权，他想达到的是阻止对方利用大海。先前的策略都是以敌方的主力舰队作为主要目标的，而费舍尔的策略则是要求轻型舰艇忽略敌方的战列舰，直奔敌人的运兵船。费舍尔认为，除非敌方能够消灭这些轻型舰艇，否则他们便会受制于其带来的威慑，从而不敢驶向英国海岸。
通商保护策略
由于英国非常依赖海上贸易，因此早在风帆海军时期，与英国为敌的国家，如法国，就发展出了通商破坏作战（Guerre de Course）来对抗英国。因此，英国海军除了依靠封锁策略扼杀对方的海上贸易及军事行动之外，还要注意避免自身的海上贸易遭到对方海军的破坏。
1. 在风帆海军时代，英国海军常用的保护海上贸易的措施，是护航制度。但进入蒸汽时代后，英国海军放弃了护航制度。根据Norman Friedman的说法（Fighting the Great War at Sea - Strategy, Tactics and Technology）：
Convoy died by the 1870s because there was no hope of providing enough fast long-range cruisers to convoy most merchant ships. The only option was somehow to hunt raiding cruisers down. In December 1874 First Naval Lord Admiral Milne wrote an analysis of trade protection which shaped future policy. He argued that a commerce raider would be drawn into the areas where the great sea routes were concentrated - what were later called focal areas. Raiders would find themselves drawn into the focal areas, where they would meet British cruisers which would destroy them. Milne identified eighteen such areas. Even a focal area defence required numerous cruisers, which the British built. The focal area strategy was never made public, because implicit in it was acceptance of heavy early losses in exchange for the destruction of the enemy raiders.
1870年代时，护航制度变得难以为继了。原因在于，商船的数量非常多，而英国海军所拥有的具备大航程的巡洋舰，远远无法为这么多的商船提供护航。因此，唯一的可行方案，就是消灭敌方的破交巡洋舰。1874年12月时，当时担任第一海务大臣的米尔恩，撰写了一份关于通商保护的分析，这篇文章对后续的政策造成了深远影响。他提出，执行破交任务的军舰，会被吸引至海上交通非常密集的区域，即后世所说的焦点海域。当袭击舰进入这些焦点海域后，便会遭遇英国巡洋舰，随后被后者消灭。米尔恩识别出了18个焦点海域。即便采用这种焦点海域防御策略，英国海军也还是需要建造海里的巡洋舰。英国人从未将焦点海域策略公诸于世，原因在于，这种战略背后的潜台词，是用战争初期时沉重的航运损失，来换取歼灭敌方袭击舰的机会。
Unfortunately an attacker did not have to match the Royal Navy’s numbers; it could build a few cruisers which could overmatch the focal-point ships. Focal-point cruisers had to deal with whatever came their way.
不幸的是，袭击方并不需要英国海军那么多的巡洋舰，他们可以建造少量但强力的军舰，从而击败焦点海域内的英国军舰。而焦点海域内的英国巡洋舰，则需要对抗各种各样的敌舰。
全球范围内的焦点海域
下图中，展示了1885年前后时，英国海军判定的焦点海域，他们采取的海上巡逻线路，以及他们所拥有的加煤站。
http://www.warships.com.cn/data/attachment/album/202104/25/222728bxz4ckq1wmwqkv78.jpg
2. 然而，维持焦点海域策略的代价也变得越来越昂贵了。根据Norman Friedman的说法（Fighting the Great War at Sea - Strategy, Tactics and Technology）：
In the 1890s new lightweight steels made it possible to build fast armoured cruisers. The British policy of maintaining a sufficient edge over the next two naval powers (France and Russia) meant maintaining a 2 to 1 advantage in armoured cruisers. Unfortunately a big armoured cruiser cost about as much as a battleship. The Royal Navy was the single largest item in the British budget and the budget exploded with the rise of armoured cruisers.
至1890年代时，新式的装甲钢出现后，各国海军纷纷开始建造具备高航速的装甲巡洋舰。当时英国海军采用的造舰政策，是两强标准，这意味着英国海军的实力应足以应对第二和第三海军强国（法国和俄国）。而在装甲巡洋舰的数量上，英国人的标准是两倍于法俄之和。然而，大吨位装甲巡洋舰的造价，几乎与战列舰相当。当时的皇家海军的军费，是英国政府预算中金额最大的一个项目，而装甲巡洋舰的兴起，导致了军费激增。
3. 有观点认为，在1904-1910年间担任第一海务大臣的费舍尔，甚至希望停止建造战列舰，并打造一支由巡洋舰和轻型舰艇作为核心力量的舰队，从而实现降低海军预算的目标，但当时的海军大臣并不认同这种做法，因此该策略并未得到落实。根据Jon Tetsuro Sumida的说法（In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914）：
By 1904, Fisher had come to the conclusion that torpedoes launched by submarines or fast surface craft had made battleships practically obsolete...By the summer of 1904, Fisher was willing to suggest that the construction of battleships be stopped altogether...Although destroyers and submarines arguably were capable of replacing the battleship in the role of coast defence, neither type possessed the range or sea-keeping qualities that would have enabled them to operate effectively along Britain’s far-flung lines of maritime supply, which thus meant that armoured cruisers were still required for commerce protection. Fisher was convinced, therefore, that a country’s naval strength had to be measured in terms of armoured cruisers, destroyers and submarines, rather than in terms of battleships. But Selborne rejected Fisher’s suggestion that battleships were no longer necessary and that Britain’s naval supremacy could be maintained with armoured cruisers and torpedo craft only.
至1904年时，根据费舍尔的观点，由于潜艇及快速水面舰艇带来的雷击威胁，战列舰实质上已经过时了。在1904年夏天时，费舍尔提出，战列舰的建造工作可以完全停掉。不过，尽管驱逐舰和潜艇或许可以替代战列舰，完成近岸防御的任务，但由于这些舰艇的航程和适航性都很有限，无法护卫遍及全球的英国海上交通线，因此出于通商保护的目的，装甲巡洋舰还是需要保留的。费舍尔认为，一个国家的海军实力，以后不再会根据战列舰来衡量了，而是会根据装甲巡洋舰、驱逐舰、以及潜艇来衡量。但是，当时担任海军大臣的第二代塞尔伯恩伯爵否决了费舍尔的建议，后者并不认可“英国不再需要战列舰，英国的海权可以通过装甲巡洋舰和雷击舰艇来保护”的观点。
实际采用的对德作战策略
1、英国海军在本土水域采用的对德作战策略，是以远距离封锁为主，以轻型舰艇防卫策略为辅。根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume II - The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, 1914-1916, P.4-6）：
The Grand Fleet (Churchill called it the 'crown jewels'), at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys, blocked the northern passage with the assistance of what became the famous Northern Patrol (10th Cruiser Squadron)...The Grand Fleet could move south if a powerful German force tried to attack the cross-Channel communications or to convoy an invading army...The Channel Fleet was the other main British force in Home waters. Based on Portland, it held the Straits of Dover, sealing the only outlet to the south. It composed of the older pre-dreadnoughts. At the southern end of the North Sea, between East Anglia and the Dutch coast, was a strong force of light cruisers and modern destroyers, based on Harwich. The functions of the Harwich Force, organically part of the Grand Fleet, were to patrol the waters between 52°N. and 54°N., assist in the sweeps of the Grand Fleet, and join the Channel Fleet if it moved north. Acting as an East Coast defence force were Patrol Flotillas, based on Dover, the Humber, the Tyne, and the Forth. The Grand Fleet guaranteed defence against an invasion in sufficient force to conquer the country, but could not guarantee preventing a landing in considerable force on the East Coast which might have done much harm in smashing up the shipbuilding industry, not to mention causing a panic, if the Germans were prepared to accept the fact that their troops would never get home again. This threat was taken quite seriously, and it was to discount it that the Patrol Flotillas were formed in 1912. The hope was that by attacking the transports they could prevent most of the soldiers from landing. The 6th Patrol Flotilla, or 'Dover Patrol', had the special duty of denying the Straits of Dover to the enemy...At the dockyard ports - the Nore, Portsmouth, Devonport, Pembroke, and Queenstown - were the Local Defence Flotillas. Their main duties were to support the shore defences of the dockyard ports against naval raids and to serve as night patrols off the ports. The vessels allotted to the Patrol and Local Defence Flotillas (with the latter getting the left-overs) were the older destroyers, the torpedo boats, and the older submarines ('A', 'B', and 'C' classes), which were fit for coastal work only. The newer submarines ('D' and 'E' classes) were based on Harwich and earmarked for offensive operations. Finally, the 12th Cruiser Squadron patrolled at the western end of the English Channel. This, then, was the disposition of the British Fleet in Home waters as the war got under way.
