请问是否可以说二战战列舰的困境不是航空而是前卫即决战
二战战列舰的困境不是航空问题，而是前卫即决战问题。这个问题不光是昼间有，夜间也有（因为夜战误击问题严重，尤其是大船，使得夜战主力变成了驱逐舰，驱逐舰领舰与轻巡洋舰（战列舰副炮反雷击总归不如6寸机关枪），而且驱逐舰一起行动，轻巡一起行动，不能混编。这造成了夜战也是前卫即决战，驱巡内卷的结果决定胜负。战列舰只能在敌我差距大，前卫战的战败也不能确认失败的场所（比如护航运输船队，护航登陆场），或者前卫战打不出决定性战果（比如前卫战是机场主导的“纯空战”）时发挥作用。稍微提炼了一下楼主观点，可能有偏颇之处还请指正：
1.雷击舰艇在夜战中取代战列舰成为主要力量，因为夜战中战列舰很可能会误击友舰（即楼主的“误击问题”，或许楼主想说的是“战列舰并不能有效地寻找并打击敌舰”），而且因为战列舰不能与驱逐舰、巡洋舰混编导致她们不能有效地干预前期交战
2.战列舰反制雷击舰艇的能力较弱（楼主原文中的“不如6寸机关炮”），因此在前卫战中建立起的雷击舰艇的优势足以压倒对方的战列舰，进而取得战斗的决定性胜利
以下是我的个人看法：
首先，战列舰并不是不可以与巡洋舰、驱逐舰混编，比如日军战列舰参加的三场夜战（榛名沉没之战、雾岛沉没之战与苏里高），而且在榛名沉没之战当晚，美方的损失有相当一部分（尤其巡洋舰的损伤）是由日军战列舰造成的，说明战列舰不仅可以在交战前期投入战斗，而且可以为拥有战列舰的一方带来不小的优势
其次，即便在水面战里，“前卫战即决战”的说法似乎也有问题，巡洋舰、驱逐舰在战列舰加入战斗之前进行的交战，并不能决定后续战列舰交战的结果，只能为某一方带来一定的优势。雾岛沉没之战中，“前卫战”以美方的四艘驱逐舰均非死即伤而终，可以说是一边倒的极端情况，但这并没有严重妨碍到后续美方战列舰主导的翻盘，可见“前卫战”只能在后续交战中，为获胜一方带来有限的优势，而不足以称之为“决战”，除非一方主动撤退，但这似乎就不是战术讨论的范畴了。
最后，雷击舰艇对战列舰的威胁是否到了足以“决定胜负”的地步？似乎并没有，史实中大部分战列舰中雷都来自航空攻击，或是舰艇失去控制后被来自水面舰艇的鱼雷击中，极少有战列舰在仍能正常行动的情况下被水面鱼雷击中的（苏里高是很极端的情况，美舰拥有非常明显的主场优势，与压倒性的雷达优势）。究其原因，一方面，战列舰的交战距离要比巡洋舰远得多，这意味着她们更容易在不易被鱼雷攻击的距离上有效地打击对方。（有人认为雾岛号沉没当晚华盛顿号没有中雷是日军巡洋舰发挥失常，但个人认为不应当排除距离过远加上美方早有防备的因素）；另一方面，在受击方提前警觉的情况下，舰艇通过规避机动躲开鱼雷攻击并不是什么困难的事情，证据就是白天进行的水面鱼雷攻击得手的可能远不如夜间攻击（期待大佬指正或补充）
那么二战时期战列舰参加的诸多夜战怎么解释呢？雷达发挥的作用不可忽视。无论是英国战列舰夜间贴近意大利的扎拉级巡洋舰，还是北角海战中约克公爵对沙恩霍斯特的追击，以及莱特湾海战中苏里高海峡海战美国无畏舰对日本山城号的炮击，华盛顿对雾岛号的攻击，诸多战列舰在夜间取得战果的案例，怎么解释？ 新乔治亚的维拉 发表于 2024-6-15 23:00
稍微提炼了一下楼主观点，可能有偏颇之处还请指正：
1.雷击舰艇在夜战中取代战列舰成为主要力量，因为夜战 ...
