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本帖最后由 seven_nana 于 2024-11-30 00:35 编辑
附录1：著名学者对英舰弹药库殉爆问题的点评
针对英国战列巡洋舰的弹药库殉爆问题，已有多位学者开展过研究。其中最为知名的，要数Nicholas Lambert。除此之外，John Campbell、John Brooks、以及John Roberts在这方面也颇有建树。这些学者的研究，可以作为对上文的补充和旁证。
Nicholas Lambert对弹药库殉爆问题的研究
根据Nicholas Lambert的说法（Our Bloody Ships or Our Bloody System - Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 1916）：
在开战之前，英国海军并不是很重视发射药的安全性问题
Before 1914, the Royal Navy did not regard the stacking of naked cordite charges as a particularly dangerous or unusual practice. Since cordite had replaced the highly inflammable black-powder as the main propellant for big guns at the end of the nineteenth century, handling regulations in the fleet had become steadily more relaxed. Generally speaking, cordite was much less feared. By the beginning of the war, senior naval officers not only tolerated the stockpiling of unprotected charges for ready use, the majority actively encouraged the practice.
在1914年之前，皇家海军并不认为将裸露的柯达火药堆叠在一起，是一件极度危险的事情，并且这样的做法也并不罕见。自从19世纪末期，柯达火药替代了高度易燃的黑火药，成为了火炮发射药后，舰队中的发射药操作规范，是逐步松懈的。总体来说，官兵们并不会像提防黑火药那样，担心柯达火药的安全性问题。在开战之时，海军中的高阶军官不仅仅是容许下级将无保护的发射药堆叠在一起，他们中的大多数人甚至还主动鼓励官兵们这么做。
On the eve of war, the Royal Navy became deeply concerned about the vulnerability of its expensive capital ships to attack by torpedo craft. To defend themselves, battleships carried a battery of medium caliber (4-inch to 6-inch) Quick Fire guns positioned to throw out a "hail of fire" at any attacker. The record for a six-inch gun, held by a crew belonging to HMS King Alfred, was fifteen aimed rounds a minute. Exercises conducted in 1913 under more realistic combat conditions, however, indicated that the Quick Fire guns could not possibly be fired at anything like this rate because of the impossibility of feeding them ammunition so quickly.
在战争前夕，皇家海军非常担心，自己手下那些昂贵的主力舰，在面对敌方的雷击舰艇时，会变得十分脆弱。为了保护自身免遭雷击，战列舰上搭载了大量的4-6英寸的中口径速射炮，以便向雷击者射出一道火网。其中，6英寸火炮的射速记录，是由艾尔弗雷德国王号装甲巡洋舰所保持的，达到了每分钟15发炮弹。不过，1913年时的演习显示，在更为接近真实战斗环境的条件下，速射炮的射速完全不可能达到上述的水准，其原因在于，供弹速度跟不上炮手开火的速度。
In April 1914, the Admiralty surveyed all flag officers and senior captains on the subject. With very few exceptions, all replied that the need to sustain a high rate of gunfire was paramount and that the only way this could be achieved was by keeping an ample supply of ammunition on deck and close to the guns. The Admirals understood the risks involved.
在1914年8月时，就这个问题，海军部向所有将官和资深舰长们进行了调研。绝大部分人都回复到，维持高射速是至关重要的，而若想达到这个目的，唯一可行的办法就是在火炮附近的甲板上堆放大量弹药。这些将官们都很清楚这样做所带来的风险。
For instance, Vice Admiral Stanley Colville (commanding First Battle Squadron) insisted that: "A rapid and sustained fire delivered at the moment the Torpedo craft are sighted is essential. The danger of the charges being ignited by the fire of enemy's heavy ships may be disregarded."
举例来说，第一战列舰中队的指挥官科尔维尔中将强调说：“当我们发现雷击舰艇时，持续进行快速射击，是非常必要的。至于发射药被敌方炮火点燃的这种危险性，是可以不必理会的”。
Vice Admiral George Warrender (of the Second Battle Squadron) similarly argued that: "It is considered more important to have the ammunition provided and ready for immediate use and to risk the chance of a cordite fire, rather than to guard against a fire, and [thus] to have the ship unprepared for an attack."
第二战列舰中队的沃伦德中将的回答也很类似：“我们认为，比起防火工作来说，还是保证弹药能够立刻使用这件事更为重要，为此我们可以承担发射药被点燃的风险。这总好过在面临敌人袭击时，我们却毫无准备吧”。
While Rear Admiral Charles Madden (who would serve during the war as Jellicoe's chief of staff) argued: "It should be laid down in the Gunnery Manual that the risk of the explosion of stacked ammunition is secondary to maintaining a rapid fire which should afford the best protection to the stacked ammunition."