按丘吉尔的说法，对于英国海军而言，大舰队就相当于王冠上的明珠，其驻地是奥克尼群岛的斯卡帕湾，主要职责是封锁了北海北部的海域，但在德国对英国本土发动入侵，或试图扰乱英吉利海峡的航运的话，大舰队也可以南下对抗德国舰队。海峡舰队，是除了大舰队之外的另一支驻扎在英国本土的主要舰队，但其麾下都是些老旧的前无畏舰。这支舰队的驻地是波特兰，主要职责是扼守多佛海峡，即从北海南部驶向大西洋的必经之路。在英格兰东部至荷兰沿岸水域，还有一支由轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰组成的哈里奇分舰队，这支部队是隶属于大舰队的，其职责是在北纬52度至北纬54度的水域内进行巡逻，协助大舰队的扫荡行动，并在海峡舰队北上时伴随其共同行动。另外，尽管大舰队的实力足以抵挡大规模的入侵部队，但并不能保证德国入侵部队绝对无法登上英国海岸。如果德国人打算发起有去无回的自杀性攻击的话，那么他们是有可能对英国东海岸造成严重的破坏的。为了抵御这种威胁，英国海军在1912年时成立了一支巡逻部队，由驻扎在多佛海峡、亨伯河口、泰恩河口、以及福斯湾的多支巡逻中队共同构成。在面对德国的入侵部队时，这些巡逻中队会攻击敌方的运输船，从而阻止德国士兵登陆。其中的多佛巡逻中队，另外还承担一项特殊的任务，那就是阻止敌方进入多佛海峡。除此之外，在诺尔、朴茨茅斯、德文波特、彭布罗克、昆士敦等军港，还设有港口防御部队。这些部队的主要职责，是与岸防部队一起守护港口，并在夜间执行巡逻任务。巡逻部队和港口防御部队，是由老旧的驱逐舰、鱼雷艇、以及老旧的近岸潜艇组成的（巡逻部队的舰艇还相对较新一些，港口防御部队的舰艇则是最老旧的）。至于新式的潜艇，则是驻扎在哈里奇，用于执行攻势任务的。最后，第10和第12巡洋舰中队，则分别协助大舰队和海峡舰队，完成对北海的封锁（另见下文）。以上这些，就是开战之时的英国本土的舰队部署情况。
2. 根据英国海军官方资料，在第一次世界大战时，他们实际采用的通商保护策略如下：
http://www.warships.com.cn/data/attachment/album/202104/26/133205cmty4bwyb71ymtw9.jpg
http://www.warships.com.cn/data/attachment/album/202104/26/133205u1piql5001pkim1f.jpg
大西洋海域的通商保护任务，是英国海军部的重点关注对象——原因在于，英国所需要的食品及工业原材料，很多都来自北美，而南美也是非常重要的食品来源地。此外，来自南非和西非的物资、以及大部分来自澳新的物资，也是通过大西洋航线来运输的。尽管大舰队可以阻止大规模的德国舰队突破北海封锁线冲向大西洋，多佛尔海峡的水雷和潜艇也可以有效阻止敌舰的行动，但小规模的敌舰，还是有可能绕过大舰队的封锁的。此外，德国人也可能会对商船进行改装，并将其投入通商破坏作战。这些操作可能会对英国的海上贸易造成严重影响。为了解决这一问题，英国海军部研究过各种不同的方法，最终确立的作战方案，是通过一份叫做“对执行通商保护任务的舰船的战时命令”的文件下达的。其确立的作战方案，是以攻击敌方破交军舰为主，以拦截敌方商船并查抄违禁品为辅。而具体的操作，则是建议在多条海上交通线汇集的焦点海域进行巡逻，而不是在单一航线上巡逻，并且最好能与指挥部保持无线电联络。
大西洋海域的各个巡洋舰中队的负责区域划分
http://www.warships.com.cn/data/attachment/album/202104/29/131540ahvqllrn0jt02z3m.jpg
http://www.warships.com.cn/data/attachment/album/202201/27/125553zgsbmsgbgdvsfvdh.jpg
为了加强保护力度，英国海军在大西洋海域部署了多支巡洋舰中队，包括：第4巡洋舰中队、第5巡洋舰中队、第9巡洋舰中队、第10巡洋舰中队、第11巡洋舰中队、第12巡洋舰中队。这些部队，都有各自的划分明确的巡逻区域。其中，第10巡洋舰中队负责在设得兰群岛附近巡逻，扼守北海的北部出海口，而第12巡洋舰中队则负责在英吉利海峡以西的水域巡逻，扼守北海的南部出海口。其余的四支部队，则都是在远离英国本土的大洋上巡逻的。
地中海区域的战略情况
http://www.warships.com.cn/data/attachment/album/202105/13/110941kj1etewjgjva1tev.jpg
地中海区域的海上贸易也非常繁荣。但由于德国海军在地中海区域部署的力量非常有限，而法国和俄国则已经在1907年时，与英国签订了三国协约（Triple Entente），因此在这个区域，英国海军面临的压力是远不如北海区域那么大的。此外，在1912年时，英法两国的外交部还达成了共识，未来在遭遇第三国的无端攻击时，英法两国军队可以联合行动。在此共识的基础上，地中海舰队司令米尔恩上将制定了他的作战计划。为了在战时协调英法两国的海军力量，他们还准备了一套通讯手册。后来，当意大利加入协约国之后，地中海区域的防务，则改为由英法意三国共同负责。
地中海地区的各国负责区域划分
下图中，展示的是1916年1月1日时，英法德三国在地中海区域的负责区域划分情况。
http://www.warships.com.cn/data/attachment/album/202201/27/125555d2z83w8crcijj6xr.jpg
亚非及澳新区域的各个海外司令部的负责区域划分
http://www.warships.com.cn/data/attachment/album/202104/24/233550y6ftm2k2kbbhiy2f.jpg
在亚非及澳新区域，英国海军则设立有四个地区性司令部，分别是：好望角司令部（Cape of Good Hope Station）、东印度司令部（East Indies Station）、中国司令部（China Station）、以及澳大利亚司令部（Australian Station）。各自防区内的通商保护任务，主要由这些地区司令部负责。在有需要的情况下，这些地区性司令部麾下的部队，可以合并为东方舰队（Eastern Fleet），并由中国司令部的总司令担任东方舰队的总司令。
结论：英国海军的对德战略，核心部分是海上封锁策略，这能够有效遏制德国舰队出击，并阻止德国利用海上交通线。除此之外，他们还采用了轻型舰艇防卫策略，以及围绕着焦点海域的通商保护策略，前者能为英国港口及近岸区域提供额外的保护，而后者则能较为有效地拦截敌方的破交舰。
二、德国海军的战略规划
在德国海军中，最高统帅是皇帝本人。具体的工作，则是由海军总参谋部（Admiralstab）、海军部（Reichsmarineamt）、以及海军内阁（Marinekabinett）分别负责的。
其中，海军战略是由海军总参谋部的长官——海军总参谋长（Chef des Admiralstab）负责的。但由于海军建设是由海军部负责的，而海军建设与海军战略是息息相关的，因此海军部的长官——海军部国务秘书（Staatssekretär des Reichsmarineamt），对海军战略也有很大的影响力。
至于德国海军麾下的作战力量，最主要的是公海舰队（Hochseeflotte）。公海舰队麾下的军舰，可以借助基尔运河（Nord-Ostsee-Kanal），在北海和波罗的海之间快速转移。在本土以外的区域，也有一些小规模的作战力量，其中最主要的，是以青岛作为母港的东亚分舰队（Ostasiengeschwader）。
关于德意志第二帝国的海军战略，有一个非常流行且非常直白的说法：在北海海域内，泰晤士河口与赫尔格兰岛之间的地方，与英国海军决一死战（Entscheidungsschlacht in the North Sea, "between the Thames and Helgoland"）。这个说法来自于提尔皮茨在1894年时撰写的IX号备忘录（Dienstschrift IX），反映了提尔皮茨强调海上决战的战略思想。提尔皮茨长期担任海军部国务秘书，在德国海军中具有非常强大的影响力，他的战略思想，通常也被认为是德国海军内部的主流思想。
决战策略：进攻 vs 防御
一般认为，德国海军所设想的这种决战，是计划在距离赫尔格兰岛不远的区域展开的。其背后的原因在于，德国人认为英国海军会采取近距离封锁战略。不得不说，这种战略规划是非常一厢情愿的——如果英国海军不采用近距离封锁策略，德国人就很难实现其削弱对手的目标。但是，故事的全貌并不仅仅是如此。
1. 德国人并非完全没有想到英国人可能会采用远距离封锁策略。事实上，早在1902年时，德国海军总参谋长，威廉·贝赫塞尔（Wilhelm Büchsel）中将，就认识到了这个问题。根据Ivo Nikolai Lambi的说法（The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914, P.220-221）
Biichsel made an ominous observation which threatened the basis of all German operational planning: "We must keep in mind that the most dangerous tactic of the enemy is to blockade us from a distance and to avoid any offensive actions." This appears to be the first anticipation on the part of the German navy of a wide blockade on the part of Britain.
贝赫塞尔似乎是德国海军中，最早意识到应该海军可能会采取远距离封锁的人。这种情况，实际上会威胁到德国海军作战计划的根基。他表示：“我们必须要认识到，敌人最危险的策略，是对我们进行远距离封锁，并避免采取任何攻势行动”。
2、贝赫塞尔的两位继任者，同样也认识到了这个问题。根据Holger H. Herwig的说法（Luxury Fleet - The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918, P.190）：
As early as 1908, the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, Vice-Admiral Count Friedrich v. Baudissin, had cautioned that the British would be content to sit back and guard the distant exits to the Atlantic Ocean; it would remain for Germany to force access to the world's maritime arteries.
在1908年时，海军总参谋长，弗雷德里希·冯·波迪辛中将表示：英国人可能会选择退至后方，守卫前往大西洋的通道。在此情况下，德国方面需要强行突破封锁，才能打通全球海洋运输路线。
One year later, Baudissin's successor, Admiral Max Fischel, put it well: In the final analysis we are fighting for access to the ocean, whose entrances on that side of the North Sea are in England's hands. However the war may be fought, we are therefore basically the attacker, who is disputing the enemy's possession.
