求教，关于南达瓜岛夜战火控失效的原因
最近玩战舰世界好多人在争论巡洋舰对战列舰的威胁到底有多大，对此我感觉南达瓜岛夜战应该是个很有说服力的例子，但是有一点我一直有点搞不太清，南达科他在很短时间内火控失效原因到底是自身设计的小缺陷加上操作失误的成分更大些还是日本巡洋舰的攻击成分更大些？船上的坑货违规操作，结果电路跳闸，电力全失，主要还是操作失当惹的祸。 Go229 发表于 2015-3-23 12:08
船上的坑货违规操作，结果电路跳闸，电力全失，主要还是操作失当惹的祸。 ...
我记得也是这样，不过这个记录的权威出处我并不知道是哪里，不知道你或者其他大佬级的人物有吗 其实最想搞清的问题是巡洋舰与战列舰近距（10km以内）交火时巡洋洗战列舰上层建筑的战术可行性到底有多大 Sunspot2670 发表于 2015-3-23 06:28
其实最想搞清的问题是巡洋舰与战列舰近距（10km以内）交火时巡洋洗战列舰上层建筑的战术可行性到底有多大 ...
屁的可行性
还不如发射鱼雷 STG44突击步枪 发表于 2015-3-23 13:36
屁的可行性
还不如发射鱼雷
我的看法和大佬您差不多，不过那些认为洗甲班有效的人拿出了干货论证他们的想法，我战斗力怕是有限不足以驳倒特来求援，楼下我发一下他们的干货论据 以下为他们的发言：
既然这样上点干货 南达科他在瓜岛损失之后 不是没出 伤害报告 恰巧我找到了
U. S. S. SOUTH DAKOTA
(BB57)
GUNFIRE DAMAGE
BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL
14-15 NOVEMBER, 1942
1 June, 1947
Preliminary Design Section
Bureau of Ships
Navy Department
这篇报告 详细的描述了 战舰的损伤情况 还附有照片
其中有很多你们不想要的东西
SECTION I
SUMMARY
1. During the action off Guadalcanal on the night of 14-15 November 1942, SOUTH DAKOTA was hit by at least 26 projectiles. The most serious material damage was that sustained by electrical wiring circuits. Many interior communication and fire control circuits were severed, particularly in the superstructure where the damage was most extensive. All radio transmitting antennae and all radars, except the one on Main Battery Director II, were rendered inoperative. Short-circuits from this damage caused an overload on the I.C. switchboard which resulted in loss of power on fire control and interior communication circuits throughout the ship for approximately three minutes.
2. Minor flooding resulted from one hit below the waterline and two hits close to the waterline. The list of about 3/4° which developed was removed by shifting fuel oil.
3. Before receiving the first hit, SOUTH DAKOTA experienced electrical difficulties initiated by the shock of Turret III firing astern. Although not the direct result of enemy action, an analysis of this casualty has been included herein because the loss of power to Turret III seriously hampered SOUTH DAKOTA during the action.
4. In spite of numerous hits, SOUTH DAKOTA received only superficial damage. Neither the strength, buoyancy nor stability were measurably impaired.
第一部分摘要 其中第一条明确写到
所有无线电、雷达除了第二主炮指挥仪之外全部失去作用。但是第四条中提到，他的船体结构，航行、转向能力并没有受到实质伤害，也就是说根本不会沉。但是上层建筑的伤害是可怖的。
然后是正题
叙事部分
10. The SG radar was inoperative from 0041 to 0046 which complicated station keeping and detection of new targets. One report of enemy vessels on the starboard bow at a range of 7000 yards had been overlooked in conn while directing fire on targets bearing 112° relative. Radar plot had just finished reporting the enemy bearing 070° relative, range 5800 yards, when SOUTH DAKOTA was illuminated at 0048 by four searchlights on the second ship in the enemy column. This force was reported to be four ships in column on an opposite course. SOUTH DAKOTA identified the first ship as a battleship and the second and third ships in column as cruisers. It is probable that the first ship wasthe battleship KIRISHIMA and the second and third ships the cruisers TAKAO and ATAGO. WASHINGTON opened fire on the leading ship of the enemy column almost immediately. About thirty seconds after illumination, the enemy opened fire concentrating on SOUTH DAKOTA. Simultaneously SOUTH DAKOTA'S secondary battery commenced firing on the illuminatingship. The searchlights were quickly extinguished on the second ship in column and the third ship assumed the task of illumination. SOUTH DAKOTA'S main battery fired two or three salvos at the second ship in column and then shifted to the third ship. The enemy began hitting almost immediately and continued hitting until 0105. Steering and engine control were never lost, but extensive damage was done to radar, radio, fire control and I.C. circuits and instruments. At 0108SOUTH DAKOTA ceased firing when all targets were lost. Enemy fire had already ceased. During the last part of the engagement contact with WASHINGTON was lost. SOUTH DAKOTA therefore withdrew to the 1000 rendezvous as her night-fighting efficiency had been seriously impaired.