麦登少将（杰里科的姻亲，后来担任了杰里科的参谋长）则提出：“我们应在炮术手册中写明，堆放弹药所带来的爆炸危险是次要的，而维持高射速才是主要的，因为高射速本身就能为这些弹药提供最好的保护”。
Even the Royal Navy's leading gunnery expert, Captain Frederick Dreyer, considered it "more important to provide ammunition for the gun to fire at the enemy, and accept the remote chance of a local cordite fire, than to guard against such a fire by having little or no ammunition at the gun."
即便是皇家海军中的炮术权威，德雷尔上校，都认为：“相比起保护弹药不被点燃，还是尽快为火炮提供弹药，以便向敌人射击更为重要。发射药被点燃的风险本就是极小的，且即便出现，也只是局部区域的发射药被点燃，承担这种风险，总好过火炮弹药供应不济”。
Despite some personal misgivings, the D.N.O., Tudor, endorsed the recommendation with the observation that "it is generally accepted that the risk of local cordite fires must be taken in order that a ship may be ready to instantly develop her maximum power of gun fire."
至于担任军械局长的都铎，尽管他个人仍然为此感到不安，但还是认同了这种做法，并指出：“普遍得到认同的观点是，为了保证军舰能够立刻发挥出最大射速，我们必须接受局部区域的发射药被点燃的风险”。
开战后，尽管出现了发射药燃烧事故，但仍旧没有在海军官兵中引起充分的重视
At the Battle of the Falklands (December 1914), the armoured cruiser HMS Kent was nearly lost after a fire on the gun deck spread down an ammunition hoist to a stock of naked cordite charges stacked just outside the main magazine. Disaster was averted only by the prompt action of a crewman in dousing the cartridges.
在1914年12月的福克兰海战时，肯特号装甲巡洋舰差点因弹药库殉爆而沉没——敌舰炮击引发的火焰，沿着弹药提升井窜入了发射药库，引燃了发射药库外堆放的一些裸露的柯达火药，好在有一名勇敢的水兵及时扑灭了这些火焰，这才避免了灾难的发生。
As a direct result of this experience, in February 1915, the Admiralty issued a memorandum to the fleet drawing attention to "the great danger of allowing cordite to accumulate in gun positions and causing severe fires." Henceforth, Whitehall advised, "this accumulation should therefore on no account be allowed. " This order, however, was ignored by most ships in the Home Fleets. Most officers still felt that "it is better to accept some risk rather than reduce the rate of supply."
有鉴于此，在1915年2月时，海军部向舰队下发了一份备忘录，告知他们：“在炮位附近堆放发射药，是一件非常危险的行为，并有可能导致严重的火灾”。海军部写到：“从今以后，不允许再出现这种堆放发射药的行为”。然而，本土舰队中的绝大部分军舰都无视了海军部提出的这些要求，绝大部分军官依然认为：“承担这种风险，总好过降低弹药供应速度”。
事实上，当时的英国海军，仍旧非常重视提高射速，且不仅仅要提高反雷击火炮的射速，同时也要提高主炮的射速
According to the revised Grand Fleet Orders prepared by Jellicoe in conjunction with his chief gunnery officer Captain Frederick Dreyer, a normal rate of fire for a ship armed with 13.5-inch guns firing 1,400-lb projectiles was deemed to be one salvo every forty seconds. "Rapid fire" meant shooting salvoes at intervals of thirty seconds or less. At one shoot conducted before the war, H.M.S. Orion is recorded as having fired seven consecutive salvoes at an average interval of 24.3 seconds. Ships armed with 12-inch guns (850-lb projectiles) could fire even faster-astonishingly, one salvo every twenty seconds or less.
根据杰里科与他的首席炮术军官德雷尔上校所拟定出的大舰队命令（GFO）来看，对于配备13.5英寸火炮/1,400磅炮弹的军舰来说，他们认为每40秒进行一次齐射（Salvo），属于正常的射速。而快射（Rapid Fire）则意味着以30秒或更短的间隔时间进行齐射。在战前开展的一次射击测试中，俄里翁号以24.3秒的平均间隔，连续打出了7个齐射。至于那些装备12英寸火炮/850磅炮弹的军舰，她们的射速还要更快，能达到每20秒打出一次齐射，甚至更快。
In a second paper on this subject, issued to the fleet at about the same time, Jellicoe emphasised that "rapidity of fire is essential both to disable the enemy quickly and to reduce the accuracy of his fire."
