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发表于 2020-7-1 07:58
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本帖最后由 LeSoleil 于 2020-7-1 15:51 编辑
简要解读：
一、贝蒂这则备忘录的背景，是其出任1BCS司令满一年的总结性文件。虽然不少研究（如2015年的“THE CAVALRY OF THE FLEET:” ORGANIZATION, DOCTRINE, AND BATTLECRUISERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1904-22）都宣称皇家海军在一战中缺乏战巡的doctrine，但这则备忘录显然已经提出并确立了RN战巡运用的重要原则，而且可以在后来的战例中完全应证。
二、贝蒂在其中对战巡功能的关注，极大的偏重于舰队行动方面，即便其所谓的战略部分，即支持巡洋舰巡逻线，也仍是如此。对此丘吉尔在回信中指出，贝蒂漏掉了战巡功能里重要的第三项，就是去追击歼灭所有的巡洋舰。如果了解费舍尔对战巡制海与决战兼用的最初预想，那么便不难看出这其中的偏差，即战巡作为巡洋舰的制海功能被遗漏了。不仅如此，在用于增援巡洋舰巡逻线方面，贝蒂特别提出战巡即便分散也必须保持在视野距离之内。这当然是为了确保有效指挥，尽量减少损失的实用的办法，但也进一步削弱了战巡的灵活行动的巡洋舰属性，而强化了其高速战列舰的属性。这一偏差同样可以得到战争进程的验证，如以12寸老战巡为主的2BCS在开战初本来作为高速机动兵力在地中海保持存在，结果不久被全部集中于本土；费舍尔主要用于反破交的急造战巡声望和勇敢级也全部被扣在本土，随即被用舰队行动的评价标准判定为防御薄弱，等。
三、有意思的是，这则1914年开战前夕的备忘录中所提出的战巡的战术功能（即作为快速分队应对敌战巡队、或者组成侧翼包抄部队攻击敌本队）的部分，与皇家海军1939年战斗条例（ADM 239/261）几乎完全一样。后者摘录如下：
INSTRUCTIONS FOR BATTLECRUISERS
300. Either battlecruisers or fast battleships may be detailed to support the cruisers ahead of the fleet. For convenience these vessels are referred to as battlecruisers and the instructions which follow apply to either type of ship, when carrying out this duty.
PROBABLE FORCES OPPOSING THE BATTLECRUISERS
301. Resulting from modernisation of foreign capital ships, fast capital ships may be stationed in advance of the enemy battlefleet. Though inferior in speed to the British battlecruisers, they may be considerably superior in armament and protection.
DUTIES OF THE BATTLECRUISERS
302. General. The conduct of the battlecruisers will depend on whether they are required to form part of the battlefleet when action is joined. If required for this duty, they will be employed during the early stages of the approach to support the light forces in the van, but must regain close touch with the battlefleet before the latter becomes engaged. To carry out this double task, good judgement will be required on the part of the Senior Officer, battlecruisers. If not required to form part of the battlefleet, the battlecruisers should continue to support the light forces, whilst taking care not to get so far ahead that they are unable to take part in the main action, if ordered to do so. The Admiral may be expected to make it clear, before action is joined, what function the battlecruisers are required to perform.
303. During the approach. Support to the light forces can best be given by destroying the enemy light forces which attempt to dispute the control of the waters between the two fleets. Soon after surface contact has been made, the enemy fast battleships, if ahead of their main force, should be encountered. If these ships are equal or inferior in fighting strength, they should be engaged and the action fought, as far as possible, towards the line joining the two fleets. If superior, the battlecruisers should fall back on their supports-the battlefleet.
304. At all times during the approach the Senior Officer, battlecruisers, must guard against his squadron becoming engaged with the enemy main force, withdrawing at once outside gun range.
MAINTAINING TOUCH WITH THE ENEMY
305. Should the enemy break off action or the visibility deteriorate, the duty of the battlecruisers is to co-operate with the cruisers in maintaining or regaining touch, using their high speed and powerful gun armament for this purpose.
REPORTS DURING THE APPROACH AND ACTION
306. Although many reports from other ships of the advanced forces may be expected, signals from the Senior Officer of the battlecruisers during his approach and action giving the general situation will be of particular value to the Admiral.
特别值得注意的是，在1914年的备忘录中，战巡队既要在敌方战巡出场的时候以之为主要目标，又特别指出战巡队应该避免在本队（battle fleet）与敌方本队交火之前进入敌方本队射程内。而在1939年战斗条令，战巡的可能对手同样是敌方的高速主力舰，也同时要求不得进入敌方本队（main force）的射程。换而言之，从1914年到1939年，战巡在主力舰对抗中的角色是一以贯之的，实际上没有任何的变化。所谓日德兰海战证明战巡不能用于主力舰对抗、后来得到修正的观点显然是错误的。
四、最后有一个很好玩的点是，如果用这则备忘录所提出的战术原则去评价贝蒂自己指挥的日德兰前卫战，那么只能得出结论：贝蒂几乎犯了所有曾被他自己特别指出来过的错误。例如，没有第一时间集结兵力，没能传递情报，5BS进入敌方本队射程，BCF的接战阵型恶劣导致烟雾互相干扰，最后驶回大舰队前端时严重遮挡后者射界……堪称教科书版的糟糕操作。虽然BCF还算完成了其基本的使命。 |
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发表于 2020-7-1 07:14