一年之后，波迪辛伯爵的继任者，马克思·菲斯切尔上将则说道：在战争模拟中，我们力图打破封锁，但通过北海前往大洋的出口，被掌握在英国人手中。无论我们选择何种作战策略，我们本质上都是进攻方，我们都是在争夺敌方所拥有的东西。
3. 为了解决可能的远距离封锁的困境，波迪辛和菲斯切尔曾提出过进攻性策略的设想。根据Patrick J. Kelly的说法（Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy, P.320-321）：
During 1908 Baudissin campaigned for a more aggressive plan for a war with Britain. If the High Seas Fleet were passive, German Atlantic commerce would be cut off. He therefore favored attacks on the blockaders with the whole fleet as far north as Scotland, ideally on the night before war broke out...Fischel tried to keep an offensive spirit.
1908年时，波迪辛提议，在与英国爆发战争时，应采用更为积极主动的作战计划。如果公海舰队被动等待，德国的大西洋贸易路线就会被切断。在此情况下，他希望动用整支舰队，对封锁者发起攻击，攻击范围最远可达苏格兰，攻击时间则是以战争爆发前夜为最佳。继任的菲斯切尔同样也试图保持进攻精神。
4. 菲斯切尔的继任者，奥古斯特·黑林根中将，则拟定了一种不同的作战计划。根据Patrick J. Kelly的说法（Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy, P.362 & P.365）：
In 1912 the prevailing assumption was that, upon the outbreak of war, the Royal Navy would rush to the Helgoland Bight and quickly set up a close blockade of the North Sea ports. The operations plan of November 1912 incorporated this assumption. Rapid British mobilization was expected to send large numbers of light units to positions off the North Sea coast, with more powerful ships lurking further out at sea. Such a course of action would preclude the Baudissin/Fischel fantasies of a German attack on the British coast immediately upon the outbreak of war. A further complicating factor was that, by 1912, the fleet was so large that it took two high tides to pass the shoals of the Jade. Heeringen’s obvious counter to such an aggressive British strategy would be Kleinkriegstyle mine, torpedo, and U-boat attacks to whittle down the blockading forces - in other words, a policy of a strategic defense combined with a tactical offense.
在1912年时，主流的假设是，当战争爆发后，英国海军会冲入赫尔格兰湾内，并对德国的各个北海港口，迅速拉起近距离封锁线。德国海军的1912年11月的作战计划，就是基于这个假设的。德国人预计，英国人会进行快速动员，并将大量轻型舰艇派遣至北海沿岸，而更为强大的战舰则会在埋伏在更后方的水域。在这种情况下，波迪辛/菲斯切尔所设想的德国海军在开战时主动进攻英国沿岸的做法，是不可能实现的。此外，还有一个因素导致了德国海军采取守势策略：至1912年时，德国海军的舰队规模已经非常大了，需要两次涨潮才能使整个舰队通过亚德湾的浅滩区域。有鉴于英国人可能会采取的这种攻势行动，黑林根的应对策略是通过鱼雷、水雷、潜艇等方式袭击封锁舰队，以削弱其力量——换句话说，他采用的是战略性防御与战术性进攻相结合的策略。
Heeringen, in a casual but prophetic remark about a war game, said: “If the English really adopt a distant blockade, with a consequent holding back of their battleships, the wartime role of our beautiful High Seas Fleet would be a very unhappy one. The U-boats would then have to .”
黑林根曾在一场作战推演后评论道：“如果英国海军真的采用远距离封锁，不把他们的战列舰给派出来，那么当战争爆发后，我们的公海舰队，就无法起到多大作用了。在这种情况下，我们可能需要依靠潜艇来完成作战任务”。
5、黑林根的继任者，胡戈·波尔（Hugo Pohl）上将，同样选择了战略性防御与战术性进攻相结合的策略。根据Paul. M. Kennedy的说法（The Development of German Naval Operations. Plans against England, 1896-1914, P.24）
It is true that the British fleet manoeuvres in 1913 were clearly postulated upon the policy of a wide blockade and that this caused the Admiralty Staff to think of a 'distant offensive'; but this alternative appeared upon closer investigation to be far too risky whilst the High Seas Fleet was so numerically inferior. Only the U-boats and torpedo-boats should be deployed offensively, Pohl recommended in May 1914.
英国海军在1913年时举行的舰队演习，明确表明了他们并不打算采用近距离封锁，这使得德国海军总参谋部一度考虑转而采用进攻策略。但在仔细研究过其可行性后，他们认为，考虑到公海舰队在数量上处于明显劣势，因此这么做的风险实在太大了。在1914年5月时，波尔上将建议，只应派出潜艇和鱼雷艇，去执行攻击性的任务。
小规模作战
如前所述，在德国海军中，以提尔皮茨为首的主流观点，是强调与英国海军进行决战（Grosskrieg）。另有一批军官，则支持采用小规模作战（Kleinkrieg）来对抗英国海军。所谓的小规模作战，是一个源自德国近代军事史上的概念，最初是描述陆军的小股作战行为，后又被引申到了海军领域，并融入了法国的新学派（Jeune École）的思想——新学派是相对于旧学派（Vieille École）而言的，前者强调运用鱼雷艇和潜艇打击敌方舰队，同时运用巡洋舰打击敌方交通线，而后者则是传统的战列舰派。
1. 提尔皮茨本人，显然认为巡洋舰作战不适合德国海军。根据Patrick J. Kelly的说法（Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy, P.313）：
Tirpitz argued that the ability to conduct a worldwide Kleinkrieg varied among states. France, for example, with two coastlines and many foreign bases with coaling stations, could pursue such a war with prospects of success; Germany, however, “to a certain degree is in a geographical corner, and has only one foreign base .”
提尔皮茨认为，不同的国家，在全球范围内开展小规模作战的能力是不一样的。举例来说，法国有两条海岸线，还有大量的海外基地和煤炭补给站，因此开展小规模作战是有成功希望的。而德国，从某种意义上来说是一个地理位置上的边缘国家，并且只有一个大型海外基地（青岛）。
2. 对于潜艇作战，提尔皮茨也是不甚热衷的。根据Patrick J. Kelly的说法（Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy, P.354）：
Tirpitz’s reaction to early U-boat development was not enthusiastic...Perhaps the decisive reason was that U-boats did not fit in with his original design as outlined in the Navy Law. A fleet of battleships and large cruisers, meant for decisive battle, could use torpedo boats and U-boats only as auxiliaries in a North Sea Armageddon. A large-scale commitment to U-boats, especially if they were designed for Kleinkrieg that focused on commerce war, could undermine the painfully constructed edifice of the Navy Law.
对于早期的潜艇发展情况，提尔皮茨并不怎么关心。最主要的原因，可能是潜艇并不能融入提尔皮茨在舰队法中规划的设想——战列舰和大型巡洋舰构成的舰队，是用于在北海战场进行决战的，而在这种决战环境中，鱼雷艇和潜艇只是起辅助作用的。如果选择大规模建造潜艇，尤其是用于小规模作战，起到通商破坏用途的潜艇，则有可能危害到舰队法和舰队建设工作——那可是提尔皮茨好不容易才实现的杰作。
3. 对于那些支持巡洋舰作战或潜艇作战的军官，提尔皮茨会想尽办法予以打击。根据Holger H. Herwig的说法（Luxury Fleet - The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918, P.190）：
Opponents of battleship construction were not tolerated at the Leipzigerplatz. Tirpitz viciously attacked proponents of cruiser warfare such as Admiral Hollmann, Admiral v. Koester, Admiral Oldekop, Vice-Admiral Valois, and Captain v. Maltzahn, denouncing them to Admiral v. Muller as "dangerous to the Navy". Nor was the Supreme War Lord spared: Tirpitz opposed Wilhelm's blueprint for the "fast capital ship", a combination of cruiser and battleship. And in 1904 the state secretary denounced submarines as only local and secondary weapons, and refused to create what he termed a "museum of experiments". Lieutenant-Commander Franz Rust in 1904, Vice-Admiral Karl Galster in 1907, 1908 and 1909, Captain Lothar Persius between 1908 and 1914, and Vice-Admiral v. Schleinitz in 1908 all felt Tirpitz's wrath for supporting submarine warfare (Kleinkrieg). Young officers who associated too closely with cruiser or submarine tactics could be assured of short careers in the Imperial Navy.
反对战列舰建造的人，在莱比锡广场（指代德国海军部）是不会得到容忍的。提尔皮茨恶毒地攻击过巡洋舰作战的支持者，例如弗雷德里希·冯·霍夫曼上将、汉斯·冯·克斯特上将、伊万·奥尔德考普中将、维克多·瓦卢瓦中将、库特·冯·玛尔赞上校等。提尔皮茨告诉格奥尔格·冯·穆勒上将（海军内阁长，负责人事），说这些人会危害海军。提尔皮茨连皇帝本人都没有放过，对于威廉二世提议的“快速战列舰”概念，提尔皮茨也是持反对意见的。至1904年时，提尔皮茨又表示潜艇只是一种只能在近岸使用的次要的武器，并认为如果花钱建造潜艇，最后只会建成一个实验品的展览馆（提尔皮茨认为早期潜艇技术不完善）。提尔皮茨在1904年时攻击过弗朗茨·鲁斯特少校，在1907-09年间攻击过卡尔·加斯特中将，在1908-14年间攻击过洛塔尔·佩修斯上校，在1908年时攻击时格奥尔格·施莱尼茨中将，原因都是因为这些人支持潜艇战。与巡洋舰或潜艇作战派走的太近的年轻军官，在德国海军中的职业生涯肯定不会很长。
4. 不过，作战策略并不属于提尔皮茨的负责范围，而是由海军总参谋部负责的。后者尽管总体来说是支持海上决战的，但也没有完全忽视小规模作战，例如，他们认真的研究过使用辅助巡洋舰进行通商破坏作战，并将其写入了作战计划。根据Matthew S. Seligmann的说法（The Royal Navy and the German Threat 1901-1914: Admiralty Plans to Protect British Trade in a War Against Germany, P.13 & P.19-20）：
The earliest indication in the German naval records of serious consideration being given to the possibility of using merchant vessels as auxiliary cruisers comes from March 1902, when the Admiralty Staff began a comprehensive survey of the resources available for waging a war on commerce with converted fast liners.