“Steering and engine control were never lost, but extensive damage was done to radar, radio, fire control and I.C. circuits and instruments.” 动力和转向没有损坏，但是雷达、火控、电台、IC线路和仪器被广泛破坏。
Hits Nos. 13, 14 and 15
Photos 21, 22 and 23
27. Three hits, estimated to have been 8-inch AP, were made in the starboard bulkhead between frames 83 and 85 from 5 to 8 feet above the third level above the housetop. These projectiles ripped through the transverse passage and the radar plot and out the port side, demolishing the top of the port spray shield between frames 83 and 86. Bulkhead 84 had a 30 by 60-inch hole torn in it and the fourth level above the housetop had a 12 by 18-inch and an 18 by 36-inch hole. The port longitudinal structural bulkhead was perforated by at least five holes about two feet in diameter. All equipment and instruments in radar plot were demolished and a fire was started. In spite of the extensive damage, there is little evidence that these projectiles detonated.
8寸炮打穿舰桥 将雷达测绘台烧毁
Hit No. 23
Photos 31 and 32
33. An estimated 8-inch AP projectile hit the radar antenna of 5-inch director No. 3. Fragments of the windshield and cap head broke off and sprayed the starboard side of the stack hood in the vicinity of frame 89. The projectile pierced the stack hood and continued on through the radar antenna of 5-inch director No. 2.
8寸炮打穿了雷达桅杆
38. The SC-1 radar antenna and mount were shot away and the radar platform was riddled with holes. From the appearance of Photo 39it is probable that the radar was hit by a projectile that detonated on contact.
SC-1 雷达天线和基座被打飞 （不是只有俾斯麦才会打飞电子器件么?)
C. Electrical Damage and Casualties 电气损失和伤亡
41. Extensive damage was done to electrical circuits in the superstructure. The loss of many fire control, interior communication,radio and radar facilities seriously impaired the fighting power of the ship particularly in night actions. The SOUTH DAKOTA Electrical Work List enumerated thirty-five different kinds of circuits needing repairs including such items as renewing all flexible wiring to main battery director No. 1 and to secondary battery director No. 1. From the information available, in most cases electrical damage cannot be associated with specific hits.
大量的上层建筑损坏造成了 火控，内部通信，无线电和雷达设施大量顺坏 导致内部通讯中断
42. The loss of all search radar was a serious handicap to SOUTH DAKOTA. In this regard the Commanding Officer in reference (a) stated:
"The trust and faith in the search radar equipment is amazing. After this ship lost both SG and SC equipment, the psychological effect on the officers and crew was most depressing. The absence of this gear gave all hands a feeling of being blindfolded."
失去了所有的搜索雷达对于南达科塔来说是非常严重的特别是在夜战中
指挥官说道：对于搜索雷达的信赖是非常重要的。当船只失去SG和SC设备之后，整个机关的军官都感到沮丧，因为这使得他们感觉自己成了瞎子。
D. Fires and Firefighting 火灾与消防
起火地点
After end of main deck in the vicinity of catapults
40mm mount No. 2, frame 72 port on first superstructure deck
5-inch loading machine
5-inch director No. 1
1.1-inch clipping room B-0502-M
Radio direction finder room B-0701-CT
Starboard flag bag
Main battery radar transmitting room
Outside Turret No. III
A-206-L
A-207-L
Radar plot B-0801-C
（自行看看这都是什么机关）
51. The fires in the superstructure, although not serious, were difficult to extinguish. Fire hoses had to be led up on the outside of the superstructure from the main deck to the 07 level as many of the ladders were damaged. Also the large number of personnel trapped in the superstructure complicated the firefighting problem. The water used in firefighting accumulated on deck and filled adjacent areas to the levelof the access coamings. Heeling of the ship caused this water to spill over and successively flood the areas below to the level of their access coamings. Lighting transformers on the main and second superstructure decks were partially immersed.