我不认为夜战环境下战列舰能比巡洋舰在更远的距离开炮（准确来说这取决于发现距离，当时的发现距离很多时候对于巡洋舰都算近的），另外战列舰和驱逐舰混编会很大程度影响驱逐舰的机动（甚至轻巡都会，驱逐舰应该自成一队），同时夜间驱逐舰的隐蔽雷击也难以发现（不管是从发现驱逐舰的角度还是发现鱼雷的角度），同时雷达与敌我识别的问题又使得驱逐舰在混乱中雷击难以避免，如果敌方采取不到万不得已不开炮的策略的话，会更难以发现。最后我说的夜战属于夜间水面决战范畴，对于围绕登陆场和机场这种攻防有必攻之地，守方有必守之地的情况下，就算前卫战失败，也可以在必攻必守之地依靠鱼雷艇等艇级力量补全侦察与雷击的部分。 新乔治亚的维拉 发表于 2024-6-15 23:00
稍微提炼了一下楼主观点，可能有偏颇之处还请指正：
1.雷击舰艇在夜战中取代战列舰成为主要力量，因为夜战 ...
当然我说的前卫即决战是类似于”如果前卫战失利的情况下继续作战，就主动会蒙受更大的损失，也难以保质的完成目标“，但如果双方有一方的目标等级是高于舰队本身的，或者双方整体实力有大的差距（比如华盛顿加南达打雾岛，作战就依旧会继续。 Flynn 发表于 2024-6-15 23:43
那么二战时期战列舰参加的诸多夜战怎么解释呢？雷达发挥的作用不可忽视。无论是英国战列舰夜间贴近意大利的 ...
地中海，苏里高和华盛顿打雾岛是因为主力舰力量差距过大（更别提苏里高美军前卫战打赢了），北角海战属于高海况下雷击舰难以发挥作用。说到底前卫即决战的前提是双方决战力量差距不大，而二战种盟轴战列舰力量差距过大的事实使得盟军可以接受前卫战失败后继续作战的损失。 润滑良好黄油花 发表于 2024-6-16 20:31
当然我说的前卫即决战是类似于”如果前卫战失利的情况下继续作战，就主动会蒙受更大的损失，也难以保质的 ...
首先对于第一件事“战列舰并不能在比巡洋舰更远的距离开火，因为她们不一定能在更远的距离上发现敌舰”：
As radar contacts by our battleships multiplied, Admiral Lee ordered course changed to 300° T. and informed the South Dakota that she might open fire when ready. The Gwin, keeping station 5,000 yards ahead of the flagship, observed two ships in the target area. Bearing was 355° T., range about 14,000. They were thought to be of the Mogami type.
At 0016, before being fired upon or illuminated by the enemy, the Washington opened on the leading Japanese ship with her main battery at 18,500 yards, using radar ranges and optical train. In 3 minutes, 42 rounds of 16-inch armor-piercing mmunition were fired. At the time the first salvo landed, the secondary battery began firing on targets about 15,000 yards away, possibly three destroyers, and the main battery spotters were blinded by the flashes of the 5-inch guns. However, radar officers reported that the first salvo straddled and that the big guns were on target with the second or third. The signal of the enemy vessel, which had been coming in strong on the radar screens, flickered and became faint and fuzzy.
A minute or so after the Washington went into action, the South Dakota opened fire on the nearest ship of the main group at a range of 15,700 yards, using radar control. This vessel was not far from the targets of the Washington's secondary battery and was overlapping in deflection the more distant vessel astern of the battleship or heavy cruiser which our flagship's main battery was pounding. It seemed likely that the Japanese were not in battle formation and therefore that they had been surprised. The South Dakota's first or second salvo hit the mark. Tremendous fires blazed up both on this ship and on the Washington's main battery target. The South Dakota spotted up 100 and right 02 to get on the ship which was following the leader. This time also the first salvos crashed home.
At 0019, after the Washington's seventh or eighth salvo, her flaming target disappeared and was presumed to have sunk. The main battery stopped firing, while the secondary continued with undetermined results until it had expended 100 rounds.
At 0019 the flagship changed course to 300° T., and at 0020 speed was increased from 17 to 23 knots. Reports were received that our destroyers were opening fire. The Gwin picked one of the enemy cruisers as a target for her torpedoes. One of the tubes fired prematurely as a result of a short circuit. The ships proved to be beyond effective range for high-speed setting. Next the destroyer fired two star-shell spreads to illuminate the battleships' targets and followed with two salvos of anti-aircraft common. The range was excessive, so fire was checked.