在差不多同一时期发出的另一份文件中，杰里科强调道：“火炮的射速是至关重要的，它不仅能达到尽快摧毁敌舰的目的，还能降低敌方火力的准确性”。
In a third document, dated 20 March 1915, an addendum to the Grand Fleet Battle Orders, Jellicoe provided the fleet gunnery officers with more precise instructions. "When the visibility is less than 10,000 yards, ships must be prepared to open rapid fire from the outset in order to make initial superiority," he wrote. To achieve "rapid fire" ships must either shoot "rapid salvoes" or to allow turrets to fire "independently."
在第三份文件，一份时间标签为1915年3月30日的大舰队战斗命令（GFBO）补充文件中，杰里科则向舰队中的炮术军官们给出了更明确的指示：“当能见度低于10,000码时，各舰必须做好从战斗初始就进行快射（Rapid Fire）的准备，以便在交战初期占据优势”。杰里科还写道：“为了达到快射的目的，各舰必须采用快齐射（Rapid Salvo）的方式，亦或者允许各炮塔单独射击（Independent）”。
除了提高射速之外，英国人还在开战前夕，增加了主力舰的主炮备弹量
On 20 July 1913, the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, Admiral Sir George Callaghan, requested the Admiralty to authorise the outfit of projectiles carried by all capital ships to be substantially increased. He maintained that "the allowance of 80 rounds per gun is no longer a sufficient margin for safety."
1913年7月20日时，本土舰队司令卡拉汉上将，向海军部提出申请，要求大幅度增加主力舰的备弹数量。他指出，每门火炮80发炮弹的备弹量，已经不太充足了。
Callaghan offered four good reasons for carrying more ammunition.
卡拉汉提出了四个充分的理由，来支持他的增加备弹量的要求。
1）To make ships less dependent upon ammunition supply ships.
降低主力舰对弹药补给舰的依赖性。
2）To relieve officers of anxiety or doubt as to the expenditure of ammunition previous to a general action.
对于在决定性交战之前就消耗弹药的情况，军官们难免有所担忧，增加备弹量可以缓解这种担忧。
3）To enable rapid fire to be employed when circumstances are favourable to its use, without fear of subsequent shortage.
在条件允许进行快射的情况下，充足的备弹量能保障快射得到有效开展，并消除军官们对于弹药消耗量的担忧。
4）To permit fire to be opened at long ranges without fear of the supply subsequently running short.
保障远程射击的开展，消除军官们对于弹药消耗量的担忧。
In October 1913, Captain Frederick Tudor, then Director of the Naval Ordnance Department at the Admiralty and one of the Royal Navy's leading gunnery experts, endorsed the Commander-in-Chief's request for more ammunition. "In view of torpedo development and of the experience of the Russo-Japanese war," he noted in his report to the Admiralty, warships could be expected to commence shooting at much greater ranges than the then anticipated "decisive battle range," which inevitably would result in the expenditure of a considerable quantity of ammunition "before any decisive results are reached."
在1913年10月时，时任军械局长的都铎，认同了本土舰队司令的这个要求。在他提交给海军部的报告中，都铎写道：“参考日俄战争中所取得的经验，相比当时所预想的决定性交战距离，实际上战舰是可以在明显更远的距离上开火的。此外，对于鱼雷性能的提升，我们也不得不予以考虑。这些情况必然会导致主力舰在取得决定性战果之前，就已经消耗了大量的弹药”。
Tudor could see no problem with providing capital ships with additional projectiles. There was plenty more stowage in the shell rooms under each turret.
对于为主力舰增加炮弹搭载量的问题，都铎认为并无困难之处。每个炮塔的炮弹库内，都有充裕的空间可以继续添加炮弹。
The provision of extra propellant appeared to present more difficulties. Quite simply there was no free space in the magazines and the cartridges could not safely or conveniently be stored anywhere else. Tudor advised that the only solution was to provide additional cordite charges in flash-proof boxes known as "clarkson cases" to be stowed on the floor of the magazine gangways. It was an imperfect arrangement but nevertheless practicable.
但若想要增加发射药的搭载量，就有些困难了，发射药库内确实没有额外的空间了，但若将发射药存放在其他区域，则又存在不够安全、且也不便于供应的问题。都铎提出，唯一的解决办法，就是将新增的发射药放置在克拉克森式发射药保护容器中，并将这些保护容器堆放在发射药库的过道区域的地板上。这种做法并不完美，但毕竟是可行的。
In early 1914 the official outfit for all capital ships was increased. Previously all big-gun ships had carried eighty rounds per gun. Thereafter, battleships were provided with one hundred rounds and battlecruisers with one hundred and ten.
1914年初时，主力舰的官方弹药搭载量提升了——在此之前，所有无畏舰的主炮弹药搭载量均为每门火炮80发炮弹；在此之后，战列舰的载弹量提升到了每门火炮100发，而战列巡洋舰的则提升到了每门火炮110发。
In fact, the quantities of ammunition actually carried were yet higher. All large armoured vessels habitually carried eight practice rounds in addition to their war outfit. At the outbreak of war these were replaced by "live" projectiles. Also, from about the end of 1913, each capital ship was provided with six shrapnel rounds per gun designed to be used as a last ditch defence against enemy torpedo craft.