但是南达科他的火灾火势都很小 并没有大面积蔓延 只是由于上层损坏问题 导致消防和通讯阻塞 火势扑灭花费了大量的时间
E. Conclusion
54. Damage to SOUTH DAKOTA did not imperil the ship. Loss of fire control, interior communication and radar facilities seriously impaired her fighting power, particularly in night actions. During the action SOUTH DAKOTA attracted all of the enemy fire so that WASHINGTON was able to sink the Japanese battleship KIRISHIMA practically unmolested.
最重要的部分 结论
损伤并没有危机船只，但是火控系统、通讯系统和雷达的损失严重损害了南达科他的战斗力，特别是在夜战中，南达科他在此次战斗中吸引了大量火力，使得华盛顿号可以无伤害的对日本“雾岛”号战列舰进行攻击。
战斗力怎么样 不用我说 美国人自己有结论
以上引自战舰世界吧armykang的帖子：关于游戏机制和历史向 战舰世界平衡的真的很好 Sunspot2670 发表于 2015-3-23 13:10
我记得也是这样，不过这个记录的权威出处我并不知道是哪里，不知道你或者其他大佬级的人物有吗 ...
南达没有沉没，1942-12-4正式提出的战斗报告里对何时何处因何种原因跳电，影响范围，何时修复，何时又因何种原因操作失误跳电，影响范围大小，又于何时修复，一项一项清清楚楚，这是公开史料，网上一搜便得，何须找什么大佬。 连美国人自己都说南达当时是“又聋，又瞎，又啞”，可没说瘫了，要死了。
南达的战力毫无疑问在作战关键时刻受到影响，虽然位置较低的后主炮指挥仪（包括其上的火控雷达）完好，但是不幸跳闸使得火控线路失能，和绘图计算室联络中断了3分钟，而SG对海搜索雷达也停摆了5分钟，虽然这些都可以恢复，但战斗已经结束，南达除了脱离战场没有其他选择。
至于同样情况是否可以复制，请先要考虑，如果是在大白天，没有雷达也有人眼，被偷袭的机会大吗？就算敌方凭借地形打个措手不及，如果没有主要因操作失误的电力问题，没有火控雷达甚至没有指挥仪，光凭主炮塔的光学测距瞄准和辅助计算机在这么近的距离下其效能也是不低的。同样在夜晚，如果不是在鉄底海峡那种复杂地形，当时的搜索雷达也不会有识别困难，所以近距离偷袭成功是要许多条件配合的，但距离远了命中就快速下降了。 http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/WarDamageReports/WarDamageReportBB57/WarDamageReportBB57.html
南达的战伤报告，里面提到了违规操作的情况 Go229 发表于 2015-3-23 16:14
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/WarDamageReports/WarDamageReportBB57/WarDamageReportBB57.html
南达的 ...
7楼贴出有关战伤的部分内容和这个网址是一致的，楼主去看全文吧。 mathewwu 发表于 2015-3-23 16:13
连美国人自己都说南达当时是“又聋，又瞎，又啞”，可没说瘫了，要死了。
南达的战力毫无疑问在作战关键时 ...
嗯，多谢指导，我抽空仔细看下战斗报告 Go229 发表于 2015-3-23 16:14
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/WarDamageReports/WarDamageReportBB57/WarDamageReportBB57.html
南达的 ...
多谢 mathewwu 发表于 2015-3-23 15:26
南达没有沉没，1942-12-4正式提出的战斗报告里对何时何处因何种原因跳电，影响范围，何时修复，何时又因 ...