The Benham had been unable to see the targets at first but finally distinguished two of them. They were not observed to be firing, and indeed the Japanese were slow to reply to our battleships and did no damage whatever in this first phase of the action. The Benham did not fire torpedoes because it was determined that the enemy vessels would be behind the protection of Savo by the time they arrived.
At 0024, after the South Dakota's eighth salvo, her target was seen to sink. The other cruiser, on which she had opened originally, was now only a doubtful pip on the radar screen. Several Japanese voice transmissions had ceased abruptly. Only the weaker ones continued.
引文描述了1942年11月25日夜战中美军战列舰的行动，其中华盛顿、南达科他号在18000码外就与敌舰进行了雷达或者目视接触，并开始向敌舰开火。其中被南达科他打沉的船是绫波号，当时她距离美军战列舰15000码左右。被华盛顿射击的川内因为施放烟幕加上美舰误以为该舰被击沉而逃过一劫。从日舰稍迟的反应来看，日方当时并没能在美方开火前发现美舰。可见美方战列舰不仅能在中远距离上观测敌舰并进行攻击，而且相当有效。相比之下，轻型舰艇在10000-7000码上的炮战并没有取得决定性战果，最后因为美方驱逐舰中雷而结束。
类似的状况在苏里高海峡也上演过，西弗吉尼亚在22000码外依靠雷达率先开火，而巡洋舰中最先开火的路易斯维尔在15600码上打出第一轮齐射（数据来自《Battle of Surigao Strait (Twentieth-Century Battles) by Anthony P. Tully》 ）
可见即便在夜间，战列舰也仍然可以凭借雷达、更好的火控与舰炮，从而在更远的距离有效地攻击敌舰，这一点是巡洋舰比不了的。以同年的塔萨法隆格海战为例：
At 2223 the cruisers changed course by head of column to 320° T., with the destroyers taking up parallel courses. About 15 minutes later, all ships formed on a line of bearing of 140°, on a course 280° T. At the same time SG radars began to search the Guadalcanal shoreline for indications of the enemy's presence.
The SG on the Minneapolis, which had played a large part in navigating the Task Force through Lengo Channel, picked up the first contact with the enemy. At 2306 what appeared to be "a small wart on Cape Esperance" became visible on the PPI screen. It grew larger until it finally detached itself from the outline of the land mass. It bore 284° T., at a distance of 26,000 yards. Admiral Wright immediately informed the rest of his Force of the radar contact. Gradually the number of ships on the Minneapolis' SG screen increased, until by 2315 seven were clearly perceptible. They were proceeding at 15 knots on a southeasterly course.12
Shortly after learning of the Minneapolis' contact, the Fletcher picked up two enemy vessels, bearing 285° T., 14,000 yards off her port bow. Tracking immediately commenced, revealing five ships, four about one mile and a quarter off Guadalcanal, the fifth half a mile outside and abreast of the second ship. A solution of 15 knots on a course of 140° T. was obtained. At 2316, as the enemy formation bore 243° T. at a range of 7,000 yards, Comdr. Cole in the Fletcher requested permission to launch torpedoes. Admiral Wright inquired if the targets were within range, and, upon receiving an affirmative answer, authorized the torpedo attack.
Two other van destroyers noted the presence of the enemy. The Drayton's SG picked up five ships after the Fletcher reported contact, but for some reason the plot was erratic, giving a target speed of zero. No Japanese ships were visible from the Perkins until 2315, when the SC equipment revealed five vessels bearing 284° T., approximately 3,000 yards from Tassafaronga Point and 14,480 yards from the destroyer. Radar plot determined the course of this target as 125° T. and the speed 15 knots. Although the number of ships appearing on the Perkins' screen was the same as that on the Fletcher's, the discrepancy in bearings was so great (Perkins 284°; Fletcher, 243°) that if the bearings were accurate the two groups of ships must have been widely separated. The Maury had no SG equipment and could not locate the enemy at this time.
Steaming 1,000 yards astern of the flagship was the New Orleans. Her SG also failed to discover the Japanese ships for several minutes after their appearance on the Minneapolis' screen at 2306. Eight minutes later, however, what appeared on the SG screen to be a reef close to Guadalcanal was identified as a column of ships, with a single vessel on the flank. This Japanese formation stood 14,000 yards from the New Orleans, and although the bearing was not recorded, it was doubtless the same formation as that observed by the Fletcher.