从相关记录来看，德国海军最早是在1902年3月时，开始认真考虑使用商船作为辅助巡洋舰的。当时海军总参谋部对德国所拥有的高速轮船进行了细致的研究，以确定哪些船只可在改装之后，用作通商破坏作战。
Despite the manifold efforts of the Admiralty Staff to advance its agenda on economic warfare with auxiliary cruisers, significant changes in Germany’s capabilities were slow in coming. The principal reason for this was the dogged opposition of the Imperial Navy Office. Nevertheless, the enhancement of Germany’s commerce raiding capabilities did slowly advance...At the start of 1912...a system had been created for commerce raiding by converted merchant ships.
为了推动辅助巡洋舰的破交作战，海军总参谋部做出了许多努力，但进展还是比较缓慢。主要原因，还是由于海军部的顽固抵抗。尽管如此，德国的破交战能力还是在进步的。至1912年初时，德国人已经建立起了一套体系，能够将改装过的民用船舶，用于通商破坏作战了。
5. 至于潜艇，在一战爆发前并未被视为破交战的利器。根据Norman Friedman的说法（Fighting the Great War at Sea - Strategy, Tactics and Technology）：
Submarines could not effectively attack commerce under the universally-accepted Prize Rules, which required that a raider examine a ship and protect its passengers and crew before sinking it. Navies became interested in submarines as elements of, or adjuncts to, fleets. For example, the German navy were interested in tactics which would lead an opposing fleet over a submarine trap.
根据当时被广泛接收的交战规则，潜艇是无法有效攻击海上通商的。原因在于，根据当时的国际法，袭击方首先应登船检查，随后确保船员和乘客的安全，随后才能击沉船只。因此，当时人们更感兴趣的是将潜艇作为舰队中的一个组成部分，或附属力量。例如，德国海军就对潜艇设伏，并将敌方舰队引诱至伏击圈的战术很感兴趣。
实际下达的作战命令
根据日德兰海战时担任公海舰队司令的舍尔（Reinhard Scheer），在其著作中给出的描述（Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World Wark，P.25）：
In the War Orders which were issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet the task before him was framed as follows : The objective of the operations must be to damage the English Fleet by offensive raids against the naval forces engaged in watching and blockading the German Bight, as well as by mine-laying on the British coast and submarine attack, whenever possible. After an equality of strength had been realised as a result of these operations, and all our forces had been got ready and concentrated, an attempt was to be made with our Fleet to seek battle under circumstances unfavourable to the enemy. Of course, if a favourable occasion for battle presented itself before, it must be exploited. Further, operations against enemy merchant ships; were to be conducted in accordance with Prize Court regulations, and the ships appointed to carry out such operations in foreign waters were to be sent out as soon as possible.
根据下发给公海舰队司令的作战命令：作战行动的目的，是对英国舰队造成损失，具体方式可以是：对监视并封锁德国湾的英国海军力量进行袭击，对英国海岸进行攻势布雷，使用潜艇攻击英国海军等。当这些行动有效削弱了英国的海军力量，使得英德双方海军力量达到均等，且我国所有海军力量都集结和准备就绪时，我们就会试图在对敌方不利的情况下，与其进行舰队决战。如果在达成均势之前，出现了有利于我方的作战机会，则应抓住机会出击。针对敌方商船的袭击行动，则应遵照国际法开展。那些位于海外地区的，计划用于执行此类任务的船只，应尽快开始作战行动。
结论：德国海军的对英战略，核心思想是先设法削弱英国舰队的实力，随后在有利条件下与其进行决战。另外，他们也会安排巡洋舰在海外进行破交作战。 本帖最后由 seven_nana 于 2023-8-27 10:07 编辑
三、自大战爆发至日德兰海战为止的实际交战情况
尽管在和平时期，以提尔皮茨为首的德国海军高级将领们，大肆鼓吹舰队决战的重要性，但实际上，在整个第一次世界大战期间，德国海军的战略，几乎一直是以小规模作战为主的。而大规模的舰队决战，则仅仅出现过一次，即日德兰海战。
德国海军的通商破坏作战
德国海军的通商破坏作战，主要包括水面舰艇破交、潜艇破交、以及攻势布雷这三种。
1、开战之初时，德国海军的水面舰艇破交取得了一定的战果，但随着其巡洋舰和武装商船相继被英国海军歼灭，此后他们就难以通过这种方式，对英国海军构成严重的威胁了。根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume II - The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, 1914-1916, P.101 & P.104 & P.113-114 & P.118-123 & P.127）：
During the first six months, before Germany had time to build up her submarine flotillas, her war against commerce was mainly the work of cruisers and armed merchant ships...The most successful of the enemy raiders were the light cruisers Emden (detached from the China Squadron), which in three months sank or captured seventeen British merchant ships of 68,000 tons in the North Pacific and the Indian Ocean...Emden was reduced to a wreck by the Australian light cruiser Sydney off the Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean and was finally beached on a reef.
在战争的最初的6个月内，德国海军的潜艇部队规模还比较小，此时他们的破交战主力，是巡洋舰和武装商船。其中，斩获最多的，是埃姆登号轻巡洋舰（原本隶属于东亚分舰队，但获准采取单独行动）。该舰在北太平洋和印度洋水域内活动了3个月，总共击沉或捕获了17艘英国商船，总计吨位达到6.8万吨。其最终的命运，是在印度洋的科科斯群岛附近的海域，被澳大利亚海军的悉尼号轻巡洋舰逮住，并被打成了一堆废墟，最终搁浅在了一块礁石上。
The most dangerous threat to British shipping lanes and bases in the outer seas was posed by the German China Squadron, based on Tsingtao and commanded by the aggressive Vice-Admiral Count von Spee. The start of the war found it at Ponape, in the Caroline Islands, on a training cruise. When Japan entered the war, it was plain that Spee would not return to Far Eastern waters, nor remain for long anywhere in the Pacific. Superior British or Japanese forces would have blown his squadron to bits. He decided to operate off the west coast of South America and use the ports of friendly Chile for coaling. There were twin magnets in that area: important British trade routes and an inferior cruiser force consisting of the armoured cruisers Good Hope and Monmouth, the light cruiser Glasgow, and the armed merchant cruiser Otranto....By the end of October, when it appeared off Chile, Spee's reinforced squadron numbered five ships: the armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and the light cruisers Leipzig, Nürnberg, and Dresden...The Battle of Coronel...was the outcome of faulty distributions against the German guerre de course...It was an absolutely hopeless business from the start...Two British cruisers and all their crews had been wiped out - about 1,600 men, including the Admiral. The German squadron had two men wounded.
对英国海上贸易线及海外基地构成了最严重的威胁的，则是由斯佩中将指挥的东亚分舰队。这支部队的驻地是青岛，但在开战之初时，正在加罗林群岛进行远航训练。及至日本也参战后，斯佩便无法返回东亚水域了，并且也没办法在太平洋上待太久，因为英国海军的中国司令部、以及日本海军的实力之和，显然要远超过他的部队。于是他决定，前往南美的西海岸，并在智利的港口进行煤炭补充。这片水域之所以吸引了斯佩，主要有两个原因：首先，这里的海上贸易线路对英国很重要；其次，这里的英国海军实力较弱，只有2艘装甲巡洋舰（好望角号和蒙莫斯号）、1艘轻巡洋舰（格拉斯哥号）以及1艘辅助巡洋舰（安大略号）。10月底时，斯佩达到了智利沿海，此时他麾下的实力为2艘装甲巡洋舰（沙恩霍斯特号、格奈森瑙号）和3艘轻巡洋舰（莱比锡号、纽伦堡号、德累斯顿号）。由于英国海军的错误部署，导致接下来爆发的科罗内尔海战，其结果是一边倒的——2艘英国装甲巡洋舰（好望角号和蒙莫斯号）被击沉，包括舰队指挥官克拉多克少将在内的大约1,600名英国官兵命丧大海。德国方面的损失则很轻微，只有2人受伤。
Fisher wanted to dispatch a force that would annihilate Spee. With Churchill's full support, on 4 November, within six hours of receiving the first reports of Coronel, he ordered Jellicoe to detach the sister ships Invincible and Inflexible from the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron...to prepare for overseas service...Sturdee was to proceed south post-haste with the battle cruisers, add Stoddart's force and other ships, and move on to the Falklands. From this key position he was to hunt down and destroy the German squadron....with a crushing superiority-two battle cruisers, four armoured cruisers (Defence, Carnarvon, Kent, Cornwall), two light cruisers (Glasgow, Bristol), and an armed merchant cruiser (Macedonia)...The action developed into a stern chase...Spee signalled his three light cruisers to try to save themselves while the two armoured cruisers occupied the attention of the battle cruisers...Scharnhorst plunged to the bottom...no survivors...Gneisenau was abandoned and sank...Nearly 200 were rescued...The Leipzig, Nürnberg, and Dresden scattered and made for the South American coast at full speed, chased by three of Sturdee's cruisers. The Kent overhauled the Nürnberg and destroyed her. The Glasgow and Cornwall disposed of the Leipzig, the Dresden got away; latter was eventually tracked down by the Glasgow and destroyed in March 1915, and the following month saw the end of the first phase of the guerre de course with the internment of the last armed liners.