事实上，实际的弹药搭载量，要比这个官方值更高——每艘主力舰的每个炮塔内，都搭载了8发训练弹（即每门火炮4发），开战后，这些炮弹都换成了实弹。此外，从1913年底开始，每艘主力舰上还额外为每门火炮配备了6发榴霰弹（即每个炮塔12发），用作抵御敌方雷击舰艇的最后手段。
By the beginning of the First World War, in other words, each British battle cruiser had been provided with an extra 40 shells or a total of 120 rounds per gun...50 percent more ammunition than they had been designed to carry.
换句话说，当大战开始后，英国战列巡洋舰的主炮载弹量，达到了每门火炮120发，相比设计值增加了40发，其增幅达到了50%。
For each of these 40 additional projectiles, more importantly, they were also provided with four cordite cartridges (representing one "full" charge) that were stored in two clarkson cases. Stacked on the floor of each of the four main magazines inside the battle cruisers, therefore, were some 160 cordite boxes.
更重要的是，对于这新增的40发炮弹，每发都对应着4个发射药包（4个药包构成一个全装药），而这4个药包则是分开装在2个保护容器中，并堆放在发射药库内的。换句话说，每个炮塔的发射药库内，都需要新增160个发射药保护容器（40x2x2）。
由于输送发射药的过程颇为耗费时间，而新增加的发射药又挤占了大量空间，且长官们又要求提高射速，因此部分官兵在供应发射药时采取了一些牺牲安全性的做法
A series of exercises in rapid shooting conducted during the spring of 1914 by Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne (commanding the Mediterranean battlecruiser squadron) reported that "the rate of supply [to the guns] depends on the work inside the magazines of removing cartridges from cases." It was found that the easiest way of preventing delay was to remove a proportion of cordite from its protective cases well before action commenced and place it close to the magazine door.
在1914年春天，地中海舰队的战列巡洋舰中队开展了一系列的快速射击训练，地中海舰队司令米尔恩上将指出：“向火炮供应发射药的速度，取决于发射药库内的工作速度，即将发射药从保护容器中取出的速度”。他们发现，为了避免发射药供应出现延迟，最简单的办法就是在战斗开始之前，事先将一部分发射药从保护容器中取出，并将其放置在发射药库防火门的边上。
There is no doubt that the combination of wanting to increase rates of fire, a desire to reduce congestion in the magazines, and a wish to anticipate possible delays in the supply of ammunition to the guns, encouraged gun crews on going into action to open the clarkson cases stowed in the magazine gangways, and stack naked cordite charges in the handling room at the base of the turrets, and in some cases also in the working chamber directly under the gunhouse.
出于加快火炮射速、降低发射药库拥挤程度的目的，同时也为了应对预想中可能会发生的供弹速度延迟问题，官兵们在战斗打响之前，就已经打开了发射药库过道中堆放的那些保护容器，取出了其内部存放的发射药，并将其堆放在了炮塔底部的换装室内，甚至还有将发射药直接堆放在炮室下方的换装平台中的情况。
Shortly after the battle, the surviving gunnery officer of HMS Invincible, Commander Hubert Dannreuther, admitted to the Third Sea Lord, amongst others, that his crews had employed similarly dangerous ammunition handling techniques.
在海战之后，幸存下来的无敌号炮术长，丹罗伊特中校，向第三海务大臣（都铎）承认，该舰的官兵采用了类似的非常危险的发射药供应方式。
Other evidence suggests that in fact the majority of ships in the Battle Cruiser Force at Jutland were equally "careless." So too were some of battleships in Jellicoe's Grand Fleet. Constructor Lieutenant Victor Shepheard (who served as Director of Naval Construction from 1951 to 1958), and who by chance happened to be present at the Battle of Jutland, observed similar scenes on board the HMS Agincourt...During the action, Shepheard roamed the ship as a supernumerary to the damage control party. He is reported as having been alarmed at the large number of charges lying around in turret working spaces, out of their cases, and unprotected. Interestingly some turrets were worse than others. Shepheard noted the turret manned by the Royal Marines was especially bad."