The experiences of the other cruisers in the column varied. The Pensacola, third in line, lacked SG equipment, and made no radar contacts until well after the Minneapolis had opened fire. Next came the Honolulu, which, despite constant SG search on the bearings and ranges reported by the Minneapolis and Fletcher, observed no enemy ships for several minutes.13 Last in the column was the Northampton, which had no SG radar, and had to depend on the reports of the other ships. Neither of the two rear destroyers, also lacking SG equipment, was able to locate the Japanese.
At approximately 2320, having received authority to launch a torpedo attack, the Fletcher fired 10 torpedoes in two half salvos by SG control. The center of the Japanese line bore 267° T., at a distance of 7,300 yards--a torpedo range of 9,600 yards from our leading destroyer and 8,200 yards from the Drayton in the rear. Simultaneously the Perkins launched eight torpedoes, recording the range as 5,000 yards. Because she still could not obtain a target speed of more than zero, the Drayton only fired two. The Maury had no positive contacts and did not fire at all.
Barely a minute after the torpedoes were launched, Admiral Wright ordered all ships to open gun fire, and the van destroyers began firing 5-inch shells and starshells. The Fletcher selected the selected the rear enemy ship as her target. It was 7,500 yards distant on a bearing of 188° T. After firing about 60 rounds in two minutes, the Fletcher lost her target from the FD radar. She therefore ceased firing and retired to the northwest around Savo Island, followed by the other three destroyers astern.14
At the time Comdr. Cole reported the target range from the Fletcher as satisfactory for a torpedo attack, seven enemy ships could be seen on the Minneapolis' radar screen, and their range had decreased to about 10,000 yards. The flagship selected a target 9,200 yards off her port bow on a bearing of 260° T. This vessel stood farthest right in the Japanese formation; the ship farthest left bore 239° T.
Assisted by starshells from the port 5-inch battery, the main battery of the Minneapolis fired four salvos at what was finally identified as a transport. The first salvo was somewhat over, but the next three were directly on. After the fourth salvo, the transport "violently disintegrated," and the flagship momentarily checked fire.
尽管在20000码外就已经通过雷达发现了敌舰，美方的第一轮开火也在10000码以内（明尼阿波利斯，9200码或是弗莱彻，7500码），而在这个距离上，日舰已经可以使用鱼雷了，实际上日方也这么做了，结果是美方遭受了很严重的损失。可见战列舰能够在更远处损伤敌舰的优势在夜战中也是存在的（不过也有前提：这些战列舰需要有相对可靠的雷达以发现敌舰，但对于二战时期的英美而言这并不是什么难事）
本帖最后由 新乔治亚的维拉 于 2024-6-16 22:41 编辑
润滑良好黄油花 发表于 2024-6-16 20:31
当然我说的前卫即决战是类似于”如果前卫战失利的情况下继续作战，就主动会蒙受更大的损失，也难以保质的 ...
对于第二件事“驱逐舰应当与战列舰、巡洋舰分开编组”
这一点我表示赞同，驱逐舰应当单独编组以更好地使用她们的鱼雷。我最初拿出这件事是为了论证“战列舰也可以与驱逐舰、巡洋舰处于相近的位置，参与前期交战，并为拥有战列舰的一方带来优势”，证据就是榛名沉没一战中美舰相当多的损伤是由日军战列舰造成的 新乔治亚的维拉 发表于 2024-6-16 22:34
首先对于第一件事“战列舰并不能在比巡洋舰更远的距离开火，因为她们不一定能在更远的距离上发现敌舰”： ...
看来雷达没有那么不靠谱，这同时也宣布了重巡不论昼战还是夜战都没有价值 新乔治亚的维拉 发表于 2024-6-16 22:38
对于第二件事“驱逐舰应当与战列舰、巡洋舰分开编组”
这一点我表示赞同，驱逐舰应当单独编组以更好地使用 ...
另外可不可以这么说，战列舰的副炮是否需要6寸副炮主要取决于该国巡洋舰数量，如果巡洋舰数量捉襟见肘，那么在考虑夜战的情况下，宁可改主炮布置（比如3座三联主炮变成两座四联主炮）也要中轴线布置至少6门6寸副炮 润滑良好黄油花 发表于 2024-6-17 12:35
另外可不可以这么说，战列舰的副炮是否需要6寸副炮主要取决于该国巡洋舰数量，如果巡洋舰数量捉襟见肘， ...