求教大佬也是想了解下大佬们的看法～ 本帖最后由 STG44突击步枪 于 2015-3-24 00:54 编辑
Sunspot2670 发表于 2015-3-23 06:43
以下为他们的发言：
既然这样上点干货 南达科他在瓜岛损失之后 不是没出 伤害报告 恰巧我找到了
问题的关键，不在于近程上能造成多大损害，而是怎么接近到近程？
一个瘦子，拿着柄手枪，去板载拿着步枪的大胖子。
这个胖子的步枪这时候恰好出了点故障无法射击。等瘦子好不容易跑完几百米到胖子跟前，放着手枪不用，饱以胖子一顿老拳
这不是二逼么？
STG44突击步枪 发表于 2015-3-24 07:38
问题的关键，不在于近程上能造成多大损害，而是怎么接近到近程？
很多人说 战列舰主炮 命中率非常低整个二战 鱼雷也是魔法鱼雷 丢出去之后命中不命中 命中谁靠信仰 而无论巡洋舰 还是驱逐舰 丢完鱼雷之后 最有效的手段就是炮击 卡拉汉用这种方式以巡洋舰和驱逐舰抽跑阿部 当然有人说 那是美国人狗点子 但是不付出努力 什么点子都没有 卡拉汉如果一开始就怂了 说 你看IJN好像有战列舰 我们撤吧 瓜岛赢的就有可能不是美国人
同样 14号南达向日军开去的时候 IJN的驱逐舰和巡洋舰 可没想 说我们可别开炮 远远丢鱼雷就行了开炮火光被南达看见了 分分钟教我们做人啊事实上如果南达不是被这些巡洋舰和驱逐舰洗了甲板 丧失了大部分战斗力 可能日军的损失要比历史大的多得多
同样在苏里高 首先向山城开火的是美军巡洋舰美军巡洋舰分队并没有说 等后面的战列舰先开火 吸引仇恨 再安心的偷炮输出也没有说 8寸炮 也打不穿咱们找个 好欺负的打吧相反 他们的攻击目标都是山城
还有其他特殊例子就不举了鱼雷是一种致命手段 但是他不是唯一手段 这些勇敢的战舰指挥官 在没有鱼雷手段的情况下 做的几乎都是贴上去打 没有说 赶紧怂 闭炮跑的
对于这些战舰指挥官来说 想的不是 说算一算 伤害划不划得来而是怎么能用手中的武器对敌人造成伤害 而事实证明 这个手段有效
天天算计 划不划的来是做小买卖的 不是军人 armykang 发表于 2015-3-24 09:50
很多人说 战列舰主炮 命中率非常低整个二战 鱼雷也是魔法鱼雷 丢出去之后命中不命中 命中谁靠信仰 而无 ...
你举的例子都是夜战加上狭窄水域！人家上面几楼的回帖早已告诉你这两个特点了！别说战列舰了！就算天顶星战舰投入这种混战一样会被击伤 ssvcrtfi79 发表于 2015-3-24 10:22
你举的例子都是夜战加上狭窄水域！人家上面几楼的回帖早已告诉你这两个特点了！别说战列舰了！就算天顶星 ...
所以这个才是战术是地形和时机的运用 难道战争中 战术变成不必要因素了？ 不能说 你看 这种情况不利于战列舰 那种情况又利于炮战你看另外一种情况又对 某方不利战争当然是这样的 不能总做理想预判 天气又好水域又开阔 通讯又不出问题指挥官又勇敢果断我优势很大 我们又先期发现敌人 我们又首发命中 鱼雷打的也准集火率又高 有命中敌人弹药架 那还打个P啊就算是幸运如 俾斯麦 一炮秒了胡德那你还不允许英国人放剑鱼 你说这是犯规 如果英国人不用飞机 德国人就能赢再说 诺福克狗点子 要不是诺福克一炮废了俾斯麦前指挥仪说不定 胡德的好戏还会重演 那这我就无语了那战争不就小孩过家家么 armykang 发表于 2015-3-24 09:50
很多人说 战列舰主炮 命中率非常低整个二战 鱼雷也是魔法鱼雷 丢出去之后命中不命中 命中谁靠信仰 而无 ...
南达丧失战斗力主要是因为操作失误电力系统故障吧，如果只有巡洋舰驱逐舰洗甲板不至于这么快就丧失战斗力 armykang 发表于 2015-3-24 10:34
所以这个才是战术是地形和时机的运用 难道战争中 战术变成不必要因素了？ 不能说 你看 这种情况不利 ...
俾斯麦能秒罗德尼和KGV？这有点太扯了吧，你以为所有RN战列舰都像胡德一样么