其他证据显示，战列巡洋舰队中的大部分军舰，都采用了类似的不当操作方式。此外，大舰队中的部分军舰，也存在这样的问题。在日德兰海战时，造舰中尉谢泼德（此人后来于1951-1958年间担任了造舰局长），在阿金库尔号战列舰上观察到了类似的情形。在海战过程中，作为损管队的编外人员，谢泼德穿梭在舰上的各个角落。当他看到了炮塔区域内堆放的大量的无保护的发射药后，他感到十分震惊。值得注意的是，有一部分炮塔中的情形，比其他炮塔更差。谢泼德注意到，由海军陆战队官兵操作的炮塔，情况尤为糟糕。
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that of the three battle cruisers that blew up at the Battle of Jutland after hits on their turrets, two, the Invincible and Queen Mary, were acknowledged to have been the best (fastest) gunnery ships in the Royal Navy.
附带说明一下，有一个值得注意的情况是，日德兰海战中殉爆沉没的三艘战列巡洋舰中，无敌号和玛丽王后号，被公认为是整个皇家海军中射击速度最快的两艘军舰。
John Campbell对弹药库殉爆问题的研究
根据John Campbell的说法（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.368-379）：
英德两国发射药安全性的对比
German charges were by no means flash proof when out of their magazine cases, but their ignition was delayed and they burnt relatively slowly, and no dangerous pressure rise occurred from a number of charges violently igniting at nearly the same instant, as occurred with British charges.
从保护容器中取出的德国发射药，本身并不具备防火能力，但其外包装会对发射药被点燃的过程造成一定阻碍，且其发射药本身也烧的比较慢，因而即便在同一时刻有多组发射药被点燃，也不会像英国发射药那样产生非常危险的压力。
Thus even in the Seydlitz at the Dogger Bank battle, when 62 complete 11in charges were involved in the fire in her after turrets, there was no explosion. In the Lion's 'Q' turret the ignition of 8-13.5in charges between magazines and guns...would have blown up the ship if 'Q' magazines had not been closed, and very probably would have done so anyway if they had not been flooded, though the total weight of propellant that ignited was only about a sixth of that in the Seydlitz's fire.
在多格尔沙洲海战时，塞德里茨号的舰艉两座炮塔内，共有62组28cm火炮发射药被点燃，但并未发生爆炸。相比之下，在日德兰海战时，狮号的Q炮塔内有8组13.5英寸火炮发射药被点燃，这些发射药的重量只有塞德里茨号那次的1/6左右，但若不是发射药库防火门已被关闭，且完成了注水作业，该舰是会被炸沉的。
针对英舰弹药库安全措施的总结
The magazine doors gave access to the handing room where the charges were placed in the lower hoists...These hoists brought the shells and charges for each gun to the working chamber, where they were transferred to the gun loading cage of the respective upper hoist.
通过发射药库的防火门，可将发射药运往换装室，并将其装入下段提升井。提升井会将炮弹和发射药运送到换装平台，随后被装入火炮装填架，再通过上段提升井继续往上输送。
Waiting positions for two charges were provided in the working chamber, and for two more in the handing room, and in action there would thus be eight charges in a turret between magazines and guns.
在换装平台上，设有可放置2组发射药的待用架，而换装室内也同样设有可放置2组发射药的待用架，换句话说，在实际战斗中，每座炮塔内总共会有8组发射药——换装室2组，换装平台2组，下段提升井2组，上段提升井（即火炮装填架）2组。
Flash doors were fitted to the trunk and the cages of the hoists, and the propellant was in more or less closed compartments in all stages of its passage from handing room to gun loading cage.
弹药提升井上的开口、以及用来容纳发射药的输送架，也都设有防火门，因此当发射药从换装室运往火炮装填架的过程中，或多或少地都是处在封闭空间中的。
Unfortunately...the above flash doors were inadequate, the magazine doors were not flash tight under pressure, and flash had a free path to the handing room via the space between the fixed and rotating turret structures. Also there were no magazine scuttles for passing charges.
不幸的是，弹药提升井上的防火门存在缺陷，而发射药库上的防火门在高压下也不能完全阻挡住火焰，且火焰还可能通过炮塔旋转部分与舰体结构之间的缝隙钻入换装室。此外，当时的英舰上也并未在发射药库舱壁上设置用于传递发射药的活门。
Flooding of magazines was very slow in British ships as it was considered that a time not exceeding 30 minutes was satisfactory, and the quickest in any ship was 15 minutes.
英舰上的弹药库注水设备，需要很长的时间才能完成注水工作，他们认为只要注水过程不超过30分钟便是可以接受的，最好的军舰上也只能做到在15分钟内完成弹药库注水。
Sprays which increased the efficiency of the flooding water were fitted in German ships, but not in British, though it was known that Vickers had provided them in the magazines and shell rooms of the Russian armoured cruiser Rurik which they launched in 1906.
弹药库喷淋设备可加快注水效率，当时的德国军舰上安装有这种设备，但英国军舰没有。然而，维克斯公司为俄国海军建造的，于1906年下水的留里克号装甲巡洋舰，却在弹药库安装有喷淋设备。
John Brooks对弹药库殉爆问题的研究
根据John Brooks的说法（The Battle of Jutland, P.467）：
We can identify six distinct, and in most cases not small, differences between British and German charges.