面对这样的惨败，英国海军的第一海务大臣费舍尔元帅，想要派出一支舰队去歼灭斯佩。他得到了海军大臣丘吉尔的全力支持。1914年12月4日，在收到科罗内尔海战的第一份报告的6个小时后，费舍尔就命令大舰队总司令杰里科上将，让第2战列巡洋舰中队的无敌号和不屈号战列巡洋舰，做好派往海外的准备。与这2艘战列巡洋舰一起南下的，是斯特迪中将，他随后与斯托达特少将所部（原本部署在南美东海岸）及其他的部队进行汇合，并驶向了福克兰群岛，目的是寻找并摧毁德国舰队。斯特迪麾下的舰队实力，要比斯佩强得多，前者拥有2艘战列巡洋舰（无敌号和不屈号）、4艘装甲巡洋舰（防御号、卡那封号、肯特号、康沃尔号）、2艘轻巡洋舰（格拉斯哥号、布里斯托号）以及1艘武装商船（马其顿号）。接下来爆发的福克兰海战，是一场追击战，斯佩自己率领2艘装甲巡洋舰对抗英国战列巡洋舰，同时命令麾下的3艘轻巡洋舰设法逃离战场。沙恩霍斯特号是最早沉没的，且无人生还，而格奈森瑙号则是在弃舰后沉没的，但有近200人被救了起来。另一方面，在发现德国轻巡洋舰的逃跑意图后，斯特迪麾下的巡洋舰展开了追击，其中肯特号追上并击沉了纽伦堡号，格拉斯哥号和康沃尔号则击沉了莱比锡号，至于德累斯顿号则成功逃脱，直到1915年3月时，才被格拉斯哥号抓住。再下个月，即1914年4月时，最后1艘逃窜在外的德国武装商船，也被扣押了。德国海军的通商破坏作战的第一阶段（即以巡洋舰作战为主的阶段），至此落下帷幕。
The German commerce warfare, whether through surface raider, minelayer, or submarine, netted, through January 1915, 75 British merchant ships of 273,000 tons, of which the surface raiders accounted for some 215,000. The 273,000 tons were a mere flea-bite to British trade, as they represented no more than 2 per cent of the steam tonnage flying the British flag at the outbreak of hostilities (12,439,800), or a little over 3 per cent if we include 82 ships of 182,000 tons detained in German or Turkish ports. The lost bottoms were quickly replaced, whereas the German loss of 287 steamers (sunk, captured, or detained in British or Allied ports) of 795,000 tons through January 1915 (mostly at the beginning of the war) were not replaced. Even if the enemy's building resources were not limited, there was no point in replacing the sunken tonnage. German overseas trade had ceased after 4 August except for the Baltic.
截止至1915年1月为止（即德国开展无限制潜艇战之前），德国海军的通商破坏作战，使英国方面损失了75艘商船，其总吨位则为27.3万吨，其中，水面舰艇造成了约21.5万吨的损失。但对英国的贸易船队来说，27.3万吨算不得什么，因为在开战之时，悬挂英国国旗的商船，总吨位达到了1243.98万吨。换句话说，英国人只损失了2%的商船。即便计入扣押在德国或土耳其港口内的82艘英国商船（总吨位为18.2万吨），那么英国船队的损失也不过就是3%。这些损失，英国方面很快就能弥补回来。另一方面，截止至1915年1约，德国总共损失了287艘商船，其总吨位达到79.5万吨（有些是被击沉、有些是被捕获、还有一些被扣押在英国或其盟友的港口，且大部分是一开战就损失了），而这些损失是无法弥补的。因为即便德国人有工业资源去建造商船，这么做也是没有意义的，因为自战争爆发以来，德国的海上贸易线路，就只剩下波罗的海尚能够维持了（德国海军在波罗的海的实力要强于俄国海军，英国海军则较难插足这片水域）。
东亚分舰队的作战轨迹
下图中，展示了东亚分舰队自开战以来的动向及作战轨迹。其中，埃姆登号是与斯佩本队分开行动的，并在完成了多起成功的袭击作战后，最终被击沉在科科斯群岛。而斯佩本队，以及纽伦堡号、莱比锡号、德累斯顿号，则是在太平洋上完成了汇合，随后在科罗内尔海战大获全胜，又在福克兰海战近乎全灭，只剩下德累斯顿号得以幸免，但这也只是延缓了其死期而已。由于东亚分舰队的实力，与英国海军遍布全球的巡洋舰部队的实力相差悬殊，因此惨遭覆灭的结果，实际上是必然的。
https://www.warships.com.cn/data/attachment/album/202210/06/130514meqzuycplcz9k3k5.png
2、自1915年2月起，德国海军发起了无限制潜艇战。但由于美国方面的抗议，这种作战方式仅维持了几个月，就被迫停止了。根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume II - The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, 1914-1916, P.343-346）：
During the first six months of the war, Germany made no attempt to use the submarine to the utmost limit of its potentiality. The U-boats' functions were mainly reconnaissance and attacks on warships...Gradually, as the senior naval officers came to realize what the submarines were capable of, pressures mounted from within the Navy, abetted by the press, for a regular submarine campaign against Allied shipping without warning. The German Naval Staff was won over in January 1915; on 4 February, the Emperor approved. On that day, Germany made her notorious proclamation of a war area that the waters around Great Britain and Ireland were a 'war zone' in which, from 18 February, all merchant ships would be sunk, 'without it always being possible to avoid danger to the crews and passengers'.
在大战爆发后的最初的6个月时间内，德国海军并未充分发挥初潜艇的能力。当时的德国潜艇，主要是用于执行侦察任务，或者袭击军舰的任务的。但慢慢的，开始有高阶海军军官意识到了潜艇的通商破坏潜能。随后，海军内部开始有人提出，要在不经警告的情况下，使用潜艇向商船发起攻击。另一方面，媒体也开始在这个议题上推波助澜。至1915年1月时，德国海军总参谋部同意了这种做法，随后在2月4日时，德皇威廉二世批准了这种作战方式。德国方面随即宣布，将大不列颠及爱尔兰岛水域划入交战区，并且自2月18日起，对于在此水域内航行的商船，德国方面会不经警告就将其击沉，且不一定会搭救其船员和乘客（即无限制潜艇战）。
The sinkings through May were of such bearable proportions, thereafter, however, the sinkings increased at a disturbing rate, reaching their 1915 (and pre-1917) high in August...A sudden check to the campaign...was the torpedoing of the British liner Arabic off Ireland by U-24 on 19 August with the loss of some 40 lives, including three American. A sharp protest from Washington resulted in the German abandonment of unrestricted U-boat warfare (30 August). This restriction, together with the order of 18 September, withdrawing the boats from the English Channel and the Western Approaches, where American shipping was concentrated, had the effect of virtually suspending the U-boat campaign in western waters for the remainder of the year. At the same time, in the latter months of 1915, the Germans shifted their U-boat operations to the Mediterranean, where there was less chance of arousing the United States or other important neutrals.
截止至1915年5月为止，德国潜艇造成的损失还在可接受的范围内，但此后就开始攀升了，并在8月时达到了1917年之前的最高峰。然而，在1915年8月19日时，U-24号潜艇击沉了英国邮轮阿拉伯号，导致了包括美国人在内的40余人死亡。对此，华盛顿方面进行了激烈的抗议。受此影响，在8月30日时，德国方面决定放弃无限制潜艇战。另外，在9月18日时，他们还下令将潜艇撤离美国船只聚集的地区，即英吉利海峡及不列颠岛以西的海域。在这两项决定的影响下，在1915年的余下时刻，在英国以西海域，基本就没有德国潜艇活动了。与此同时，在1915年的最后几个月里，德国潜艇转移到了地中海地区，原因在于此处不太会遇到美国人，也不太容易招惹到其他的重要的中立国。
The year 1915 ended without either side gaining a decisive advantage. For the whole year 855,000 tons of British merchant shipping had been lost through enemy action: 748,000 by U-boats, 77,000 by mines, and 29,000 by cruisers and other surface craft. Compare these figures with the five months of 1914: 241,000 tons were lost, of which cruisers, etc. accounted for 203,000, mines 35,000, and submarines, not quite 3,000. New construction in the United Kingdom and the overseas dominions and colonies since the start of the war (1,306,000 tons) more than replaced the shipping losses.
在1915年里，交战双方均未能在破交/保交作战中取得决定性的胜利。这一年，英国方面总共损失了85.5万吨商船，其中有2.9万吨是被巡洋舰或其他水面舰艇击沉的，7.7万吨是触雷沉没，被潜艇击沉的则达到74.8万吨。作为对比，自战争爆发至1914年底的5个月内，英国方面总共损失了24.1万吨商船，其中有20.3万吨是被巡洋舰击沉的，3.5万吨是触雷沉没，被潜艇击沉的不到3千吨。然而，自开战以来，英国及其海外领地和殖民地，总共建造了130.6万吨的商船，因此不仅能弥补损失，并且还有富余。
无限制潜艇战的交战区
下图中的阴影部分，便是德国海军划定的交战区；进入该水域的船只，包括中立国的船只在内，都可能在未经警告的情况下遭到攻击。
http://www.warships.com.cn/data/attachment/album/202201/27/191930a04t3c1gimogwjij.png
3、在1916年3-4月间，德国海军又短暂地开展过一段时间的潜艇战，但很快又在美国方面的压力下停止了。根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume II - The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, 1914-1916, P.346-348）：
The conduct of U-boat operations...The cardinal question now, as always, was whether U-boats operating under restrictions imposed by the Government because of political considerations could be really effective. The endless wrangles between the two sides resulted in a vacillating policy. On 30 December 1915 the leaders of the Army and Navy reached complete agreement that 'there are no military reasons against the resumption of the submarine campaign', and that 'a submarine campaign conducted without any restrictions will, by the end of 1916, injure Great Britain to such an extent that she will be inclined for peace'...January was filled with lively exchanges of opinion between the Admirals (supported by the Generals) and the politicians. The Chancellor would not shed his misgivings-an unrestricted campaign would bring America and other wavering neutrals over to the side of Germany's enemies. Agreement was reached on a restricted campaign, to be started on 29 February...In their final form the instructions for the U-boats read: '1. Enemy merchant ships, encountered in the War Zone, are to be destroyed without more ado. 2. Enemy merchant ships, encountered outside the War Zone, may only be destroyed without more ado when they are armed. 3. Enemy passenger steamers may not be attacked either inside or outside the War Zone by a submerged submarine, no matter whether they are armed or not.' In other words, unrestricted warfare was postponed, but the U-boat campaign against Allied commerce was 'sharpened'.