你能举出多少例子证明某种战列舰采用或放弃6寸副炮的主要原因就是“该国巡洋舰数量”？
你又能举出多少例子证明“如果巡洋舰数量捉襟见肘，那么在考虑夜战的情况下，宁可改主炮布置（比如3座三联主炮变成两座四联主炮）也要中轴线布置至少6门6寸副炮”？ 普里戈任 发表于 2024-6-17 13:26
你能举出多少例子证明某种战列舰采用或放弃6寸副炮的主要原因就是“该国巡洋舰数量”？
你又能举出多少 ...
我认为这点之所以没出现过是因为二战时期各国并没有把战列舰的夜战提到重要的位置，尤其是当时战列舰仍然作为主力舰，应该不会考虑缺乏护航的情况。 普里戈任 发表于 2024-6-17 13:26
你能举出多少例子证明某种战列舰采用或放弃6寸副炮的主要原因就是“该国巡洋舰数量”？
你又能举出多少 ...
如果硬要说的话，俾斯麦的副炮应该是有考虑到这点的。 二战前最积极在夜战中投入主力舰的RN认为：
夜战中轻型舰艇并不总是能发挥不对等优势，雷击在很大程度上是拼运气和临场发挥。在较劲距离的交战中，主力舰的大口径主炮的命中威力可以等同于鱼雷的命中，而主炮投射量和射击频率远胜鱼雷，因此夜战中大口径火炮是比鱼雷更合适、更能取得稳妥的杀伤的武器。当然前提是夜战的训练和索敌情报前置工作必须做好，让主力舰相对安全的投入战场。（瓜岛夜战某种程度上也证明了这一点：日本方面大量雷击舰艇投放的鱼雷并没有赢过美军的主力舰火炮）
与瓜岛类似的是，俾斯麦号最后一战的前夜，英国驱逐舰队也对跛脚的俾斯麦号发动了雷击，结果无一命中。相对于炮击，雷击战术对于编队组织、阵型掌握和协调、雷击位置的选择与切入，对方姿态的实时把控都要更高。所以对于防御方而言，夜间雷击是巨大威胁，但对于进攻方而言，却很难说是稳妥的手段。 本帖最后由 羊羽 于 2024-6-17 17:53 编辑
润滑良好黄油花 发表于 2024-6-17 13:45
我认为这点之所以没出现过是因为二战时期各国并没有把战列舰的夜战提到重要的位置，尤其是当时战列舰仍然 ...
除了英美双巨头外，德意日法的新式大型战列舰都上了6吋级别副炮（虽然有的号称高平两用）。 新乔治亚的维拉 发表于 2024-6-16 22:34
首先对于第一件事“战列舰并不能在比巡洋舰更远的距离开火，因为她们不一定能在更远的距离上发现敌舰”： ...
不过靠谱的雷达也不是一开始就有的吧 LeSoleil 发表于 2024-6-17 13:52
二战前最积极在夜战中投入主力舰的RN认为：
刚刚仔细看了关于二战美军夜战战术条例的变化，美军最后采用的战术是巡洋舰编成一队远距离炮击，驱逐舰使用阿利伯克的双编队战术，除了强调雷达的使用和摇摆阶梯射击（配合发现敌人不用测距仪立刻开火的战术）与火炮与鱼雷并重（具体来讲巡洋舰以火炮为主力，驱逐舰以鱼雷为主力）还有驱逐舰队的自由侦查与攻击行动之外，还强调了训练要以攻击巡洋舰驱逐舰为主，夜战特混编队尤其是驱逐舰编队要固定不要变动，巡洋舰要经常变换航向躲避远程鱼雷，战前要制定严密又易于执行的计划而不能期待临时指挥。
但其中并没有提及主力舰在夜战中应该如何应用，请问英军对夜战中驱逐舰和巡洋舰的看法与美军相似吗？英军主力舰在夜战里的定位是什么。 润滑良好黄油花 发表于 2024-6-17 20:58
刚刚仔细看了关于二战美军夜战战术条例的变化，美军最后采用的战术是巡洋舰编成一队远距离炮击，驱逐舰使 ...
RN的战斗条例里没有这么细的细节，都是各station commandar自行决策的。可以确定的是从1935年起RN非常积极的将主力舰投入夜战并实施了大量演习。 LeSoleil 发表于 2024-6-18 15:05
RN的战斗条例里没有这么细的细节，都是各station commandar自行决策的。可以确定的是从1935年起RN非常积 ...
是不是战列舰和巡洋舰编在一队当特大号巡洋舰用？
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