对于这个话题，英德两国在以下六个方面存在明显的差异。
Cordite MD was a ‘hotter’ propellant, i.e. once ignited, it burnt faster at a higher temperature.
英国发射药的燃烧温度更高，且燃烧速度更快。
Cordite MD was less stable; it incorporated an inferior stabilizer and, probably due to a higher level of impurities, it deteriorated more rapidly.
英国发射药的稳定性较差，其使用的稳定剂性能较差，且变质速度也比较快（这可能是由于英国发射药的化学成分纯度不够导致的）。
All British propellant was in silk bags whereas only a quarter of German propellant was in silk bags, the rest in brass cartridge cases – these brass cases partly protected the propellant against ignition by flash, while their thermal inertia reduced the rate at which the temperature of the propellant could increase.
英国发射药全都是装在丝绸包裹中的，而德国发射药只有小部分装在丝绸包裹中，大部分是装在铜质药筒中的。这些药筒具有一定的防火作用，且在遇到外部高温时，铜材的热隋性也能延缓发射药温度的上升速度。
The single 7oz igniter for a full German charge was safe at the bottom of the cartridge case, underneath the charge; each British quarter-charge had a 16oz igniter attached to one end.
一组德国发射药上只含有7盎司的点火药，且位于药筒底部的安全位置；而每包英国发射药上都有16盎司的点火药（一组发射药总共64盎司）。
In most German ships at Jutland, main and fore charges were kept in unopened magazine cases until they were loaded into the hoists; whereas it is probable that, in many British ships, magazine lids were removed and charges taken out of the magazine cases to be stacked in readiness in the handing room and magazine aisles.
日德兰海战时，在绝大部分的德国军舰上，发射药库内的发射药，都是放在发射药保护容器中的；相比之下，可能有很多英国军舰，都采取了打开保护容器上的盖子，将发射药从中取出，并堆放在换装室和发射药库过道中的做法。
While venting from German turrets proved effective, the venting from British magazines and handing rooms was restricted.
从实际情况来看，德舰上的炮塔有良好的泄压功能，而英国发射药库和换装室的泄压能力则比较差。
Any one of these differences need not have been decisive. But their effects were mutually reinforcing and together...they constitute a more than sufficient explanation of why, if a propellant fire was started by a hit on a British ship, it was so much more likely to develop chaotically into a catastrophic explosion.
上述的六个因素，如果单独拿出来说，都不是决定性的差异。但将这些因素加在一起后形成的综合效果，足以用来解释英舰上的发射药火灾，为何很容易升级为弹药库殉爆。
John Roberts对弹药库殉爆问题的研究
根据John Roberts的说法（British Battlecruisers 1905-1920, P.116-118）：
A magazine explosion as a result of enemy action was seen as unlikely...The difference between expectations and reality were clearly demonstrated during the Battle of Jutland...
在大战开始前，英国海军认为，由于敌舰攻击而导致弹药库发生殉爆的概率，是非常低的。然而，日德兰海战中的实际情况，揭示了预期与现实之间的显著差异。
After Jutland a very broad range of measures was introduced to reduce the risks from cordite fires, which were briefly as follows:
在日德兰海战之后，英国海军采取了一系列的改进措施，来降低发射药燃烧事故造成的威胁，具体情况大致如下：
(a) Improved flash protection to gun mountings.
对炮座的防闪焰措施进行改进。
(b)Fitting flash-tight scuttles to magazine.
在弹药库处加装具备防闪焰功能的发射药传递活门。
(c) The sealing-off of all vent plates to magazines.
将弹药库处的通风板全部封死。
(d)Modifying magazine doors to open outwards into handing room.
将弹药库防火门改成向外开启（即向换装室开启）的形式。
(e) All ventilator, magazine cooling trunks, hatches etc, into magazine to be kept closed during action as long as air remained fit to breathe.
在战斗过程中，只要不影响人员呼吸，则弹药库处的舱门、通风管道、冷却设备进出气口等都应予以关闭。
(f) Charges were not to be removed from cases in the magazine until required, and lids were not to be removed from cases until absolutely necessary.
对于存放在弹药库中的发射药，不准将其从保护容器中提前取出，也不准将容器上的保护盖提前取下。
(g)Fitting sprayers in magazines to drench exposed charges.
在弹药库中增设用于淋湿发射药的喷淋设备。
(h)Fitting additional 1in plating to magazine crowns and the roofs of turrets.
在弹药库顶盖和炮塔顶盖上加装1英寸厚的装甲。
All these changes, with the exception of the added protective plating, were aimed at limiting the spread of a cordite fire and did not address the basic problem of why such fires would spread so rapidly and so violently in British ships.