潜艇战的问题，其背后的核心矛盾，是潜艇部队能不能在德国政府划定的限制下，开展有效的破交行动。围绕着这个矛盾，军方和政府之间不断地进行着角力，因此政策也是反反复复地发生变化。1915年12月30日时，德国陆军和海军的高层达成了一致，他们表示：”从军事角度说，他们不反对恢复潜艇战，并且他们还认为，如果开展无限制潜艇战，是可以对英国造成严重威胁的，并且至1916年底时，英国人就会倾向于选择和平了“。在1916年1月时，陆海军将领，与政客们进行了激烈的争论。德国首相不同意开展无限制潜艇战，因为这将会导致美国以及其他处在摇摆状态的中立国，转而变成德国的敌人。于是他们达成的共识是，将会从2月29日开始，展开受限制的潜艇战。下发给潜艇部队的最终命令是：”1、如果在交战区内遇到敌方商船，可以立即予以击沉。2、如果在交战区外遇到敌方的武装商船，也可以立即予以击沉，但如果没有武装，则不能这么做。3、无论是否在交战区内，潜艇都不得攻击敌方的载客船，即便其搭载有武器也不例外“。换句话说，尽管这并不是无限制潜艇战，但针对商船的破交作战的激烈程度，实际反而上升高了（因为在交战区以外遇到敌方武装商船时，也可以立即予以击沉了）。
The new German policy was launched with the torpedoing of the first merchant ship of the 1916 campaign on 4 March. As had happened with the Arabic, the zeal of the U-boat commanders forced a modification of German policy. The culprit this time was UB-29, which on 24 March torpedoed without warning the unarmed French steamer Sussex. Many of her 380 passengers, including several Americans, were killed or injured, although the ship remained afloat.
在1916年3月4日时，德国潜艇用鱼雷击沉了一艘商船，以此宣告新政策正式开始实施。然而，就像之前的阿拉伯号事件一样，潜艇指挥官的行为，再度迫使德国方面修改了政策。这一次，是UB-29号潜艇，在3月24日时，该艇在未经警告的情况下用鱼雷攻击了法国轮船苏塞克斯号。尽管该舰并未沉没，但其搭载的380名乘客，有多人因此死伤，其中就包括美国人。
The incident roused great indignation in the United States. An ultimatum from Washington, presented on 20 April, gave Berlin the choice between a rupture in diplomatic relations and 'an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels'. Bending before this threat, the German Government had the Chief of the Naval Staff issue orders (24 April) to the High Seas Fleet and the Flanders Flotilla that 'until further orders, submarines may only act against commerce in accordance with prize regulations'.
这桩事件，激起了美国方面的严重不满。4月20日时，华盛顿对柏林下达了最后通牒，迫使其不得不在外交关系破裂和修改潜艇战策略之间做出抉择。在此威胁下，德国政府让步了，要求海军总参谋长叫停作战。后者在4月24日时，对公海舰队及弗兰德斯潜艇部队下达了命令，要求其除非得到进一步命令，否则潜艇必须按照国际法来开展通商破坏作战。
Admiral Scheer, the new C.-in-C. of the High Seas Fleet, was bitterly disappointed. Believing that commerce war waged in accordance with prize law could not succeed and would only expose the submarines to excessive risk, he recalled all the High Seas Fleet submarines from the trade routes by wireless on 25 April, and informed the Naval Staff that the U-boat campaign against commerce was now discontinued. The Admiral commanding the Flanders Flotilla took similar action. This practically meant the abandonment of the second campaign in the War Zone round Great Britain. (The minelaying submarines and those in the Mediterranean were not affected.) The total British merchant-shipping loss for the first five months of 1916 (all areas), from submarines, mines, and cruisers, amounted to 131 ships of 442,000 tons.
新上任的公海舰队总司令，舍尔中将，对此结果深感失望。他认为，在遵循国际法的前提下，潜艇通商破坏作战是难以获得成功的，并且会让潜艇承担不必要的风险。因此，在4月25日时，他下令召回公海舰队麾下的潜艇，并告知总参谋部，他已经叫停了潜艇通商破坏作战。弗兰德斯潜艇部队的指挥官，也采取了同样的做法。这意味着，针对英国周边海域的第二次潜艇战役，宣告结束了。但布雷潜艇的布雷行动，以及地中海区域的潜艇战，则仍然在继续开展。在1916年的前五个月里，英国总共损失了131艘商船，总吨位为44.2万吨（潜艇、水面舰艇、以及布雷造成的损失的合计）。
4、攻势布雷，尤其是布雷潜艇开展的攻势布雷，也对英国的海上贸易造成了较大的威胁。根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume II - The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, 1914-1916, P.367-368）：
From June 1915 enemy minelaying took the shape of small minefields laid from specially built submarine minelayers (the 'UC' boats). Previously, the losses of ships by mines, though large, were not alarming. The submarine minelayer altered this, for the methods of dealing with a large concentrated field were unsuitable for small groups of mines laid promiscuously, and a considerable increase in British minesweeping work was rendered necessary...The British tonnage total for the first five months of 1916 was 38 ships of 95,000 tons.
自开战起，德国海军就陆陆续续有开展攻势布雷行动。起初，水雷对英国商船造成的损失，还在可接受的范围内。但自从德国海军的UC型近岸布雷潜艇服役后，情况就变得不一样了。自1915年6月起，德方的攻势布雷，主要就是由这些潜艇来执行的。他们每次布下的雷场很小，而英国方面此前采用的针对大片雷场的扫雷方式，又不太适合用来对付这种东一片西一片的小型雷场，因此导致有大量商船因触雷而沉没。与此同时，为了对付这些雷场，英国方面还不得不投入更多的人力物力，来执行扫雷任务。在1916年的前5个月内，有38艘英国商船因触雷而沉没，总吨位为9.5万吨。
大舰队与公海舰队的对决
德国海军的作战行动，尽管是以通商破坏为主，但公海舰队也的确有过几次主动出击作战，例如：对雅茅斯的袭击，对斯卡伯勒、哈特尔浦、以及惠特比的袭击，对洛斯托夫特的袭击等。此外，多格尔沙洲海战和日德兰海战，其实也是德国海军先主动出击的。截止至日德兰海战为止，只有赫尔格兰湾海战，是英国海军主动出击而打响的。
北海范围内的交战情况概览
下图中，展示了英德双方在北海范围内的大致巡逻范围（英国红色虚线，德国蓝色虚线），英国实施的远距离封锁线（紫色虚线），双方之间爆发的大规模战斗（多格尔沙洲海战、日德兰海战），德国海军对英国沿海地区发起的袭击行动（雅茅斯、斯卡布罗和哈特尔浦、洛斯托夫特），以及英国与欧洲大陆之间的海上交通线路（红色箭头）。
https://www.warships.com.cn/data/attachment/album/202308/27/100138g7zgmecxcsjt3stj.jpg
从开战到赫尔格兰湾海战
在开战之初时，根据德皇的命令，德国海军选择了消极避战，而英国海军则选择了主动出击。根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume II - The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, 1914-1916, P.42-43 & P.50-54）：
On 1 August the High Seas Fleet was concentrated in the mouth of the Jade ready for war. There it remained. Except for a submarine flotilla reconnaissance sweep, the dispatch of a minelayer and a commerce raider, and patrolling the Heligoland Bight, the entire German Fleet lay idle in the first days of the war. On 12 August it was decided that the stay of the Fleet in the mouth of the Jade would be indefinite. No attempt was made to seek out the Grand Fleet or to stop the British Expeditionary Force. Since the Emperor had decided that the ships (the battle fleet, above all) must not be risked in offensive actions, the orders sent to the C.-in-C., Admiral von Ingenohl, from the beginning stressed the importance of preserving the Fleet. This decision was made over the strong objections of the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral von Tirpitz. That did not matter too much, since Tirpitz, the creator of the German Fleet, was restricted by the nature of his office to administrative matters. The whole conduct of the naval war, on the German side, was in the hands of the Naval Staff (Admiralstab), which was directly responsible to the Emperor.
