[讨论] 费舍尔的战巡防御观

第四弦

1912年无比的其中一个方案，有意思的特征还是蛮多的，像是柴油机动力、当成烟道的桅杆、炮塔顶着的司令塔、内置小艇等等：

（别的图好像太大了传不上来，不知道该怎么处理）

第四弦

其实弗里德曼也有类似叙述：

British (and foreign) pre-1914 thinking about capital ship tactics was based on the perception that guns were cumulative weapons: it would take considerable time and considerable battering to destroy or neutralise a ship. British officers had ‘knock-down’ tables showing how many minutes of fire it would take to disable particular ships. Required time was set partly by the hitting rate, so as range increased it was assumed that knock-down time would increase considerably. Success in protracted battle was expected to depend not so much on armour penetration as on smashing effect. The British also hoped that their high explosive Lyddite would create disabling toxic effects.

Thus the destruction of the three British battlecruisers at Jutland by a few hits (possibly one each) was a shocking surprise. Afterwards the Germans claimed that their superior shells had penetrated British armour with devastating effect. However, it seems clear in retrospect that these penetrations would not have been fatal had the British not adopted what amounted to suicidal turret practices. The British were also surprised that German commander Admiral Scheer was concerned mainly with disengaging once as he spotted the main British fleet. The British needed a different kind of shellfire which could quickly immobilise an enemy so that he could be pounded to pieces or sunk by torpedoes. That was the significance of the new generation of armourpiercing shells introduced at the end of the war.

The battlecruisers blew up at Jutland not because the Germans had magic shells, but because the British had adopted extremely dangerous magazine practices because German shellfire had been so ineffective in the previous Dogger Bank battle. Moreover, British shells did penetrate German magazines (for example in the battlecruiser Seydlitz) in both battles, causing devastating fires. The Germans never took special anti-flash precautions because their powder, always contained in metal cases, could not generate the kind of flash which detonated British bagged powder. However, had the British followed the accepted precautions at Jutland, ships would have lost individual turrets without blowing up. The evidence is that HMS Lion lost ‘Q’ turret from a hit probably much like that which blew up her nearsister HMS Queen Mary; Lions captain and gunnery officer refused to relax the rules in order to fire more rapidly. After the First World War, the Royal Navy reverted to its earlier view that shell damage would be cumulative. Once the magazine problems revealed at Jutland had been cured, it sought to fight at a range (about 15,000 yds) at which it expected to achieve a high hitting rate. It doubted that the long range fire practised by the US and Imperial Japanese Navies was practical in this sense.

不过他显然把重点更多地放在发射药安全上

另外最后这个说法挺有意思【After the First World War, the Royal Navy reverted to its earlier view that shell damage would be cumulative. Once the magazine problems revealed at Jutland had been cured, it sought to fight at a range (about 15,000 yds) at which it expected to achieve a high hitting rate.】
似乎可以拿来解释KGV偏弱的炮座和炮塔正面

第四弦

LeSoleil 发表于 2023-3-20 14:45
我觉得kgv的炮塔正面并不特别弱。英国人设计传统，炮座因为圆弧形，厚度就是偏低的，不是不能理解。至于 ...

我想说的其实是KGV的炮座炮塔比她自己的水线装甲带弱，并不是横向对比……
到吨位足够的38年狮级，除了把动力舱加到374以外，也把炮塔正面和炮座都直接加到了374，大概反映出他们并不觉得之前的324就特别够用了，还是有进一步加强其防护的倾向
有狮级作为对比再看KGV的炮塔炮座，它不仅比弹药库的374更薄，甚至也薄于动力舱的349，显然在防护权重上是更靠后的；换句话说，（在解决了发射药安全问题这个大前提之下），吨位受限的情况下，可以容忍炮塔炮座有更容易被击穿的风险。那么再结合弗里德曼的说法，我觉得含义就很明显了：水线装甲带能贡献更长的血条，而炮塔炮座不能，所以前者更重要

第四弦

LeSoleil 发表于 2023-3-20 17:19
没错啊，你看QE的炮座炮塔……KGV的13寸炮塔面板是删删改改的遗留漏洞，这个没问题，但是也就那样。倾斜20 ...

嗯我的意思就是，QE这些战前设计中比主装弱的炮座炮塔与KGV的其实是一回事儿，只不过前者是由于当时认知中柯达火药本身就安全，后者则是通过各种安全措施使恢复前者风格的设计成为可能。站在这样一个较长的时间轴来看，或许对于日德兰式的一发入魂全舰殉爆的担忧，反而是短时间内的一个特例，解决了发射药安全问题之后对于伤害效果的看法，反而更接近费舍尔的那种旧观念。

（Before 1914, the Royal Navy did not regard the stacking of naked cordite charges as a particularly dangerous or unusual practice. Since cordite had replaced the highly inflammable black-powder as the main propellant for big guns at the end of the nineteenth century, handling regulations in the fleet had become steadily more relaxed. Generally speaking, cordite was much less feared. By the beginning of the war, senior naval officers not only tolerated the stockpiling of unprotected charges for ready use, the majority actively encouraged the practice.）