上述的这些改进措施，除了加装装甲之外，其余改进措施的目的都是为了限制发射药燃烧引发的火灾，避免其扩散的。换句话说，这些措施并没有解决最根本的问题——发射药燃烧引发的火灾为何会扩散地如此之快，为何会造成如此惨重的破坏？
The more obvious conclusions were that the German charges were slower to ignite and slower in burning, thus retarding the process sufficiently to prevent a rapid rise in pressure.
显而易见的结论是，德国发射药的燃烧速度更慢，也更不容易被点燃，因此避免了燃气压力极速上升的情况。
Several reasons were advanced for this namely that:
具体来说，两国的发射药存在以下差异：
(a) German charges were enclosed in thin brass cases, which slowed the transfer of a fire from one charge to another and could, if the lid was still in place, prevent the ignition of the charge completely.
德国发射药是包裹在铜质药筒中的，药筒延缓了火灾从一包发射药蔓延到另一包发射药的速度，且如果没有去除保护盖的话，甚至可以完全避免发射药被点燃。
(b)British charges had a gunpowder igniter sown into the end of each half charge, which assisted in the transference of fire from one charge to another, gunpowder being much more susceptible to ignition by flash than the charge itself.
每包英国发射药的底部，都配有黑火药点火药，由于黑火药比发射药本身更易燃，因此这种点火药会加快火焰从一包发射药蔓延到另一包发射药的速度。
(c) German charges were inherently more stable as a result of better methods of manufacture and more careful control of the purity of the explosive during manufacture.
由于德国发射药的制造工艺更好，化学纯度方面的品控更优，因此本身就比英国发射药更稳定。
(d)The age deterioration of British charges made them steadily more liable to ignition and more rapid and violent burning, particularly if any impurities were present in the cordite.
而英国发射药则会因为长时间存放而变质，使其变得更容易被点燃，且燃烧时更为猛烈，尤其是在化学纯度不佳时，就更是如此了。
Of these the most serious was the last and by April 1917 the control of cordite production had been considerably improved and work had begun on replacing all the old cordite in the fleet.
上述几项问题中，最后一个问题是最严重的。至1917年4月时，柯达火药的生产水准已经得到了明显改善，此后，英国人开始着手将舰队中配备的老发射药，逐步替换为新生产的发射药。
In addition, experimental work was started which was largely aimed at following German practice, and included the investigation of new coverings, abolition of igniters and improved methods of manufacture, of which only the last actually produced any concrete results.
除此之外，英国人还开展了一系列的试验，试图仿效德国人的发射药生产制造模式，这其中包括对发射药容器、点火药、以及生产工艺的改进，但最终得以实现的，只有生产工艺的改进。
附录2：德国主力舰的发射药燃烧及弹药库殉爆案例
发射药燃烧和弹药库殉爆问题，并不仅仅是英国海军的问题——在第一次世界大战期间，德国军舰上的发射药，有过多次被敌方炮火点燃的案例，此外也有弹药库殉爆的案例。
主炮发射药被点燃的案例（仅限主力舰）有：
1、布吕歇尔（SMS Blücher）号装甲巡洋舰，多格尔沙洲海战；弹药供应通道内的部分发射药被点燃；死伤情况不详。
2、塞德里茨（SMS Seydlitz）号战列巡洋舰，多格尔沙洲海战；C、D炮座内的62个发射药组合（前发射药+主发射药）被点燃，总重量超过6,000kg；有165人因此死亡。
3、德尔弗林格（SMS Derfflinger）号战列巡洋舰，日德兰海战；C炮座内的7个丝绸包装的前发射药和7个铜制药筒包装的主发射药被点燃，总重量878.5kg；有68人因此死亡，炮组成员仅有6人幸存。
4、德尔弗林格（SMS Derfflinger）号战列巡洋舰，日德兰海战；D炮塔内的13个丝绸包装的前发射药和7个铜制药筒包装的主发射药被点燃，总重量1085.5kg；有75人因此死亡，炮组成员仅有1人幸存。
5、塞德里茨（SMS Seydlitz）号战列巡洋舰，日德兰海战；C炮座内的2个丝绸包装的前发射药和2个铜制药筒包装的主发射药被点燃，总重量210kg；炮组成员仅有13人幸存，其中10人来自弹药库，炮塔成员仅有3人幸存，且受到了严重的烧伤，炮座内的人员全部死亡。