1914年8月1日，即开战日时，德国公海舰队正聚集在亚德河口，但此后，他们尽管有派出一些潜艇、布雷艇、以及袭击舰，同时也有向赫尔格兰岛方向派出过一些巡逻部队，但公海舰队的大部队并未出动，而是一直呆在港口内等待。至8月12日时，高层决定，这种蹲守港内的策略，将无限期延长。由于德皇决定，公海舰队（尤其是战列舰部队）不应冒险开展攻势行动，因此下发给公海舰队总司令冯·英格诺尔上将的命令，强调的是保存舰队实力。于是，在英国陆军远征军跨越英吉利海峡之时，德国舰队并未予以阻挠，此外他们也未曾出海寻找大舰队。对于这个决策，海军部国务秘书冯·提尔皮茨元帅，提出了强烈反对，但这种反对并没有什么效果，因为提尔皮茨只负责军政，但并不能下达军令。实际下达作战命令的，是海军总参谋部，而这个部门则是直接听命于德皇的。
What is the explanation of German naval strategy? For one thing, the Emperor and the Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, saw in an intact fleet a valuable bargaining asset at the peace table. The control of higher naval strategy by the Army General Staff was another reason for holding back the High Seas Fleet. For the generals the chief function of the Fleet was to protect the Army's flank and rear against possible English or Russian landings on the coasts of the North Sea or Baltic Sea, respectively. The influence of the High Command was also decisive in keeping the Navy tied to a leash during the transit of the B.E.F. The generals were confident they could wipe it out on land, so why risk ships to effect that object at sea? Also, the German Naval Command believed that a general engagement would be a disaster on account of the marked British superiority in capital ships.
德国人为什么会采取这样的策略呢？首先，在德皇威廉二世和德国首相贝特曼-霍尔韦格看来，在与对方进行和谈时，一支实力完整的舰队，是非常重要的筹码。其次，德国的战争策略是由陆军主导的，而对于陆军高层来说，海军的主要职责是保护陆军的侧翼和后方，阻止英国军队从北海登陆德国本土，以及阻止俄国军队从波罗的海登陆德国本土。另外，德国陆军高层充满自信的认为，德国陆军可以横扫英国陆军远征军，因此没必要让海军主动出击。最后，在德国海军自己看来，由于英国海军在主力舰方面拥有明显的数量优势，因此如果与其进行大规模决战，那么结果将会是灾难性的。
Heligoland Bight action on 28 August...Its initiator was Keyes...With assistance from Tyrwhitt he hatched an operation which called for intercepting the German destroyer day patrols off Heligoland...The plan went awry, and Tyrwhitt and Keyes soon found themselves in the presence of superior German forces when the German Fleet Command sent out all available light cruisers to cover the retirement of their destroyer flotilla...Beatty sent Goodenough in to support Tyrwhitt...and he arriving on the scene at the exactly right moment...scattered the Germans...The Germans lost three light cruisers (three others were battered) and a destroyer, with over 1,200 officers and men killed, wounded, and taken prisoner. The British lost no ships, and only the light cruiser Aretltusa and three destroyers had suffered any serious damage. Casualties were 35 killed and about 40 wounded...The operation was hardly a masterpiece of planning. There was an utter lack of co-ordination, and the plan itself was so loose that three British squadrons were operating practically independently in the same waters.
1914年8月28日的赫尔格兰湾海战，是由潜艇部队司令，凯斯准将提议的。在哈里奇分舰队司令，蒂里特准将的协助下，凯斯拟定了前往赫尔格兰湾，拦截德国驱逐舰巡逻队的作战计划。但实际的战斗，未能如计划般开展，因为德国海军派出了轻巡洋舰部队，来掩护驱逐舰部队的撤退，于是凯斯和蒂里特的部队陷入了不利的局面。不过，贝蒂（第1战列巡洋舰中队的指挥官）拯救了局面，他先是派出古迪纳夫准将（第1轻巡洋舰中队的指挥官）的轻巡洋舰前去支援，随后又亲自带领战列巡洋舰，在恰好的时间点上投入了战斗，驱散了德国部队。此战中，德国方面有3艘轻巡洋舰被击沉，还有3艘受损，此外还有1艘驱逐舰被击沉，总共有超过1,200人死亡、受伤、或被俘。英国方面则没有军舰沉没，但有1艘轻巡洋舰和3艘驱逐舰受损较重，伤亡方面则是35人死亡，约40人受伤。不过，从作战计划的角度说，赫尔格兰湾海战远非完美，因为英方的三支部队之间的协作非常糟糕，他们尽管是在同一片水域中行动的，但却基本上是各自为战的。
There were far larger consequences of the action. The bold, deep penetration of German home waters confirmed the German Fleet in its exaggerated respect for the Royal Navy. The Emperor was more determined than ever to restrict his Fleet to a defensive strategy and not risk important units...On the British side, the Heligoland Bight action was hailed as a glorious victory. It cheered the country, the Navy, and the Army. Yes, they had won the first important action of the war at sea.
这场海战带来了深远的影响。德国海军对英国海军的恐惧，在此战后进一步加强了。德皇的保舰思想变得更为顽固了，他坚决不愿意拿他的战列舰部队进行冒险。对于英国来说，赫尔格兰湾海战则被当作一场辉煌的胜利来庆祝，不仅仅鼓舞了海军，并且还鼓舞了陆军以及整个国家的士气。这场海战，是英国海军于大战之中取得的第一次重大胜利。
德国海军对英国沿海地区发起的袭击战
在1914年底至1915年初时，德国方面对英国沿海地区发起了一系列的袭击。根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume II - The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, 1914-1916, P.130-140 & P.156-167）：
On 3 November four German battle cruisers bombarded Yarmouth on the Norfolk coast. The Admiralty braced itself for some 'tremendous event', for which the raid was meant to serve as a diversion. Nothing happened because the enemy had no ulterior motive. It was actually a mine-laying operation, with the coastal bombardment as a side-show.
1914年11月3日时，4艘德国战列巡洋舰出现在诺福克郡的海岸上，对雅茅斯进行了炮击。英国海军部为此紧张不已，认为这只是更大规模的作战的佯攻，但实际上，德方并没有进一步的动作，因为这场炮击行动，本身只是为了掩护德国海军的攻势布雷行动。
Admiral von Ingenohl decided to stage a battle-cruiser raid on the East Coast: a bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool at on 16th December, while laid mines off Filey...Ingenohl had brought most of his battle fleet into the North Sea to support Hipper's battle cruisers...This was in disobedience of the Emperor's order. The raid, it was hoped, would lure a part of the Grand Fleet down from the north and over the freshly laid minefield...Room 40...pieced together from German naval messages a plan for an offensive operation by all five of the battle cruisers, with light cruisers and destroyers, directed against the British coast...Detailed by the Admiralty to spring the trap...The Navy had an excellent opportunity to cut off the raiding force. Four battle cruisers and six dreadnoughts stood between Hipper and his bases...But for the signalling error they break off the engagement...But the disagreeable fact is that this was the first of four serious errors made by Lieutenant-Commander Ralph Seymour, Beatty's Flag-Lieutenant. The second was at the Dogger Bank, and the third and fourth, at Jutland. This stroke of luck for the Germans saved Hipper just as Warrender had been saved from certain doom by a similar bit of luck when Ingenohl had turned away.
至1914年12月16日时，德国海军又针对英国东部沿海进行了一次袭击，他们这次炮击的城市是斯卡布罗和哈特尔浦，同时在法利的沿海区域进行了攻势布雷。另外，为了给希佩尔少将（德国巡洋舰部队的指挥官）提供支援，英格诺尔上将还违背了德皇的命令，带着公海舰队的绝大部分军舰出航了。德国海军此次出击的意图，是吸引大舰队的部分力量南下，并将他们引入新布下的雷区中。然而，英国海军的40号房间（无线电通讯破译机构），从他们破译的德国海军通讯中，判断出了德国海军打算派出5艘战列巡洋舰（准确的说是4艘战列巡洋舰加1艘装甲巡洋舰），在轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰的协同下，对英国东海岸进行袭击的意图，因此英国海军部为德国舰队设下了一个陷阱。他们派出了包括4艘战列巡洋舰和6艘战列舰在内的部队，来拦截希佩尔的部队。英国舰队一度曾与德国舰队发生遭遇，但由于通讯上的错误，他们最终让敌人溜走了。这个通讯错误，是贝蒂（第1战列巡洋舰中队的指挥官）的舰队通讯官，拉尔夫·西摩尔少校，在整场战争中犯下的第一个严重错误——第二个错误发生在多格尔沙洲海战，而第三和第四个错误则发生在日德兰海战。希佩尔是幸运的，因为英国人的错误，让他成功逃脱了原本可能发生的遭遇战。另一方面，由于英格诺尔所率领的公海舰队本队，在交战发生前就掉头溜走了，因此沃伦德（第2战列舰中队的指挥官，英国方面在本次行动中的战场总指挥）也避免了原本可能遭遇的灭顶之灾（因为英格诺尔所率领的舰队，在实力上要远强于贝蒂和沃伦德的部队）。
The Emperor's reaction to various pressures for a more energetic offensive was to confirm that the preservation of the Fleet was still his guiding policy. But he did grant Ingenohl the privilege of making more frequent sallies into the North Sea on his own initiative...The continuation of British scouting operations in the Dogger Bank area caused Ingenohl to send Hipper towards the Dogger Bank to discover what enemy forces were in the area and to surprise and destroy any scouting forces he met. Hipper's force consisted of four battle cruisers, supported by four light cruisers and eighteen destroyers. It left the Jade at 5.45 p.m. on 23 January...Hipper had no idea that Ingenohl's orders to him had been intercepted and decoded at the Admiralty. In the late afternoon of 23 January, minutes after Hipper left the Jade, Goodenough's 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and Beatty's battle cruisers left Rosyth...Tyrwhitt with three light cruisers and thirty-five destroyers was to join Beatty at the rendezvous at 7 a.m. on the 24th...The trap was ready to be sprung. Everything favoured the British and a major victory seemed within reach...The Navy lost the chance of annihilating victory because the signal to attack the rear of the enemy had been misinterpreted and the action broken off...Technically, the Dogger Bank was a British victory. The enemy had fled the field of battle, the Blücher had been sunk and the Seydlitz badly damaged, over 1,000 German seamen had been lost (killed or taken prisoner). British casualties were less than 50 (killed and wounded) ; the Lion's injuries were not vital, although she had to be towed to Rosyth by the Indomitable and it was four months before she was ready.
在德国国内各种加强海军攻势行动的呼声下，德皇尽管仍然坚持保舰策略，但也给了英格诺尔一定的自主权，允许他更频繁地出击。由于英国海军持续在多格尔沙洲区域开展侦察行动，因此英格诺尔决定，派希佩尔前往这片水域，看看英国人到底在干什么，并消灭他所遇到的侦察部队。希佩尔所率领的部队，包括4艘战列巡洋舰（准确的说是3艘战列巡洋舰加1艘装甲巡洋舰）、4艘轻巡洋舰、以及18艘驱逐舰。他们在1月23日5时45分时，驶出了亚德河口。但希佩尔并不知道，英格诺尔发给他的命令，被英国海军截获并破译了。于是在1月23日傍晚，贝蒂带着2支战列巡洋舰中队（5艘战列巡洋舰），在古迪纳夫的第1轻巡洋舰中队（4艘轻巡洋舰）的伴随下，驶离了他们的锚地，罗赛斯。而蒂里特则率领着3艘轻巡洋舰和35艘驱逐舰出航，并计划在1月24日7时，与贝蒂进行汇合。陷阱已经设置完毕，局势对英方非常有利，他们似乎就要取得一场重大的胜利，然而结果却并非如此——由于通讯上的错误，英国舰队错误地将火力集中在了布吕歇尔号上，导致了其他德舰的逃脱，于是他们错过了一次大获全胜的机会。不过，从技术上来说，多格尔沙洲海战仍然是英国方面的胜利，毕竟德方有1艘装甲巡洋舰（布吕歇尔号）被击沉，1艘战列巡洋舰（塞德里茨号）被重创，同时还有超过1,000名官兵死亡或被俘；另一方面，英方的伤亡则不到50人，但狮号受到了较大的损伤，在不倦号的拖带下才得以返航，并花了4个月的时间才完成修理。
The Dogger Bank action cost Admiral Ingenohl his command. The new C.-in-C. was the outgoing Chief of the Naval Staff, formerly an outstanding squadron commander, Admiral von Pohl...On the whole, Pohl was an improvement on Ingenohl, particularly as regards tactical know-how. But he lacked real genius and the professional esteem of his brother officers, he was not a strong leader (his arrogance made him unpopular with the officers), and, under the Emperor's goading to be more cautious than Ingenohl, his strategy turned out to be a continuation of his predecessor's. Over a year was to pass before German capital ships dared show themselves in the North Sea again.
多格尔沙洲海战的失利，导致了英格诺尔上将的下台。他的继任者，是原先担任海军总参谋长的冯·波尔上将。总的来说，波尔的能力要比英格诺尔更强，尤其是在战术方面，前者比后者强不少。但波尔并非天才，同时又颇为傲慢，因此他麾下的军官们并不太喜欢他。同时，由于德皇要求他谨慎行事，因此波尔采取了非常保守的策略。在接下来的1年内，德国主力舰再也没有向英国沿海发起过袭击。
大舰队所面临的困境
尽管大舰队对德国的远距离封锁是卓有成效的，但由于一直未能获得在决战中击败德国海军的机会，因此官兵们的士气是有些低落的。根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume II - The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, 1914-1916, P.411-412）：
The main task of the Grand Fleet was the destruction of the enemy's naval forces. And here there were obstacles of some magnitude. The strain and responsibilities of war had compensations in the activity of the first period. In contrast, the year and more that followed the Dogger Bank action were quite uneventful for the Grand Fleet...The situation was somewhat paradoxical. Britain did not possess absolute command of the sea, since U-boats and occasional disguised raiders were able to pierce it. At the same time, because the enemy was content to keep the vast bulk of his Fleet in its ports and harbours, Great Britain was exercising a command of the sea more absolute than had ever been exercised by any country. She was keeping Allied trade routes open and denying them to the enemy...This was no reason for jubilation in the Grand Fleet, whose officers yearned for battle. The British naval tradition, as understood by the Grand Fleet, demanded one or more great clashes at sea.
大舰队的主要任务，是摧毁敌方的海上力量。但想要实现这个目标，却存在着巨大的困难。在开战初期时，交战双方顶着巨大的压力和责任，开展了几次作战行动。但在多格尔沙洲海战之后，大舰队就变得非常沉寂了。此后，海上的战略态势，就变得颇为奇怪了。由于德国海军的潜艇仍然在行动，并且他们有时还会派出辅助巡洋舰，因此英国方面并未获得完全的制海权。另一方面，由于德国海军的舰艇，绝大部分都待在港口内，因此英国对海权的掌控程度，实际上达到了前所未有的高度。在此情况下，英国的盟友能够有效的利用海上交通线，而敌方却完全无法进行海上运输和贸易。尽管如此，大舰队的官兵们却无法为此感到欣喜，因为他们渴望的是战斗。在他们看来，英国海军传统，就是与敌方舰队进行决战。
日德兰海战的前序
在1916年初时，在新上任的总司令的带领下，公海舰队又开始活跃起来了。根据Arthur J. Marder的说法（From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume II - The War Years to the Eve of Jutland, 1914-1916, P.420-427; From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume III - Jutland and After, May to December 1916, P.36-37）：
One reason for the quickened tempo of the war at sea from February 1916 was Admiral Reinhard Scheer. This able officer with a gift for command and a quick mind, a vigorous personality and wide war experience (he had been commanding the 2nd Squadron of the High Seas Fleet), succeeded the mortally ill Pohl as C.-in-C. on 24 January 1916...Scheer's important sorties was the tip-and-run raid on Lowestoft, 25 April...The High Seas Fleet left the Jade, with the battle cruisers under Rear-Admiral Boedicker, in the absence of the ailing Hipper...At about 3.50 a.m. Boedicker's screen sighted British warships on their port side. This was the Harwich Force...Here was a splendid German opportunity to cut off and destroy a much weaker force...On the grounds that Tyrwhitt's superior speed rendered pursuit useless, more probably, though, because of uncertainty as to what British force there might be behind Tyrwhitt's screen, at 4.55 a.m. Boedicker turned to the eastward. At 5.20 a.m., Scheer turned and speedily made for home. His strategy was no bolder than Boedicker's tactics...The raid was hardly a brilliant exploit, whether from the point of view of strategy, tactics, or results.
自1916年2月起，公海舰队又开始活跃起来了，其原因是，波尔上将得了重病，因此在1916年1月24日时，原第2战列舰中队的指挥官，舍尔中将，晋升为公海舰队总司令。舍尔非常胜任这个职位，他思维敏捷，精力充沛，作战经验丰富，并且有指挥天赋。舍尔率领公海舰队出击，在4月25日时，对洛斯托夫特进行了炮击。不过，由于希佩尔少将生病抱恙，因此这次指挥战列巡洋舰部队的，是伯迪克少将。当日3时50分左右，伯迪克的部队与英国海军的哈里奇分舰队发生了遭遇，这一次，德国海军本有机会抓住并消灭一支比自己弱得多的英国部队（因为哈里奇分舰队中没有主力舰，只有轻巡洋舰和驱逐舰），但由于蒂里特逃得很快，而伯迪克又不确定蒂里特的后面有没有其他英国部队，因此在4时55分时，他放弃了追击，折返向东了。在5时20分时，舍尔也进行了掉头，并打道回府了。可以说，舍尔的战略决策，并不比伯迪克的战术决策更大胆。这次袭击行动，无论是从战略还是战术层面来说，都是让人失望的。
Scheer was well aware that to seek a battle a outrance with the markedly superior British Fleet would be to court suicide...If the Grand Fleet could be enticed from its bases by a reported German sortie, there would be a chance of picking up a few of the larger ships by a submarine patrol skillfully positioned off the British bases. The plan that was finally adopted (30 May) called for an advance by the High Seas Fleet to the north, in the direction of the Skagerrak.
舍尔很清楚，与实力强大的英国舰队进行正面对决，无异于自杀。但他设想出了一种新的作战策略，如果在英国军港外提前部署好潜艇，那么当英国方面获得了德国舰队出航的情报，并出海拦截的话，那么德国潜艇就有机会对英国主力舰进行伏击。基于这种策略，在5月30日时，他再一次率领公海舰队出航，这次他驶向了斯卡格拉克海峡的方向（德国海军将日德兰海战称为斯卡格拉克海战）。
结论：从战争爆发后的情况来看，英国海军的战略，基本实现了其应有的作用。但在远距离封锁的模式下，双方舰队不容易互相遭遇，因此迟迟没有出现英国民众期望中的海上决战。另一方面，德国海军的战略，则被证明是一厢情愿的——战争爆发后的实际情况，与他们起初设想的情况大相径庭——受到德皇的保舰策略的限制，提尔皮茨苦心打造的战列舰部队，在绝大部分时间里都无所事事。而战列巡洋舰部队尽管表现更为活跃，但也并未斩获什么成果。在此情况下，他们不得不更多地依赖小规模作战，尤其是潜艇破交作战。然而，在国际压力之下，德国海军在日德兰海战前夕时，不得不叫停了北海区域的潜艇作战行动，因此在1916年5月底时，德国公海舰队司令舍尔中将，带领公海舰队出击，并设法与英国舰队进行交战，这就是日德兰海战的起因。 七公主的新篇大作 膜拜大佬。
页:
[1]