6、塞德里茨（SMS Seydlitz）号战列巡洋舰，日德兰海战；C炮塔内的2个丝绸包装的前发射药和2个铜制药筒包装的主发射药被点燃，总重量210kg；在被这发炮弹击中之前，塞德里茨号的C炮座已经被炮弹击中过一次了，大部分炮组成员已经死亡，幸存人员也已经撤离。
7、吕佐夫（SMS Lützow）号战列巡洋舰，日德兰海战；B炮塔内的部分发射药被点燃；死伤情况不详。
副炮发射药被点燃的案例（仅限主力舰）有：
1、戈本（SMS Goeben）号战列巡洋舰，萨利赫角海战；P3炮廓内的16个发射药被点燃，此外还引爆了3枚高爆弹，炮组成员全部阵亡。
2、毛奇（SMS Moltke）号战列巡洋舰，日德兰海战；S5炮廓内的2个发射药被点燃，人员方面有17人死亡，6人重伤，17人中伤。
3、石勒苏益格-荷尔斯坦因（SMS Schleswig-Holstein）号战列舰，日德兰海战；S6炮廓内的2个发射药被点燃，人员方面有3人死亡，9人受伤。
4、国王（SMS König）号战列舰，日德兰海战；P1炮廓内的至少2-3个发射药被点燃，36名炮组成员死亡。
5、国王（SMS König）号战列舰，日德兰海战；水中弹击穿了防雷装甲，副炮弹药库内的大约15个发射药被点燃。
弹药库殉爆的案例（仅限主力舰）有：
1、波美拉尼亚（SMS Pommern）号战列舰，日德兰海战；被英国驱逐舰雷击，沉没。
2、阿达尔伯特王子（SMS Prinz Adalbert）号装甲巡洋舰，在波罗的海区域被英国潜艇雷击，沉没。
John Campbell对德舰发射药燃烧问题和殉爆问题的点评
根据John Campbell的说法（Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, P.368-379）：
Less care was generally taken of German charges than British, and there were no noteworthy flash precautions, and it was the practice in 1914 to have supplies of ready charges in gun-house and working chamber.
在发射药的安全保护措施方面，德国人做得并不如英国人好，且德舰上的防闪焰措施也是有所不足的。另外，在1914年时，德国舰队中的普遍惯例，是在炮室和换装平台内堆放待用的发射药。
It is an often repeated error to state that as a result of this fire the Germans introduced flash precautions before Jutland. Actually the principal step taken was drastically to limit the number of charges out of their magazine cases or in opened cases, though too many were still present at Jutland in the Derfflinger's two turrets in which fires occurred...some flash doors were fitted in the Lutzow, but this was not done in the Seydlitz or Derfflinger where flash reached the handing rooms.
有观点认为，鉴于塞德里茨号在多格尔沙洲海战中的经验，德国人在日德兰海战之前，采取了防闪焰相关的措施。然而，这只不过是一个被经常复述的错误观点罢了。实际上，德国人所采取的主要改进措施，是尽量避免将发射药从保护容器中取出、且尽量不要将保护容器的盖子打开。不过从日德兰海战中的实际情况来看，德尔弗林格号的那两座被点燃的炮塔内，还是堆放了太多的暴露在外的发射药。另外，尽管吕佐夫号上安装了一些防火门，但塞德里茨号和德尔弗林格号上并未安装防火门，因而火焰窜到了她们的换装室内。
None of the German armoured ships of the pre-dreadnought era had torpedo bulkheads, and their underwater protection was far inferior to that of the German dreadnoughts and battlecruisers...The loss of the Pommern from explosions following a torpedo hit appears to resemble that of the armoured cruiser Prinz Adalbert in the Baltic in October 1915. The latter was hit by an 18in torpedo from the E8, which is thought to have caused the middle 5.9in ammunition room to explode, and this was followed by the ship blowing up.
前无畏时代的德国战列舰和装甲巡洋舰全都没有配备防雷装甲，因此其水下防护水准远逊于无畏舰时代的德国战列舰和战列巡洋舰。波美拉尼亚号的沉没过程，与阿达尔伯特王子号装甲巡洋舰的情况颇为类似，后者同样是因为遭到雷击后发生爆炸而沉没的。1915年10月时，英国潜艇（HMS E8）发射的一枚18英寸鱼雷击中了阿达尔伯特王子号，导致了舰体中部的15cm弹药库发生爆炸，最终导致该舰沉没。
神教点评
根据上述内容来看，德国军舰上的弹药库安全措施，同样是存在安全隐患的，且在发射药相关的安全规定和操作流程方面也存在着一些不足。
但另一方面，德国发射药的安全性，在这些事故中得到了充分的证明——许多德舰之所以没有遭遇殉爆沉没的惨剧，都应归功于德国发射药通常只是燃烧、很少出现爆炸的优异特性。 |
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发表于 2018-5-25 13:45
发表于 2018-7-8 16:40
发表于 2018-7-12 16:04
